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The Railway Clerks' Association 1919 - 1939 
Abstract
This thesis analyses the history of the Railway Clerks' Association 
between 1919 and 1939. At the beginning of this period the Association 
was the largest and strongest white-collar trade union in the country; 
in 1920 it had recruited nearly 90 per cent of the railway white-collar 
work-force. Although the membership numbers declined after 1920 they 
soon stabilized at 50 to 60 per cent of its potential membership which 
was significantly greater than the overall density of trade union 
membership amongst the male labour force between 1921-1939. At the 
beginning of the period, in 1919, the Association obtained negotiating 
recognition from the railway companies. Even so, it continued to use 
parliamentary methods to influence its members' employers and to sponsor 
its members as parliamentary candidates: at first to gain parliamentary 
influence to further its own aims, later to help with the Labour Party's 
long-term aims. Its best success in this field was in 1929, v^en eight 
members of the Association were elected. It called its members out on 
strike in 1926 - the only white-collar trade union to do this. The 
response from its membership was not overwhelming, but the importance of 
this gesture is that it happened and there was a visible response.
After commenting on theories concerning white collar trade unions, the 
working conditions of railway clerks and the organisation of the 
Association, the thesis discusses, within the framework of Michels' 
theory of organisations, selected aspects of the Association's work: wage 
negotiations, including the negotiations that secured recognition; 
parliamentary and electoral work; the Association's efforts to persuade
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the railway companies to provide better pension funds; its experiences 
during the General Strike; and how it dealt with internal«dissension. 
The thesis concludes with an assessment of the Association as an example 
of a white-collar trade union and the level of organization and 
experience it had achieved by 1939, in relation to the challenge of war 
and its aftermath that the Association was to face.
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SELECT LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
ASLEF
ASRS
The Associated Society of Locomotive 
Engineers and Firmen.
The Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants. (The main precursor of the 
NUR).
' Association* In the text of the thesis the RCA is normally 
referred to as the "Association*.
BL or BM
Cd. or Cmd. 
CLC.
Conciliation
Workers
CWB an NWB
EC
Reference for material held at the 
British Library.
Parliamentary paper.
Central Labour College.
A railway term for workers who 
acquired limited negotiating rights 
in 1907. The grades of workers 
excluded were clerical and supervisory.
Central Wages Board and National Wages 
Board. The two major tribunals set up 
as a result of the 1921 Railways Act. 
Tribunals wfith the same names and much 
the same functions wfere in existence 
for the conciliation staff from 1920,
In 1935, these tribunals wfere 
superseded when new negotiating 
procedures were agreed between the 
railway trade unions and the railway 
companies - RSNC and RSNT.
Executive Committee; usually the 
Association's Executive Committee.
GWR
ILO
ITF
Great Western Railway Company (the 
greater part of this company was known 
by this name before 1921, but it was 
also one of the four large companies 
created as a result of the 1921 
Railways Act).
International Labour Organisation.
International Transport Workers' 
Federation.
LGOC London General Omnibus Company, (part 
of the T. 0. T. ).
L. & Y. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway 
Company (a pre-grouping company),
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LMS.
LNER
LNWR
LPTB
London Midland and Scottish Railway 
Company. (One of the four railway 
companies created as a result of the 
1921 Railways Act).
London and North-Eastern Railway 
Company. (Another of the four railway 
companies created as a result of the 
1921 Railways Act).
London and North-Western Railway 
Company (a pre-grouping company).
London Passenger Transport Board.
(The body created in 1933 when the 
intra-urban passenger transport of 
London was nationalised. )
MSS. 55 and MSS. 55B These are references to the archives of 
the Association held at the Modern 
Record Centre at Warwick University.
NALGO National Association of Local 
Government Officers, later Nationalised 
and Local Government Officers 
Association.
NASMY National Association of Station Masters 
and Yardmasters, previously known as 
NESMA i.e. North Eastern Station 
Masters Association.
NCLC
NER
NUR
Nation Council of Labour Colleges.
North Eastern Railway Company (a pre- 
-grouping company).
National Union of Railwayman. 
1990's, known as the RMT).
(In the
ORT & E Fund Omnibus, Railway and Equipment 
Companies Superannuation Fund ( a 
T. 0. T. fund)
PRO
RCA
Public Record Office.
Railway Clerks' Association, the name 
the Association was known by from 1898 
to 1951, For the first year of its 
existence(1897) it was called: the 
National Association of General Railway 
Clerks.
RCH Railway Clearing House.
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REC Railway Executive Committee. The name of the 
committee of railway managers which 
administered the railway industry during both 
world wars
RPI Retail Price Index.
RSNC & RSNT
T. & G. 
T, 0. T.
These bodies, the Railway Staff 
National Council, and the Railway 
Staff National Tribunal, replaced the 
CWB and the NWB in the negotiating 
procedures which were agreed in 1935.
Transport and General Workers Union.
Trams, Omnibuses and Tubes - the 
popular name given to the London 
Traffic Combine, a group of companies 
which ran intra-urban transport prior
to 1933.
TWF
Unappointed clerks
WEA
WETUC
Transport Workers' Federation.
Railway clerks not awarded permanent 
status. They suffered from a 
number of disadvantages such as not 
being in the pension fund. Their 
numbers declined over the period, from 
656 in 1927 to 411 in 1938. The 
Association constantly pressed for 
their status to be regularised
Workers' Educational Association.
Workers' Educational Trade Union 
Committee.
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Introduction
This thesis deals with the history of the Railway Clerks' Association 
from 1919 to 1939, henceforward referred to as the'Associâtion! It was, 
and is, a 'white-collar' trade union, now the Transport Salaried Staffs 
Association. The period is that of the two peacetime decades between 
the two World Wars, but its boundaries have not been arbitrarily chosen. 
They were landmarks in the Association's history, in that it achieved 
employers' recognition as a negotiating body in 1919 and faced new 
challenges brought by the second World War in 1939.
The Association's inter-war history is presented in terms of five 
topics that were its major preoccupations: wage negotiations; 
parliamentary and electoral activity; the movement to improve pension 
schemes; the Association's experience of the General Strike; and its 
response to internal dissension. Although the Association's membership 
declined from its highest point in 1920, the level it maintained 
afterwards and its industrial behaviour in general does not accord with 
the received wisdom to the effect that white-collar workers' loyalties 
are likely to be divided, in that they have common interests with 
management that compete with their allegiance to fellow workers. This 
implies that any unions they may form are likely to be relatively weak 
and not disposed to militancy.
However, if we consider organisations of clerical vrorkers, and of 
wage earners of similar occupational status in the early 1920's it is 
readily apparent that they did not conform to a single stereotype, but 
rather represented a spectrum of industrial attitudes. Workers in public 
service employment (such as Civil Service clerks and Post Office 
employees) did indeed belong to 'no strike' unions, and the 'guilds' of
- 8 -
bank clerks and similar groups were regarded as friendly to management.
On the other hand, elementary school teachers, distributive trade workers 
(including 'high class' shop assistants in the leading departmental 
stores) and draughtsmen had all by the early 1920's formed unions which 
had affiliated to the TUC and were willing to prosecute strikes(l).
The Association was not, therefore, unique amongst white collar 
organisations and the putative social status of its membership was not a 
particularly relevant factor in explaining its industrial strategy.
Rather, explanations for the Association's characteristic behaviour in 
the period are to be found in attitudes conditioned by its earlier 
history, the degree of organisation it had achieved by 1919, and the 
economic context of railway employment between the wars. These factors 
are specific to the Association and its members' employment.
Although there is a literature on white-collar trade unionism, the 
generalisations it offers have not proved helpful in explaining the 
Association's experience. The remainder of this introduction, 
therefore, begins with discussion of the limitations of the 
literature. There follows a summary of the historical background to the 
Association's character and behaviour at the end of the first World War 
and after. Finally, the introduction provides notes on the 
Association's leading personalities of the time, and of the 
organisational arrangements it had by then established for the conduct of 
its institutional affairs.
A consideration of the literature on white-collar trade unionism 
raises the question of the use of social theory in history.
Sociologists are concerned with explaining the present and predicting the 
future - that is, insofar as they seek to establish the social conditions 
under which particular outcomes are likely. Historians are concerned 
with exposing and explaining the past. If it is considered that the
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present barely exists, that the future is unknowable and that the past is
really all we have to go on, then a social scientist needs to be some
sort of an historian to gather the material on which to ground and test 
his or her theories. But vhat of the theories to be used by historians, 
for historical explanations?
In practice, much of the theory drawn on by social historians has 
been developed by sociologists, and is conditioned by their
preoccupations with the dynamics of social change. Marxist theory is a
major example of one frame of reference through which some sociologists 
have sought to explain ongoing change, not the same enterprise as the 
historian's. A difficulty with discussing much of the social theory 
that has been applied to white-collar unions is that the literature 
represents a number of theoretical perspectives and two opposed academic 
traditions: 'Industrial Relations' and 'Sociology'. They do not coexist 
in harmony, and their criticisms of each other constitute much of the 
content of their contributions to academic journals<2). But it cannot 
be dismissed as academic in-fighting of little significance, especially 
inasmuch as it relates to methodology. Four types of perspective and 
methods are at issue: the industrial relations approach associated with 
George Sayers Bain; the empirical sociological one as used by R. M. 
Blackburn and Kenneth Prandy; the neo-Weberian approach of which David 
Lockwood's work is a seminal example; and the structural-Marxist 
perspective(3). This last is represented by a number of analysts in 
different countries: Rosemary Crompton, Harry Braverman and Nicos 
Poulantzas have been principal exponents.
The work of both Lockwood and Bain covers the relevant period, and 
might be expected to be particularly pertinent to this study.
Lockwood's starting-point was what he described as clerical workers'
'lukewarm' reaction to trade unionism, at least until the outbreak of the
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second World War(4). He explained it by way of a more refined account 
of social structure than that which accords a common proletarian identity 
to workers who share the same market situation, regardless of the type of 
work they do. By taking account of particular market factors that are 
significant for the different types of work even though the market 
situation may be undifferentiated at a very general level, of 
particularities about workplace situations and relationships that govern 
the different workers' daily experience, and of the 'status' dimension of 
socio-economic placings, Lockwood disposes of the argument that clerical 
workers' low level of trade union activity is the product of 'false 
consciousness'. The Association in the 1920s and 1930s did not fit 
Lockwood's stereotype and, indeed, he acknowledged that there are 
atypical examples<5). They do not necessarily invalidate his argument, 
since they may be attributable to differences in the factors that he 
cited as relevant to his refined analysis of class-consciousness. That 
is, the Association may have been an atypical union because its members' 
market situation and workplace experiences were also atypical of clerical 
workers in general. An important question that follows is to do with 
the concept of typicality: on detailed examination, how much common 
experience is there within clerical work as a whole? Lockwood offered 
his work as 'a preliminary statement', acknowledging the need for more 
data: (6) the relevance of the Association's experience is less as a test 
of his theory or something to be explained by it than as an extension of 
the information that can be brought to bear on it.
Bain's comprehensive study of the growth of white-collar unionism is 
an especially useful reference, but its conclusions have little 
application to the case of the Association. His discussion of conceptual 
considerations covers the problem of producing satisfactory definitions 
of ’white-collar workers' and their 'trade unions'. The Association
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comes well within his terms, as an organisation of clerical employees 
defined as a trade union for the purposes of the Department of 
Employment. His tabulation of white-collar unions affiliated to the 
Trade-Union Congress after 1946 divides them into 'purely' and 
'partially' white-collar; the Transport Salaried Staffs Association is in 
the first group(7). Bain amasses much well-organised empirical data 
that is of great value, especially for comparisons, but his conclusion 
that job-regulation is the only variable factor that significantly 
affects trade union activity is contestable, as unacceptably schematic 
and over-restrictive(8), However, his work is addressed to factors 
influencing trade union growth; as the Association's inter-war experience 
was essentially one of consolidation it cannot appropriately be adduced 
in relation to Bain's conclusions and there is no profit in pursuing a 
critique of the conclusions for its own sake.
The method represented in the work of Blackburn and Prandy might be 
called 'nuts and bolts' sociology. It entails distributing 
questionnaires, tabulating the responses and using sophisticated 
mathematical techniques to analyse the results. One difference between 
this method and Bain's is that Bain has used published data, whereas 
Blackburn and Prandy undertake their own investigations. Despite these 
differences of methodology, Bain and others of the 'Industrial Relations' 
school might be expected to see Blackburn and Prandy's work as being 
generally aligned with their perspective; on the contrary, they are 
highly critical. Surprisingly, sociologists who leap to Blackburn's and
Prandy's defence include some whose perspectives and methods are quite 
different. In fact, Crompton's article in a reader edited by Richard 
Hyman and Robert Price contains a rejoinder to criticism of Blackburn and
Prandy by Bain<9>. In that it deals with the present, Blackburn and
Prandy's work is too distant from the 1920s and 1930s to be relevant to
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the present study,
The Marxist-derived theories also have little to offer, for reasons 
succinctly expressed by C. Smith:
"The Marxist approach to the current debate on the new middle class has 
unfortunately been wholly associated with continental structuralism.
This approach is antithetical to empirical investigation and history, and 
although it constantly stresses the central place of class struggle for 
class analysis it effectively subordinates class consciousness, 
experience and action to absolute theoretical structures. If empirical 
reality and history are ignored then the 'testing' of theory becomes an 
exercise in philosophical rationalism"(10).
What is important for present, practical purposes is that 
sociologists' developments of Marxist theory may have little application 
to historians' different problems. Past social changes may not have
been of a kind that Marx predicted, and may also display more complexity 
than Marxist theory can accommodate.
There is one theoretical perspective, of a different order to those 
discussed so far, that has proved valuable: the organisational theory 
developed by Robert Michels. His major work. Political Parties^ was 
published in 1911, translated into English in 1915, and has been 
republished many times since(ll). The reason for this continuing 
interest is that the theory has a tenable explanation for the weakness of 
democratic procedures that is apparent in most of the organised voluntary 
groups which use them. Michels called his theory 'The Iron Law of 
Oligarchy', and formulated it as follows: 'It is organisation which
gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the 
mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators.
Who says organisation says oligarchy' (12). In more straightforward 
terms, in any organisation which has elected officers with any element of 
power, the officers will employ all sorts of practices, fair and unfair, 
to stay elected.
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The first thing to say about this profoundly cynical appraisal of 
voluntary organisations is that it was not written by a 'business union' 
cynic who considered that trade unions have adjusted sensibly to the 
norms of our 'pluralistic', capitalist society and a good thing too.
Prior to writing Political Parties, Michels was active in left-wing ,
politics and had been black-listed by universities in his native 
Germany<13). His intention certainly was not to exult that workers, or 
anyone else for that matter, could not set up truly democratic 
institutions, but rather to warn us not to set our expectations too high 
- and 'too high' is extremely low.
Michels' theory was put to the test in the 1950s by the American 
sociologist, S. M. Lipset, and his colleagues(14). The International 
Typographical Union appeared to be unique in having evolved internal 
political parties which vied with each other for power in the union.
Over the years, the union administration had been controlled by one or 
other of these parties, which had no links with the national political 
parties. Their interest was solely in internal union affairs. The 
union members' work was to set type in the printing workshops of North 
America. It is not too difficult to see how such a party system could 
have arisen amongst such workers(15), spread over such a large area. 
Despite the evidence that the union had a form of vibrant democracy, 
Lipset took the view that the special circumstances which made it unique 
meant that it was of little use as a model for democratic organisation in 
other unions. He concluded that, for most organisations, Michels' theory 
was still vQ^ lid. (There was also some suggestion that the union's 
preoccupation with its internal politics was dysfunctional for the „ 
efficient prosecution of union business).
For present purposes, the theoretical perspectives raised here have 
been considered only instrumentally, in relation to their potential for
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illuminating a particular white-collar union's affairs at a particular 
time. From this point of view, sociological theories are intellectual 
constructs, amongst others, to be applied insofar as they seem likely to 
advance historical understanding. Michels seems to offer the most 
useful theoretical perspective even though, unlike E. M. Forster, he would 
not have given even one cheer for democracy(16). It is not claimed that 
his perspective offers an over-arching explanation for the whole of the 
Association's inter-war experience and behaviour, only that it is 
enlightening about some important aspects of them. It is the general 
category of ' middle-range' and 'low level' theory that, it is here 
argued, is best suited for application to the union's affairs, rather 
than 'grand' theory which might claim to provide an account of the role 
of unions in general, and white-collar unions in particular, within 
society at large. This is not to say that either this thesis or its 
author's interests are narrowly institutional. Rather, the argument is 
that there is at present neither a sufficiently developed body of 'grand 
theory' nor one of empirical data on trade union activity for the thesis 
usefully to address 'grand' issues. This is a reflection on the 'state 
of the art'; work of the order of this thesis is part of the enterprise 
of establishing a body of data which can offer some limited suggestions 
about explaining social affairs, and may in future be part of the grounds 
for more extensive theoretical propositions.
turning to the subject-matter of the thesis itself, it is necessary 
to establish something of the historical background to its account of the 
Association. Founded in 1897, the Association became a different kind 
of union in 1919 and dealt with a different kind of employer from 1939. 
The change in 1919 was a consequence of its recognition for negotiating 
purposes; that of 1939 was due to the Government's taking control of the 
railways for the duration of the war and nationalising them afterwards.
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The Government had also controlled the railways during the first World 
War but had then returned them to the private sector, reorganised into 
four large companies; there had formerly been over a hundred.
In 1919, the Association negotiated what turned out to be a good pay 
settlement. It was able to do so not because the railway managements 
were particularly weak or the Association particularly strong, but 
because inflation and living costs were unprecedentedly high. The cost 
of living began to decline within a couple of years and was never again 
to reach the same heights between the wars. As a consequence of the 
settlement of 1919, railway clerks enjoyed pay that was better than male 
workers' average earnings for most of their working lives(17), The 
settlement included a sliding-scale element, prudently negotiated by the 
railway managements to gear pay to expected reductions in living costs, 
but they were greater than had been allowed for and the effect of the 
sliding scale was limited. Later on, the employers made wage cuts, but 
further falls in the cost of living cushioned railway clerks from their 
full impact(18).
Comparatively high pay was not the only economic advantage that 
railway clerks enjoyed. During the 1920s and 1930s, when many sections 
of the British work-force suffered high levels of chronic unemployment, 
the railway workforce, and especially the clerks, had the benefit of much 
lower levels(19). Finally, the railway white-collar workforce was 
overwhelmingly male, (20) not threatened by recent and contemporary trends 
for clerical work to be identified as 'women's work', and priced 
accordingly. Although there were women clerks they did not infiltrate 
the workforce enough to change its essentially male character. Railway 
clerks' relatively high level of trade union activity between the vrars 
cannot be explained in terms of embattlement against perceived threats to 
their economic status and security. In part, its explanation lies in
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their Association's recent history, and their own involvement in it.
One factor that favoured a more militant attitude than might have 
been expected in white-collar workers is that railway clerks were poorly 
paid before the first World War, both relative to other Workers and by 
reference to the cost of living. The period from 1900 to 1914 was one 
of inflation, mild in comparison to such rates as have been experienced 
in the latter part of the present century, but severe in terms of 
prevailing, low levels of cash wages, (21) very vulnerable to small 
increases in inflation. Railway clerks' pay varied from £78 8s Od a year 
with the Great Central Railway Company to £108 1 Is Od for the London and 
South Western Railway Company(22), In 1910 the British Association 
published figures that the Railway Clerks' Association - always keen to 
demonstrate its members' unfavourable position relative to other white- 
collar workers' - seized on eagerly and disseminated widely(23), 
Reproduced at Appendix IV, they give the proportions of non-manual 
workers in various industries whose annual pay exceeded £160. Only 
10.34 per cent of 'railway clerks and officers' were represented, as 
against a range of 22.22 per cent to 46. 15 per cent for the other eight 
categories of workers in the schedule.
The railway companies not only paid their employees badly, but also 
treated them high-handedly. They justified their attitude by reference 
to a theory that railway operations needed a mode of military 
discipline(24). They disapproved of trade union activity, especially 
for white-collar grades. Occasionally, the Association asked Labour 
Members of Parliament to put pressure on railway managements to moderate 
their behaviour: there was scope for Parliamentary action insofar as
railway development entails the frequent passage of private Acts of 
Parliament, which can be obstructed(25).
These were the main conditions under which the Association became
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comparatively militant in its early, formative years. They need to be 
highlighted at this point, to support the argument that the Association's 
behaviour when its members became relatively prosperous can to some 
extent be explained in terms of attitudes carried over from recent, 
harder times. It is better understood in the context of the following 
sketch of the Association's development before and during the first World 
War. The Association's continuous history dates from May 1897, and has 
been investigated by Adrian Tranter, whose work should be referred to for 
a fuller account of the early period<26).
The railway industry has two types of white-collar workers: those 
\idio work on stations, in goods yard and in train depots, and clerks v^o 
work in vAiat used to be known as 'managerial offices'(27). The working 
conditions of 'station clerks' were peculiar to the railways;
'managerial clerks' had a work experience more like the general run of 
office work. Prior to the first World War, when the Association's 
membership was low, its Executive Committee reported difficulty in 
recruiting clerks in 'managerial offices'(28), implying that 'station 
clerks' were easier to recruit. This is not surprising, in view of 
railway operational staff's unusual working conditions. Their small 
work-groups, employed several miles apart and scattered over the country, 
consisted of majorities of manual workers and smaller numbers of white- 
collar workers(29). In such small, semi-closed communities the manual 
workers might have been expected to have a strong influence on the white- 
collar workers embedded in their midst(30). It should be noted that G.
S. Bain, whose work has already been cited, has resisted other writers' 
observations that white-collar workers are more likely to join unions if 
they work in close proximity to unionised manual workersOl). On the 
other hand, as has been suggested in this introduction's discussion of 
Lockwood's work, the limitations of white-collar unions' recorded
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histories mean that all generalisations about them must be treated with 
reserve. ,
Before the first World War, the manual workers' union, the 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (ASRS)(32) had a number of 'all­
grade movements'. This term was used for periods of planned industrial 
activity, which included recruiting campaigns and attempts to obtain 
improved pay and conditions for all the union's members. They were so- 
named because the railway companies attempted to weaken the industrial 
weight of their work-force by insisting on separate negotiations for each 
grade of staff. 'All-grade movements' dated back to the 1880s(33), but 
the two that are important for the present argument occurred In 1907 and 
in 1911. The movement of 1907 led to the first conciliation scheme, 
that is, a rather limited system of negotiating rights. Only railway 
manual workers obtained these rights, clerical and administrative staff 
were excluded; the 'all-grades movement of 1911 culminated in the first 
national railway strike(34). Railway clerks were not directly involved 
in either, but the increased industrial activity appears to have improved 
recruitment for their Association, very likely because most of its 
potential members were 'station clerks'(35); see Table 1.
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Table 1
Railway Clerks' Association; Membership Statistics.
Year Branches Membership
1903 53 4, 034
1904 59 4, 666
1905 67 4, 129
1906 86 6,277
1907 120 10,114
1908 114 8, 043
1909 124 8, 457
1910 132 9, 476
1911 173 16,903
1912 191 19, 151
1913 212 25,791
1914 233 29,394
(Sources: TSSA Annual Report, 1976; MSS. 55B/1/EC/16/5863)
This table shows that the Association at first could not maintain a 
stable growth. Its establishment of a man and boy in Doncaster(36) had 
not been able to maintain the membership of four-and-a-half thousand 
recruited by the end of 1904 so it is not surprising that the the 
momentum of the 1907 surge could not be sustained, By 1911, the 
Association had a London office and a full-time staff that held on to the 
increased membership and systematically built up from it. Increased 
membership means an increase in subscription revenue, so more full-time 
workers can be employed and more members serviced. A launching-pad of 
resources had to be established for the increased membership to be 
consolidated as the base for further progress.
In March 1914 the Association's head office in London was completely 
reorganised, not because its Executive foresaw the opportunities for
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recruitment that the War would bring, but in consequence of its recent 
purge of syndicalists, including an assistant secretary(37). The
Association's subscription income of £1,000 per month could support a 
fairly large head office establishment:(38) General Secretary, Chief 
Assistant Secretary, 3 Assistant Secretaries, 3 Leading Clerks, 4 Boy 
Clerks and Messengers(39).
This well-ordered establishment enabled the Association to take full 
advantage of the general increase in trade union membership, a feature of 
both World Wars Wiich, for the first, was sustained until the long and 
painful period of inter-war unemployment began in 1921(40). The 
Association's membership then stood at 87,054(41) which, taking the 
Association's own estimate of its constituency as 100,000(42), was very 
close to a density of 90 per cent. It was not able to sustain this 
membership; in 1921 it was 60, 264^  and the following year (1922^ 51,367. The 
decline was thought to have been caused by a doubling of the membership 
subscription,and when^ three rates were introduced in 1923, membership 
rose again until 1925^ v^en it was 66,130. Every union which took part 
in the General Strike lost members; by 1927 the Association's membership 
was down to 50,208. Unlike other unions, the Association mounted a 
campaign to increase its membership and it continued to rise until the 
beginning of the War in 1939, when it stood at 64,389(43)
Before the first World War, the Association was generally considered 
to be a non-striking trade union(44). This characteristic seems to have 
been less a matter of principle than of circumstance. As long as the 
Association recruited only a small proportion of potential members, the 
leadership appears to have considered that its scope for industrial 
militancy was limited. The Association was, of course, also 
concentrating its energy on increasing the size and scope of its 
organisation. When its size became significant and the end of the War
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looked like bringing new and apparently intractable difficulties, the 
Executive began to think that a more militant policy was indicated. In 
1915 it was decided to increase members' subscriptions by over 160 per 
cent, to create a strike fund(45),
It must be emphasised that the militancy which was proposed was 
industrial, rather than political, and the distinction is between the 
different ends - that is^  political or industrial-to which militancy might 
be addressed; it can be characterised as 'Labourist*. Excursions into 
activity not approved by the Labour Party or the Trades Union Congress 
(TUC) would not have been entertained as Association policy. Here are 
three examples from 1919 when* by common consent, working-class militancy 
was exceptionally high(46). First, the Executive would not agree to 
call a one-day strike to mark May-day(47); second, \^en Goole branch 
asked if the Association was joining in the strike on 1 August that was 
called to protest against conscription and secret war documents, 
the Executive said it was not(48); and third, when London Bridge Head 
Office branch asked if the Association supported the 'Hands off Russia' 
strike on July 20th and 21st, the Executive replied that as it was not 
yet Labour Party policy, neither was it the Association's(49). These 
examples illustrate the Association's political and industrial stance in 
1919; they need to be considered in relation to its decision-making 
structures and personnel.
The General Secretary over practically the whole period covered by 
this thesis was A. G. Walkden, later Lord Walkden, who took office in 
1906 at the age of thirty three(50). The Association's establishment on 
the eve of the first World War, with its secretaries, clerks and 
messengers, shows that Walkden had by then instituted an orthodox 
administrative hierarchy for conducting the Association's business; one 
of its members deserves special attention. This was George Lathan, born
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in 1875 and almost Walkden's exact contemporary(51)< The two men worked 
amicably for twenty five years with Lathan never allying himself with the 
'palace revolts' that happened from time to time.
The Association's formal organisation consisted of five elements, as
it still does: branch, annual conference (or special delegate
conference), executive committee, general secretary and head office, and 
divisional councils.
The basic element is the Branch. Every member must belong to one,
and only a branch can send delegates and resolutions to an annual of
special delegate conferences.
Since the end of the first World War the Annual Conference has met 
for a week in mid-May, at a seaside resort; conferences were formerly in 
inland cities. Special Delegate Conferences can be called at any time 
by the Executive Committee or a substantial number of branches. In 
practice, they have been called by the Executive to demonstrate vdiat 
backing there has been for a strike or a wage demand, or to discuss an 
important topic which has just arisen. Delegate conferences, and most 
particularly the Annual Conference, are the Association's supreme formal 
authority, but the evidence suggests that, in practice, much power 
resides in informal procedures .
The Executive Committee is elected by regions, into which the 
branches are organised. It is empowered to take all important 
decisions, including decisions on strike action, but it usually calls a 
delegate conference if it needs to assess membership support. It 
usually meets once a month, but may meet more frequently if occasion 
demands.
The General Secretary is appointed by the Annual Conference, usually 
for the rest of his working life. He is the most important official of 
the Association, and has the right to speak at any of its conferences and
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at the Executive Committee, but he has no vote. He is supported by the 
staff of the Association's head office, which is under his control.
The foregoing arrangements all date from the Association's 
foundation, but divisional councils came later. Their boundaries are 
coterminous with the regions and their function is to supervise the 
branches in the regions, concentrating on any that seem to be falling 
apart, or have a number of members who are in arrears with their 
subscriptions, or are backsliding in any other way. They are supposed to 
meet only two or three times a year, but may set up special sub­
committees that meet more often. . Their powers do not override those of 
the branches, and they have to be careful not to duplicate the branches' 
functions. For example, they may not take up a position on resolutions 
to Annual Conferences. This particular issue was settled in 1925, when 
Maidenhead Branch wanted to submit a resolution to Annual Conference 
which criticized the General Secretary and which the North-West London 
Divisional Council wanted to support. It was told that it had no powers 
to do so(52).
Although the Annual Conference is in theory the supreme authority, 
there have been occasions when one has passed a resolution which the 
Executive and General Secretary have circumvented. As implementation is 
up to them, it is possible for them to subvert the will of the Annual 
Conference by delay. A year's procrastination can result in the 
contentious resolution being overturned at the next Annual Conference. A 
group that is in session throughout the year can frustrate the wishes of 
a body that meets only once a year no matter v^at is the formal 
relationship between them.
A good example is the way workers' education was handled in the 
early 1920's; it is discussed in Chapter ,6* In short, it began with a 
resolution of the Annual Conference of 1920 in connection with a
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particular educational organisation; the Executive Committee continued to 
support a rival organisation and did not implement the resolution of 
1920, which was negated two years later at another conference mainly 
because the Executive managed to muddy the water. Resolutions aligned 
with that of 1920 continued to be submitted to conferences for several 
years after 1922.
If real power does not lie with the Annual Conference, does the 
Executive Committee make all the binding decisions? On the whole it 
does, but there are occasions when a sizeable minority on the Executive 
has to be circumvented. There was such an occasion at the beginning of 
the first World War, when a strong faction in the Labour Movenent 
disapproved of the War, ^ilst there was also great enthusiasm for it 
that represented much working-class feeling(53). The Association was as 
subject to this dissension as was any other institution that reflected 
different tendencies in the Labour Movement. The General Secretary 
discovered that the Wartime organisation of the railways would mean 
limited recognition for the Association, but he also appears to have been 
an initial 'War enthusiast'. War was declared on 4 August 1914, but 
there was no wartime meeting of the Association's Executive until the 
19th September; there had been a conference of white-collar workers a 
week earlier. The members of the Executive who opposed the War found 
themselves in a minority; their valid complaints that, contrary to 
Association policy, members were being encouraged to do other people's 
work, that the General Secretary had worked with Conservatives in 
recruiting campaigns, and that an emergency executive committee meeting 
should have been called all found little support. The General Secretary 
said he had worked all the time in consultation with the President and 
the Treasurer(54). So, perhaps this is all that is needed to run the 
Association for a while. Eventually there has to be a meeting of the
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Executive, but the control exercised by those in authority, including the 
permanent officials, may ensure that its timing is the most propitious 
for their own purposes. The 'anti-war' minority on the Association's 
Executive had weakened somevbat by mid-September of 1914.
The instances cited here are not claimed to be typical of behaviour 
in the Association; but they illustrate how its formally democratic 
structures and procedures could be manipulated. At the same time, they 
also illustrate how the Association moved into the inter-war period with 
a well-established organisational structure, and a sound administration 
controlled by an experienced and respected General Secretary under whose 
leadership it had recruited an impressively large membership, perhaps the 
highest proportion of its possible constituency that could ever have been 
hoped for. If there was to be militancy, the organisational conditions 
for it could not have been better.
Militancy is a portmanteau term which we need to unpack. It can 
refer both to a willingness to use strike action in the normal course of 
industrial relations and the resort to strike action for political 
reasons. In the immediate post-war period the Labour Movement evinced 
both types of militancy and both were evident in the ranks of the 
Association. Political militancy had not been unknown before the first 
World War - there had been a minority of industrial syndicalists 
associated with the Sheffield branch - and what was novel about the 
situation at the end of the War was a widespread rank and file 
willingness to strike in pursuit of wage claims or for other industrial 
reasons (such as trade union recognition). During the onset of the 1921 
depression, many members - it would appear - became more reluctant to 
strike* and the Association's Executive seemed to be out of step with 
this new-found caution of the membership. While the E.G. remained 
relatively industrially militant, its political moderation (and its
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unwillingness to contemplate strikes for political ends) were 
unquestioned. As we shall see, it successfully deflected a move on the 
part of a majority of conference delegates to sponsor a scholarship at 
the Marxist Central Labour College.
The Association's response to post-war conditions will be examined 
in the context of managements' parallel responses. On the one hand was 
the new disposition towards militancy, supported by a high level of 
organisation and official recognition; on the other, relative economic 
security and the likely concomitant impulse to conserve what was gained, 
to trim and conciliate, with the object-lessons of other workers' 
misfortunes ever present. In the event, the Association presents a case 
study of a trade union which, for a time, had an executive more militant 
than its members(55): perhaps an unusual circumstance but one that is
not necessarily unique, and worth examining for the light it may throw on 
theories, generalisations and received opinion about the behaviour of 
organised labour.
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Chapter 1
WORKING CONDITIONS and NEGOTIATING MACHINERY; the BACKGROUND
This chapter outlines the background to the Association's activities 
between the wars; its members working conditions, and the negotiating 
machinery that was set up at the beginning of the period. Conditions 
will first be examined as they were prior to the first World War, when 
there were over a hundred railway companies, although only a dozen or so 
were important; conditions in 1919 were much as they had been since the 
turn of the century. Changes that occurred in 1919-1920 will then be 
considered, under three headings: pay, working hours and working
accommodation. The chapter ends with an account of the Railway Act of 
1921, which sets the scene for the rest of the period.
Working Conditions before 1914
Although there were a number of railway companies, there was little 
difference between them in the way they treated their clerks. As the 
table at Appendix IV shows, by comparison with clerks in commerce, the 
professions and government railway clerks were badly paid, although their 
salaries were, probably, comparable to clerks^in manufacturing 
industry(1). Whereas between 22 and 47 per cent of eight other 
categories of clerks earned over £160 a year, only 10. 34 per cent of 
railway clerks did so - and for the purposes of the table they include
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chief and district officers and stationmasters(2). Thousands stayed on 
£80 for years, The North-Eastern, in 1905, paid sixty-two per cent of its 
total salaried staff less than £100 and ninety-five per cent less than 
£200(3). These rates were increased during 1910 -1912, but only to deal 
with the inflation of that period. During the War there were periodic 
war bonuses to cope with wartime inflation, but the basic wage remained 
the same.
This was the generality, but there were two groups of clerks whose 
lots were different; one \me betteij the other was worse. Operating 
clerks - telegraph clerks, booking clerks and other clerks working at 
stations and depots - had worse conditions. Their pay was at the lower 
end, about £95-£100, and they had to work longer hours to earn it, 
usually a ten-hour day. But they often worked longer unpaid overtime and 
they worked alternate Sundays. The other group worked normal office 
hours (rather longer than office hours in general) and were better paid 
than most railway clerks. Some were better paid than other commercial 
clerks. These were clerks who worked in central London, where there was 
competition for clerical labour. The Railway Clearing House near Euston 
station was one of the largest railway offices, before the first World 
War. Although the earnings of most of the clerks there were also in the 
low range (£90-£100), a few reached £200 and four heads of department 
were paid £450(4).
As to working hours^the main divide was between operating clerks and 
the others. As explained above, operating or station clerks worked the 
longest hours(5). Other clerks worked a fortyeight-hour week, sometimes 
with Saturday as a half-day but normally with no work on Sundays. One of 
the first campaigns undertaken by the Association was for clerks to be 
paid extra for Sunday work and for overtime. It had some success(6).
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Railway Clearing House Clerks were paid for their periodic overtime, but 
not as a right; the Clearing House usually decided to grant it as a 
favour. In 1862, for example, a rate of 8d per hour had been granted: 
more than the rate paid to junior clerks, but less than that paid to 
other clerks<7),
Operating clerks had twelve days' paid holiday and Clearing House 
clerks had a fortnight. Bagwell has said, "there is no ^
indication in the records as to whether they were paid for those weeks of 
absence", but other evidence suggests the clerks had some pay for sick 
leave and holidays(8).
Before the first World War, railway office accommodation was 
considered poor(9). The majority of railway buildings had been erected 
in the middle of the nineteenth century when most of the expansion of the 
railway system took place. In 1911, the Association sponsored a Railway 
Offices Bill. It received a first reading, but appears to have proceeded 
no further(10). Its interest is that the reforms it proposed are so 
modest that existing conditions must have been very poor indeed. The 
aspects it was hoped to reform were; first, appearance and sanitary 
condition of offices; second, overcrowding; and third,better provision 
of washing places and lavatories.
Among the suggestions under the first were that if an office had 
not been painted within seven years it should be white-washed and that 
floors and windows should be thoroughly cleaned every seven days. Under 
the second, three types of office were considered;
(a) only occupied during the daytime hours; for thëse it suggested 
that the minimum accommodation should be 800 cubic feet per person;
(b) occupied continuously both day and night; here the minimum 
suggested figure was 1,600 cubic feet;
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<c) underground offices; here the suggested minimum was 2000 cubic 
feet.
These are modest standards and railway offices must have been 
overcrowded if they represented improvements. It was also suggested 
that all underground offices should be closed by 1 January 1915. The 
better provision of lavatories and washplaces were specified as one of 
each for every 25 people working or in attendance at any office.
The End of the War and Real Improvements
This chapter's introductory summary of working conditions up to the 
end of the first World War has been presented to illustrate how drastic 
were the improvements which came after.
The first was at the, beginning of 1919. The other railway trade
unions - the National Union of Railwayman (NUR) and the Associated
Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) had been pressing for
a shorter working day for a number of years. As the War reached its 
end, they began to use a new argument: when the enormous body of armed
forces which had been created during the War was demobilised there would 
be widespread unemployment if no special provisions were made for ex- 
servicemen's absorption into civilian life. One way to make some room 
for them would be to reduce the working day. Nobody on the government 
or the managerial side of the fence appears to have used this argument, 
but there was general concern about the effects of démobilisât ion(11).
In the event, the reform that the trade unions had been urging, at least 
since 1890, became widespread throughout industry during 1919(12). For 
the railways, an agreement was signed that an eight-hour day should come
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Into operation on 1 February 1919(13). This had an immediate effect on 
'station' clerks' conditions, but little or none on those of clerks in 
other offices that the Association called 'managerial offices'.
A general note should be entered here. Prior to the first World 
War, negotiation between workers and management were conducted on a 
company basis, but the War Bonus negotiations followed the railways' 
wartime nationalisation and covered the whole industry. This industry­
wide basis was used for all subsequent negotiations.
The effect of postwar changes in clerks' hours is clearer from the 
'Memorandum of Agreement' which was published on March 1st, 1920(14).
From that date, clerks working a day which fell between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. 
would work five long days and one half day; their total rostered hours 
would be 48. Station clerks were to have an eight-hour day and a 48- 
hour week, with no rest day during the week and a quota of Sundays 
depending upon the station where they worked. One group of clerks did 
have a set rest day; those on continuous night duty, who were to have a 
day off in every ten, as far as possible. If nobody could be found to 
work that night, they were to have an extra day's pay. So a night clerk 
could work continuously, but would have the compensation of an extra 
day's pay for every ten worked.
Post-War Pay
The post-war pay agreement is also detailed in the Memorandum.
There was now a set payment for Sunday work and overtime. Work on a 
Sunday was to be paid at the rate for an ordinary day plus two thirds of 
that rate. Overtime was to be paid at the ordinary rate plus a half.
There were six classes of clerk; 57. 2 per cent of clerks were in
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the lowest, Class V(15), Their pay varied from £80 per annum at the age 
of 18 to £200 on reaching 31. For the four grades of clerk above class 
V there were successive increases, with maximum pay at £350 in Class I.
A few clerks - 2.6 per cent - were classed as 'Special Grade' and earned 
more than £350.
This was a better deal, even for Class V clerks, than had been 
envisaged; a more detailed account is provided in Chapter; 2; on wage 
negotiations. Class V clerks had only to progress a little up their age 
scale to earn more than the average manual wage. Added to that, the 
agreement was made at a time of high inflation and within eighteen months 
the cost of living dropped considerably, enhancing the real value of the 
pay increases. At the same time unemployment rose to over a million and 
stayed at that level or higher for the whole of the interwar period.
There was little unemployment amongst railway clerks.
In a period of high unemployment, anyone in a secure job with a 
slightly better than average pay is in a strong economic position.
Railway clerks were not prosperous between the wars, but their relative 
economic position was better than it had ever been before.
Working Accommodation
The improvement of offices and the erection of new buildings are 
likely to be more onerous undertakings than the improvement of wages and 
the lessening of the working day, and the railway companies were 
financially stretched. Between the wars they undertook only such 
building ^ r k  as was considered to be absolutely necessary to ensure - 
efficient working and keep within their legal constraints. During the
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1930s, money did become available to the railway companies for capital 
work, although the bulk of it was taken up by the Southern Railway for 
its electrification scheme(lG). However, judging by the present 
appearance of the stations affected by this scheme it involved a 
considerable amount of rebuilding. Victorian buildings must by this time 
have been presenting problems for efficient working and the railway 
managers may have favoured their rebuilding on these grounds alone, v A 
number of government policies pushed money in the railway s'direction and 
are likely to have influenced decisions to rebuild. In particular, one 
result of the Local Government Act of 1929 was that the railways did not 
need to pay such a large sum In rates (17), and rearmament in the late 
19305^ 3 meant extra revenue.
The 1921 Railway Act
During 1919, railway clerks' hours and pay were improved, but they 
had to wait until the 1921 Railway Act for negotiating rights.
Previously, they had no such rights, only privileges grudgingly granted.
Prior to the war, the only representative positions generally 
available for railway clerks were as staff representatives on pension 
funds. Some companies had "conciliation boards and similar conferences" 
(18) which catered for railway clerks, but they appear to have been very 
limited and local. By the start of the War, Association members held 
most of the staff positions available in connection with pension funds, 
but if railway clerks wanted their pay or conditions improved they could 
only ask the railway management to receive a deputation. Trade union 
officials could not be on such deputations; they could only stay on hand 
to advise the delegates outside their meetings with railway managersCi4).
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The 1921 Railway Act changed this, but also had other far-reaching 
consequences for industrial relations in the railway industry. At the 
end of the first World War, many members of the coalition government 
which was then in power had been converted to the idea that government 
control of the railway system should continue into peacetime(20). The 
railway system had been taken over at the beginning of the War and it was 
difficult to see how the ensuing reorganisation could be unscrambled into 
the original hundred or so pre-war companies. The statutory instrument 
that was meant to nationalise the railways and other national utilities 
was the Ministry of Transport Bill of 1919(21), which, as presented, 
included powers for the Minister to nationalise a transport undertaking 
simply by an 'order in Council'. This power, amongst important others, 
was lost during the bill's five-and-a-half months in the House of 
Commons. The explanation seems to be that whilst the wartime coalition 
government was not averse to collectivist policy in the interests of 
efficiency, the mainly Conservative House of Commons elected after the 
war would brook no such thing as the nationalisation of a transport 
undertaking (22). After the emasculation of the Ministry of Transport 
Act, the 1921 Railway Act could not go beyond reorganizing the railway 
industry (23).
Under that Act, Great Britain's many railway companies were 
reorganised into four large ones (24). This was about as much 
disaggregation as was compatible with the railways' continued efficiency, 
after the thorough-going wartime reorganization.
The main burden of the Act, a feature which was to bedevil the economy 
of the railway industry for years, was its assumption that the industry 
would keep its virtual monopoly of long-distance carriage. Instead, the
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railways suffered from strong competition from road haulage and some of 
the Act's provisions hindered the industry's efforts to achieve economic 
viability. This was important for the Association, because inefficiency 
in the industry could mean reduced pay for the Association's members or 
even their dismissal. However, although this aspect of the Act was 
important in conditioning the climate for subsequent n e g o t w h a t  was 
of immediate and different practical importance were the negotiating 
rights and other workers' rights bestowed by the Act. They are to be 
found in the third schedule and also in the fourth part of the Act.
Reorganizing a hundred or more companies into four large ones may 
not affect many workers who remain at the same locations doing the work 
they have always done, but others - some senior and some not - will 
suffer much disruption and even risk dismissal, regardless of their good 
employment records. Such employees' rights were protected under the 
third schedule of the Railway Act.
This schedule was not in the first draft of the Billg 
It was devised by three representatives of the Association's interests: 
its solicitor W. R. Southeard; W. Graham, whose services as an M. P. it 
retained; and its Chief Assistant Secretary, G. Lathan. They persuaded 
the Government to incorporate it into the Act(25); this was possible 
because there was a certain amount of 'horse-trading' at one stage of its 
passage through parliament. The Government wanted worker-directors 
included on the boards of the new companies, but neither the railway 
managers nor the railway trade unions wanted them. In return for the 
unions agreeing to combine with them in resisting the idea of worker- 
direct ors the railway managers accepted the machinery of negotiation in 
the fourth part of the Act and the third schedule(26),
After the amalgamation of railway companies, Lathan looked after the
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interests of members of the Association who experienced problems arising 
from the Act. With his special knowledge of the third schedule, he was 
able to handle them successfully over a number of years<27).
The Machinery of Negotiation was based on a system which had been in 
use for some years by manual railway workers, so it was not completely 
untried. As can be seen from Appendix V, it was a hierarchical system 
with five levels, representing different levels of complexity and 
importance. For example, wage claims for the whole of the railway 
workforce were generally taken to the Central Wages Board. When - as was 
most likely - a claim could not be settled it would be passed on to the 
National Wages Board. This illustrates two functions of the hierarchy; 
it provided for the level at which negotiations should start on any 
issue, and also for the transmission upwards should the issue not be 
settled at the lower level. In theory, a minor matter introduced at a 
Local. Departmental Committee might, because of disagreements, find its 
way up to the National Wages Board, although that would be very unlikely. 
Two other points about this machinery of negotiation should be mentioned. 
One is that the chairman of the National Wages Board was nominated by the 
Minister of Labour(28) and was usually a distinguished lawyer. The 
first one was Sir William Mackenzie; the account in Chapter 2 notes how 
he was called in to arbitrate on two points of dispute between the 
Association and the employers, the first one before the Association had 
any formal negotiating machinery to use(29).
The other point is that there were five sectional councils for the 
five main groups of railway workers. This was not a simple ' divide-and- 
rule* policy. Different groups were acknowledged to have different 
kinds of problems; engine- drivers' problems, for example, are different 
to those of clerks. Different groups' problems may be capable of
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settlement at a low and specialized level only to be passed on if 
settlement is not achieved or if the problems are found to have a wider 
applicability.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented the C o  conditions of railway clerks' work 
prior to the first World War and immediately after it. During the War, 
their conditions altered very little. Their pay had risen as a result 
of the ' war bonus' introduced in response to wartime inflation, but it 
was intended only as a temporary expedient and may even have tended to 
lag behind increases in living costs. The year 1919 was crucial for 
railway clerks. Some of them got a shorter working day, there was 
recognition for their trade union and a moderately reasonable pay 
agreement. The 1921 Railway Act gave them their first negotiating 
rights, but it saddled their employers, with out-of-date regulations which 
limited their ability to compete with other forms of long distance 
transport.
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WAGE NEGOTIATIONS 1919 - 1939 
Introduction
The Association could never have maintained its membership had it not 
devoted a large part of its resources to improving and defending members' 
pay. Prior to the first World War, the Association's experience of wage 
negotiations was all gained at one remove, in advising deputations of 
members representing their own interests to employers; once the war was 
over and the Association had obtained recognition, it negotiated at first 
hand. And, as things turned out, negotiations were continuous until the 
outbreak of the second World War. The Association's other 
preoccupations were always pursued against a background of ongoing wage 
negotiations.
As far as wages were concerned, the interwar decades fell into three 
distinct periods for the Association. An immediate postwar phase, 
ending in the third quarter of 1920, was productive for improvement in 
pay, but was followed by a long period, extending into 1937, when all the 
emphasis was on defending what had been achieved both by way of wages and 
negotiating procedures. A second expansionist phase began in 1937 and 
lasted until it was overtaken by the beginnings of wartime conditions in 
1939.
The two short periods favourable for improvementc in pay and
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conditions were, predictably, propitious for recruitment and membership 
increased during them. Even so, it remained fairly stable for most of 
the interwar years, which suggests that members appreciated the 
Association's strategies of containment through a difficult time. It
was helped by a relatively low cost of living; the wage negotiations of 
1919 were successfully concluded when inflation was high and their 
beneficiaries were well paid, relative to the average worker, throughout 
the succeeding depression. Realising this, and responding to economic 
problems that were both national and industry-specific, the railway 
managements embarked on cutting railway workers' pay.
Because the cuts threatened all railway workers, the three railway 
unions combined to oppose and minimise them, and to negotiate them away 
as soon as possible. Their alliance was also useful when managements 
introduced a new 'boss-friendly' negotiating machinery; the unions 
opposed it as long as possible and then worked hard to modify its 
procedures, making them more neutral.
The alliance was sustained through the hard times vdien all railway 
workers shared the same problems, but began to break up vdien real 
improvements in workers' pay and conditions once more looked possible.
The different occupational groups had different demands and concepts of 
improved conditions; sectional interests became predominant and, as the 
second World War approached, the alliance's significance declined.
The chapter's detailed account is chronological and starts with the 
initial negotiations which secured the Association's recognition. The 
subsequent phases of negotiations are discussed in the context of the 
economic changes that conditioned them, leading to different emphases of 
interest from time to time. The two unions with which the Association 
allied were the NUR and ASLEF; unlike the Association they were 
recognised by the employers before the first World War and, by 1919, they
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had some years' experience of conducting negotiations through a formal 
system that was the basis for the 'Machinery of Negotiation' set up under 
the Railway Act of 1921. The arrangements that were then established are 
set out in Appendix U and discussed in Chapter 1. The absence of formal 
arrangements for the Association before 1922, and the nature of those 
that applied thereafter, need to be borne in mind as the background to 
the continuous story that began in 1919.
Achieving Recognition: Wartime Experience and the Success
of 1919
The the Association was not recognised by the railway companies 
before the first World War, so it was something of a breakthrough v^en 
W. Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, called the Association's 
General Secretary into consultation about railway affairs in 1914(1).
This was tantamount to recognition, at least for wartime.
The government had taken control of the railways and appointed a 
committee of railway managers to administer them: the Railway Executive 
Committee (REC). The limits of such recognition as was represented by 
the meeting at the Board of Trade were revealed in 1915, when wartime 
inflation made wage increases necessary. Negotiated between the REC and 
the two unions ASLEF and the NUR, the increases were known as 'war 
bonus', implying that once peacetime conditions returned there would be a 
reconsideration. The Association was not invited to take part in the 
negotiations, (2) and rather blusteringly played down its exclusion in the 
pages of the Railway Clark, The received wisdom at the time was that 
there should be periodic negotiations on the war bonus, so that it would 
to move in line with inflation. The establishment of regular
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negotiations could serve as incentive to trade unions' recruitment; and 
the Association stood to lose out in this side effect and, at first, 
responded to the new situation by trying to play down the implications of 
its exclusion. But its bluster soon slackened with the realisation that 
the increase in trade union membership was general. (3) The war bonus 
negotiations were a watershed; wage negotiations formerly took place 
between a union or a deputation of employees and any one of the hundred 
or so separate railway companies; from now on they were all national. It 
was one more sign that the pre-war railway administration was doomed.
The Association's membership continued to rise sharply; 1913,
25,791; 1914* 29,394; 1915, 42,654; 1916, 49036; 1917, 58,661; 1918,
71, 441;(4). The Association estimated its constituency as 100,000(5), 
which meant it had recruited nearly three-quarters of its possible 
members. It decided to press more strongly for recognition. The REC 
was approached and the Association soon found out the new sticking-point. 
The railway managers were prepared to negotiate with it for ordinary 
clerks, but not for the supervisors vdio administered them, that is^ 
station-masters and the more senior clerks.(6) The REC had an 
ostensibly strong case, because the principle of common representation 
for supervisors and those they supervised had never been conceded. It 
was thought unlikely that the Association would organise enough support 
to overturn the strongly entrenched objections to it.
Common representation that includes supervisory or managerial grades 
with other workers continues to be problematic and it is remarkable that 
the Association pressed so strongly for it in 1918 and 1919. There are 
two particular disposing factors. Most station-masters - the largest 
proportion of the supervisory group - were in charge of stations some 
miles apart from each other and it is difficult to see how they could set 
up an organisation of their own; any manifestations of inclinations to
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organise on their part made them susceptible to recruitment by 'company 
unions'. So there was more to the Association's solicitation of their 
support than the simple imperative of increasing membership; and a drive 
to recruit inspectors was a linked initiative, as inspectors travelled 
from station to station and could maintain contact between the station- 
masters and the Association. (7) Both groups had always been accepted as 
members, but when it became clear that the Association's right to 
negotiate for them would turn on the extent of their membership, there 
was a special drive to recruit them,with reduced subscriptions for 
inspectors. The Association's second reason for promoting common 
representation was the one used in public discussion. As is explained 
later in this chapter, the Association's bid for recognition became the 
subject of a Cabinet Conference early in 1919, and its position was 
presented thus, by G.J. Wardle, the Parliamentary Secretary at the 
Ministry of Labour, and until very recently the Association's 
representative in the House of Commons:
"As he had been a railway clerk for eighteen years he might be 
presumed to know something of railway organisation. He could not 
understand how the Government were to avoid granting recognition to the 
clerks. He himself, vdien 17% years of age, had a clerk under him, and 
vben his own chief was away he dealt with all correspondence. There 
were thousands of offices on the railways where the staff was quite 
small, and where, in the absence of the station-master, the chief clerk 
acted for him. To cut out the supervisory staff from the union by some 
arbitrary line would be quite impracticable.
The Association, by forming sections, had themselves recognised that 
there were differences between the several grades, and in that way had 
gone some distance to meet the objections of the railway companies. It 
was impossible to have a surgical operation and cut out the station- 
masters of the union or to give them truncated rights within the union. 
He thought detailed arrangements could be made within the union, and by 
it, which would fairly meet the apprehension of the Railway Executive. 
The National Union of Railwayman were willing to part with the station- 
masters enrolled by them to the railway clerks". (8)
The Association had a basis for making a play to represent 
supervisory grades in its existing recruitment of station-masters, and
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realised that the more station-masters it could recruit the stronger the 
case would be. Expecting a lively dispute, the Association decided to
reorganise its station-master membership as well as setting out to
increase it. A station-masters' conference was held at Birmingham on 
the week-end 20 and 21 July 1918 (9). Its purpose was to give an 
opportunity for station-masters from all parts of the country to meet 
each other and for the details of the separate organisation to be worked 
out.
The railway companies did not supinely allow the Association to 
recruit station-masters unhindered. They set up 'Junior officer 
leagues', but these appear to have been still-born.(10) A more effective 
threat was the increased activity of the North East Station Masters
Association (NESMA)(11). The NESMA was a curious society, not simply a
'company' union, although their company approved of it and audited its 
coal accounts. There was a custom in parts of the North-East of England 
for station-masters to act as coal retailers in the vicinity of their 
stations(12), and NESMA was to some extent a retailers' federation. As 
such, its members' interests were not aligned to trade union members' 
customary concerns, and on some points might be antithetical to them. 
There is no direct evidence that their increased activity was generally 
promoted by the railway companies, but there are indications in that 
direction and the Association's Executive and senior officers certainly 
thought it was. (13) The railway companies were more likely to approve of 
a body such as NESMA, over which they had an element of control through 
their power to facilitate the retail business, than of a completely 
independent body such as the Association. There is evidence that the 
managements of some companies did indeed encourage NESMA. (14) As a 
federation of coal retailers it would have been severely disadvantaged 
had it taken on the full function of a trade union, organising the
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services that trade union members would expect.
This then was the atmosphere in which the Association operated at 
the end of 1918. The War was over, so the Government would want to 
reorganise railway workers' pay and conditions before it handed the 
railways back to a post-war railway administration. The Government, 
even after the first post-war general election in December 1918, was 
virtually the wartime coalition, but the House of Commons upon which it 
depended was relatively right-wing. Collectivist experiments were over, 
and the country was to be returned to a peace-time status that was as 
close as possible to that of 1913.
The Association, meanwhile, pressed the REC to allow it to negotiate 
for the bulk of the clerical and administrative staff of the railway 
companies. It was not thought that this objective could be achieved 
without a strike so mass meetings were organised(lS) and a special 
delegate conference to approve a strike was fixed for 
2 February 1919. When a further letter from the REC was received in 
late January, reinforcing arguments made in earlier correspondence, the 
Association's Executive sent a deputation to the Board of Trade to 
explain v^at they intended to do. (16) The Cabinet discussed all this on 
31 January.(17) It was decided that the subject needed wider discussion 
so a Cabinet conference was convened at which ministers, junior ministers 
and railway managers could discuss the problem.
Its first meeting was on 2 February. (18) The Association held a 
conference on the same day, to consider calling its members out on strike 
at 6 p.m. on 3 February (19). (The significance of the time was that 
most clerks would have just stopped work^ so the effective start of the 
strike would be the 4 February. The eight-hour day for railway workers 
had been implemented on 1 February(20).
Most of the members of the Cabinet Committee thought that the
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Association's case should be conceded when they learned that, of the 
8,800 station-masters, 60 per cent were Association members and over 
5,000 of them had made declarations that they wanted to be represented by 
the Association. The railway managers were still not convinced, so the 
meeting decided that the REC should meet the following morning (3 
February) and their representatives should meet the rest of the Cabinet 
Committee in the afternoon(21). The Association's conference decided to 
approve the proposal for a strike, but to defer its start for a day, with 
negotiations to continue in the meantime(22).
When the Cabinet Committee met again, the railway managers found 
themselves In a minority. Only their Minister - Albert Stanley, then 
President of the Board of Trade and himself a former railway manager - 
supported their argument that the special and supposedly necessary 
railway discipline would be lost if the Association's case were conceded. 
So it was decided to refer the matter back to thé Cabinet to pronounce on 
the principle of common representation for supervisors and subordinates 
by the same trade union. It was also pointed out that the Association 
were due to strike at 6 p.m. on the 4th February, so discussion could not 
go on too long(23).
The Cabinet met again at 11.30 a.m. the following day. Although 
reluctant to concede the principle because of its effects in other 
industries, and also reluctant to override the railway managers' 
arguments, they accepted that the Association's proposals were 
moderate(24) and that the wider industrial climate was uncertain. They 
were worried that if the Association struck the whole railway workforce 
might join them, a possibility made more likely because a limited London 
tube drivers' strike had just started(25). A general railway strike was 
something to be resisted at this juncture. In Glasgow, the industrial
situation could not have been much worse. All the principal factories
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were on strike, and a red flag bg&F|^2%#\on the municipal flagpole. The 
Riot Act was read on 31 January, the local troops were confined to 
Maryhill barracks and troops from outside - presumably transported by 
train - were used to overawe the populace and restore the status quo<26>.
The Cabinet decided that in the Association's case the principle 
should be conceded and that Stanley should meet representatives of the 
Association to negotiate the details of recognition(27).
The meeting took place later that day(28), making an agreement 
broadly in line with the Association's submission to the Cabinet(29).
Here is a summary:
The Association was to provide autonomy within its structure for 
senior clerks and station masters, but they still would have access to 
Association officials.
Membership of the Association should not be made compulsory.
Certain staff who dealt with confidential matters or who worked 
closely with chief officers were to be excluded from membership.
Questions of discipline and management were not to come under the 
terms of recognition, but in this case paragraph 72 of the Report of the 
Royal Commission on the Railway Conciliation Scheme of 1907 which 
provides for an appeal before a final decision is made in cases of 
misconduct, neglect of duty, and other breaches of 
discipline.
The Association would not deny the right of other associations to 
represent the men, if they could make a good case for the right, on the 
other hand no preferential treatment would be offered to any association.
On the 4 February, the Association sent telegrams to all branches: 
"Full recognition conceded. Do not strike"(30). The news did not reach 
some members early enough to prevent their acting on the strike decision 
and they lost pay for the time they took off work, but they kept their 
jobs(31).
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The Initial Pay Settlement; 1919-20
The Association's Executive's original approach to the REC had been 
in terms of the Association's current 'programme' for pay and conditions; 
negotiations had been held up because station-masters were included but, 
with the newly agreed terms of recognition, they could now proceed. The 
programme had been in preparation for many years, having achieved its 
final form at a special delegate conference held at Liverpool on 16 and 
17 November1918 <32). One of the functions of the conference was to 
stiffen the spirit of the membership, because it was expected that 
neither recognition nor the employers' acceptance of the programme would 
come without a fight.
However, the formal object of the conference was to get endorsement 
for the programme to be presented to the REC. A general programme had 
already been worked out, in expectation of recognition, but the union's 
Executive Committee needed to be sure that whatever might be put forward 
as a basis for negotiation would be up-to-date and consistent with 
current opinion in the membership.
The outcome was not a simple authentication of the Executive 
Committee's plan. Amendments were proposed to various effect: the events 
surrounding the passage and aftermath of a particularly contentious one 
are here described in detail, illustrating something of the mood and 
aspirations of the membership at the time. The Executive Committee's 
response demonstrates their skill, and that of the General Secretary, A.
G. Walkden, in managing union affairs.
The story involves three proposed salary scales for general clerks - 
the one incorporated in the Executive Committee's proposals, another that 
was the subject of the amendment which was proposed by the Wolverhampton 
Branch and the one which was finally included in the programme. (33)
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All the scales started with £70 for 16 year olds. The Executive 
Committee's scale went up to £230 at the age of 33 and included an 
increment of £50 for 16 year olds. The second scale had a smoother 
progression and so was relatively unfavourable to clerks under 24, but 
extended to a maximum of £350 at the age of 42. Although the amendment 
was passed, the final scale retained the original maximum of £230 but was 
compressed, ending at the age of 26. The compression meant that, for the 
age-range it covered, the final scale was more favourable than both of 
the others as far as it went, but did not reflect the most radical 
feature of the Wolverhampton amendment: its long range.
The argument for the long scale was that only one in three hundred 
clerks could expect promotion, so most of them would be on the same 
salary scale for all their working lives. The scale was much less 
generous to younger clerks than the Executive Committee's because its 
proposers did not think eighteen year olds needed as much as the £130 in 
the scale as first drafted. They placed the biggest increase at the age 
of 25, vrtien a clerk would be likely to be marrying and starting a family. 
The Executive Committee's proposed increments of £5 per annum between the 
ages of 19 and 29 were, they said, an insult.
The Executive Committee could only counter these arguments by saying 
that their scale reflected the railway companies' opinion that an 16 
year old was worth appreciably more than a 17 year old. This did not 
satisfy the conference and the Wolverhampton amendment was passed by a 
large majority on the evening of Saturday,
16 November. The following morning the Executive Committee came back to
the conference and Walkden said that they could not accept the amendment, 
contending 'at considerable length' (to quote the minutes) that it was 
doubtful whether it could be supported by the rank and file and whether
the public or the Labour Party would agree to such a demand. He
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suggested that the Wolverhampton point of view could be accommodated by 
the shorter salary scale with its increments of £10 per annum for clerks 
in their twenties. Additionally, a new clause was now suggested to deal 
with 'stagnation', by which was meant three years without promotion for a 
clerk vAio had completed the scale. If no promotion were available, a 
special salary increase would be awarded.
Walkden's oratory was persuasive enough for the proposed compromise 
to be accepted by a large majority. The Executive Committee now had 
support for a programme near enough to their first draft to be, as they 
saw it, a reasonable basis for negotiation. The General Secretary's 
skill had avoided the inclusion of hostages to fortune exemplified by the 
Wolverhampton amendment.
Once the Association was in a position to negotiate for clerks and 
their supervisors with the REC, the NUR was prompted to intervene.
Having recruited some clerks and a larger number of supervisors, they 
wanted to join in the negotiations. A joint meeting of the NUR and the 
Association was held at Unity House on 3 July 1919 to organise a joint 
approach<34). The meeting accepted most of the programme for clerks' 
and station-masters' grades, as submitted to the REC on 10 January, The 
main alterations were that supervisors dealing with traffic staff should 
work a 48-hour week; and that the proposals for a 34 hour week for night 
workers and for ending 'split turns' should not be pressed. (Split turns 
are still being worked in 1992).
At the Executive Committee on 21 July, (35), the RECs proposed 
programme was considered. So far, it was only for clerks and compared 
unfavourably with the Association's. The REC s salary scale was based on 
pre-war rates plus a percentage to allow for the rise In the cost of 
living. Some idea of pre-war rates of pay can be obtained from a White 
Paper published in 1915(36). Its figures are derived from salaries paid
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to railway workers in 1913, and, because of deficiencies in the base 
data, the mean average total pay of station-masters and station clerks is 
the only figure which can be quoted with some degree of reliability (37): 
£1. 14.0 per week, or £88. 16.0 per annum. During the war, it would have 
been increased by the addition of £1.13.0 war bonus, lifting it to £3.7.0 
per week or £174.4.0 per annum. The new rates proposed by the REC were 
calculated at 92 per cent higher than pre-war rates (38), giving an 
average wage of £3.5.4. per week or £169. 14. 7 per annum. This would mean 
that many clerks would have a wage cut, albeit a small one.
The Executive Committee rejected the REC s proposals, but they were 
to be made the basis of the final settlement (39). Because it had taken 
so long to extract this mediocre programme from the REC, and because they 
foresaw a need for lengthy negotiations before it would be in a state 
acceptable to a majority of the membership, the Executive Committee asked 
the NUR for advice on how to speed up negotiations (40). The NUR said 
the Committee should write and ask if the station-masters' programme was 
ready, and also if the clerks' programme could be improved. If nothing 
was heard by 6 August, they should write again; if nothing was heard in 
the following week, they should protest to the Board of Trade (41). The 
Executive Committee followed this advice; they also prepared to hold a 
special conference on 17 August at Birmingham, which would be asked to 
authorise the Executive Committee to take industrial action (42).
An improved offer for clerks was received on 16 August, on the eve 
of the conference (43). There were improvements only for more senior 
clerks on the general (fifth grade) scale and for the higher grade 
clerks. The new offer addressed the problem of war bonus; for example, 
the pay increases proposed for higher grade clerks would involve a 
reduction in their bonus. At this stage, an adult's war bonus was worth 
£1. 13,0 a week or £85. 16,0 per annum; the REC proposed a new war bonus
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scale geared to the proposed Increases in salary, If someone's salary 
was increased by £90, then he would lose all his War Bonus - in effect 
his salary increase would be £4.4.0 per annum. At the bottom of the 
scale, if someone's salary was increased by only £5.0.0. per annum he 
would receive £85 in bonus - he would have a real increase of £5. 0. 0. per 
annum. Although the Executive were not yet happy with the REC s 
proposals, they at least provided that everyone would obtain an effective 
increase on his current salary, even though it might be very small.
Further action taken by the REC was also considered at this August 
conference. It had been announced that two quarterly bonuses were to be 
paid to station-masters' grades for the three-monthly periods ending 30 
April and 31 July 1919. This was to compensate for the erosion in 
differentials they had experienced due to the 'conciliation grades' 
settlements ('conciliation grades' are railway manual workers; the term 
derived from the 'conciliation scheme' negotiated for them in 1907). 
Clerks earning over £300 per annum were to have similar bonuses.
Walkden pointed out that they were the only improvements in these 
grades' pay, so far. Any permanent improvements for them would depend 
upon the outcome of the Association's negotiations in the forthcoming 
weeks. He also pointed out that the bonus payments would not be used 
v^en calculating pensions(44).
The conference duly approved the Executive Committee's efforts and 
authorised it to take any action - even calling on members to strike to 
ensure a reasonable settlement as soon as possible. This resolution was 
telegraphed to the REC.
The REC informed the Executive Committee the following day that the 
station-masters' programme would be ready that afternoon, but they still 
could not say when the supervisors' programme would be ready. The 
Executive Committee decided that if the station-masters' programme was
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not forthcoming they would complain to the Board of Trade: if there was 
no satisfactory response by 22 August, the members would be called 
out on strike on 24 or 25 August(45). The NUR were told what was 
proposed. The station-masters' programme was received that afternoon and 
passed to the station-masters' negotiating committee (46). On the 19 
August the REC slightly improved their programme for clerks(47).
The supervisors' programme was expected the following week. 
Settlement for the clerks was reached on 22 August (48). The improvements 
again seem small. The main concession appears to have been that the 
Association was to be allowed to negotiate for clerks receiving £300 per 
annum and upwards but not for those in the 'Special' Class (i.e. 
supervising clerks in the top grade). On salaries over £150 per annum 
the Civil Service scale of war bonus was to apply. All stations were to 
be reclassified; this meant that, in theory, all members' jobs were 
thrown into the melting-pot so that they could not be sure what their 
future salaries would be. It was said that classification would take at 
least two months but, in the event, it took much longer; reports of 
appeals against reclassification decisions were still being made in July 
1921(49). The supervisors' agreement was promised for 28 August, but 
the NUR said they would only deal with the supervisors in relation to the 
grades they supervised. They were eventually to obtain the same terms as 
the station-masters (50).
The negotiations for the station-masters' settlement were 
interrupted by the 1919 railway strike organised by the NUR and which 
lasted from 26 September to 5 October. They started again on % 1 7 
October, and on 8 November a settlement was finally reached. The 
negotiators had made marginal improvements on the original REC proposals. 
Another grade had been inserted, splitting up the lowest grade of 
Gt at i on-mact or(51).
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Once again, vrtiat was eventually settled was nearer to the REC 
programme than the Association's. Its Executive Committee may be open to 
criticism for raising members' expectations too high, but it must be 
remembered in their defence that the Association had never been 
recognised for salary- negotiating purposes before 1919 (52). Without 
experience, it was difficult for the RCA to judge what was realistic, and 
a passage in an interim report on the negotiations indicates its 
uncertainty. Walkden, as negotiator, reported to the Executive Committee 
that(^  ^if the REC published its programme it was unlikely that the 
membership could be persuaded to take industrial action to improve the 
final settlement (53).
The negotiators could also have argued that the programme which was 
first presented to the REC was agreed by delegate conferences of the 
membership, so that it was the membership at large, or at least the 
delegates to the conferences, Wio were unrealistic (54). In the event, 
the membership accepted the settlement with very little show of 
disappointment. The only note of rebellion mentioned in the Executive 
Committee minutes was that some staff at Manchester (London Road) had 
circulated a printed handbill regretting the settlement (55).
These negotiations had not finally determined the arrangements of 
the male clerical staff's pay and conditions for the post-war period.
They did not allow for two considerations: the REC s perception of war 
bonus as a wartime income supplement which would cease to be paid as 
early as conditions would allow, and their associated belief that there 
should be an element in the salary agreement to cope with changes in the 
cost of living, still rising but considered likely to fall in due course. 
In January 1920 the REC devised a scheme which would, to a certain 
extent, deal with both. The idea was to designate part of the war bonus 
as 'floating bonus' and to set up a sliding scale which would adjust it
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so that, when true peace-time conditions returned and the cost of living 
stabilised, 'floating bonus' would be eliminated with any residue being 
absorbed into a clerk's normal salary. The sliding scale reduced or 
increased 'floating bonus' by £5 for every variation of the cost of
living by five full points. Adjustments vrere to take place quarterly at
the end of March, June, September and December. It appears that the only 
direction of 'floating bonus' actually envisaged by the REC was
downwards; their letter about implementing their new scheme referred to
no 'reductions' taking place before 30 September 1920(56), a date which 
represents something of a concession. In fact, unforeseen movements in 
the cost of living index and the practicalities of responding to them 
created problems which are fully discussed later in this chapter.
The Executive accepted the bulk of the RECs proposals and, by 2
February, a draft agreement had been approved (57). The formal
Memorandum of Agreement, which was to be the basis of the railway male 
clerks' salary and conditions of employment for the whole of the interwar
period, was signed on 1 March 1920(58).
Settlements for other (smaller) groups were made on following dates 
in the year(59);
Table 2
Relief Clerks 20 April
Railway Supervisory Staff- 20 April
Traffic Control Staff 25 May
Women Clerks 26 August
Supervisory Dock Staff 11 November
The Settlement of 1920: Evaluation and the Further Context
In national terms the postwar settlements were relatively good. 
Average wages for male workers in 1919 were about £3.0.0. per week or
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£170 per annum (60). Without taking into account war bonus, a fifth- 
grade clerk on the new scale would reach this average wage at the age of 
27; from then on his earnings would exceed it. Most clerks - the only 
exclusions were new entrants appointed after 1 October 1920 - would have 
the advantage of war bonus which, although of most benefit to younger and 
worse-paid clerks, added considerably to all salaries, meaning that 
average wages were achieved before the age of 27. After 1919, the 
average wage rate index (base 1956 = 100) dropped sharply. In 1921, it 
vras 53, in 1922 it was 38.8 and it reached its lowest point in 1933 at
34.4 (61). This meant that most adult railway clerks would have above-
average salaries throughout the inter-war period.
Two factors modified this pattern: the sliding scale which adjusted 
salaries in line with the cost of living, and salary reductions made in 
July 1928 and March 1931, The working of the sliding scale and the wage- 
cuts are discussed at some length later in this chapter, but a brief 
summary of their effects follows. The cost of living dropped throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s but, as the sliding scale acted only on the 'floating 
bonus', the major part of members' pay was not eroded. Wages were cut in 
1928 and 1931, each time by 2% per cent but with the extra provision in 
1931 of a further cut on salaries exceeding £100 per annum, being another 
2% per cent of the excess.
It is difficult to evaluate these two factors' full effect on 
salaries. The cost of living element operated only on part of a clerk's 
or station-master's war bonus. The REC probably considered that this 
would be sufficient to keep salaries in line with the expected fall in
the Retail Price Index (RPI). In the event, the RPI fell more
precipitately than could possibly have been expected. In 1920, when the 
salary agreement was formally dated, the RPI stood at 125, falling to 92 
in 1922. It fell to 78 in 1923, thereafter fluctuating less wildly (62),
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The cost of living adjustment was not designed to cope with such a fall 
and must have had little effect on salaries after 1923, although a rise 
in the RPI in the Autumn of 1923 meant that there was some. The 
Association's Executive applied for residual bonus to be increased, and 
the suspicion that the railway managers intended C, the sliding scale 
to deplete but not to increase salaries was partly confirmed. The 
railway managers contested the Executive's application which was referred 
to the Chairman of the National Wages Board, who decided in the 
Association's favour.
The salary cuts of 1928 and 1931 were not provoked by falls in the 
RPI but by large drops in railway receipts. These derived from the 
severe trade depression and competition from other forms of transport.
The cuts in salary were unwelcome, but their effects on railway employees 
were mitigated by the concurrent fall in the RPI. It fell by three 
points between 1929 and 1930; between 1930 and 1931 it fell by another 
two; and by over two more between 1932 and 1933. Railway clerks, in 
fact all railway workers except workers on marginal, minor railways, had 
another advantage compared to other groups of workers at a time of 
recession: the security peculiar to railway work. It is not as easy to
close down a portion of a railway as it is to close down part of a 
factory complex. Most of the 1920s and 1930s were characterized by more 
or less severe economic depression, with widespread unemployment. At 
such times, anyone in reasonably secure employment is in a relatively 
strong economic position. This is not to say that railway clerks were 
amongst the most comfortably-placed workers in the country, but their 
position was enviable by comparison to workers in general.
But the RCA's Executive Committee were not complacent about their 
members' good pay and superior working conditions. They did not compare 
their members' lot with workers in general, but with that of other
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clerks; bank clerks, Insurance clerks, or civil servants. Nevertheless, 
even with reference to these 'higher class' clerical occupations the B.C. 
could justifiably argue^its industrial strategy had brought significant 
improvements since the pre-war period. In 1911-1913, the average railway 
clerk's pay was only 65. 5 per cent of the average Civil Service clerical 
officer's; in 1924 it was 78 per cent. The narrowing of the 
differential with bank clerks' pay was even greater(63).
Comparisons with elite clerical workers may have conditioned the 
application for a 25 per cent salary increase in 1920, although the 
jump in inflation due to the short-lived post-war boom was its main 
justification. Before the application could be pressed to a conclusion 
the sudden drop in inflation in 1921, and the reduction in railway 
receipts due to the start of the inter-war depression, must have made it 
appear ridiculous. This chapter has already indicated that the pay 
settlement of 1919 was the basis for the Association's members' salaries 
throughout the inter-war period; this was a consequence of prevailing 
economic conditions. They included the low cost of living compared with 
the height it had reached just after the war ^ e n  the salary settlement 
was concluded, the drop in railway receipts due to the widespread 
economic depression and the unexpected competition from other methods of 
transport. There was little justification for the Association to argue 
for salary increases; in fact, most of its negotiating skill over this 
period was addressed to countering the railway companies' efforts to 
cut salaries.
The pattern of salary arrangements and settlements between 1919 and 
1939 suggests that railway clerks enjoyed a period of relatively moderate 
affluence. This has a bearing on the Association's behaviour between the 
wars: despite its being the only white-collar union to come out on 
official strike in May 1926, and other evidence of a higher level of
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union activity than might be expected from clerical workers, it might 
also be argued to haye been conservative in its general attitude.
Although the settlement of 1920 set the basic wage pattern for the 
next two decades, it was followed by another claim, prompted by the 
alarmingly intensive, but short-lived phase of inflation the same year. 
The settlement had not established a formal negotiating system, and the 
further working without one was instructive.
Negotiating without a Formal Structure; the 25 per cent
Pay Claim. 1920-21
Wartime inflation did not end in 1918; it continued to rise during 
the short-lived boom of 1919-1920. This post-war inflation did not last 
long. It was decreasing in early 1921 and - reflecting the level of 
economic activity - soon reached the low level of the inter-war years.
In early 1920, it was not realised how short- lived this intense 
period of high inflation was to be. In April 1920 the West Midlands 
Divisional Council told the Executive that the recently negotiated pay 
scales were too low. The Executive agreed with them and lodged a claim 
for a 25 per cent flat-rate increase on all salary scales<64). This may 
seem excessive, but inflation had been increasing rapidly and had been 
doing so for some time.
The other railway unions (NUR and ASLEF) also applied for a wage 
increase to cope with the increase in the cost of living. Unlike the 
Association they had an agreed machinery of negotiation, and two months 
later a 10 per cent increase was conceded(65). This success by 
conciliation staffs suggested that some part of the Association’s claim 
would be met. However, although it had recently obtained recognition 
and had negotiated a pay settlement, it had to wait for the Railway Act
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for a formal negotiating machinery. Without it, the Association did not 
get a hearing until August 1922. By then, the cost of living was back 
to double figures (in November 1920 it stood at 176(66)), so the 
Association's representatives had no hope of getting their full claim, 
but their members had lived through a period of high inflation with 
inadequate pay and had lost the differentials not long since established 
between their pay and that of conciliation staff.
The claim was processed in a haphazard and tardy fashion. As the 
railways were still subject to Government control, there were two 
interest groups on the managements' side: the Government and the hundred
or railway companies, and this was the last chance for some of their 
board members to make a decision with national implications. The other 
two railway unions also had an interest in the percentage increases at 
issue, The Association had to fight for a reasonable examination of its 
claim; the 1921 Railway Act would soon provide a machinery, but this 
particular claim was being processed v^ilst all the interested parties 
were also involved in negotiations in connection with the Act - a 
Parliamentary Bill for most of this time. All this militated against the 
Association's claim being dealt with efficiently and speedily even had 
there been goodwill on all sides, but another reading is that the 
Ministry and the railway managers were exploiting the opportunities for 
delay hoping, like Mr Micawber, that something would turn up. And so it 
did: the cost of living began to drop.
The Cabinet had authorised the Minister of Transport, Sir Eric 
Geddes, to handle matters arising from the National Wages Board's 
conclusions, and subsequent arrangements remained under Ministerial 
surveillance during the post-war reconstruction. In May 1921 the railway 
companies' reply to the unions' claim was forwarded by the Ministry of 
Transport to the Association's Executive (87). It presented the
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Association with the facts of life as the railway managers saw them.
They listed the more recent wage settlements, saying that there was no 
mention of the claim for a 25 per cent increase when they were 
negotiated. The railway managers said that family budgets, which the 
Association had collected in support of their claim, were of no relevance 
when wage rates were fixed, and listed the improvements in conditions 
which had already been conceded, all involving demands on the railway 
companies' financial resources. They insisted that the sliding scale 
adjustments were all that was needed to cope with inflation, and took the 
view that the railway industry could afford no more improvements in 
railway workers' pay and conditions in the foreseeable future. (The 
financial difficulties had arisen because the railways were facing real 
competition for the first time). The railway companies' case was 
presented at greater length than it had earlier been put to Geddes, but 
he was a receptive audience, whereas the Association's Executive were 
not(68)
Geddes and the railway managers were extremely resistant both to the 
Association's claim and one that was concurrently being pursued by the 
NUR, for the increase that it had recently negotiated to be extended
beyond conciliation grades to other grades it represented -
that is, including some in the same grades as some of the Association's
members. Geddes was hostile for the same reasons as the railway
managers, but he also had a more personal interest. The railway managers 
maintained that the railways should firmly refuse any more pay increases; 
that the principle that an award affecting one section of the men should 
automatically be extended to other grades was pernicious and would 
ultimately spell ruin; and that the clerical and supervisory grades' 
sliding scale agreement was more generous than one that applied to 
conciliation staff, enough for them to need no pay increase to compensate
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for the rise in living costs,
Geddes*s more personal reason for opposing increases in railway 
workers' pay was partly a result of his friendship with Lord Ashfield, 
the title assumed by Albert Stanley on his ennoblement, who was Chairman 
and Managing Director of a large combine of intra-urban facilities in 
London (trams and buses as well as underground railways). At Geddes'
instigation, Ashfield wrote to Geddes on 17 May, putting on record his 
contribution to a dinner-party conversation with Geddes a few days 
earlier. (69) Geddes quoted extensively from the letter in a memorandum 
he sent to the Cabinet on the 15th June, 1920; briefly, it detailed 
problems of managing militant staff. The Cabinet do not appear to have 
taken the letter as seriously as did Geddes, because there is no mention 
of it or its purport in the report of the Cabinet's conclusions (70).
The Executive were incensed when their claim was cursorily rejected,
b£4p>
with the Association's having^given no chance to state the case or submit 
evidence. The case for a 25 per cent increase was supported by ASLEF, 
who wanted it for locomotive supervisors. The three trade unions had to 
wait until 27 January 1921 for a meeting with the
Minister of Transport (71). The cost of living was still very high, but 
had begun to drop. The Minister said he would institute an inquiry into 
the claim, under which the evidence submitted by the companies and the 
unions would be examined and reported on by Sir William Marwood and Mr H. 
J. Wilson, senior officials at the Ministry (72).
The General Secretary wrote to the Minister of Transport in reply to 
the railway managers' contentions, but expected the resolution of the 
claim to wait for the conclusion of the Minister's inquiry (73).
However, there was another factor the Association's Executive could not 
have known about: the railway managers were casting around for ways of
reducing wage bills. They were complaining to the Ministry of Transport
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that obligations accepted by the Government during the period of war-time 
control committed them to unreasonably high expenditure<74). Their case 
was investigated, but the only instances of commitments having been made 
against their advice was when an eight-hour day was granted in December 
1918, and possibly when the maximum rate for engine drivers was increased 
by Is Od a day in August 1919.
A compensation payment of £10 million was made to the railway 
companies under the terms of the Railway Act of 1921, to compensate for 
'the standardisation of pay, hours of duty or other conditions of service 
which were to be made under the terms of the Act' (75). This payment was 
presumably also intended to include compensation for improvements made in 
railway workers' pay and conditions during the Government's control of 
the railways; but their managements nevertheless seemed to think that the 
Government was leaving them to carry an unreasonable burden. They were 
also dissatisfied with the negotiating machinery which was to be 
implemented under the terms of the Railway Act. The initial absence of 
such machinery, and the Minister's sympathy with the railway managements, 
kept the pay claim 'on a back burner' v^ilst the case for it was at its 
st rongest.
The First*Assessment of the 'Sliding Scale'; 1921-22
In 1921, 'residual bonus', the portion of pay governed by the 
'sliding scale', became an item of dispute between the railway managers 
and the Association whilst the 25 per cent pay claim was still pending.
It was a most complicated part of railway workers' pay, so much so that 
problems about it arose again in 1922. The National Wages Board that 
was required by the legislation of 1921 was not yet in full operation, 
but it had a Chairman-designate, Sir William Mackenzie, who was called in
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to help settle the disputes about the sliding scale both in 1921 and 
1922. The war bonus had been introduced to adapt wages to wartime 
conditions; it was retained when inflation persisted after the war but 
the railway companies expected that the need for it would disappear when 
peacetime conditions were reinstated. The pay settlements of 1919-1920 
provided for it to be dissolved through the twin applications of the new 
pay scales and the sliding scale that was to be invoked as inflation 
declined(76).
In July 1921 the railway managers told the Association that as the 
cost of living had dropped below 125, their employees' residual bonus was 
to be cut accordingly (77). The Association considered that their 
members' pay should
not be reduced whilst their pay claim remained outstanding - the Ministry 
of Transport was still delaying a definitive reply on it. (78).
The Association asked the railway managers to refer the issue to Sir 
William Mackenzie. The managers were reluctant because they were 
accustomed to making such decisions(79). Eventually, they decided to 
refer the question as a special case; by now it was May 1922. In August, 
Sir William said that they companies had acted quite properly in reducing 
their employees' pay in line with the cost of living (80).
He would have known of the NUR's claim that the conciliation staff's
award should be extended to other railway workers and that the 
*
Association's outstanding claim was now before the newly instituted 
Central Wages Board, which would presumably take account of any evidence 
that might be produced by Marwood and Wilson of the Ministry. He would 
also be aware that the cost of living had declined from its high point of 
176 In November 1920, when these claims originated, to 81 In August 1922.
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The 25 per cent Pay Claim, the End of the Story; 1922
The new machinery of negotiation provided for a Central Wages Board, 
with equal representation for railway managements and trade unions, ifjp 
they could not agree on an issue, it was passed on to the National Wages 
Board, which had an independent chairman, appointed by the Minister of 
Labour, and representatives of railway 'users' as well as of the railway 
industry. Its decisions had to be delivered within 28 days and were 
normally accepted by both parties(81).
In July 1922 the Central Wages Board rejected the Association's 
claim but sent the NUR's to the National Wages Board. The Association's 
representatives objected, saying that they would try to persuade the 
National Wages Board to consider their claim anyway. The Central Wages 
Board evidently saw the two claims as alternatives, preferring the NUR's 
claim because it derived from an award already made; both claims were for 
the same grades of workers.
Much had happened since the claims had originally been made; the 
inflationary pressures which had led to them had disappeared and the 
finances of the railway industry were being eroded by increasing 
competition. There was also another pressure on the railway companies. 
The previous November (1921), the Federation of British Industries (FBI) 
and other bodies of employers had sent deputations to the railway 
managers saying that they wanted lower pay for railway workers so that 
the railway rates could be reduced (82). Soon after, but not apparently 
as a result of this pressure, the increases in pay obtained by 
conciliation staff in June 1920 began to disappear. Railway operation in 
more marginal areas of Great Britain, such as Wales, Cornwall or 
Scotland, has always been financially less profitable, so it is not 
surprising that, in January 1922, it was Scottish railway companies -
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amalgamations under the 1921 Railway Act had not yet been completed - 
which asked the National Wages Board to withdraw these pay increases for 
them. The request was granted and the pay increases were eroded 
gradually, by doubling the amount of the decreases under the sliding 
scale agreement. A little later, the pay increases of English railwaymen 
were diminished in the same way, so that the greater part had been 
withdrawn by July 1922. The NUR accepted the erosion, but were able to
stave off any further attacks on conciliation staff's wages. Their
efforts ^ r e  made easier because unemployment, which had reached a high 
level in 1921, dropped back in 1922 (83).
This, then, was the background to the National Wages Board's 
consideration of the NUR's claim for a 10 per cent increase in clerical 
and supervisory workers' pay in October 1922. The Board met on October 
11th; the Association, supported by ASLEF, urged their claim for 25 per
cent, but the Board decided to consider only the NUR's claim. Their
first decision was that they needed more information, so they asked the 
Ministry of Transport for the report commissioned from Marwood and Wilson 
in 1921 (84). Five days later the Board rejected the NUR's claim by a 
majority vote; and there is some justification for the minority's opinion 
that the claim had been prejudiced by the delay to which it was 
subjected. (85) The NUR had obtained the pay increase for 'conciliation' 
workers Wien the cost of living was increasing and no-one knew when it 
would stop or where it would level out. No doubt the Association would 
have got something had they been able to force the issue at the same time 
as the NUR was able to put the 'conciliation' workers claim through the 
formal machinery.
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By May, 1922, the economic conditions both of the country and the 
railway industry were all too apparent. One of the few favourable 
factors was the low cost of living. It had continued falling from 
November 1920 to July 1923, when it reached 69. During this period, the 
sliding scale had eroded the Association's members' pay as the cost of 
living went down(66). In the Autumn of 1923, the cost of living began 
to rise once more and the Association applied for pay to be increased. 
The railway managers responded that they wanted an end to clerical 
workers' war bonus, and uniform salary scales. They said the governing 
point on the cost of living index was 125, and that increases could not 
be made until this point was again reached. However, the railway 
companies had increased conciliation staff's pay in line with rises in 
the cost of living; another reference to Sir William Mackenzie produced 
an opinion in the association's favour: if residual bonus could be
eroded Wien the cost of living fell, then it should increase when the 
cost of living rose (87).
The Inter-war Period: Its True Face
The economic mood of the interwar period for the railway industry 
was, by now, firmly established. There was to be little realistic 
negotiation for improvements in wages or conditions until the few years 
immediately before the second World War. The emphasis was to be on 
resisting wage cuts.
The Executive did not have to wait long for the next call from the 
railway companies for wage economies. It came in July 1923, when they
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said they wanted to reduce wages, so as to reduce freight charges. This 
episode ended with the ASLEF strike of 1924(68). The next approach from 
the railway companies was in June 1925. This was soon after the return 
to the Gold Standard at the pre-war parity, one of the effects of which 
was to make the export of goods more difficult. Goods not exported 
require no transport to ports, so railway freight returns stood to be 
severely affected by this change in policy.
The proposals were that all wages, salaries and directors' fees 
should be reduced by 5 per cent, but that the sliding scale bonus would 
continue. This wage cut would initially last for one year; after that it 
would be terminable by either the trade unions or the railway companies 
giving three months notice(89). Months of negotiating ended on 16 
November 1925, when the National Wages Board rejected the railway 
companies' proposals(90).
Between 1925 and June 1928, when the wage cuts were again proposed 
by the railway companies, the General Strike - discussed in Chapter 5 - 
marked a deep divide. Before it, the Association's Executive thought 
its membership could be mobilised against a wage cut, even to the extent 
of coming out on strike. After the actual experience of striking, and 
especially of the aftermath to it, the grounds for confidence in 
solidarity were weakened. It should also be noted, though, that as the 
experience of the strike receded, to be overtaken by that of working 
conditions which included wage cuts, militant attitudes re-emerged.
The Railway Industry's Economic Problems; 1928
Unlike the earlier proposals, those of 1928 resulted In an actual 
wage cut, not solely because the railway trade unions were in disarray 
after the General Strike of 1926, but also because the economic condition
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of the railway industry had deteriorated enough for the railway companies 
to make a defensible case for economies. In 1921, part of their case 
against the claim for a 25 per cent pay increase was that competition
from road transport was eating into their revenue. This competition was
not great in 1921 (91), but it was much more damaging by 1928.
The change was not simply that the railway industry gradually lost
the virtual monopoly of long-distanfttransport of passengers and goods, 
which it had enjoyed prior to the first World War, but that the business 
lost to road transport tended to include the more lucrative traffic.
This meant that profits fell more quickly than the changes in 
transportation might suggest (92). And not all the loss of rail traffic 
was due to competition; the British economy was in decline. The older 
industries declined fairly rapidly and the newer ones did not grow fast 
enough to maintain a balance. There were some variations in this pattern 
over the period,with a decline in 1921, some recovery prior to 1928, a 
sharp drop between 1929 and 1932, and finally a slow recovery up to the 
outbreak of the War. The decline in economic activity meant a 
corresponding decline in inland traffic, and it is difficult to 
distinguish the effects on the two factors which reduced the railways' 
prof itability(93).
One of the reasons advanced by some commentators as a factor in the 
railways' poor economic performance is that it was too tightly 
constrained by the 1921 Railway Act (94), which provided for a schedule 
of standard charges, drawn up by an independent tribunal, for carrying 
passengers and goods. The companies were allowed to charge 'exceptional' 
rates, but these had to be broken down into their separate components. 
This charging scheme was to take effect in 1928 and it was calculated 
that, if the railways were run 'economically', then the industry^would 
earn a revenue called the 'Standard Revenue', which was based on what the
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railway industry earned in 1913. The 1921 Act was drafted with no 
thought of the railways' possible loss of their virtual monopoly of 
inland long-distance carriage. The economic contraction was to have its 
main effect on the older staple industries which had developed alongside 
the railway industry and could not change their mode of transport as 
easily as the newer industries. Therefore, the old industries depended 
upon the railways, but the newer industries could use any transport which 
was available.
The railway companies' reaction to competition was to obtain 
legislative permission to invest in road transport companies 
themselves(95). This vrais only partly successful. Such benefits as the 
new investments brought were not evident by the summer of 1928 and it was 
all too clear that the 'Standard Revenue' would be nowhere near 
established. So the railway companies turned to their staff to help them 
to achieve at least some semblance of economic stability.
The First General Pay Cut; 1928
The foregoing has summarised the background to the negotiations 
which began on Tuesday 26th June, 1928, when the General Secretaries of 
the railway trade unions met the Railway Staffs Conference. William 
Glower, the Chairman, told the unions that cash receipts of the railway 
companies were over £4 million less than during the same period the 
previous year. The railway companies wanted to remedy this situation by 
reducing labour costs (96). The details of the proposed savings were not 
presented at this meeting, but another was called for July 18th, when the 
companies presented their plans.
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Most of the Association's Executive attended, but the General 
Secretary and the President were at the International Transport Workers 
Conference at Stockholm, so the attenuated Executive agreed that no 
binding commitments would be made. The Association's Executive did not 
find this too difficult a task because they were not the only union with 
senior officials away at Stockholm - the NUR's Industrial General 
Secretary was presiding there<97).
The railway companies told the unions in some detail how their 
economic position had deteriorated (98), and detailed the wage cuts 
that they said would be needed. The proposals were that the remaining 
war bonus should be withdrawn; that all enhanced payments for night-duty, 
Sunday duty and overtime should be cancelled; that there would be a 
temporary suspension of the Guaranteed Week and Guaranteed Day for wages 
staff and, in their place, a guarantee, that each worker would receive 
'weekly earnings from all sources, including any Sunday duty and 
overtime, of not less than his standard week's wages' (99).
The negotiating machinery was not involved: a decision that stands 
to be questioned given the disadvantages of informal proceedings. It 
appears that each side had a dominant personality v^o preferred them on 
this occasion: Sir Felix Pole of the GWR and J. H. Thomas, the General 
Secretary of the NUR.
Sir Felix Pole (100) was the Chairman of the meeting held on 18 
July, and announced that, "it was possible for Railway Companies and the 
Trade Unions to make a binding agreement, and the companies preferred not 
to go to the National Wages Board." (101) This attitude is 
understandable from an employer's representative but not from the General 
Secretary of the largest railway trade union. P. S. Bagwell has set out 
Thomas's position as follows:
"Since 1920 the invariable procedure had been to negotiate through
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the Central and National Wages Boards; but he did not advise following 
this precedent since before these bodies they would have to convince the 
representatives of business and of the general public. The traders were 
all saying that the cause of the railways' difficulties was the 'high 
rate of railwayman's wages'. His view, therefore, was that if they had to 
go through this machinery with the existing national agreements, 'nothing 
could save them ... '. By 60 votes to 14, congress endorsed the plan of 
the B.C. negotiating directly with the companies, provided that any 
sacrifices made should be spread over the whole staff and that any 
proposed agreement be submitted to an S. G. N. before ratification."
(102).
There were two further considerations. The railway companies had 
never been satisfied with the negotiating machinery imposed on them by 
the 1921 Railway Act (and, in 1933, they persuaded the unions to accept a 
modified form of negotiating machinery); also, temporary wage cuts 
negotiated informally would be at least partly under the control of the 
trade unions. If wage cuts were imposed as a consequence of a judgement 
by the National Wages Board, then the unions - in theory - would not have 
the same control.
When J.H. Thomas asked how long the companies wanted the cuts to 
last. Sir Felix Pole replied that they did not want to put a time limit 
on them, but did not intend to re-introduce war bonus(103). The 
immediate and predictable reaction of the trade union representatives was 
hostile, but they asked for more details of the decreases in traffic and 
revenue, agreeing to meet the railway companies again on 24 July.
The President and General Secretary of the Association returned from 
Stockholm in time to attend a preliminary meeting with the other two 
unions on 23 July. They jointly decided that they could not accept the 
proposals. The Association's Executive were prepared to accept a two- 
and-a-half per cent cut in wages, on condition that all outstanding 
matters to do with the General Strike were cleared up. The NUR was 
prepared to make a contribution, provided that it was equitable and 
applied to everyone. ASLEF would not agree to any cute; they wanted the
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railway companies to present their proposals to the National Wages Board 
(104).
Next day the unions put their conclusions to the railway companies' 
representatives, who said that anything decided at the negotiations would 
be offered to ASLEF; ASLEF's decision meant that it had withdrawn from 
them. The companies offered revised proposals: a five per cent cut from 
the gross pay of all railway employees, but with no adult's pay reduced 
to less than £2 a week; war bonus to be withdrawn a year after the 
proposed cuts came into effect, when they would also be reviewed; the new 
arrangements to be terminable at the end of a year - subject to three 
months notice - by either party to the agreement. (105).
Nothing was decided. Negotiations were to be resumed the following 
afternoon; at a preliminary meeting in the morning J.H. Thomas said that 
the proposal on the war bonus should be rejected and that the unions 
should concede no more than a three-and-a-half per cent cut based on a 
graduated scale. Walkden, for the Association, agreed that the war 
bonus should not be jettisoned but suggested that the maximum cut should 
be two-and-a-ha If per cent ; The NUR's Executive
accepted the flat-rate method by a majority vote, and the meeting was 
then joined by ASLEF's Executive, in attendance at Thomas's invitation. 
After being brought up to date on events so far, they decided to continue 
to insist on formal negotiations(106).
The afternoon meeting turned out to be largely a dialogue between 
Thomas and the railway managers, for two reasons. The meeting was 
mostly about determining, the size of the wage cut and, by now, Thomas had 
a reasonable appreciation of the two unions' thinking on this subject.
The second reason was that also involved in these negotiations were the 
shopmen, whose jobs were most at risk and who were members of the 
NUR(107). A flat-rate wage cut was eventually agreed at 2% per cent.
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subject to ratification by all the railway companies.
The following morning, the Executives of the NUR and the Association
met most of ASLEF's Executive. Walkden and Thomas explained what had
been agreed, and asked them not to present a disunited front to the 
National Wages Board They decided to attend the following morning's 
meeting with the railway companies' representatives(108), and the 
agreement on the cuts was signed on Friday, 27 July. Its terms were much 
like those attached to the railway companies' proposals for a five-per-
cent cut in that it could be terminated after a year, subject to three
months notice (109). It would take effect on 13 August 1928.
The agreement was ratified by a Special Delegate Conference of the 
Association on 12 August(110). In September a similar agreement was 
concluded with the Metropolitan Railway Company (111) and a sub-committee 
was set up to monitor the railway companies' finances and determine when 
the cut ought to be restored (112).
The Wage Cuts Temporarily Lifted; 1929-30
In April 1929 the sub-committee reported that the railway companies' 
traffic figures had improved, and the Association's Executive asked the 
other railway unions to combine with them to start the proceedings 
towards getting railway workers back on full pay. (113). The other unions 
were reluctant to move so soon(114), and it was August before the formal 
notice to end the wage cut was served. The railway companies asked for 
a meeting; (115) the NUR and the Association agreed to one on 24 
September, (116) but ASLEF could go no further until after a meeting 
fixed for its Executive on 7 October(117). The railway companies agreed 
that goods and passenger traffic had increased, but said that receipts 
were still in decline. They supplied statistical evidence, asking the
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unions to study it and to arrange another meeting at which ASLEF could 
be present (118).
On 11 October the three unions agreed that the railway companies had 
not made out a sufficient case for the cut to stand. The Association was 
under some^pressure from its membership(119), its Annual Conference 
having voted in May that the cut should end in November(120). On 
hearing of the unions' decision, the railway companies replied that they 
had hoped the unions would have waited until all the 1929 figures were 
available, insisting that the cut was still needed and the lowest that 
could be managed. They claimed that they would be forced into asking, 
the Wages Boards for larger cuts if the trade unions persisted with their 
pressure.
The trade unions were left to consider their position. Worried 
about the continuing threat to shopmen's employment, the NUR was prepared 
to accept the cut for a further six months from 13 November provided that 
the shopmen's full-time employment was guaranteed. Under pressure from 
its members but ill-placed to resist the railway companies without the 
support of the larger union, the Association proposed a formula for 
retaining the wage cut for another six months, to be followed by a 
twelve-month truce during which there would be no worsening of National 
Agreements. The Executives of the other two»unions accepted the 
proposal, but the railway companies would agree only if the ' truce' 
period was halved. The timetable for the following year therefore 
became: 13 November 1929 to 13 May 1930, wages cut by two-and-a-half per 
cent; 13 May 1930 to 13 November 1930, wages restored. The companies 
made no further moves to reduce wages(121).
The Association's negotiators defended their stewardship to a 
Special Delegate Conference on 20 October 1929. The delegates were not 
too delighted by the prospect of another winter of reduced pay, but they
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were pleased that normality was to follow. There appears to have been a 
general feeling that the negotiators could have done no better(122).
The Annual Conference of 1930 was at Llandudno, in May. The wage 
cut had ended a week earlier, but it appears to have made the membership 
restless about pay and conditions. The Association's policy on them was 
based on the 'Liverpool programme' which.was devised in 1918, finalised 
at a conference in Liverpool, and used for the following year's salary 
negotiations. The Conference of 1930 decided that the Liverpool 
Programme should be superseded by one that took account of relevant 
decisions taken at subsequent Annual Conferences. The Executive was to 
present a draft to a special delegate conference to be held before 9 
November, having first circulated a preliminary version to the 
branches(123).
The Executive did not want a special delegate conference until the 
'truce' had ended(124). Some of them were M. Ps on the Government side, 
and likely to have been especially aware of the poor economic condition 
of both the country and their industry. J. H. Thomas was Lord Privy 
Seal, in the Cabinet and with a brief to reduce unemployment. Even had 
he not discussed the worsening conditions with Walkden, many of the 
Executive were likely to have reasons for being apprehensive about the 
railway companies' plans for the end of the 'truce' and so to have been 
disposed to hold back.
The Association's negotiating committee worked on the new programme 
for some months and the Executive made a few alterations to it in August 
after circulating it to the branches; the Special Delegate Conference was 
to be empowered to decide which items were to be submitted to the railway 
management6(125). During the summer of 1930, the NUR also devised a new 
programme to be considered by a special general meeting held in the 
autumn (126).
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The Wage Cuts Restored, and Wider Issues; 1930-33
The Association's Special Conference was held over the weekend of 
the 8 and 9 November. At an Executive meeting held just beforehand, 
letters from both the British and Irish railway companies were read out. 
Both groups wanted to meet the trade unions to discuss wage economies 
within the next few days, as soon as the truce ended(127).
The Special Delegate Conference spent some of its time discussing 
the impending meeting with the railway companies; delegates had the 
benefit of much 'inspired propaganda' that had appeared in the press 
during the last few days. They decided that the Executive should 
present the new programme to the railway companies when and how they 
wanted. They also 'pledged [the conference's] support to the Executive 
Committee in resisting any encroachments on the standard rates of pay and 
conditions of employment of the Railway, Clerical, Administrative and 
Supervisory Employees'(128),
The following Thursday, the three unions' Executives met 
representatives from the railway companies, and heard proposals for wage 
cuts that were in some ways worse than those proposed in July 1928(129). 
One in particular would have affected a large part of the Association's 
membership most severely: to divide Class 5, the lowest grade of clerk, 
into two classes, 5 and 6. When the male clerical staff were classified 
in 1920, 57.2 per cent were in Class 5(130), so the bulk of railway 
clerks were likely to stay in it all their working lives. Its maximum 
salary was £200 ^er annum at the age of 31. The new proposal would 
effectively restrict many such clerks to a whole working life in class 6, 
with a maximum salary of £150(131).
^The Association's Executive decided on 27 November to reject the 
railway companies' proposals and to ask them to put into effect five
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items from the Association's new programme, These dealt with 
'stagnation' (working in the same grade for a long period); 
classification; non-salaried, unappointed and temporary staff; higher 
class temporary duty; payment for Sunday duty(132).
The Executive and the representatives of the railway companies met 
on 10 December(133). The managers persuaded the Association not to put 
forward the item on classification to the Central Wages Board, but to 
discuss its implications separately with railway managers. There was no 
agreement on the other proposals, and they were referred to the Central 
Wages Board, which passed them to the National Wages Board(134). The 
National Wages Board began hearing evidence on 19 January 1931(135).
The two-and-a-half per cent cut was reinstated, and supplemented; all 
earnings in excess of £100 per annum were to be subjected to a further 
cut of two-and-a-half per cent. Two of the Association's items were 
accepted; on temporary duty in a higher class and payment for 
Sundays(136).
The Trade Union and Co-operative Union members of the National Wages 
Board signed an 'Addendum' to its findings, to the effect that in their 
opinion only public ownership and control could solve the railways' 
problems(137). (This may have been intended to signal to the Minority 
Labour Government, then in office, what its transport policy should be).
A Special Delegate Conference held in London on 15 March accepted the 
findings (138). It is difficult to see what else they could do, although 
it was an unpleasant judgement for them to endorse. From August 1928 
until May 1930 the Association's members had endured a cut of two-and-a- 
half per cent in their earnings, and had warmly greeted their release 
from it, (139). Now, less than a year later, it was reintroduced and was 
practically doubled for many clerks. It would have been with some relief 
that the three railway trade unions shifted their attention to the
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Addendum to the National Wages Board report. On 27 March a joint sub­
committee drawn from the Executives of the three unions was established, 
to take all steps to ensure implementation of the principle of the 
Addenddum. A long-standing Railway Nationalisation Society had 
previously been a minority enthusiasm, although Walkden was a prominent 
member, but it now it became a joint railway trade union effort(140),
Although the Metropolitan Railway and the London Traffic Combine 
(also known as T. 0. T. - Trains, Omnibuses and Tubes) together managed 
most of London's underground railways, the Metropolitan Railway Company 
tended to follow the lead of the main-line railway companies in many ways 
- including industrial affairs - but the London Traffic Combine had its 
own style of management (141). The two companies' conduct of their 
affairs during the economic depression of the 1930's was characteristic; 
employees of the Metropolitan and the main-line railways all had the same 
pay cuts in March 1931(142), whilst the London Traffic Combine made no 
cut but said they would negotiate one if necessary. The 1921 Railway 
Act did not cover their underground railways, so their managements were 
not bound by the National Wages Board's decisions.
The London transport system was not under the same economic pressure 
as the main-line railways. Its work was mostly passenger transport, 
which to a large extent meant moving people between homes in the suburbs 
and work in the City and West End. The inter-war period was notable for 
suburban developments farther and farther from the centre of London and, 
as car ownership was not yet widespread, London's intra-urban transport 
system was economically viable(143). Given its more favourable economic 
circumstances, it may appear strange that the Metropolitan Railway 
Company tended, so often, to conduct its affairs like the main-line 
companies, but for a critical stage of its development its Chairman, Sir 
Edward Watkin, was also Chairman of a main-line railway company in the
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North Midlands, and he has been described as dominating another, in the 
South East. Years earlier, he had attempted to link North Eastern France 
to Northern England via a Channel Tunnel and had proposed a link-up of 
the three railway companies, which he virtually controlled; the South 
Eastern Railway, the Metropolitan Railway and the Manchester, Sheffield 
and Lincolnshire Railway(144). His presence explains why the 
Metropolitan Railway was likely to consider itself a link in the chain of 
main-line railways rather than merely a commuter railway.
In December 1931 the London Traffic Combine gave notice that they 
now wanted a pay cut(145). The three railway unions saw no justification 
for it and told the company that if they combined with the unions to 
persuade the new Coalition Government to reintroduce the London Passenger 
Transport Bill, which had been part of its predecessors' programme, their 
problems would be overcome (146). The Combine did not agree that 
economies which might come by way of the Bill would be sufficient (147).
Nothing more was heard from the Combine for some time, but a pay cut 
went ahead for its Special Class clerks, (148) who were not represented 
by the Association as the Combine did not allow their recruitment(149). 
The Association consulted its London Traffic Combine members, yAio were 
prepared to leave the final negotiations
to the Executive(150). The Combine's wage cuts were announced in July 
1932, and were similar to those handed down by the National Wages Board, 
but with one modification: no adult employee's earnings would fall below
£2.10s. Od in any one week (151).
The Association agreed to the cuts, ASLEF rejected them and the 
other unions that were affected had to consult their members. The 
Combine's bus workers rejected them on a ballot, but the Combine told the 
Transport and General Workers Union, that the cuts would operate from 
23rd September 1932(152). Despite the opposition, there was little
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evidence of disruption either to bus or train traffic. Many employers 
were resorting to wage cuts in the early 1930s and industrial action on 
the issue was unlikely to have commanded much support. Another 
consideration was that London's transport workers were likely to have 
been preoccupied with their prospects as employees in a nationalised 
industry. Contrary to expectations, the Coalition Government had not 
dropped the Labour Government's London Passenger Transport Bill, having 
pragmatically accepted the case for London's underground trains, buses 
and trams to be under unified administration. The Bill was enacted on 13 
April 1933(153).
Whilst the Association's members who worked for the new London 
Passenger Transport Board were considering the implications of their new 
status, those who worked for the four main-line railway companies, were 
faced with the possibility of yet another wage cut. The railway 
companies were known to be casting round for economies. Since May 1932 
(154), the railway trade unions had been negotiating with some of them on 
'pooling' agreements. The essence of these was that companies would 
'pool' competitive traffic and the receipts would also be 'pooled', by 
being divided on the basis of the actual traffic in 1928-30(155), The 
first of these agreements, between the London Midland and Scottish and 
the London and North Eastern companies, was proposed in May 1932; later 
that year the Great Western also became involved(156).
The railway unions were concerned that these arrangements would lead 
to staff dismissals(157), and the Association was particularly worried 
that the Minister of Transport had authorised them without. providing 
safeguards for staff(158). The companies later gave a written 
undertaking that they would not dismiss anyone taken on before 1 July 
1932, but they reserved the right to accelerate the age of retirement and 
to transfer people to worse-paid jobs(159).
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The railway unions monitored pooling closely, but found few specific 
instances of detrimental effects. Examples in the first few months 
include the loss of an opportunity for promotion, when the vacancy 
created by the retirement of the Regional Passenger Manager at York was 
filled by the transfer of a manager from the Cheshire Lines 
Committee(160); another was that of a 59-year-old man who was sacked as a 
direct result of the pooling (161). But accurate monitoring was 
difficult because it entailed distinguishing the direct effects of 
pooling from normal staff movements. The difficulty was exacerbated by 
an actual increase in the total number of workers employed by the railway 
companies between 1933 and 1934(162). As far as total railway employment 
was concerned, 1933 was the worst year of the depression (163) and the 
increase, in part, represented the beginning of a recovery. (A Road 
Traffic Act in 1930 and a Road and Rail Traffic Act in 1933 helped the 
railways to compete on something like equal terms with road haulage).
The recovery could not have been foreseen on 30 September 1932, when 
railway companies' representatives met the three unions and asked for the 
largest wage cut so far: 10 per cent(164). The exact terms were that 
the current cuts imposed under clause 99 of Decision No, 119 of the 
National Wages Board(165) should be replaced by a deduction of 10 per 
cent from the earnings of all railway employees (including railway 
directors) subject to no person's weekly earnings falling below 38s per 
week (166). The unions rejected the proposal at a further meeting on 14 
October(167), and it then began its trek to the National Wages Board, 
where it arrived on 29th November(168).
An interesting feature of this session of the Board, as far as the 
Association was concerned, was Walkden's criticism of the railway 
companies' investment policy; the companies had claimed that their main 
problem was that they had not enough surplus to pay shareholders an
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adequate return on their capital(169), Walkden*s point was that much of 
the railways' capital assets were unremunerative, dating back to the 
early years of railway development and should be written off. He said
that they should be converted into a 'sinking fund', giving the example
of the Glasgow Corporation which had cleared a debt of £2,359,000 by this 
means. He also cited the London and North Eastern Railway Company, which 
had converted some of its stock into a sinking fund debenture stock in 
1930. In connection with the last example, there had been no difficulty 
in clearing the stock: the list was closed within an hour(170). This 
point is important, because the railway companies' representatives said 
that whilst the Government had the resources for this type of exercise, 
the companies had not(171). Their basic argument was that they needed to 
pay reasonable dividends on the capital they borrowed, otherwise 
investors would lose confidence in railway shares. The evidence of the 
LNER's sinking fund appears to be that railway shares were so highly 
regarded in the 1930's that there was much more scope for investment 
management than railway managers, generally, were prepared to 
contemplate.
Criticism of other aspects of railway management in similar terms to
Walkden's tend to confirm that his strictures were just. This was
written in 1974, with a hindsight that Walkden could not possess:
"One cannot, however, acquit the railways of responsibility for some 
part of their economic misfortunes in the inter-war years. For one 
thing, they probably interpreted their obligations more rigidly than the
law demanded........The organizational problems arising from railways
working on a large scale and the growth of a generation of railway men 
unaccustomed to a competitive environment may help to explain the 
deficiencies. The deficiencies, however, existed and contributed to the 
general economic adversity which the railways encountered in the 1920's 
and 1930's." (172).
The railway companies may not have had the same resources as the 
Government but they had itc backing. The Road Traffic Act of 1930 and
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the Road and Rail Traffic Act of 1933 were both partly designed to lessen 
the effect of competition from road transport. There appears to have 
been some appreciation of the 1921 Railway Act's inappropriaAess to 
post-war conditions. It envisaged that the railways' near-monopoly would 
continue for the foreseeable future and this assumption included such 
provisions as the arrangements for fixing freight rates. As has been 
shown, it was unjustified.
The railway companies' other main argument was that their workers 
were overpaid, especially in real terms. They said that wages generally 
had risen by 68 per cent since 1914, but railway wages had risen by 114 
per cent(173). As has been related, the railway companies thought that 
the wage structure they had inherited in 1920 was a bad bargain. The 
railway unions replied that pre-war rates of pay were 'disgracefully' low 
and nobody should dream of returning to them; (174) that rates of pay 
negotiated in 1919 and 1920 were meant to be permanent; and that they had 
then believed management to share this common understanding with 
them(175). Finally, they advanced a Keynesian-type argument ; workers' 
wages were spent every week, circulating quickly: more of this type of
expenditure was needed to move Britain out of recession. They quoted from 
an article in the Railway Gazette, "How can prosperity be expected to 
return if the means for the purchase of industrial produce is reduced." 
(176)
The proceedings of the National Wages Board lasted from 29 November 
to 20 December. Its six separately reported findings came out on 13 
January 1933 and demonstrated disunity, political but unusual, as the 
Wages Boards normally managed to reach consensus. The representatives 
of the railway companies found for the ten per cent deduction; those of 
the Federation of British Industries (FBI) and the Chambers of Commerce 
also agreed on it,’ but insisted on a report of their own. The
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representatives of the Co-operative Union, the TUC and the railway trade 
unions all found against the cuts, but in three separate reports. The 
independent Chairman issued his own report, but there are indications 
that he considered it a compromise all the Board's members should have 
accepted (177).
It will be summarised in some detail because the railway companies 
eventually suggested accepting it. The Chairman proposed the withdrawal 
of the cuts imposed two years earlier, and the introduction of smaller 
ones, to start on the first full pay day after 11 February 1933 and to be 
for conciliation, clerical and supervisory staff (178). The cuts suggested 
for conciliation staff were per cent on all salaries* with an
additional cut of the same percentage for all rates of pay higher than 
50s Od per week. There was a proviso that the cuts should reduce no- 
one' s pay to less than 40s Od per week. The proposed cuts for clerical 
and supervisory grades were similar, but expressed in annual terms; the 
cut was 4 V e  per cent on all salaries with an additional 4 V e  per cent 
for those higher than £125 per annum. The cuts were not to operate on 
additional payments such as allowances, overtime, payment for night work 
and Sunday duty (179).
The Association's Executive at least had the satisfaction of the 
Chairman's acknowledgment that railway workers' wages had been very low 
at the beginning of the war, and his endorsement of their perception of 
the settlements of 1919 and 1920 as intended to remedy this situation and 
set permanent standards. But he did not regard them as irreducible 
minima. Although departures from them required strong justification, he 
thought the railway companies had a sufficient case, for they would not 
be able to raise more capital without offering reasonable dividends. 
However, railway workers had already made a substantial contribution 
towards helping the railway companies out of their difficulties and this
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cut should be the final one(180).
The railway companies wasted no time. Four days after the meeting 
at which the Association's Executive discussed the findings, the 
companies told the three railway unions that they would accept the 
Chairman's proposals even though they thought the wage cut should have 
been larger. The Association's Executive asked the other two railway 
trade unions for a joint meeting with them and also decided to convene a 
Special Delegate Conference on 6 February to decide on their response to 
the railway companies(181).
The joint meeting was held on 24 January. ASLEF had already 
rejected the proposal - the companies' letter had arrived whilst their 
Executive was in session and able to make an immediate decision. After 
some debate about a form of words acceptable to all three, the unions 
agreed on a joint rejection for sending to the railway companies; the 
Association decided not to proceed with the Special Delegate Conference 
(182).
A New 'Machinery of Negotiation'; 1933-35
The railway companies replied to the trade unions on 
2 February 1933. They regretted that the unions could not accept the 
Chairman's report and "they must now proceed to consider afresh the 
situation thus created." (183); their further response, made on 3 March 
1933, was not more pressure for wage cuts, possibly because of some sense 
that the worst of the depression was over. (184).
Instead of trying to score another goal (that is, achieving some 
measure of wage cut) they asked for the goal-posts to be moved by 
modifications in the machinery of negotiation. As laid dowry by Section 
62 of the 1921 Railway Act, they were giving a year's notice that they no
— 86 -
longer wanted to use the whole of its machinery of negotiation. They 
were satisfied that Sectional Councils and Local Departmental Committees 
established under the Act were useful and did not want to interfere with 
them, but they wanted to discuss with the Association other changes they 
now proposed. All the union Executives wanted to preserve the existing 
system and the Association's Executive decided to recommend the impending 
Annual Conference to adopt this as the Association's policy. They also 
asked the other two unions to convene a meeting, so that a common policy 
could be determined(185),
As the issue would only become crucial when the year's notice ran 
out at the beginning of March 1934, it was not intensively pressed during 
the summer and autumn of 1933. There were meetings between railway 
company representatives and the executives of the three railway unions on 
19 July (186), and eventually, on 7 November (187), a small joint sub­
committee was established(188). There were reports of meetings of this 
sub-committee on 19 December and on 10 January 1934, and other 
information about its proceedings was passed on from time to time. One 
item of special interest to the Association was that the management 
proposed that only the three main railway unions would be recognised in 
future. This implied the final disposal of competition from 
organisations such as the North-Eastern Station-masters Association, 
which had been a threat during the recognition negotiations and in the 
aftermath of the General Strike (189).
The Railway Act of 1921 specified that the three railway trade 
unions were to be parties to the Machinery of Negotiation together with 
the railway companies (190), but the new proposals went further in 
allotting specific tasks to the railway trade unions, including their 
headquarters' senior staff. Effectively, no other trade union would be 
recognised by the railway companies under new proposals unless they were
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drastically modified. It soon became evident that the railway companies 
had two main concerns which they hoped the new machinery of negotiation 
would satisfy: that 'trivial* matters should not reach too high a level
and that the successor to the National Wages Board should hold its 
meetings in private.
The draft machinery of negotiation, as finally produced, was a 
thorough 'belt and braces' affair. It over-ensured that the two concerns 
were thoroughly satisfied, but in ways that meant ordinary trade union 
members' scope for airing grievances would be severely limited. The 
trade union representatives could not accept the draft and criticised it 
in detail. The main burden of their strictures was its formalising of 
informal procedures. One proposal in particular was a hostage to 
fortune. Whatever merits union officials might privately have seen in 
it, the idea that one level of negotiation should be 'Discussion between 
the Headquarters of Unions and Companies' would have strengthened the 
hand of dissident trade unionists alert to indications of their 
representatives' alienation from grass-root members.
Criticisms appear to have been muted on one aspect of the 
negotiating machinery - the final tribunal. The trade unionists on the 
joint sub-committee could not accept that its meetings should be in 
private and said so, but they did not express concern that it was to have 
a three-man membership and that its decisions were to be binding. Those 
of the National Wages Board were binding neither on employers nor 
employees, and it had a very wide membership (191). As the trade 
unionists singled out some aspects of the new 'final tribunal' for 
special comment, including the privacy of its proceedings, the absence of 
immediate and specific criticism of the limited membership and the status 
of its decisions is remarkable. These matters are fundamental and, one 
might think, crucial in a sense in which the privacy issue was not. They
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became so identified, and were the features most fiercely attacked when 
it was realised that the companies were not to be persuaded to drop the 
proposals.
The unions' representatives approved of the present system and 
concluded that neither the National Wages Board nor anything else should 
be changed(192). A joint meeting of the three trade unions endorsed 
their recommendations (193), but the railway companies were not 
deterred. Talks between them and the unions continued, and differences 
were not to be quickly resolved, for two main reasons. It would have 
very difficult to modify the companies' proposals in ways that would 
retain their objectives whilst meeting some of the trade unions' 
criticisms and, because the economy of the railway industry was steadily 
improving, the trade union and the railway company negotiators were 
currently involved in talks towards phasing out the 2% per cent cuts. 
Their erosion will be discussed later, but the concurrent talks should be 
kept in mind as part of the background to the establishment of new 
negotiating machinery.
There are reports of six meetings between the railway companies and 
the union delegates in the summer of 1934, between mid-April and mid- 
September (194). At times, both sides showed impatience at the rate of 
progress; on 12 July the unions reported a deadlock to the Ministry of 
Labour(195), and on 16 September the railway companies informed the 
Association that they had given notice that they would accept no findings 
of the Central Wages Board made after 3 March 1934 (196). But by the end 
of 1934, agreement was in sight. The final meeting of the negotiators 
was held on 17 January 1935, and both teams of negotiators recommended 
that the amended machinery of negotiation be accepted by the railway 
companies and the three trade unions (197).
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The trade unions had decided that their negotiating efforts would be 
concentrated on four aspects of the draft Machinery of Negotiation. These 
were:
(a) Constitution of the final tribunal.
<b) Publicity of its proceedings.
(c) Compulsory acceptance of its findings (i.e. to 
be resisted; the importance of this issue had, 
at last, been recognised).
(d) Freedom of reference, (i.e. either side must be
able to refer any claims to the final tribunal) (198)
The unions' efforts are best judged by how far they achieved their aims 
on these issues. The final tribunal remained the three-man body that the 
railway companies proposed(199) - but each railway trade union which had 
an issue before the tribunal could nominate an 'assessor' and the railway 
companies could nominate an equal number of 'assessors'. These assessors 
could be present during the tribunal hearings, could put questions 
through the chairman to elucidate factual matters and could be asked for 
their advice by the tribunal, but otherwise were not to interfere in its 
hearings and were not to sign its decisions(200).
This is certainly a concession of the unions' point (a), but only 
the working of the machinery would determine how valuable it would be.
On point (b), 'Publicity of its proceedings', the implications of the 
modifications which had been achieved were even less clear-cut. The 
relevant paragraph in the revised machinery of negotiation reads, 
"Hearings before the Railway Staff National Tribunal shall be private to 
the parties unless otherwise agreed by the parties or, failing agreement, 
unless otherwise decided by the Tribunal". The phrase "unless otherwise 
decided by the Tribunal" was the unions' addition and it only slightly 
improved the chances that the Tribunal's proceedings would be less than 
totally private. However, the constitutional provision for assessors
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meant'that the Tribunal's proceedings would be more open than the 
managers had first proposed. A three-man tribunal, whose proceedings 
were supposed to be private, would have more chance of keeping them so 
than would a body augmented by up to six assessors - so many more people 
to gossip. The unions were completely successful on their point (c); a 
clause that, "Decisions of the Railway Staff National Tribunal, whether 
unanimous or by a majority, shall be binding upon the parties to any 
agreed reference" was dropped and no reference was made to the status of 
the tribunal's decisions.
The most difficult aspect of the amended machinery to evaluate is 
point (d). The railway managements proposed a number of procedures to 
inhibit progression up the hierarchy of tribunals, so a number of 
modifications were required to satisfy the trade unions. They negotiated 
changes to over a dozen paragraphs of the draft proposals, often to the 
end of ensuring that a member's grievance could reach a high enough level 
for adequate treatment by the unions' standards - again, only experience 
in using the machinery would show how successfully the modifications 
fitted the bill.
The new procedures were certainly not as satisfactory for the unions 
as those prescribed in the 1921 Railway Act, but within the limits of 
their power the unions had achieved a reasonable compromise. Even so, 
they were not able to modify paragraphs such as 18 and 19 of the 
Memorandum of Agreement,
Paragraph 18.
"In no circumstances shall there be any withdrawal 
of labour or any attempt on the part of employees 
to hamper the proper working of the Railway, until 
any matter in the dispute has been submitted 
through the proper channels to the higher 
Management, or, if such matter is within the scope 
of the Machinery of Negotiation, until the 
provisions thereof have been fully utilised."
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Paragraph 19.
"In the event of individuals withdrawing their 
labour or hampering the proper working of the 
Railway in contravention of the provisions of 
Clause 16 hereof the Railway Trade Union shall 
not afford them any support, but shall use their
best endeavours to induce such individuals to
conform to this Agreement. "(201)
Agreeing the the new negotiating machinery may have promoted a 
relationship between the unions and the companies that was helpful for 
securing the unions' exclusive rights of representation, but paragraphs 
18 and 19 imply that they were to some extent to act as agents of 
management. They might, conceivably, find themselves forced by this 
agreement to act contrary to members' perceived interests: it also left
an obstacle to be overcome should the Association become more disposed to 
militancy. A Joint meeting of the three railway trade unions approved
the amended version of the machinery of negotiation on 21 January 1935; a
few outstanding points were clarified the following day and the 
procedures were finally accepted(202).
By the 17 February, the Association's Executive had received some 
responses from the union's branches. Banbury, Barrow and Pontypool 
congratulated them, but Bradford No. 1, Dundee No. 1, Keighley and Reading 
were critical and thought that a special conference should have been 
called before the new procedures were accepted (203). The NUR's 
acceptance did wait upon a Special General Meeting held in London on 20
February. After approval by a vote of 47 to 32, formal agreement took
place on 26 February, with effect from 1 March 1935 (204).
The trade unions' Executives were well aware that the new 
negotiating machinery was less favourable to the unions than that
prescribed by the 1921 Railway Act. It is difficult to know what
judgement to make at this point. Memories of the General Strike were 
still fresh, and, although the economy was improving it still offered
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nothing to be turned to the unions' advantage; it is unlikely that they 
could have made a better bargain. The real test of the unions' mettle 
would come when they used the new procedures, but with a second World War 
soon to overtake events, the evidence for a conclusive judgement was 
never presented.
Restoration of the Pay Cuts; A Beginning; 1934
Economic improvement has already been suggested as the railway 
companies' likely reason for addressing negotiation procedures rather 
than continuing to press for wage cuts. There was sufficient evidence of 
it by the Spring of 1934 for the unions to decide that they might 
reasonably ask for existing cuts to be abolished.
The Association arranged a meeting with the other two railway unions 
on 10 April. It began with the Executive reading the riot act to the 
others for having already asked the railway companies to repeal the cuts, 
without waiting for a meeting to co-ordinate their efforts. The other 
unions were quite willing to coordinate their negotiations, saying that 
they in fact preferred to do so. Their early action had, however, 
cleared the way for a process that was going to be protracted. The new 
London Passenger Transport Board was not prepared to begin negotiations 
until the end of its first year's working in August, but the NUR had 
arranged to meet the main-line railway companies. Although Walkden 
thought that it was too early to ask for complete abolition of the cuts, 
he favoured the Association's cooperation with the other unions (205). 
Their first joint meeting with the railway companies only elicited that 
the companies would need more time for consideration (206).
The railway unions' negotiating teams' preoccupation with the new 
negotiating machinery meant that it was 12 July before they had their
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first meeting on the wage cuts. They decided to ask for another meeting 
with the General Managers of the Main Line Railway Companies, and for the 
the London Passenger Transport Board to abolish their cuts, as their 
economic position had improved considerably(207).
Their first meeting with the railway managers took place on 20 July 
and was not very productive. The railway managers said that their 
economic position did not warrant complete abolition, but hinted that a 
partial easement would be possible. They also suggested that the matter 
should be referred to arbitration. The NUR and ASLEF said that they 
would need to consult their Delegate Conference before discussing a 
partial restoration of the wage cut (208),
The three unions met again to co-ordinate their negotiating stance 
on the morning of the 8 August; they were to meet the railway managers 
again the following day. The NUR and ASLEF had originally put forward 
claims regarding overtime, Sunday duty, and other matters as well as the 
restoration of the wage cuts; it was decided to drop these supplementary 
issues and concentrate on the removal of the initial 2% per cent cut 
which affected all railway workers. ASLEF said they would need to 
consult their Delegate Conference again before agreeing to this change in 
negotiating tactics (209), but they must have had it on hand as they were 
able to ensure negotiating unanimity by 9.30 the following morning(210) 
The unions also agreed to ask the London Passenger Transport Board to 
hold a joint meeting the following month to discuss the cuts, but the 
Board wanted to wait until February 1935(211).
The unions met the railway management again 9 August. The managers 
initially claimed to be in no position to restore the cuts; they said the 
unions should either submit their case to arbitration or wait until 
February, when the financial situation would be clearer. The Association 
suggested, probably with collective tongue in cheek, that the case should
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be arbitrated by the National Wages Board as the body which had 
originated the cuts - a provocative suggestion when, at the railway 
companies' instigation, the parties to the discussions about the cuts were 
pursuing parallel discussions about abolishing the National Wages Board. 
The railway managers, surprisingly, took up the suggestion, but the NUR 
and ASLEF would have none of it - they wanted something straight away. 
They then stated the collective claim, which was for the first 2% per 
cent deduction to be abolished, the second 2% per cent deduction to 
stand, and the arrangement to take effect from 1 September.
The railway managers rejected the claim, but were willing to drop 
the second 2% per cent on earnings over 40/- per week (or £100 per annum) 
because this would cost less; they were also prepared to ease conditions 
for those earning 40/- to 45/- per week(212). The unions pressed hard, 
but the only adjustment they could make was an alteration of the time- 
scale over which the second 2% per cent should be eroded. In the end it 
was agreed that it would be reduced to IH per cent from 1 October, and 
abolished after 1 January 1935 (213).
On 11 September the London Passenger Transport Board also agreed to 
abolish their second 2% per cent cut in two stages. This, was in line 
with the main line railway companies(214), but their finances improved so 
rapidly that they were able to abolish all their wage cuts much earlier. 
In December they announced that their 'first' 2% per cent would be 
removed in two stages, IW per cent after 1 April next, and the rest from 
the 1 June. So, by June 1935, the London Passenger Transport Board no 
longer cut their employees' wages (215).
This settlement for the LPTB led to increased demands from members 
and the other unions that the main-line Companies cuts should be 
removed(216), but it took some time for the unions to organise a joint 
approach(217). In May, ASLEF's Annual Assembly of Delegates resolved
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that all steps should be taken to remove the final 2% per cent (218), but 
it was September before there was another joint union meeting.
Restoration of the Pay Cuts; The Final Phase and Some Real
Improvements; 1935-37
By now, the negotiating machinery had been changed, the London 
Passenger Transport Board* s cuts were a memory and the main-line
companies' second 2% per cent cut was old news; it was time to erode the
last wage cut. The railway trade unions arranged to meet the Railway 
Staff Conference on 22 October 1935. All the main-line railway companies 
were represented on this body; its existence was formalised by the hew 
Machinery of Negotiation. The management side said at the October 
meeting that they could recommend no further alteration in the wage cuts 
because the net railway revenue for 1935 was not expected to be much 
different from that for 1934. That figure was £6 million less than the 
revenue for 1930(219), the basis of the cuts imposed under National Wages 
Board Decision No. 119. Dissatisfied, the unions asked for a meeting with 
the General Managers (220), which took place on 7 January 1936. The
railway companies were then prepared to compromise, as were the NUR and
the Association; but it was nine days before ASLEF agreed to join them 
(221). (ASLEF's reservations protracted this phase of the negotiations 
and were a portent of future disunity amongst the railway unions).
On 10 March the railway companies offered £600,000 towards easing 
the cuts and made two suggestions as to how it could be expended (222).
It may appear a strange concession by the General Managers, after what 
had been said at the Railway Staffs Conference the previous October. It 
was not simply that the General Managers reserved to themselves the right 
to offer what 'goodies' were available. Although the railway industry's
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net revenue was lower in both 1934 and 1935 than it had been in 1930, 
there had been changes that made the railway companies better able to 
manage without cutting their employees' wages. The industry had become 
more efficient, with the Southern Railway's electrification of many of 
its suburban lines, some electrification around Manchester and Tyneside, 
and the use of larger, more powerful locomotives on long- distance routes 
(223), The 'Pooling Agreements', already mentioned as a source of 
concern that some of the Association's members might lose their 
Jobs(224), had probably led to some savings. The Government responded to 
the discovery of the effects of road transport on the railways; and one 
particular statutory measure gave the railways a much-needed opportunity 
to stabilize some of their traffic. The Local Government Act of 1929 
provided for them to be relieved of three-quarters of the rates levied on 
them, on condition that the savings were used to reduce the rates for the 
carriage of various goods: agricultural produce; coal, coke and patent ,
fuel either for export or to be used in iron and steel works; raw 
materials for the manufacture of iron and steel (225), Possibly as a 
result of the consequential review of the railways' liability to pay 
local rates it was discovered that they had been over-assessed since 
April 1931, so the four main-line railway companies eventually found 
themselves with rate rebates of £12,993,558 (226). This alone would 
have made easing the wage cut much less of a financial problem.
The unions offered an alternative to the companies' two suggestions 
of 10 March; on 25 March the companies sent them back with a few 
modifications. The Association wanted to accept at this stage, because 
the offer now differed little from its own proposals(227). The other 
Executives decided to consult their members, but recommended acceptance 
to them(228).
By June, the union conferences were over and the three executives
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could decide how to procédé. The NUR's Special Delegate Meeting had 
instructed their Executive to negotiate for a better deal and to report 
back before making a decision, but they did not reject the General 
Managers' offer. ASLEF*s Conference decided that it was inadequate and 
that the wage cut should be removed. They also decided that a number of 
improvements to their conditions should be included in the next phase of 
negotiations, and that these should be pressed through the negotiating 
machinery. The ASLEF Executive had opposed being mandated to these 
proposals by their conference, but had been over-ruled. They still 
wanted to be included in the Joint negotiations, but could not modify 
their position. The Association's Conference had supported its Executive 
in trying to persuade the railway companies to pay railway employees 
their full wages (229).
The divisions amongst the railway unions made the General Managers' 
task easier when they next met the unions on 12 June, All three unions 
pressed for an improvement in the companies' offer of 25 March, but the 
companies refused to budge and said that unless the three unions accepted 
their offer unanimously, the matter would have to take its course through 
the negotiating machinery (230). The managers would have realised that 
the differences between the unions would make it difficult for them to 
present a good case. Added to this, one of the railway chairmen 
regretted the offer of 25 March and thought that the General Managers 
should ask the Railway Staff National Tribunal for further reductions in 
pay (231).
The two other unions tried to persuade ASLEF to recall their 
conference, so that the three unions could accept the companies' offer, 
but the ASLEF Executive said this could not be done(232). Because the 
railway managers insisted on unanimity of acceptance the NUR and the 
Association had no alternative but to take the case through the new
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negotiating machinery(233), It passed through the Railway Staff National 
Council on 18 June and was considered by the Railway Staff National 
Tribunal between 15 and 20 July(234). The Tribunal's decision, its first 
one, is dated 27 July, and gave the railway workers more than the 
railway managers offered. The cut was reduced to IH per cent, but some 
cuts in overtime rates were also restored. The decision was accepted by 
both the NUR and the Associâtion(235). The new rates were to operate for 
a year from 16 August, after which they could be further modified either 
by agreement or formal negotiation.
ASLEF negotiated its separate claims later in the year. None was 
conceded, but Decision No. 1 of the Railway Staff National Tribunal 
applied to the union's members (236). Although Decision No. 2, dated 29th 
December, 1936, turned down ASLEF's claims, it made an important 
concession of principle; "If the improvement in the net revenues of the 
railways continued, railway employees could obtain a share in the 
improvement without waiting for the large increase in railway profits 
that would be required before the Standard Revenue (£51,359,095) can be 
reached" (237).
The Railway Staff National Tribunal Decision No.1 had stipulated 
that wages should remain as they were for a year, but it was tacitly 
agreed that negotiations should begin once the 1936 railway returns were 
available; the railways' net revenue for 1936 did show an increase, so at 
least this portion of the unions' negotiating argument would be 
favourable(238).
The three unions arranged for a joint meeting to be held on 12 March 
v^en, it was hoped, a combined negotiating position could be organised. 
This year, negotiations were to be addressed not only to the remaining 
cuts, but all three unions were also presenting claims for improvements 
to wages and conditions. The Association had five claims:
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Cessation of the IH per cent deduction.
Special increases in pay for those for whom promotion is 
not available. (Also called allowance for stagnation). 
Reduction of hours of duty to a 36 hour week.
Extra payment for time worked between 6.00 pm and 
6.00 am. Time off in lieu of work on Bank and Public 
Holidays. (239).
The discussion which followed the presentation of the unions' 
programmes laid down ground rules for the next phase of combined pay 
negotiations. Previously, this had not been thought necessary, but 
earlier negotiations had been principally concerned with the removal of 
the wage cuts. Although a remnant of these remained, the next 
negotiations would concentrate on specific improvements and, as each 
union catered for people doing different types of work, they had 
different priorities. There was another reason for the ground rules - 
the memory of the previous year's negotiations was still fresh, with 
awareness of the effects of the disunity displayed by the unions.
The ground rules were that each union would consider the proposals 
of the others and that if general agreement were not reached on all items 
in the three separate programmes, each union should be free to submit 
its own; and that the proposals of all three unions should be submitted 
on the same date, to be agreed between the General Secretaries(240).
The item about 'stagnation' in the Association's 'short programme' 
(the term used to distinguish it from the comprehensive programme that 
covered its wider and longer-term policy) needs further explanation. The 
Association's members had long pressed for such a provision. Many of 
them spent all their working lives in the lowest clerical grade, because 
they worked where there was no scope for promotion. It was argued that 
extra pay was justified for them after they had spent a substantial time 
in the grade. The problem became more acute between the wars because, 
although it was especially likely to be manifest at small, remote
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locations, one of the largest concentrations of clerks in London had been 
beset by it since the war. This was the Railway Clearing House(241), set 
up early in the history of the railways to apportion payment for the 
transport of goods and passengers amongst the railway companies over 
whose lines they were carried(242). After 1922, when the many railway 
companies were reduced to four, the Clearing House's work was drastically 
reduced and became less complex, resulting in less scope for promotion. 
Eventually, the companies were to recognise the Clearing House's problems 
with a scheme for stagnation compensation and the Association was to 
attempt to try to generalise from the Clearing House scheme(243).
The joint claim, which included the Association's programme, was 
discussed only briefly in a preliminary meeting with the railway 
companies. It was set on its course through the negotiating machinery 
soon after the joint union meeting on 12 March 1937, ending at the 
Railway Staff National Tribunal in July 1937. During this tribunal's 
hearings, the Railway Rates Tribunal announced (on July 28th) its 
agreement to the railway companies' request to raise their charges by 5 
per cent(244). The railway companies' expectation would have been that 
this would increase the revenue available to them; its immediate effect 
would be to persuade the members of the RSNT that they could view the 
union's case with some generosity. There were other grounds for 
supposing that the railway companies were becoming more prosperous, for 
1936 was the third consecutive year that the railway revenue account 
showed a net increase. It should be remarked here that the increase in 
charges did not have the hoped-for effect: they came into operation on 
1 October 1937, and the net revenue figure for 1938 fell by nearly £9 
million. For the LNER this was the wjrst inter-war year(245). However, 
the Railway Staff National Tribunal's only evidence on railway revenue 
was optimistic, but even so they were not over-generous. The most
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notable feature of their decision was that the railways could once more 
be happy in the knowledge that they were honest employers who paid their 
employees their full wages. The 1# per cent deduction ceased as from 16 
August 1937, exactly a year after it was reduced from 2% per cent.
The Association only succeeded with two items of the rest of its 
programme. Members who were required to work on Whit-Monday or August 
Bank Holiday were to receive a day off in lieu with pay for each day 
worked; this appears to be the beginning of a railway institution known 
as 'compensatory leave'. The Association's other success was that clerks 
who were required to work throughout the night hours between 10 pm and 4 
am were to be relieved of one turn of duty for every fifteen turns 
worked. If relief was not feasible, there was to be a day's pay in 
lieu(246). The settlement was the Railway Staff National Tribunal's 
Decision No. 3, and it also restored the pre-1931 overtime rates (247). 
All its awards came into effect on the 16 August 1937.
Assessment. Improvements and Prospects; 1937-1939
The tribunal's decision marked the end of the wage cuts which had 
lasted for over seven years(248), during which time the negotiating 
efforts of the three railway trade unions had been largely concentrated 
on removing them. The Association's Executive were now in a position to 
start thinking about real improvements in the working conditions of their 
members. There were two major constraints on this: 1938 was to be a
very poor financial year for the railway industry and the second World 
War was visibly on the horizon. But whilst the uncertainty engendered by 
the increasing expectation of war was a constraint on serious long-term 
plans, one aspect of war preparations acted as a spur to wage 
negotiations. This was a rise in the cost of living which was so evident
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by October 1938, as to merit a short debate at that month's Executive 
meeting(249).
The Association's current programme of pay and conditions had been 
devised in 1930(250) during the brief interregnum between the two wage 
cuts. One item that illustrates its character as an expression of hope 
for better times to come is its 'category 12, (hours of duty)' which 
states that a week's work should be no more than 38 hours. Railway 
clerks' standard working week was 48 hours, and they had to wait until 
1947 before it was reduced, and then only to 42 hours(251).
The programme could not be used as a basis for general negotiations 
in the late 1930^y^ but in April 1937 it was submitted to the London 
Passenger Transport Board. This was not quite as irrational as it may 
appear. The Board had given up its wage cut two years earlier, and was in 
a stronger economic position than the main-line railway companies; as has 
been explained, its business was mostly passenger transport and Londoners 
maintained their long-established tendency to move further towards the 
peripheries of London, and away from the centre where they worked(252). 
Work in London tended to be clerical work in administration, commerce, 
and business, and was less affected by unemployment than the 
manufacturing industries, for whose needs the main-line railways catered.
Changes in the location of industry during the 1930J?^ also 
contributed towards the Board's prosperity. With rapid growth in the use 
of electricity, industry could tap energy anywhere in the country and was 
no longer constrained to stay close to the coal-fields; new industries 
tended to be located near their larger markets. They were often 
concerned with consumer goods such as cars and household machinery, and 
their markets were the bigger conurbations. London, as the largest, 
acquired a sizable number of factories producing consumer goods. But 
despite its relative prosperity, the Board rejected the Association's
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programme, saying that none of its items nor anything else could be 
considered until the main-line railway companies learned the decision of 
the Railway Staff National Tribunal, which was made in August 1937(253).
Any members of the Association's Executive who were not already 
convinced that the 1930 Programme needed revision would have been 
persuaded by now, so a revised version was prepared and also, perhaps 
more importantly, a new 'short programme' was devised (254). The 
Executive recommended that it should be confined to proposals for 
improvements in salaries, special payments and conditions for night 
workers(255). Draft programmes were ready in November 1937, and were 
circulated to the branches who were told that a special delegate 
conference would be held in February, 1938, to produce a definitive 
version.
Although the London Passenger Transport Board had rejected the
Association's programme - and one from the NUR at the same time(256) -
»
the railway unions considered it to be the section of the railway 
industry with the best prospects for improving workers' pay and 
conditions. So, after the Annual Report of the LPTB was available, the 
three unions met on 11 November to consider the possibilities. John 
Marchbank, for the NUR, said that the figures submitted by the Board did 
not justify resubmitting the programmes, but that some progress might 
ensue if the unions took up a suggestion from Frank Pick (Vice Chairman 
of the LPTB) that they drop their programmes and negotiate on specific 
issues(257). On 30 November, the Association was advised by a meeting of 
its members who worked for the Board that it should aim for a flat-rate 
increase and salaried-staff status for women ticket clerks(258).
The three unions had a number of meetings with officers of the 
London Passenger Transport Board in January and February 1938, and signed 
an agreement at the end of February. They began on 3 January by
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withdrawing their programmes, substituting specific claims, The 
Association's five proposals included time off in lieu of work on Bank 
Holidays, pay and conditions for special groups, and pay increases for 
most of the Association's members who worked for the Board(259). The 
proposals were lengthy, but the Association's negotiators seem to have 
tried to cover every possible case. The Board's officers undertook to 
respond to the claims at a meeting in three weeks' time
It was on 25th January; Frank Pick reported that the Board was 
prepared to improve the wages of the lowest paid grades and also to 
improve trainmen's conditions, especially in regard to 'spreadover' 
turns. The main offer on the Association's proposals was that the women 
ticket clerks' work would be examined with a view to regrading. The 
Board was prepared to grant a day off in lieu for work performed on Whit 
Monday and August Bank Holiday - this was something main-line Association 
members already enjoyed - but not to improve clerical and supervisory 
workers' salaries, as Board's salaried staffs' pay and grading were 
better than for equivalent main-line staff. Walkden said that Pick had 
not put forward any arguments to overturn the Association's case so he 
concluded that it would be possible to go back to the Board if a similar 
approach were also made to the main-line companies. Frank Pick offered 
the unions the opportunity to discuss enlargement of the Board's London 
Area, which carried some extra pay weighting, but with nothing to be 
agreed unless the main-line companies also enlarged their areas(260).
When the unions learned the details of what the LPTB proposed, W. J. R. 
Squance, for ASLEF, said that his union was thinking of rejecting the 
Board's offer. In the event it did not, but added a dissenting paragraph 
to the Memorandum of Agreement(261>. W. Stott, for the Association, said 
that it wanted to do as much as possible for the women ticket clerks, but 
intended to submit its 'short programme' to the Board and the main line
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companies at the same time(262).
•Hu,
The Memorandum of Agreement between^ Board and the unions was signed 
on the 28 February. Its most important aspect, as far as the subsequent 
history of railway pay negotiations is concerned, is that the minimum 
weekly wage of the lowest paid grade was raised first to 50s.Od, 
backdated to January 1938, and then to 52s Od with effect from 1 January 
1939. Women clerks at Chiswick and the senior women clerks at the other 
locations were the only ones whose work was deemed to justify admission 
to salaried status. Other pay increases were for motormen (the 
underground railway's term for train-drivers) whose minimum weekly pay 
went up to 78s Od, a rate which was not to be achieved by main-line 
drivers until October 1939(263), but ASLEF's aspiration for something 
even better was shown by the dissenting rider to its formal 
agreement(264).
The Association's short programme went to the board and the main­
line companies in May 1938. On 15 July, Frank Pick said the Board was 
still considering it(265). Stott met him in December, 1938, and was told 
that the Board's financial circumstances were better than those of the^  
main-line companies, but not strong enough for it to introduce the 
Association's short programme. He said that the Association should await 
the Railway Staff National Tribunal's decision on it; a favourable 
decision from the Tribunal would support the case for the Association's 
members who worked for the Board. There would still be a case if the 
Tribunal decided that improved conditions should wait upon improvements 
in the main-line companies' finances, but Pick would have to reject the 
short programme out of hand if asked for an immediate reply(266). The 
Railway Staff National Tribunal rejected it, as will be seen, but Pick 
offered stagnation allowances the which the Association accepted(267).
The offer was that £10 per annum should be added to the pay of Class
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5 men and 2s 6d per week to that of Class 2 women who had been their 
grades for five years (268). The Executive Committee wanted the award 
extended to booking clerks and women ticket clerks, and also wanted 
improved rates for night work. Pick said that it could not be extended, 
but he would recommend that the Board accept the claim for night duty 
sybject to the concurrence of the main-line companies(269). The 
negotiations were still in progress in July 1939, on the eve of the War. 
Wartime conditions made profound changes to many aspects of civilian life 
and wage negotiations had their share of change. At the beginning of 
1940, railway salaried staff had their pay increased by £10 per annum and 
in June, 1940, another £8 was added to this advance (270).
Despite the fate of the Association's short programme, there was 
^ome progress on stagnation for some other members of the Association as 
well as those at the London Passenger Transport Board. These were clerks 
at the Railway Clearing House, where the problem was especially pressing. 
They were offered their stagnation scheme in September 1938, but one 
element in it was more like the LNER*s accelerated retirement scheme than 
the London Passenger Transport Board's stagnation scheme. The offer of 
£10 per annum for Class 5 clerks who had not been promoted was a less 
generous offer than the Board's similar provision, because Clearing House 
clerks who qualified for it had be be over 39 years old and individually 
eligible for promotion. The accelerated retirement provision was that 
employees who were 57 years old or over could ask for leave with pay 
prior to retirement. Their pre-retirement pay would be equal to the 
pension they would receive at the age of 60 (their normal retirement age 
in 1938) and a lump sum equal to the employee's contribution to the 
Superannuation Fund would be paid out when he left. It was hoped that 
the scheme would make room for promoting clerks who had spent a long time 
on Grade 5; if early retirement was taken by all the higher-grade clerks
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vdio qualified for it there would be scope for 283 promotions. The
Association decided to participate in the scheme (271).
Although it was important for clerks at the Railway Clearing House,
they represented only a small part of the Association's membership. The
main thrust of the Association's negotiating efforts in the few years 
immediately prior to the war was, of course, to improve conditions for 
the majority of their members who worked for the four main-line railway 
companies. The drafts of the two new programmes which were devised to 
specify the required improvements were debated at a Special Delegate 
Conference in London over the weekend of 12 and 13 February 1938. The 
Conference was scheduled to consider the revised version of the standard 
programme and the new short programme. It spent most of its time on the 
short programme, but three items were quarried from the standard 
programme and added to the Executive's draft of the short version. These 
concerned hours of duty (i.e. asking f.or a 40 hour week), unappointed 
clerks and annual holidays (272). The Executive were most concerned by 
the addition of the item on the length of the working week, as they were 
worried that the NUR and ASLEF would not support it (273).
The standard programme was never debated in detail by a delegate 
conference, so it remained a draft programme, but the Special Conference 
used it to augment the Executive's draft short programme. Two features 
of the 1938 draft standard programme may explain why it was left in 
draft. These are its specifications for an age scale ending at 28 years 
and for a common salary scale for male clerks, women clerks, station- 
masters, agents, and traffic controllers. Neither of them was in the 
1938 short programme, which reverted to the style of the current 
agreement which had been negotiated in 1919. In 1918 many of the members 
liked long age-scales and argued for one that extended to 42 years of 
age, as Association policy(274). This may have been their response to
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stagnation, but the Executive did not like it in 1918 and by 1938 were 
trying to make age-scales even shorter. The general salary scale appears 
to be an attempt to get equal pay for women and a standard approach to 
all members whatever their grade. It was probably felt that persuading 
the railway companies to accept the two proposed innovations as well as 
increased pay and better conditions was too optimistic, and politic for 
the programme to remain in draft form for the time being.
The three unions held a joint meeting on 4 May 1938, to consider 
their programmes and to agree a joint approach to the railway companies. 
The two other unions detailed their programmes(275) and the Association 
said it was to submit a version of the short programme. As the Executive 
expected, the item that excited the most interest was the claim for a 40 
hour week. The NUR thought it should be dropped, but the Association's 
representatives said that it must stand, as it had been agreed by a 
delegate conference(276).
The Association submitted its programme to the Railway Staffs 
Conference on 20 May(277). Before the three trade unions' claims reached 
the final tribunal, representatives of the four main-line railway 
companies asked the unions to meet them. By the time of the meeting, 12
October, it was evident how poor a year 1938 would be, with receipts for
the first 39 weeks at £4% million less than in 1937; the managers 
estimated the cost of the Association's claim at £3,262,000(278). The 
NUR had already estimated that their claim would cost £5 million per 
annum(279); the managers' estimate of the combined claims was £6*
million, and they asked the unions to drop them (280). The unions now 
knew how strongly their their claims would be opposed, but they continued 
to press them through the negotiating machinery.
On 8 November, representatives of the three unions met the General 
Managers of the four main-line companies and their principal assistants.
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For the companies, it was said that 1938 was going to be a very poor 
year. The returns showed that the first half of the year was the most 
disastrous since 1926 and the net revenue for 1938 was unlikely to reach 
£30 million. (They were right - it did not reach £29 million(281). If 
management's predictions turned out to be correct, they would have to cut 
their costs. The unions' General Secretaries said they would 
nevertheless be proceeding with their claims at the Railway Staff 
National Council the following week (282).
The Meeting of the Railway Staff National Council was held on 14 
November. The Association withdrew two items in its claim; one was on 
the extension of the London area, withdrawn on the understanding that the 
companies would discuss the whole question. The Companies did not want a 
blanket increase in the qualified area, but were prepared to consider 
selected localities, one example being Enfield. The other item was that 
the designation 'Unappointed Clerks' should be dropped; it was withdrawn 
on the understanding that there would be thorough and sympathetic 
discussions about giving all clerks appointed status (283).
At a meeting on 23 November, the unions decided to submit all their 
claims to the Railway Staff National Tribunal early in the New Year; the 
actual date was 24 January, 1939. The decision of the RSNT (Decision 
No. 5) was delivered on 28 February, and made only two concessions: a 
minimum of 3 hours' payment for workers called out on Sunday and some 
limits on spreadover (sometimes known as 'split') turns - these related 
to two of the NUR's claims and one of ASLEF's. The Association's short 
programme was completely rejected(284). The NUR decided to pursue the 
claim for a minimum wage of 50s Od a week(285). They had some hope of 
success, because this was the minimum conceded by the London Passenger 
Transport Board a year earlier, and now risen to 52s Od(286). ASLEF
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decided to continue to pursue its separate claims without modification 
<287).
Normal Negotiations Suspended; 1939
During the Spring and Summer of 1939 it became increasingly evident
that there was going to be a war. Rearmament had become official
Government policy in 1934 and began in earnest in 1935(288). The work of 
Air Raid Precautions (ARP) had also begun in 1935, and in 1937 local
authorities were put under duties to establish ARP facilities (289). In
April 1939, for the first time ever in peacetime, the Government 
introduced military conscription. It may have appeared a modest 
proposal, in that all men aged 20 and 21 were to undergo six months 
military training(290), but in most cases the six months lasted until 
1945 or 1946.
The active preparations for war which began in the middle of the 
1930^ developed gradually, and such activities as the establishment of 
'shadow aircraft factories' or rearmament in general had no apparent 
effect on railway finances until the second quarter of 1939, but 
thereafter it was dramatic. Traffic receipts were a quarter of a million 
pounds a week greater than those of a year earlier(291). ASLEF continued 
to press its claims, and the railway companies' reluctance to grant a 
minimum weekly wage of 50s Od must have been incomprehensible to the NUR. 
As the Association sorted out its affairs against a background of 
changing conditions, the ordering of priorities became important, and one 
was the NUR's claim. The Association had been a party to the London
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Passenger Transport Board's agreement of February 1938, which included 
conciliation staff, and recognised that equity demanded a similar minimum 
wage for their main-line equivalents. A spokesman for the railway 
companies had pointed out at the Railway Staff National Tribunal in 
August 1937^ that although some clerks earned less than 50s Od a week the 
Association was not asking for a rise in their wages(292). These were 
Class 5 clerks aged 22 or less whose pay would rise with their age. 
Conciliation staff on less than 50s Od a week would remain below it 
unless they were promoted.
The Association's Conference of May 1939 agreed that the short 
programme should not be pursued for the moment, but expressed sympathy 
for the NUR's claim for the minimum wage(293). When the Association's 
Executive and the other unions met the General Managers on 30 June to 
consider 'labour costs', they reported their Conference's decision; ASLEF 
were still pursuing their original claim and the NUR were concentrating 
on the minimum wage. The General Managers said that after consideration, 
they would call another meeting(294).
In acquiescing in the RSNT Decision No.5, the Association did not 
stop attempting to improve their members' conditions. As hinted 
previously, their decision was probably partly motivated by the 
realisation that the war was imminent and that it would be difficult to 
proceed with its programme under changing conditions. It was more 
realistic to concentrate on immediate problems and offer a helping hand 
to the larger union, whose limited objective should be more capable of 
realisation. An idea of the issues they continued to pursue can be 
gathered from the minutes of a meeting of the Railway Staff Conference 
(i.e. management representatives and representatives of the NUR and the 
Association)(295). They were copied and circulated to the membership on 5 
May 1939, perhaps for the same reasons that make them of special interest
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today.
One Issue which was debated was the problem of 'Unappointed Clerks', 
one of the items dropped from the short programme at the Railway Staff 
National Council level on 8 November 1938. At the meeting with the 
Railway Staff Conference some of the promised 'thorough and sympathetic' 
discussion took place, but nothing was decided. It was not to be 
expected that any decision would emerge, given the nature of the meeting 
- that is, as part of the procedures through which continuous dialogue 
was, and is, maintained as a feature of the relationship between railway 
trade unions and railway managers. Other topics were also discussed, and 
an especially interesting item dealt with Air Raid Precautions(ARP), 
national service and conscription. The companies had no answers to 
questions about protection, evacuation or volunteering for ARP or other 
forms of national service, but they said they would soon be issuing a 
statement. They were also questioned about what would happen to 
superannuation allowances, reinstatement, insurances and mortgages for 
men called up as Reservists, Volunteers, Territorials or Conscripts - and 
had the same reply.
This meeting is of special interest because it demonstrated 
transformation from peacetime conditions to readiness for war, and how 
far it had gone by May 1939. The NUR and the Association appear to have 
reacted to the current climate by either limiting their immediate wage 
claim or temporarily dropping it. But ASLEF had made no such adjustment, 
and behaved as though nothing was changing. Their attitude seems to have 
created a rift between them and the other two unions. The ASLEF 
Executive must have been made impatient by constantly being told - to 
paraphrase a catch-phrase that was to become all too common later - 
"don't you know there's a war coming", and by now, they were 
contemplating a strike. On 10 August, ASLEF's representatives met
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railway company representatives separately by their own choice, not 
wanting a meeting which included the other two unions (296).
Their mood would have been sharpened because the NUR had obtained 
part of its claim. At a meeting between the three unions and the General 
Managers on 28 July, it was announced that the minimum rate for 
conciliation staff was raised to 45s Od per week(297). A subsequent 
Special General Meeting of the NUR, held on 11 August, 1939, had decided 
to continue to press for the minimum wage, but not to call for a strike, 
and thanked the Association for dropping its claim and supporting the 
NUR's (298),
The NUR and the Association met the General Managers again on August 
14th. John Marchbank, for the NUR, said that his General Meeting was 
still pressing for a 50s Od minimum; the managers replied that their 
financial position would not allow them to increase the minimum of 45s Od 
which had recently been conceded. W. Stott, for the Association, said it 
was not pressing its claims further and had expressed sympathy with the 
NUR. But he said that if anything more was conceded, then, in view of 
the comments made at the RSNT, the Association's claim for night duty 
deserved to be considered; and that the Railway Clearing House's 
' numbertaking' staff suffered from very unsatisfactory conditions(299).
There had been some question of ASLEF's claim going to arbitration. 
Both Stott and Marchbank were opposed; it would be an extension of the 
machinery of negotiation and might erode its basic principles. It is not 
clear what was implied, but their conversation appears to have killed any 
idea of arbitration. The managers said they had told ASLEF that the 
claim could not be met but that it could be taken back to the RSNT. On 
16 August they amplified this, telling ASLEF's representatives that if 
they wanted the Railway Staff National Tribunal to be reconvened on the 
grounds that circumstances had changed since January, then the General
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Managers would expedite a meeting of the Tribunal<300).
This does not appear to have satisfied ASLEF, because a strike was 
planned for 26 August(301). War was little more than a week away and 
preparations for it, involving intensive use of the railways, were well 
in hand. ASLEF was called to the Ministry of Labour on 25 August and 
subsequently called off the strike (302). In a few days' time, starting 
on 1 September, 3, 823 special trains were to evacuate over a million and 
a^quarter school children with their teachers and some other adults such 
as pregnant women and nursing mothers (303).
The NUR's claim for a 50s Od minimum went to the Railway Staff 
National Council on 29 August, (304) and then, together with an ASLEF 
claim for increased pay, to the Railway Staff National Tribunal. The NUR 
got its award, but at 50s Od only for London. There was a minimum of 48s 
Od in industrial areas and 47s Od in rural areas, the corresponding rates 
for women being 38s Od, 36s 6d, and 35s Od. The minimum weekly rate for 
engine drivers was increased from 72s Od to 78s Od. This decision.
Number 6, dated 10 October, 1939, settled this last peacetime claim heard 
by the Tribunal; after that, wartime conditions were in force(305).
The distinction between pay decisions in peacetime and wartime 
arises because peacetime pay is supposed to reflect normal, market 
conditions. As has been related, the railway clerical staff's pay for 
the whole of the inter-war period was based on an agreement negotiated in 
1919. Despite the cuts that were made from time to time, the agreement 
of 1919 remained the basis for wages and subsequent negotiations.
Wartime economic conditions are exceptional*, responses to them are 
thought of as short-term. The 'War Bonuses' of the first World War were 
expedients designed so that the workers could cope with warKi:«n%: 
inflation; they had their parallels in the second World War's 'War 
Advances'. The awards made under RSNT Decision No. 6 derived from
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peacetime claims and were considered to be peacetime decisions, not 
special expedients, but they were made when railway revenues already 
reflected wartime conditions; the passage of what were technically 
peacetime claims had been that much easier<306).
In concluding this chapter, we should attempt to address two 
questions: what was the Association's distinctive contribution to
collective bargaining in the railway industry? What difference did trade 
union collective bargaining make to railway clerical workers' wages? The 
first question arises because the three rail unions negotiated jointly 
through a common bargaining structure, and it may appear from the record 
that the largest union, the NUR, played the dominant role on the trade 
union side. Whereas ASLEF frequently appeared willing to break away 
from the joint-union position, the Association seemed to be a subordinate 
ally of the NUR, However, the Association made distinctive contributions 
to the unions' joint action at a number of points: for example Walkden 
suggested the original pay cut should be 2% per cent, and on other 
occasions the Association made its sectional or otherwise distinctive 
attitude clear. Most of the time the three unions worked in concert to 
prevent wage cuts, minimise them or restore them. In this situation it 
was difficult for the Association to advance the particular interests of 
its members.
The second question raises complex issues in labour economics. The 
evidence of the erosion of clerical differentials between 1914 and 1924 
<307) does suggest that collective bargaining strength brought some 
relative gains to railway clerks. The evidence is by no means 
conclusive; the rapid wartime and immediate post-war inflation, 
combined with clerical labour shortages between 1914 and 1920 were 
certainly important factors that need to be taken into account. On the 
other hand, it appears to have been their collective bargaining strength
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that better enabled railway clerks to resist demands for large wage cuts 
(such as were imposed on Civil Service clerks). However, the larger 
issue as to the extent to which the rail unions were able to deflect 
market forces cannot be resolved here.
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Chapter 3
PARLIAMENTARY AND ELECTORAL ACTIVITIES 
Introduction; The Significance of Parliamentary Representation.
The wider context for the issues dealt with in this chapter is the
relationship between the trade unions and the other elements of the
Labour movement. The Labour party adopted a new constitution in 1918
which incorporated a commitment to public ownership of the means of
n«r
production; an overly socialist objective that does^accord easily with 
the political orientations represented by the main stream of British 
trade unions. Ross McKibbfn has explained the the adoption of Clause IV 
in terms ofWconcession to the Labour Party's left-wing intellectuals by 
its trade union elements, made in the course of the letter's ensuring 
their continued dominance(1). This chapter considers the especial 
significance of Parliamentary repreSr^ation for the Association, but also 
provides some material relevant to considerations raised by McKibbmn in 
that it describes certain careers in trade union leaders that ended with 
service in the House of Commons.
To some extent, the Association's MPs may represent the continuation 
of a concept of Parilamentary^as a quasi-honorific retirement appropriate 
to vetÉÿiK^  trade union leaders of the Lib-Lab generation active before the 
first World War. This in itself is too limited an interpretation, given 
the Association's initial and particular reasons for seeking 
Parliamentary representation. However, although this chapter includes 
details of the outlook of the Association's MPs, there are indications 
that they had much in common with the old 'Lib-Labs(2). The
Association considered Barliamentary activity an important aspect of its
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work. To illustrate this: in 1910, vdien the membership was not yet 9,500 
and the total funds less than £3,500(3), the Annual Conference voted that 
the General Secretary, A. G. Walkden, should become a parliamentary 
candidate. (4) By 1913, he was actively nursing the Wolverhampton West 
constituency, and a four-page journal called the Wolverhampton Worker(5) 
was periodically available. All this was paid for from RCA funds - 
presumably from the political levy. In March 1914 it was reported that 
£600 had been spent over the past two years in the constituency(6).
The legal background to the outlay of money by trade unions needs to 
be outlined. In 1909, a member of the ASRS called W. V,. Osborne obtained 
a legal ruling which prevented his "union using its funds for political 
purposes. The following year, injunctions under this ruling were used 
to stop other unions using their funds in the same way(7). The Labour 
members in the House of Commons complained to their Liberal associates 
and asked them to restore trade union's pre-1909 financial freedom. The 
Liberal majority did not want this, and offered compromises. In the 
1911 budget, they made provision for M. P. s to be paid for the first 
time(8). This reduced pressure on trade union funds, because Labour 
M. P. 8 had (formerly been paid by their sponsoring trade union or by the 
Labour Party. The 1913 Trades Union Act was the compromise. This was 
finally accepted by the Labour Party; its main provision was that trade 
unions had to set up a separate fund for political purposes. The part of 
members' contributions that went towards it became known as the political 
levy. Members could 'contract-out' from it, if they wished(9).
The Association wasted no time. Later that year it organised a 
ballot to decide whether the Association should have a political fund.
The result was announced in October; 15,496 voted for the fund and 1,340 
voted against it (10). At the end of 1913 the Association had 25,000 
members, so about 70% of the membership took part in the ballot. The
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political levy was fixed at 6d. per annum(ll), which meant it c o u l d ^ ^ ^  
raise a maximum of £625 in a year for political purposes. Only 800, 
being 3 per cent of the membership, contracted-out from paying the 
levy(12).
The Association's expensive political activity Just prior to the 
first World War was not undertaken purely for the prestige of having a 
General Secretary v^o was also an M. P. ; parliamentary activity was seen 
as a legitimate means of pursuing industrial objectives and one likely to 
have been well attuned to the general attitudes of a body of clerical 
workers. Parliamentary intervention can be traced back to 1906, vdien 
pressure was needed to ensure that the membership would be included in 
the Workmen's Compensation Act for death and disablement compensation 
after accidents. This is recognisable as pressure group activity of a 
conventional kind, but a more unusual form of parliamentary activity was 
described in the Executive Committee minutes as 'the blocking of 
parliamentary bills'.
' Blocking' a bill, or introducing blocking motions against one, means 
applying parliamentary procedure to unconventional ends(13). It was a 
potent weapon to use in connection with railway legislation, because the 
railway companies often needed 'private legislation' - so called to 
distinguish it from 'public' legislation normally promoted by the 
government and dealing with the general conduct of public affairs.
Private legislation is customarily promoted by bodies cuch ac local 
authorities or industries, to legitimate activities that they wish to 
pursue in the ordinary course of their work but which would normally be 
unlawful.
In 1909, the North Eastern Railway Bill was successfully 
blocked(14). In 1913, blocking motions were introduced against the 
Railway (No. 2) Bill to stop the intimidation of a clerk on the Midland
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Railway and these also succeeded (15). The M. P. vrtio Introduced them was 
G. J. Wardie, who was sponsored by the ASRS(16).
Prior to the Association's obtaining recognition, such activity was 
one of the few pressures which it could exert on the railway companies 
but, long after recognition, the Association's M.Ps were still blocking 
railway companies' bills to remedy members' grievances. In 1929, the 
tactic was used to try and help the members who were still discriminated 
against because they had taken part in the 1926 General Strike (17). 
However, even in 1913, before more orthodox forms of negotiation were 
available, blocking was not seen as a universal remedy. Some branches 
wanted it to be used in salary negotiations but the General Secretary did 
not think this appropriate(18). Parliamentary activity was not only 
particularly feasible for a railway union, but had especial attraction 
for one with a non-striking image; 'defence not defiance'. It was 
constitutional and did not disrupt the ordinary routine of work and 
service to the public. Nevertheless, it was unorthodox; the General 
Secretary clearly saw a need for it to be used with discretion. But its 
importance was undeniable, and related to the importance of private 
legislation for the railways.
The Railway Companies and Private Legislation
Railway companies needed to promote private 
legislation when they were first constructed because land lying on the 
surveyed routes of the railway had to be purchased compulsorily; this was 
not as innovative as it may seem, for the canal companies had used 
similar procedures(19). When their network was completed, the railway 
companies still had to acquire land for new works and extending old ones, 
and sometimes needed to promote legislation for other purposes. They had
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originally provided pensions for some of their employees in this way, so 
when they wanted to modify their pension arrangements, further 
legislation was needed (20). Nowadays, a fund can be more easily 
established, but in the early part of the nineteenth century private 
legislation was needed to accomplish a surprising range of enterprises. 
(Until 1857, it was the only way to obtain a divorce. (21))
So there are various reasons why the railway companies promoted 
private legislation over the years, but the main ones were to do with the 
acquisition of land and the erection of works and buildings on it. The 
following examples are from legislation proposed during the Parliamentary 
session of 1923. The GWR wanted to create a mile of railway line in 
Cornwall and to acquire land partly to build houses for employees; the 
London Electric Railway wanted to construct some new underground lines; 
the North Eastern Railway wanted to lay out some lines in the 
neighbourhood of Goole. All these Bills were principally to extend the 
railways, but the GWR's bill also sought to extend its police's power to 
search and arrest (22).
Unconventional parliamentary procedure can be used against private 
legislation because it is not* normally supported by the government of the 
day, relying on its majority in the House of Commons. Private 
legislation's passage through the stages known as readings is normally 
expected to be no more than a formality because it is non-controversial. 
But if no more than one M. P. signale his dissent at the 'second reading' 
stage, the Bill becomes opposed and must be debated. At the present 
time (1992) this is only a hindrance, because private bills that are not 
enacted can be reintroduced in another session, (23) but it appears that, 
although this was also possible in the 1920^);^ the volume of private 
legislation was such that it vrais less practicable. This decrease in 
private legislation has not gone unnoticed; as was written in 1958:
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" ,..it may be said that Private Bill Legislation is definitely on the
down grade. The heyday of Private Bill Legislation was in the period of 
the great railway activities round about 1840. At that time Private 
Acts were not only very numerous but also very voluminous. Some six or 
seven hundred such Acts were passed through the House in a single 
session, many of them containing several hundred clauses. At the 
present time about fifty such Acts are passed in a session, and their 
size is very much diminished.
The reasons for this are many and varied, but the chief ones may be 
briefly mentioned:
In our restricted country most of the railways are now built, the 
canals made, and the land enclosed, and, though new discoveries such as 
electricity lead to fresh activity, the majority of our recent 
inventions, e.g. the aeroplane and wireless, having little territorial 
basis, have less need for private legislation. The most important cause 
of the decline in Private Bill Legislation is, however, the passing of 
general Acts removing the need for much special legislation, and enabling 
that which is still required to be much less voluminous. "(24)
In 1920, 135 private bills were introduced; there had been 263 in
1900. The decline in economic activity meant that only 84 were
introduced in the Parliamentary session of 1924-25, but there were 129 in 
1929-30. (25) In comparison, only 28 private bills were introduced in the 
1990-1991 session<26).
The railway companies would only initiate legislation when they had
a real need for it, and hindrances to its easy passage could be more
damaging than simply adding to its procedural tedium and expense: they 
could hold up a company's development.
Acquiring Help to exert Parliamentary Pressure
The foregoing demonstrates the potential of parliamentary activity.
A union seeking to use it, however, needs a Member of Parliament who will 
support the union's interests and act as the necessary agent in using the 
parliamentary weapon. A member of the Association supported by it was 
first elected to Parliament during the General Election of 1923(27). 
Before then, the Association had to rely on a friendly Labour M. P. to 
look after its jplarliamentary interests. The first of these was 0, J.
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Wardle, elected for Stockport at the General Election of 1906, He was an 
ASRS-sponsored M. P, ; he had been the editor of the Railway Review, the 
Journal of the ASRS, (later the NUR), He had been a railway clerk, so he 
is likely to have been a sympathetic colleague for the RCA's officers and 
Executive Committee(28). He did the actual blocking of the HER's bill in 
1909. In September, 1918, the NUR refused to support his candidature in 
the forthcoming election, because his political sympathies were 
considered equivocal. The Association's Executive Committee decided to 
be responsible for his candidature subject to his continued support by 
the Stockport Labour Party and endorsement by the National Labour Party. 
He was lent £500 for his election expenses (29). But he stood without 
Labour support, so the Association had to stop retaining his services 
(30). He did not receive the 'coupon' but he did express support for the 
coalition(31); he had been Parliamentary Secretary at the Board of Trade, 
before the election. He kept this job after it, but later became 
Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Labour (32). After the end of 
his formal retention by the Association he continued to be very helpful 
during the negotiations for recognition(33). No RCA-sponsored M. Ps were 
elected at the 1918 election, so the RCA had to find another Labour M, P. 
to look after their parliamentary affairs. He was William Graham, the 
Labour member for Edinburgh (Central) (34). He represented this 
constituency from 1918 to 1931, when, like many other Labour M. P/i:.\ he 
lost his seat. (35) He died in 1932. The RCA's first MP was elected at 
the general election of December, 1923, He was H. G. Romeril, a former 
President of the RCA, who had been an employee at the Railway Clearing 
House since 1896, and represented South-East St. Paneras (36), Even 
though he held his seat for only a few months, losing it at the General 
Election in October 1924, his presence must have been useful because 
William Graham's appointment as Financial Secretary to the Treasury from
- 124 -
23 January 1924 to 3 November 1924 would have Inhibited hie scope for 
representing the RCA's interests.
The RCA did not have to wait long before they had another sponsored 
MP. A.E, Townend, who later in the decade was to become the 
Association's treasurer, was elected at a by-election in September 1925,
as member for Stockport(37). He was to hold his seat until 1931. A by-
election in July put another RCA member into the House of Commons: A. W.
Longbottom, who was elected for Halifax. Like William Graham and A. E. 
Townend he lost his seat in 1931.
As will be noted in the discussion of dissent in Chapter 6, the
outcome of the 1929 General Election must have exceeded the Association's 
wildest expectations: eight RCA members were elected. The RCA's 
President, T, H. Gill, was elected for Blackburn; the General Secretary,
A. G. Walkden, for Bristol (South); the Chief Assistant Secretary, G. 
Lathan, for Sheffield (Park); an E.C. member F. C. Watkins for Hackney 
(Central): G. Mathers for Edinburgh West, A. E. Townend and A, W, 
Longbottom both held their seats and H.G. Romeril regained his seat at 
South-East St.Paneras. It was providential that so many members of the 
RCA had been elected, because W. Graham was given a Ministerial 
appointment - President of the Board of Trade - in the new 
administration.
All the Association's members lost their seats at the 1931 General 
Election, when only 52 Labour candidates were elected. Between 1931 and 
1935 the Association had no formal representation in the House of 
Commons; it was not alone in this position. The sudden change from 282 
Labour Members to 52 left a number of trade unions and other 
organisations in similar circumstances; and things were not to improve. 
The following year (1933), the Independent Labour Party (ILP) was 
disaffiliated from the Labour Party, which meant that the Parliamentary
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Labour Party lost five more Members.
The Association's Executive realised they had a problem and in a 
report on the effects of the 1931 election explained how they meant to
copet
The Executive Committee will doubtless also pay due regard to the 
desirability of giving early consideration to the steps to be taken to 
repair the parliamentary weakness, and in the meantime to secure if 
possible from amongst the present Labour Members the assistance of those 
who will be prepared to take such action as may be necessary on questions 
which affect the interests of our members (38)
The Association's problems may have been less than was originally 
envisaged. Most commentators agree that the Parliamentary Labour Party 
between 1931 and 1935 was held together by the General Council of the 
TUC, and AG Walkden was one of its senior members for the whole period 
(39). At the General Election of 1935, six RCA members were elected, and 
from then until 1983 there were always Members of Parliament sponsored by 
the Association.
The Association's campaign to provide parliamentary 
constituencies for its members.
From 1907, the Association consistently sought to ensure that its 
interests in Parliament were not neglected. For obvious reasons, they 
were always thought to be best protected by sponsoring RCA members' 
candidature as MPs.
These have been sponsored from 1924 to date, intermittently at first 
and continuously from 1935, but not without a good deal of hard work and 
the outlay of considerable funds. The effort began in 1910, when the 
Annual Conference decided that a -Parliamentary constituency should be 
found for the General Secretary and that it should be nursed with
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Association funds. In 1918, a similar decision was made in favour of the 
Chief Assistant Secretary <40).
The effort to implement the 1910 decision was under way by 1913, 
when West Wolverhampton was being nursed Intensively for the General 
Secretary. The intention must have been to prepare the constituency for 
a general election expected by the end of 1915 (41). Because of the war, 
there was none until December, 1918.
During 1917, the Labour Party began persuading trade unions to 
sponsor more parliamentary candidates; it was realised that the 
Representation of the People Bill, vrtien passed, would increase the size 
of the possible Labour vote (42). The 1917 Annual Conference would not 
authorise a parliamentary panel(43). This may seem surprising 
considering how the Executive could normally persuade a conference to 
accept their point of view, but the later wartime conferences were 
outside their control; delegates refused to increase membership 
subscription in line with wartime inflation(44), and the 1917 conference 
was the only time the periodical resolution for the Association to merge 
with the NUR was passed(45). The explanation for the Executive's loss 
of control appears to be partly that the war had altered the mood of the 
population at large(46), but there were also changes in the Association's 
membership: many of the pre-war members were in the forces and the
wartime membership included a large number of women. Despite the 
decision of 1917, the Executive Committee decided to sponsor more 
candidates in the election expected soon after the end of the war (47).
At Executive Committee meetings during the rest of 1917 and 1918, members 
and senior staff suggested constituencies where they could stand for 
parliament(48). In the event, three Executive Committee members and 
three staff stood in December 1918. None was elected. (Details of the 
Association's electoral activities can be found at Appendix VI)
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Some part of their election expenses was paid, but for this election 
it is not clear how much. For later elections, after a Parliamentary 
panel was more formally established, details of costs are much clearer. 
Part of the union subscription was the political levy and the major part 
of it would be the income of the Political Fund Sub-Committee, which 
continued to be appointed by the Executive Committee until the Annual 
Conference of 1923 when, after much effort and money had been expended on 
trying to get RCA members elected, there was nothing tangible to show. 
Appendix VI gives details of where the various RCA members stood for 
parliament but, in summary, the story until the Annual Conference of 1923 
was as follows. In a by-election in March 1922, and again in the 
General Election in November of the same year, AG Walkden stood for 
Wolverhampton West - the constituency he had favoured since 1913 - and 
was unsuccessful both times. Seven other RCA-supported members also 
stood for parliament in 1922, and none were successful; the Association 
spent nearly £7,000. Added to this, the Wolverhampton West by-election
cost over £900. A total of less than £200 had been contributed locally 
in all these constituencies (49).
The ensuing attack on the Association's ^rliamentary policy was not 
principally concerned with its existence. Most of the membership 
appeared to agree that there should be a parliamentary policy, but were 
dissatisfied with its form and lack of success so far. A special 
committee of inquiry was appointed, consisting of three members of the 
Executive Committee and three people selected by the Annual Conference.
It was to make a full review of the Association's method of 'placing' 
candidates, relationships with local Labour parties, and other related 
matters. This was all decided when a resolution (numbered 99) was passed 
in the teeth of the Executive Committee's opposition (50). The Executive 
Committee came well prepared for the debate, because they expected
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opposition from an unusual quarter. A senior member of the head office 
staff, G. Ridley, the Line Secretary who dealt with the affairs of staff 
employed by the Southern Railway Company, wanted to become a Member of 
Parliament, It had been decided that only the General Secretary and the 
Chief Assistant Secretary should be sponsored candidates for Parliament 
(51). Ridley disputed this and took his case to the Annual Conference. 
Just before the Conference the senior Assistant Secretary,
W. Stott, declared that he also would also challenge the ruling that 
limited sponsorship.(52)
Ridley succeeded in obtaining a committee of inquiry but he did not 
become an RCA-sponsored candidate at this stage. Later in the year, at 
the Executive Committee's July meeting, he apologised for his behaviour 
at the Annual Conference (53). He was still waiting for a sponsored 
constituency ten years later in 1933, when he was once more refused help 
to stand in Peterborough (54). For most Labour candidates, help from a 
trade union was practically a necessity. It has already been shown how 
much the RCA paid out in the 1922 election compared to what was raised
locally. It might be argued that if a moderately wealthy union was
sponsoring a candidate there would be little incentive for much money to 
be raised locally but this argument appears much less plausible in the 
light of the conditions of life for many Labour voters in the 1920%% and 
1930ÿt‘. Although Ridley did not get a constituency in 1933 he did not
have to wait much longer; in November 1936 he was elected for Clay Cross
in Derbyshire. Then, as now, this was a diehard Labour stronghold, being 
one of the fifty-two constituencies which returned Labour members of 
parliament in 1931(55). Ridley thanked the Executive for the opportunity 
he had been given and for the assistance of Mr. Morris from head office, 
who had been released from duty for the period of the campaign (56). W. 
Stott, who had supported Ridley in 192^ became the General Secretary of
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the RCA in July 1936(57),
The Committee of Inquiry appointed in 1923 took a long time over 
their report and it eventually appeared in March 1924 (58). It caused a 
certain amount of disturbance to the work of the official Political Fund 
Sub-Committee (59). The task of the Committee of Inquiry was difficult 
because there was little objective criticism which could be levelled 
against the parliamentary work of the Association, except on one 
particular issue: the General Secretary's candidacy at Wolverhampton
West, which will be dealt with at some length. But, first, the more 
straightforward issues should be considered.
It was a difficult time for the operation the Association was 
attempting. The inter-war period was the time when the Labour Party 
replaced the Liberal Party as the alternative party of Government. This 
was not a planned transformation; fortuitous circumstances favoured it. 
The first was the way in which Lloyd George became Prime Minister in 
1916, not as the leader of one of the major parties but of a wartime 
coalition; it consisted of a portion of his own party, the Liberals, 
allied with a large Conservative element. The ensuing peacetime 
coalition's support was mainly Conservative; the Liberal Party became 
attenuated. This was the manner of its decline, but there were social 
changes which made it inevitable. Until the ) C.Z
electorate was largely middle class, and the underlying split which 
produced opposing parties was essentially that between business and 
landowning interests. As the franchise was widened this split became 
less fundamental, and it became possible for a more broadly based party 
dependent to a large extent on trade union support to become one of the 
major parties and for supporters of the older parties to combine. A 
political change such as this one meant that traditional political 
categories were dissolved, with consequent difficulties for the
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Association's Political Fund Sub-Committee in assessing the political 
potential in the constituencies they considered. They dealt with their 
task rationally, sending questionnaires to branches in constituencies 
which had been 'offered' to the Association. These appear to have been 
detailed and complicated, because there were grumbles that adequate 
information had not been returned<60). Past electoral performances were 
studied and movements in voting patterns recorded. Finance was also 
considered.
Money does not appear to have been expended rashly, but it was 
realised that political power is not available for a pittance(61). The 
issue on which the Political Fund Sub-Committee was open to criticism was 
not one which had escaped their attention, nor was it likely to have 
escaped that of the Association's more alert membership, who probably 
fully recognised that they could do nothing about it and simply had to 
wait until it resolved itself.
It was the problem of the General Secretary's constituency (62). In 
extenuation, it must be said that this was the first constituency where 
the Association had 'placed' a candidate and it had not been subjected to 
the scrutiny that was applied to others. A. G. Walkden, by this time, 
was in a very strong position inside the Association, as an able General 
Secretary in post since 1906. He had guided the Association through a 
period during which its membership rose from 6,000 to nearly 90,000(63). 
He had helped to organise the Association's recognition and a salary 
agreement that, with hindsight, was clearly favourable.
If he was reluctant to conclude from his experience that he should 
wind up his efforts in Wolverhampton West, it would have taken much 
temerity on anybody else's part to encourage him to do so. His 
reluctance was understandable; his attempts to win the seat for Labour 
went back over more than ten years, during which he must have established
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many links in the constituency. The strength of these and his awareness 
of all the resources that had been put into his support would have made 
it hard for him to decide to cut his losses. But there is much to 
suggest that the constituency was a bad choice. The Liberals had fought 
it on a number of occasions between 1885 and 1910, winning it only once, 
in 1906, when they 'swept the country'. Even then the Conservative 
candidate obtained 49.2 per cent of the vote<64). This point can be 
emphasised by a paragraph from the Times House of Commons, 1935(65).
Sir Robert Bird holds what may be described as a 'family' seat in 
West Wolverhampton. Except for a break in 1929, when it was lost to 
Labour, the division has been represented by father and son since 1910. 
Sir Robert Bird succeeded his father on his death in 1922.
The Special Committee of Inquiry's report of March 1924 had only 
one recommendation of any substance: that no new constituencies should
be considered. Even this was modified in that, if there was a general 
election, the General Secretary could accept a new one should it be 
offered to him(66); a provision that the standstill was to last only 
until the Annual Conference could consider the report, in two months' 
time, limited its effect.
The report's apparent diffidence can be explained by the result of 
the 1923 General Election, held after the appointment of the Special 
Committee of Inquiry but before its report was issued. The election 
resulted in the formation of the first - minority - Labour Government; it 
was also the occasion for the election of Romeril as the first RCA- 
sponsored member of parliament. Walkden's further failure at 
Wolverhampton, at a time when enough Labour members were elected to form 
a government, appears to have at last convinced him that a mistake had 
been made; he chose a different constituency, Heywood and Radcliffe, for 
the next election. It had been won by Labour at a by-election in 1921,
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having previously been held by a Coalition Liberal. It went Liberal 
again in 1922, and was retained by the same candidate in the General 
Elections of 1923 and 1924, although in the last of these he enjoyed 
Conservative support and described himself as a 'Constitutionalist' <67), 
The altered atmosphere at the conference of 1924 compared with that 
of May 1923 was apparently enough to ensure a non-contentious reception 
for the report of the Special Committee of Inquiry. Had the Conference of 
1924 taken place after the General Election of that year, instead of five 
months before it, the mood would have been less benign. The Labour 
Government lost this election and H. G. Romeril lost his seat; the Labour 
Government and a RCA-sponsored M. P. had lasted only for about eleven 
months. The RCA sponsored seven candidates in 1924 and helped the 
campaign of another RCA member. 'Sponsored' candidates were candidates 
who were on the RCA's parliamentary panel, elected there by the annual 
conference. Their constituencies had to be approved by the Political 
Fund Sub-Committee, which was mainly concerned with the question of the 
constituency's ' winnability', which was naturally a prime concern of the 
candidate. 'Helped' candidates were RCA members who had persuaded 
constituency Labour parties to adopt them as the party's Labour 
candidates. Up to ninety per cent of a sponsored candidate's expenses 
were paid by the Association; in one case this amounted to £700.
'Helped' candidates were given smaller amounts towards their election 
expenses; they were fixed at a maximum of £50 in 1931, and the highest 
earlier amount that has been identified is £200(68).
The Association did not have to wait until the next general election 
before there was an RCA-sponsored Member of Parliament; it was A. E. 
Townend, a member of the Executive Committee and later to become the 
Treasurer of the Association. Townend had been an indefatigable 
candidate before achieving victory in a by-election in Stockport in 1925.
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He stood for Manchester (Blackley) in 1918 and 1922; since then, in 1923 
and 1924, for the Stockport seat that he eventually won. Demonstrating 
that the tide appeared to have turned, a candidate who had simply been 
'helped' - A. W. Longbottom - was elected for Halifax at a by-election in 
July 1928. He had strong local connections, having been elected to the 
borough council in 1912; he was its mayor in 1923(69).
When the General Election of 1929 arrived, eight RCA-sponsored 
candidates stood, together with nine RCA-helped candidates. This was 
many more than the Association had fielded previously, but the 
circumstances appeared extremely favourable. The Labour Party had won 
thirteen by-elections since 1924 and two of these, as we have seen, were 
won by RCA candidates(70). But despite the favourable omens, the 
Association had reason for caution. The best results that had been 
achieved at a general election so far had been one candidate elected out 
of eight fielded. Even though there had been two RCA members in the last 
Parliament the RCA could not have expected the results that were 
announced. Seven out of the eight sponsored candidates were elected as 
well as A. W. Longbottom, who was 'helped' (71). This was a magnificent 
outcome, but it was the reward of over fifteen years experience, eleven 
years hard work, and a considerable expenditure. This time, Walkden 
stood for South Bristol and was elected. It was a shrewd choice. The 
constituency originally approached the Association in 1919(72), but as 
Labour had never won this seat the Political Fund Sub-Committee did not 
consider it a sensible constituency in which to 'place' a candidate. 
Further consideration in 1929 led to a revised opinion. Walkden fought a 
Liberal who had held the seat since 1922, but his recent majorities had 
been less than two thousand(73).
The negotiations and circumstances surrounding Walkden's movements 
between his three constituencies have been discussed here at some length
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because he was the first candidate that the Association 'placed', and 
also the most important. More information is available about his 
parliamentary career than about any other RCA member's and, although his 
case is atypical, an examination of it throws some light on Association's 
conduct of their parliamentary affairs,
The outstanding election success of 1929 had its liabilities, 
referred to in the discussion of dissension in Chapter 6; its effect on 
the administration of the Association provoked internal criticism. 
Although the General Secretary and the Chief Assistant Secretary had both 
stood for Parliament before, experience before 1929 did not indicate that 
these two officials were likely to become Members of Parliament at the 
same time. The staffing changes that had to be made to compensate for 
their enforced absence involved giving increased responsibility to some 
moderately senior members of staff and paying them more(74).
After the Lord Mayor's show comes the dustcart, in this case the 
General Election of 1931, with disastrous effects on the Labour Party 
that have already been mentioned. It followed the Labour Prime 
Minister's response to the financial crisis of 1931. With some Cabinet 
colleagues, a few other Labour MPs, and most of the Liberals allied with 
the Conservatives, he formed a 'National Government'. A general election 
soon followed, and the National Government was confirmed with a large 
majority. The Labour Party was reduced to a rump of 52 members, none of 
whom was from the Association.
During the inquest on the election of 1931, the advisability of the 
General Secretary's and the Chief Assistant Secretary's both being 
Members of Parliament at the same time was raised, but nothing was 
decided(75). This was not surprising, because the high regard that 
inhibited criticism of Walkden extended also to Lathan. He had been a 
senior official of the Association for many years and his election as
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Chairman of the National Labour Party for 1931-1932 paralleled Walkden*s 
chairmanship of the TUC s General Council for 1932(76), But the issue 
would not go away: nobody had foreseen that the two chief officials of 
the Association would be simultaneously elected to Parliament, but now 
that it had happened, many members did not want to see it again. In 
February 1932 the Political Fund Sub-Committee, which had Lathan as its 
secretary, submitted a long report entitled, 'RCA Staff and Parliamentary 
Candidatures' (77). The burden of the paper's case was.that the 
Association had conducted its affairs sensibly in most respects and 
especially, as far as its paid officials were concerned, in restricting 
sponsorship to its General Secretary and Chief Assistant Secretary. In 
the course of the argument, the duties of the chief officers of the 
Association were examined in some detail. This makes the document useful 
outside the bounds of this chapter; although its evidence was deployed 
in defence of a contentious case, scope for distortion was limited. The 
report recommended that the two following resolutions should be presented 
to the Annual Conference for endorsement by the Executive Committee;
(a) That in the case of the General Secretary and the Chief Assistant 
Secretary the present policy in regard to their parliamentary 
candidatures be continued.
(b) That the arrangements which have operated hitherto in regard to 
eligibility for selection for the RCA panel, and the placing of " i
prospective candidates in constituencies be continued.
At the Executive Committee meeting which considered this report an 
attempt was made to ensure that the General Secretary and the Chief 
Assistant Secretary did not stand for Parliament at the same time. As 
the result of the vote was a tie, with twelve votes on each side, the 
President ruled that the recommendation was not carried, and the status 
quo remained(78).
Both Walkden and Lathan were elected at the next General Election,
136
in 1935; but this was only six months before they were both due to 
retire, in June 1936. Subsequent elections were covered by the decision 
of the Annual Conference of 1935 that either the General Secretary or the 
Chief Assistant Secretary could be eligible as a 'placed' parliamentary 
candidate, but not both(79).
The Association fielded ten sponsored candidates and eighteen 
'helped' candidates in 1935 (80). Six of the sponsored candidates were 
elected, but none of the others. It was possible to 'help' so many 
because support was now limited to a maximum grant of £50 each (79).
In February 1933 the Political Sub-Committee (82) had issued a 
report on the financial basis of the Association's political work(83).
As well as describing how the grants were made to constituencies, Members 
of parliament, local political parties and other local political bodies, 
the report shows how the grants had evolved from the ad hoc payments of 
the early 1920's to a carefully calculated scale, that balanced v^at was 
available from the political levy against the amounts needed by Labour 
constituencies with high rates of unemployment and little available 
funding for local political activity.
Although the Association's Parliamentary policy was developed 
principally for industrial reasons, its M. P. s' commitment to the 
Association did not monopolise their resources to the detriment of the 
development of their normal constituency business and parliamentary 
careers. However, appreciable amounts of their time were spent in 
safeguarding the Association's interests. In May 1924, only one member 
of the Association was an M. P. ; H. G. Romeril, and on 26th May 1924 he 
devoted his maiden speech to ensuring that the LMS Superannuation Bill 
passed its second reading(84). There are other examples, but this Bill's 
direct relevance to the Association's interests indicates the trend, 
coincident with but not caused by the Association's policy of direct
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parliamentary representation, away from the 'blocking' tactics that had 
principally prompted it. This trend, and the wider implications of 
direct representation, are discussed at the end of this chapter, after a 
note on an aspect of the Association's political activity which it has so 
far neglected; its general Parliamentary impact. Members of Parliament 
who are sponsored by trade unions are likely to be disparaged as'lobby 
fodder'. There is, however, an argument that a parliamentary party has a 
need for only a comparative few high-fliers and a larger number who can 
be depended upon not to be a disturbance. Party leaders in the House of 
Commons are highly likely to agree with this analysis.
The records of the eleven Association members who were elected to 
Parliament between 1923 and November 1935 certainly present them more as 
foot-soldiers than as the officer-class of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party, as the following table shows;
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Table 5
Anderson
Mathers
Years in House 
of Commons
24
18
Walkden 12
Parliamentary 
Posts held
a Whip for 
2 years
PPS 2 years; 
Scottish Whip 
for 10 years; 
Sponsored a 
Bill; various
Other
Achievements
Privy Councillor 
Lord Commissioner 
of Church of 
Scotland 4 times; 
Knight of the
hon Pari.posts Thistle
various hon. 
Pari, posts
TUC Gen. Council 
1921-1936 
Chairman 1932 
Spec. Industrial 
Committee 1925- 
-26
Watkins
Lathan
Ridley
Townend
Simpson
Romeril
Longbottom
Gill
12
9
PPS 3 years
PPS. 2 years
Chairman of a 
Parliamentary 
Committee
PPS, 2 years
President Nat. 
Fed. Prof. Wkrs 
1921-1937; Chmn 
NEC of Labour 
Party; Nat. 
Treasurer of 
Labour Party 
1936-1942.
Chairman NEC 
Labour Party.
President of 
CWS; Knight.
Sources: Vols. Ill and IV of Mho's Who of British
Members of Parliament, edited by M. Stenton and 
S. Lees, Vol. Ill Brighton 1979, Vol. IV Brighton 1981.
The table comprises 101 years of service in the House of Commons,
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although not all of those elected in 1935 served for the full ten years 
before the next General Election. The record of Parliamentary posts is 
unimpressive, even allowing for the shortness of Labour's periods in 
office between 1923 and the wartime coalition. That two of the M. P. s, 
Mathers and Walkden, were elevated to the House of Lords is evidence that 
they became acknowledged as senior politicians of proven ability who 
could make a substantial contribution to the presence that Labour 
necessarily had to maintain in the second chamber, but it is not 
sufficient to alter the impression of the members' low Parliamentary 
profile at Westminster.
The Association never stopped organising Irish railway clerks after 
1921, even though they were now in two different countries. Northern 
Ireland was still part of Britain and the Association's interests there 
continued as before, but Eire became more and more a foreign country, as
socially perceived as well as constitutionally. The grants that were
given to the Association in Eire for political work may seem to have been
nominal or token amounts, but, for a number of reasons, they appear to
have been sufficient. In 1922, £25, 10.0 was given to Mr J. T. O'Farrell, 
the Association's Irish Secretary, for his attempt to become a member of 
Bail Eireann(85). By 1933, Mr W. Davin, who had been elected a member of 
the Dail, was receiving an allowance of £50 per annum. It was explained 
that this was less than was paid to RCA members of the British 
Parliament, because Mr Davin had found it took one third of his time to 
be a member of the Dail; in the other two thirds he could continue to be 
a railway clerk(86). The Association does not appear to have spent much 
of its political levy in Northern Ireland. Involvement in local politics « 
was, in practice, more difficult for trade unions in Northern Ireland 
than in Eire, and much British legislation applied to Northern Ireland, 
which was represented at Westminster as well as having its own assembly.
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These two factors probably explain why the Association did not make even 
a token effort.
The general election of 1935 was to be the last one until 1945, 
after the war. The few changes in parliamentary personnel were the 
product of by-elections. One of these, in November 1936 was at Clay 
Cross in Derbyshire, when Ridley was at last elected to 
parliament (87).
From the foregoing it is evident how much importance the 
Association set on its Parliamentary policy. For many years, it was not
only one of the few ways in which it could influence the railway
companies, but was also an important way of promoting the interests of 
its members. Parliamentary policy's greatest significance was in its 
earlier days, when it was pursued by retaining the services of a
sympathetic Member of Parliament. By the time it became possible for the
RCA to have its own members returned to Parliament, there were many other 
ways of influencing the railway companies, besides Parliamentary action. 
However, it was still important, because although the Association could 
now meet and bargain with railway managers, it sometimes needed some 
other pressure to persuade them to parley. At times, the railway 
managers wanted the Association's Parliamentary support, and this could 
be turned to the Association's advantage.
The scope for different forms of pressure expanded as the 
Association acquired more influence with the Labour Party. One source of 
this influence was the coincidence of some of the Association's 
Parliamentary activities with the interests of the Labour Party's 
parliamentary managers.
A political party has no trouble finding candidates for 'possible' 
seats; if there is a real chance of becoming an M. P., people will jostle 
for it. If the seat is anything less than 'possible', candidates are
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harder to find. Nowadays, there is an informal expectation that 
aspiring candidates will be helped to find a likely seat after fighting 
one or two unlikely ones. It may also have applied in the 1930s but, as 
we have seen, there was extra help for Association members who could 
persuade a constituency Labour party to adopt them as a candidate, even 
if their election was unlikely. The eighteen candidates who were 
'helped* rather than sponsored in the General Election of 1935 stood in 
a variety of seats, some of which were extremely unlikely. One had a 
large majority and a future prime minister to face; two others faced 
majorities of 29,000 and 18,000(88). They ranged all over Britain; one 
in Scotland, three in Wales, three in the London area, one in Birmingham, 
one in Liverpool(89). Others were in such unpromising areas as 
Wiltshire, Cheshire, Devon, and Lincoln(90).
Although this scatter of candidates would have gratified the heafts 
of Labour Party bosses, it was unplanned. Whether or not the 
Association's active membership is or has been any more prone than that 
of other unions to seek public office, references to it crop up 
remarkably often in the life stories of such individual members whose 
names figure in this account. Examples are the station-master at 
Kingham, the E.G. member from Swindon, and A. W. Longbottom of Halifax, 
who are all mentioned in Chapter 5. Personal experience as a branch 
delegate at an Association annual conference in the 1970s suggests that 
the tradition continued at least until then; it was held in late May, as 
is usual, and the year had been a good one for the Labour Party. The 
chairman asked all who had become councillors at the recent local 
elections to stand up, and although those who rose were never counted, 
they appeared to represent a remarkable proportion of the delegates.
The Executive Committee's decision to institutionalise a standard 
system of helping candidates, irrespective of their chances of election,
— 142 —
as well as pursuing a policy of selective sponsorship, represents a 
response to the aspirations, if not to the direct pressure, of the wider 
membership. The relevant extract from the E. C. minutes says:
....it has been the practice to make special grants to members of the 
R. C. A. adopted as Parliamentary Candidates by Local Labour Organisations. 
The payment has been stabilised under the authority of a Minute of the 
Committee of the 12th July, 1931, at a maximum of £50(91). [Note that £50 
represents about £750 at current value, 19911
So, by 1935, the Association's parliamentary activities had grown 
from acquiring the help of a friendly M, P. to maintain the interest of 
its members to becoming an adjunct to the Labour Party's electoral 
strategy.
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Chapter 4
THE ASSOCIATION and the RAILWAY PENSION FUNDS 
Introduction
As employment-related pension schemes are partly funded by employers who, 
in times of financial pressure, may attempt to make economies at the 
expense of the schemes, trades unions whose members have access to them 
have a clear interest in monitoring their management. A further reason 
for white-collar unions taking a special interest in pensions schemes has 
been that an employer's pension scheme helped to guarantee white-collar 
workers their superior status and distance them from manual industrial 
workers - a distance likely to be functional for their employers. This 
aspect of employers' pension schemes was especially evident before the 
first World War, but even when a new pension fund was being considered by 
the LPTB in the 1930s, the management at first refused to consider 
including ticket checkers because they were not defined as salaried 
staf f.
During the 1890s, the railway companies' pension schemes' crisis 
became apparent, and it appears to have been a factor in the foundation 
of the Association. The Association never lost its interest in pensions 
funds and this chapter chronicles it up to the beginning of the second 
World War. The Association's attention to pensions was likely to have 
contributed to its success in keeping so many of its members during the 
inter-war period.
It may not immediately be obvious why a company should want to 
provide a pension scheme. There are at least two reasons: a pension
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scheme provides an additional incentive for an employee to stay with the 
company until retirement age and it creates scope for sanctions against 
unsatisfactory employees at risk of dismissal. This is because, 
characteristically, only the employee remaining in the pension fund until 
retirement obtained the maximum benefit; if he left for any reason before 
pensionable age he was only eligible for reduced benefits. These 
provisions were similar for all railway pension funds, although there 
were differences of detail(1),
The Early History of the Railway Pension Funds
The railway companies appear to have been modest pioneers in the 
establishment of pension funds (2) and for making membership of them a 
condition of employment for railway salaried staffs (i.e. clerks and 
supervisors) (3), The first fund was set up by the London and North 
Western Railway Company in March 1853, and other railway companies 
established them throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century 
(4).
In 1873, the Railway Clearing House established a fund(5), with 
rules framed so that employees of railway companies participating in the 
Railway Clearing System could be members. This meant that companies both 
in Great Britain and Ireland could use the fund's services for their 
employees, if they did not want to establish funds of their own.
In the event, most of the pre-1921 railway companies used the 
Railway Clearing House fund; only the fourteen larger companies had 
independent ones(6). There were also the London Traffic Combine's and 
the Association's own fund. All except the two last-mentioned were 
established by statute.
Normally, a pension fund's resources were invested with its parent
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company, and guaranteed a return of four per cent, There were 
exceptions; the return on the Railway Clearing System's investments 
varied - it was three and a quarter per cent in 1910, but contributions 
from the railway companies who participated in the fund increased it to 
four per cent.
Five of the companies with independent schemes - London and South 
Western, the Lancashire and Yorkshire, the Great Eastern, the Great 
Central and South Eastern and Chatham neither contributed to their 
pension funds nor paid a return on the funds invested with them.
Instead, they guaranteed that the benefits which the funds offered would 
be paid. All the railway funds(7) were established by private Acts of 
Parliament; this is how railway companies could guarantee their fund’s' 
benefits with their shareholders' money.
The members of the Association were compelled to pay a fortieth of 
their earnings to one or other of these funds(8). This was a 
significant drain on their income, especially for the lower- paid, 
younger clerks. But before the first World War, very few of them were 
paid enough to be liable for income tax, so it was insignificant for them 
(and in any event was not paid by deduction) and railway clerks were 
exempted from paying National Insurance contributions(9), consequently, 
contributions to pension funds would almost certainly be the only 
employment-related charges on their pay.
The Departmental Enquiry
Prior to 1908, deficiencies began to appear in the funds and the 
Executive of the Association wanted an inquiry into them, so they asked 
the G. J. Wardle^the M. P. whose services they retained, to press for one.
At the time Wardle was a supporter of the Liberal Government which had
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been formed in 19<^^
1kirhift» years later, A. G. Walkden, the Association's General Secretary, 
described how Wardle obtained a Departmental Committee for the 
Association and contrived to be a member of it, In 1918, when the 
description appeared the Executive minutes, Wardle was a member of the 
Coalition Government; the NUR were threatening to disown him and Walkden 
wanted the Association to support him. Here is the relevant extract;
"So far as the RCA is concerned; he secured for us in May, 1908, the 
Board of Trade Enquiry into Railway Superannuation Funds. This involved 
continuous diplomatic negotiations over a long period and pressure with 
Mr Lloyd George (then President of the Board of Trade) and hie 
Parliamentary Secretary (Mr. Hudson Kearly, now Lord Devenport) with whom 
he had various interviews upon information and statistics Mr Wardle had 
submitted following the action he took in the matter soon after his 
election to Parliament in January, 1906.
There was a strong force of influential opposition against our demand 
for a Government enquiry and it was not until Mr Wardle had blocked a 
Railway Bill which went to debate that gave him the chance of speaking in 
the House upon the Railway Superannuation Funds in general that the 
Committee was agreed to by Mr. Hudson Kearly, and it was not actually set 
up till after Mr Winston Churchill succeeded Mr Lloyd George at the Board 
of Trade in 1908" (10).
The Committee heard evidence and examined documents between 1908 and 
1910. Their report, the evidence they heard and the documents they 
examined were published as two Command papers - 5349 and 5484 - which are 
very useful sources for the state of the railway pension funds up to 
1910. The Committee which signed the final report in August 1910 had 
only six members, including Wardle (11). Its conclusions are 
interesting, because the funds did not change very much over the next few 
years. Even after the Railways Act of 1921, v^en most of the many 
railway companies were grouped into four large ones, these pension funds 
still catered for most of the railway Salaried staff.
One of the main recommendations of the committee dealt with an 
innovation which had contributed to the large deficits. It was concerned
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with three methods of determining the size of a retirement pension;
• average salary', 'last seven years average salary' and ' money value'.
The first system had been generally used prior to 1896 (12). A 
pension resulting from it would be based on a percentage of an employee's 
average salary during his whole employment. The 'last seven years 
salary' system was similar, but the pension would be based on the 
employee's average salary over the last seven years of his employment. 
Clearly, anyone who had been promoted would get a larger pension under 
this scheme, and this would be so even for someone who had not achieved a 
higher grade than Class V but who (as would almost certainly be the case) 
was at the top of Class V scale on retirement. This was the system which 
was fairly generally introduced in 1896, making larger demands on the 
funds than did the earlier one, According to Walkden, (13) the newer 
system was adopted because the older clerks, who were close to retirement 
age, persuaded younger clerks to support them in their desire to have it. 
The Association preferred a 'money value' system, under which, in 
principle, the pension took the form of an annuity based on the accrued 
value of the contributions paid by the pensioner and by the employer on 
his behalf during his employment. Details of the precise formula 
recommended for calculating the pension are not recorded, but it was 
evidently such that the 'money value' system would provide a bigger 
pension than either of the other two for ordinary clerks retiring at the 
age of sixty-five, but a smaller one for retirements at earlier ages.
The Association's preference derived from the judgement that both of the 
'averaging' systems were^ 'inequitable to lower-grade men'(14). (In 
1912, the Association introduced a ' money value* system for its own. 
employees; the scheme's reorganisation is discussed later in this 
chapter).
The Departmental Committee favoured the original system. They said
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"...the average salary system is the one best adapted to carry out, with 
financial soundness, the objects for which the Funds were established". 
The point here seems to be that the averaging systems reserved controls 
to the employers that would be relinquished if they adopted a 'money 
value' system. A 'money value' system isolates a member's own fund, with 
its contributions from himself and the company. The other systems had a 
common fund which had the effect of augmenting resources from capital 
derived from the membership of people who left the railway employment 
before retiring; these employees were bound to leave behind a portion of 
vdiat had accrued in the fund for their eventual pension, if only the 
interest which had been earned on their contributions. But the more 
generous of the two 'averaging' systems was too expensive, so the 
'average salary' one won out.
The remainder of the recommendations are pieces of advice on how to 
run pension funds sensibly and humanely. Guaranteeing funds was said to 
be no substitute for actuarial valuations, and the recommendations 
included the suggestions that committee-men should be elected by the 
staff, and that employees dismissed for fraud should be given something 
from the pension fund<15). There does not appear to have been much of a 
response from the railway companies, probably because they considered 
that what was necessary had already been done between 1903 and 1907, when 
the deficits had appeared.
After the innovations which were then attempted and the further 
consequential adjustments which were made, the main features of the 
railway pension funds were left unaltered for a number of years. This 
period of stagnation was extended by the first World War, when the pre­
occupations of the railway managements excluded such considerations as 
reorganising pension funds.
The Association had endeavoured to secure the election of active
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members to the management committees of the funds. This was not simply 
so that they could exert some influence on the way in which they were 
organised and also supply valuable information about them to the 
Association's Executive. Until the 1921 Railway Act became effective, 
these committees were the only places where elected representatives of 
the railway clerical work-force had a voice in management. By March 
1913, the Association had representatives on most of the railway pension 
fund committees and had set up an Executive Sub-committee to monitor the 
funds and to organise an even higher level of representation (16).
The apparent complacency of the railway companies in regard to their 
pension funds did not last long after the War. In August and November 
1919, the Association obtained improved salaries for its 
constituency(17); this upset the balance between contributions to the 
pension funds and the benefits they disbursed, Deficiencies in the funds 
began to get bigger.
In normal times, these deficiencies would have been a matter of some 
concern, but the Executive of the Association were informed, in March 
1921, that the railway companies considered that the Government would 
reimburse them and had already made representations to the Ministry of 
Transport. This was because the new salary structure had been negotiated 
v4illst the Government controlled the railway system (18).
This illustrates how the relationship between the Government and the 
railway companies had changed. In 1910, a Departmental Committee was 
prepared only to offer advice to the railway companies. In 1918, the 
Government appeared ready to nationalise them (19).
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The First Hurdle; Persuading The Railway Companies to Set
up New Pension Funds
The reorganisation of the raiways in 192J^mplied changes for their 
pension funds for which the Association had to prepare itself (20). Its 
responses to the railway companies' plans for pension funds appear to 
have been based on the assumption that employees recruited after 1923 by 
the new companies could not become members of the old (pre-grouping) 
pension funds; the funds had all been established by Acts of Parliament 
in which the people eligible for membership were specified as being 
employees of the particular companies sponsoring the funds(21).
There was one exception; the Railway Clearing System Fund was open
to
'Salaried officers and clerks in service of Railway Clearing House
Companies or Committees subscribing to the fund'(22).
However, the new amalgamated companies appear not to have enrolled 
their new entrants into this exceptional fund.
With the help of a consulting actuary the Association compiled a 
proposal for a Model National Superannuation Fund (23), The idea was 
that the Association would have a counter-proposal to offer when plans 
for new arrangements for pensions emerged from the new companies. The 
Association's assumption about the legal obstacles to new entrants 
joining the old pension funds was severely jolted in December 1922, when 
the Southern, the London and North Eastern, and the London Midland and 
Scottish groups put forward superannuation proposals to the Railways 
Amalgamation Tribunal. They sought empowerment to enrol new entrants 
into 'continuing' pension funds of the old constituent companies, The 
Tribunal did not support the Association's objections the idea. The 
Association did not let the matter rest, but took its objections to the 
Court of Appeal (24), which also rejected them(25), In early 1923 the
- 151 -
Southern Railway promoted a Parliamentary Bill so that they could acquire 
the Lynton and Barnstaple Railway. This Bill came before a Committee of 
the House of Lords on May 3 1923. The Association petitioned the 
Committee and succeeded in getting a paragraph inserted in the Bill which 
had the effect of virtually reversing the Railway Tribunal's decision as 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal(26). When the news of the Association's 
victory over the Southern Railway was announced at a meeting of the 
Executive, it seemed that the issue was settled, but a few weeks later 
the Association again had to intervene vrtiilst a railway Bill was passing 
through Parliament.
This time it was an LM5 Bill in the House of Commons; it was amended 
in line with the insertion in the Southern Railways' Bill (27). The issue 
really was settled now because the LNER also agreed on a similar 
paragraph for a bill they were promoting(26). The whole episode 
demonstrates the skilful manner in which the Association' parliamentary 
muscle was used in 1923.
The LMS Pension Fund
The apparent reason that the Association moved so speedily on the 
LMS bill was that the company were trying to recruit a medical 
practitioner in Derby into the Midland Superannuation Fund. He had 
worked part-time for the Midland Railway Company and also had a practice 
in town, but was now appointed to the railway's full-time staff(29).
The Association were worried that if the LMS were allowed to recruit 
this employee into the 'old' fund they would try to do the same with 
other new entrants, although this was a special case of someone who had 
been retained by the Midland Company for some years and for whom there
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might have been exceptional Justification for using the pension fund of 
the company with which he had been formerly associated. The Association 
had, in effect, won its case, but there is evidence that improved pension 
schemes would have been introduced even though the railway companies 
would have preferred to keep all the options in their hands. The climate 
of opinion had changed because there was now a more general provision of 
welfare benefits. The old age pensions as first introduced in 1908 may 
not have been significant, as they were small, non-contributory and 
restricted to the poorest of the over-70s; but after old age pensions 
became part of the National Insurance scheme in 1925, the railway 
companies' pensions began to lose some of their attraction as reasons for 
choosing a job on the railways. The effect may have been marginal, but 
it was something the companies had to take into account. (30).
Although the LMS group joined in the effort to retain the right to
enrol employees into 'old' pension funds, it had already begun
negotiations towards a new pension scheme; a draft outline scheme was 
presented to Association members in July 1922.
The Association pressed the LMS to accept their Model National 
Scheme, but the LMS directors rejected it on the grounds that it depended 
upon a rate of interest on its investments that was one per cent more 
than could be expected(31). The 'old' railway pension schemes invested 
their funds with the railway companies and most of them had a guaranteed 
return of four per cent (32). The National Model Superannuation Scheme 
had been approved by the Association's annual conference in May 1922 
(33), and the Association, undeterred by the LMS's rejection, had spent 
the summer of 1922 pressing the railway companies and the Ministry of 
Transport to adopt it (34).
Only three of the new amalgamated companies asked the Railways
Amalgamation Tribunal to allow them to recruit new entrants into the
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pension funds of their constituent companies. The fourth company, the 
Great Western, were in the happy position - as far as they were concerned 
- of not needing to make such an application. Under the Railway Act of 
1921, the Great Western Railway had been treated differently from the 
other amalgamations, into each of which two or more sizable companies had 
been dissolved and given a new identity<35). In the case of the Great 
Western, the old company of that name was the core company into which 
smaller companies were absorbed(36). This meant that, unlike the other 
amalgamations, the post-1921 Great Western retained a pension fund 
appropriate for new employees.
By June 1923, negotiations to produce new pension arrangements 
appeared to be proceeding satisfactorily for the LNER, the Southern and 
the LMS. All these companies were said to have made acceptable 
undertakings of their intention to close down the funds of their 
constituent companies and establish new ones, The amalgamations of 1921 
had created conditions which obliged the new companies to review their 
arrangements, presenting the Association with the opening they needed, if 
reasonable pension funds were to be organised for their members. As this 
did not apply to the Great Western and the Railway Clearing System the 
Association recognised that negotiations about these two funds were 
better left alone until the other three new funds had been satisfactorily 
established (37).
The LMS superannuation scheme was drawn up by a sub-committee of the 
LMS Board(36), between June and December 1923. The Board wanted to 
standardize its pension arrangements; in 1923 the employees were catered 
for by six different pension funds, It looked to the sub-committee for 
an early solution to the problem of plural pension schemes, being worried 
that employee members of the committees for their 'old' London and North- 
Western and the Lancashire and Yorkshire pension funds were likely to be
- 154 -
instrumental in promoting a Parliamentary Bill for the Association's 
model scheme. With the support of the Labour Party, such a Bill was 
likely to be enacted, and the scheme forced on the company(39),
It may have been the sub-committee's fear of having a scheme forced 
upon them by their employees that led them to devise a most generous one 
of their own. It was submitted to an actuary, who advised on its 
feasibility in December 1923(40). Surprisingly, considering the 
generosity of the sub-committe's proposals, he calculated that the draft 
scheme would require provision for £342,724 less in actuarial reserves 
than would be needed for the continued operation of the six existing 
pension funds. If the figures are examined, it can be seen that the main 
decrease in required reserves was because existing LNWR, L & Y and, to a 
lesser extent, the Caledonian, had larger reserve figures than for the 
corresponding new proposals. This was partly because the LNWR had its 
own supplementary pension scheme, which it had extended to the L & Y and 
which had created a higher reserve figure(41). It is likely that the 
sub-committee's unspecified brief was that their scheme should be better 
than the one the Association appeared about to launch, but it would have 
to be actuarily sound. The sub-committee were well-placed to put forward 
a favourable scheme because it would be assessed in comparison to 
pension schemes with reserves which had been inflated because of 
adjustments made to deal with the effects of wartime and post-war 
inflation on their annuitants. By 1923, the cost of living was much 
reduced from the level it had reached in 1920 and a careful actuary could 
budget for lower reserves.
The sub-committee must have been relieved that the main basis of 
their scheme could be provided at a reasonable cost. There were further 
financial considerations, but the sub-committee proposed how they could 
be overcome(42). The scheme was approved by the Board of Directors on
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21 December, and a Parliamentary Bill was prepared(43). By January 1924, 
negotiations about the coverage of the new LMS scheme were well advanced. 
It had been agreed that employees who were members of the company's 'old' 
pension funds could all enrol with the new fund, There still remained 
two problems: unappointed clerks were not allowed to enrol in the new
fund; and pensions already being paid under the rules of the 'old' funds 
would not be affected by the introduction of the new one. The 
Association thought there were 2,000 unappointed clerks, 1,000 being 
supervisors. There had been a management decision in 1920 not to take 
them into a superannuation fund(44). The LMS management were separately 
considering the position of 7,426 salaried employees who had not had the 
opportunity of joining a pension fund(45). The LMS figures appear to 
include their unappolnted clerks; it is not clear how accurate was the 
Association's estimate of them as a component of the total.
From July 1923 to May 1924 the plight of the whole group was 
deliberated upon by a management committee. Their lot was Improved 
steadily over this period. At first, it was proposed that those with at 
least 20 years service should be given a very basic pension(46). In 
December, it was reported that the General Manager was dissatisfied with 
the proposed basic scale and wanted it to be improved: he decided to base 
a new scale on that of the new pension scheme(47). In May 1924 the 
employees who had been formerly excluded were admitted to the new scheme 
on modified terms(48). Conditions improved even more for the unappolnted 
clerks, whose case was pressed by the Association and who were given 
better terms of admission to the new LMS pension fund in 
November1924(49). This was after considerable pressure (50); it is not 
clear whether the final terms applied to all of the employees who were 
originally excluded.
When the Bill was passing through Parliament, the company faced much
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opposition representing the interests of railway pensioners whose 
pensions were derived from the company's 'old' pension funds; it seemed 
to be feared that the new arrangements put at risk the capital that 
produced their pensions. This opposition was overcome with the help of 
the Association's parliamentary representatives (51).
The Association supported the scheme enthusiastically as the best 
pension scheme that a railway company had so far promoted. The employee 
paid two and a half per cent of his salary and the company matched this 
sum, but also guaranteed to add any cash needed to maintain the fund's 
solvency. Retirement was at the age of sixty, when the employee would 
receive a pension based on one eightieth of his final year's salary for 
each year of his membership. There was a maximum of forty-eightieths and 
a minimum pension of £120 a year. Added to this was a capital sum which 
consisted of one thirtieth of his final year's salary for each year of 
membership; the maximum capital sum was forty-five thirtieths of his 
final salary(52).
The Supplementary Funds
The pensioners of the 'old' pension funds held up the passage of the 
LMS'8 superannuation fund's Bill on the grounds that the capital of their 
pension funds was being incorporated into the new fund without any 
benefit accruing to them from the merger(53). Their pensions were fixed 
sums, the value of which had declined in real terms during and since the 
war (54).
It appears to have been the Association that had first taken the 
initiative when the railway pensioners' plight became difficult. In 
February 1919, the Executive asked the railway companies to join them in
- 157
a scheme to help these pensioners. The suggestion was that members 
should voluntarily pay 3d per week to a fund and that the companies 
should contribute an equal amount. The fund should then be used to help 
the railway pensioners(55), By February 1920, there were eight such 
supplementary funds. This did not include the Railway Clearing System. 
The Railway Clearing House had one for its own pensioners but the smaller 
railway companies which used the Railway Clearing System's fund had not 
yet been persuaded to set up supplementary funds. Some of the companies 
without them helped their pensioners with grants from their own 
reserves.,
The LNWR (which after 1921, was to be one of the larger components 
of the LMS) had established a system to help pensioners who had retired 
since February 1919, quite separate from their supplementary fund(^, 
C Z )  Less than five years later - in June 1924 - only one company, the 
South- Eastern and Chatham^was reported not to have a supplementary fund
(57) but even so the company was said to give grants to its pensioners
(58). The Association was concerned, because although every fund had set 
up some form of extra assistance, in some cases either the company had 
stopped contributing or some or all of the employees had stopped their 
contributions. If the company's contribution depended upon the size of 
the employees' contributions, then lack of support from employees could 
mean that the help for pensioners was doubly diminished(59).
In the Association's report of June 1923 the LMS supplementary fund 
was said to be fairly well maintained. In June 1924 the LMS calculated 
the extent of the help which had been given to their pensioners.
Employees had contributed £18,000 and the company had added £30,000. The 
total had been distributed as reasonably as possible amongst the fund's 
pensioners(60).
Dwindling enthusiasm for the supplementary funds may have been
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because inflation had been declining gradually from its highest point in 
1920. Even so, the cost of living was not back to its pre-war level and 
pensions calculated in 1916 or earlier were still disadvantageous, which 
may be why pensioners' supporters in Parliament so strongly opposed the 
LMS superannuation Bill in 1923 and 1924(61).
Despite the problem of the pensioners, and the fact that the 
unappointed clerks' position was not yet settled, the Association threw 
its weight behind the Bill and lodged a petition urging its passage(62). 
This appeared to have had some effect because in July the Bill was 
reported to be before the Unopposed Committee of the House of Commons 
(63), and it received the Royal Assent on 1 August 1924(64).
The LMS fund was the first bridgehead, and had the Association's 
concentrated attention. Nevertheless, whilst it was being pursued, 
pressure was still maintained on the other three amalgamated companies to 
persuade them to produce an agreed pension scheme. The next to do so was 
the Southern Railway and an account of this is the next stage of this 
narrative. It is followed by several other shorter accounts of the 
fortunes of other pension funds, and ends with the long story of the 
setting-up of the LNER's pension fund. The LNER's story spans the whole 
period between the wars, from 1921 v^en the amalgamation process began 
until the Royal Assent was given to the LNER Superannuation Fund Act on 
25 May 1939, on the eve of the second World War.
The Southern Railway's Pension Fund
The Southern Railway's first proposal, in December 1925, was for a 
revised pension fund solely for new entrants. This would mean that older 
employees would only be able to look forward to pensions based on pre-war 
terms. The Association said this was unsatisfactory, and that they would
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oppose such a scheme(65). This opposition was decisive. In March 1926 
it was reported that the Southern Railway Superannuation Bill had been 
withdrawn(66)
In June 1926 the Southern Railway sent to the Executive of the 
Association the draft of a new pension fund bill they now intended to 
promote. It applied to all the employees of the Southern Railway pension 
fund but the Association's representatives on the pension fund committee 
were not happy with it (67).
In August, when a scheme that was virtually the same, but with an 
easier scale of benefits, was offered by the company, the Association 
representatives asked the Association's Executive to press for even 
better terms(68). In December, the company's pension fund Bill was 
published without the most recently negotiated‘adjustments, so the 
Executive decided to consult the company's management(69). By the end of 
the month, the last remaining difficulty was the size of pensions for 
employees who broke down in health; the pension fund representatives 
left this to be negotiated by the Executive(70)
These were the last pre-^arliamentary negotiations and, in October 
1927, the new pension fund was established and its provisional committee 
had its first meeting(71). It was a less generous fund than the LMS one, 
but in some ways the Executive preferred it.
Pensions were based partly on the employee's average salary over the 
last seven years(72). This meant that the minority of clerks vrfïo 
obtained promotion did not do as well as under the LMS fund's provisions, 
so the scheme was more in keeping with the Association's ideas of equity. 
Nevertheless, on all counts except the disproportionately generous 
benefits for the small number of 'high-flying' promotees the LMS scheme 
was recognised as exemplary, and from now on the Association dropped the 
idea of their National Model Scheme and pressed each company to have an
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LMS-type fund.
In August 1935 the Southern Railway proposed an additional feature 
for their pension fund. This was that, if a pensioner died, his pension 
could remain in existence and be paid to hie widow<73). The Association 
was surprised by this initiative, but submitted it to a line conference 
of Southern Railway representatives(74). Not surprisingly, the 
conference approved the scheme and it was introduced(75). A move such as 
this from the employer's side, when the railways were in a severe state 
of depression, may appear strange, but in the 1930s the Southern was 
probably the most prosperous of the four amalgamated companies, for 
reasons already made clear.
Four years later, the Association agreed to recommend an increase in 
contributions for membership of this fund(76). This does not appear to 
be connected with the introduction of the new benefit - other funds had 
considered such a benefit (77) and in all cases had adopted it(78). It 
was not that the new benefit was too expensive but that, as one result of 
the Depression, retirements were tending to be earlier than envisaged in 
the original actuarial calculations; the other funds were similarly 
affected, as will be explained later. It appears that, as experience of 
pension funds grew, there was a greater propensity to agree upon higher 
contributions(79).
The Railway Clearing House's Pension Fund
The Railway Clearing System's fund had been an especially important 
one because it was used by railway companies in Britain and Ireland which 
did not want to establish their own funds. After 1921, as the large 
amalgamated companies set up their own funds, they took away from the
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Clearing System's fund employees of the smaller companies they 
incorporated, so that the Clearing System's fund became less important 
after amalgamation reduced its work(80).
Employees who had become members of the Railway Clearing System's 
pension fund before 1 July 1913 enjoyed the subscriptions and benefits 
which had been in effect before the Railway Clearing System 
-Superannuation Fund Act of 1914. In the 1920^s they were said to be 
members of the 'Old Fund'. Employees subject to the provisions of the 
1914 Act were said to be members of the 'New Fund'. In December 1926, 
there was a surplus of £101,646 for the 'Old Fund' and a deficiency of 
£107,313 for the 'New Fund'. A two-man sub-committee of the Managing 
Committee of the Railway Clearing System pension fund had recommended 
that members of the 'New Fund' should have their contributions increased 
by half a per cent.
The Executive was disconcerted by this action, because one of the 
members of this small committee had been sponsored by the Association and 
he had not consulted the Executive. All the representatives on the 
fund's managing committee were asked to delay this increase in 
contributions as long as they could (81).
The Association was not opposed to increased contributions if they 
could be justified, but the Executive appears to have considered in this 
case that increasing contributions would simply have dealt with the 
immediate crisis and left underlying defects in the fund untouched. What 
they wanted was a complete reconstruction of the pension fund. The 
suggestion it should be thoroughly revised was passed to its managing 
committee in May 1927.
^  This committee considered the suggestion at several meetings(82), 
but eventually decided the issue was not within their competence and sent 
it to the Clearing Committee(83). This body consisted of representatives
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from the railway companies; its function was to organise the Clearing 
House. The Association was exerting some pressure on the funds' managers 
partly because members were urging them to 'hurry the matter forward'.
It is interesting that the Dublin Branch was particularly persistent, 
because it demonstrates that many Irish railway clerks still used the 
fund(84).
After a few months'deliberation, the Clearing Committee decided to 
ask the General Managers to set up a small committee to examine the fund 
(85). In January 1928 the actuaries reporting on it said that, even 
though they had reported that an increase in contributions was needed to 
restore it to financial stability, their report was not a 'certificate' 
as required by the rules of the fund(86).
Despite this intervention, in April 1928 the railway companies 
increased the employees' contributions to the fund from two-and-a-half 
per cent to three per cent. The Association protested at this unilateral 
move and the Railway Clearing System pension fund's Watch Committee 
endorsed the Association's protest (87). The fund's secretary replied 
that the increase in contributions could not be changed, but that the 
Clearing System did intend to reconstruct the fund(88).
Negotiations to this end took place, and by August 1928 A. G. Walkden 
was admitted to them(89). The General Managers agreed to ask their 
actuaries to compute the cost of giving the same benefits as the LMS 
fund, the Southern's fund or the GWR fund(90). It is likely that Walkden 
told the General Managers that a pre-war fund such as the GWR's would not 
be acceptable to his members; this was certainly his response later on 
when the LNER suggested it as a model. Calculations based on the other 
two exemplars became available in August 1930. A scheme matching that of 
the LMS would cost an extra £992,333; one like the Southern would mean 
£1,015,000 more. The Southern benefits entailed the higher estimate
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because there were few highly paid officials in the Clearing System's 
fund and, as has been explained, the Southern's method of computing 
benefit favoured the lower grades.
The companies' representatives asked if increased contributions were 
possible. They cited the case of municipal undertakings where the rate 
was five per cent. Walkden said that there was no possibility of more 
than three per cent, this being the highest rate of contribution in 
operation on any railway(91). The reply of the railway companies, in 
November 1930, was that they could not pay for the fund's reconstruction 
on their own(92). The Committee of the Clearing System's pension fund 
confirmed that members could not afford contributions of more than three 
per cent(93), In 1930, the whole economy of the country was depressed; 
the railways v^re suffering from competition from road transport and 
salaries were being cut. It was almost inevitable that negotiations 
should fail in 1930,
Between 1935 and 1939, there was a further series of negotiations 
between the Association and the fund's management. There were a number 
of reasons for this renewed activity. The quinquennial actuarial 
examination was due(94); there was pressure from women clerks to join 
the pension fund; and in September 1937, the managers of the fund 
offered its members a similar scheme for the widows of pensioners as had 
been accepted by the members of the Southern Railways pension fund.
(This type of scheme was now known as a joint annuity).
The results of the 1936 quinquennial valuation of the Clearing 
System's pension fund became available in May of that year. The 'Old' 
scheme now showed a surplus of £1,297,717; the 'New' scheme (the one 
modified by the 1914 Act) still had a deficit, but there had been some 
reduction since 1926(95). A meeting of contributors' committeemen and 
representatives of the General Managers was held on 23 July 1936. The
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staff representatives said that they would agree to higher contributions 
if a satisfactory reorganised fund could be established.
The General Managers' representatives would make no concessions, but 
said that they would report on the meeting to their superiors(96), As 
will be seen in the case of the LNER pension fund, the principle of 
accepting higher contributions was decided at the 1936 Annual
Conference(97). The Association's actuary had agreed with the LNER
management that the benefits negotiated by the Association in the 1920s
for the LMS and Southern Railway's pension funds were found to be more
expensive in the 1930s, and higher contributions were necessary(98). The 
main reason was that the original schemes had envisaged retirement at 63, 
but the Depression meant that many more people were retiring at 60(99).
This change of policy appears to have had some effect on the General 
Ffanagers but probably not as much as had been hoped. They accepted the 
case for reorganising the Clearing System's pension fund, but they said 
that it would have to wait until the LNER pension fund negotiations were 
completed(100); in the event this was not until the Bill to establish the 
LNER pension fund became law on 25th May 1939(101).
Before considering the attempted inclusion of women in the Clearing 
System fund, it may be useful to examine why they were not already 
covered. Prior to the first World War, the railway industry employed very 
few women. During that war many of the male clerks joined the forces and 
whilst they were away their work was done by women. Many were dismissed 
v^en the men came back, but some remained, and more were subsequently 
recruited. This is what happened in railway clerical employment 
generally, but there were special circumstances at the Railway Clearing 
House.
At the beginning of the first World War, there were about 3,000 
clerks at the Clearing House. During the War, because much of the inter-
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company accountancy was dispensed with and clerical labour was in short
supply, the numbers fell to about 1,400. After the War, the Clearing
House did not return to its pre-war system of accounting - one reason was 
that there were now only four companies(102) - so, by 1920, the number of 
employees had only risen to 1,618(103),
At the outbreak of the War, there were 196 women at the Clearing
House. The wartime peak in September 1917 was 275, but by 1918 the
number had sunk to 192. The percentages of women employed were 
approximately as follows: 1914 - 6.5%; 1917 - 19.5%; 1918 - 12%
(104). No provision had been made for their inclusion in the Clearing 
System's pension fund. In December 1935, the women clerks at the Railway 
Clearing House asked the Association to help them to gain admittance to 
the fund, and they repeated their request in early 1937. The 
Association's Executive expected difficulties, because women's inclusion 
in the recently negotiated London Passenger Transport Board fund had met 
with opposition from some male worker members of the fund's committee
(105).
The Executive's fears appear to have been well founded. The issue 
was still not settled in July 1939 although there was some hope that a 
Bill could be promoted in November to allow women employees to be members 
of the fund(106). The new LNER pension fund allowed for both men and
women(107), and so may have accounted for optimism about the Clearing
System's Fund; the General Managers had said that its reconstruction
would depend on the fate of the LNER's fund.
The proposal for a 'Joint Annuity' as an addition to the Clearing 
House pension fund came from the management. This initiative may have 
been included to blunt or deflect the pressure from the fund's membership 
for it to be reorganised and improved on the lines of the reorganised 
pension funds of some of the main-line companies. The proposed 'Joint
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Annunity' did not differ materially from that recently introduced for the 
Southern Railway, which was also a company initiative; the Association 
accepted it immediately and it was rapidly implemented. If it was meant 
to take something off the pressure for a reorganised pension fund and the 
inclusion of women, there is no evidence that it succeeded<108).
The reconstruction of the Clearing House System's pension fund was 
eventually achieved in 1941, at the same time as the new GWR scheme, 
discussed later in this chapter, became effective. The Railway Clearing 
System Act became law on 2 July 1941; the new GWR pension fund became 
effective on the same day. These two funds are very similar in concept, 
having the same contribution rates and the same basis for the payment of 
pensions. Women were included on the same terms as men, but, in line 
with State pensions, they retired at an earlier agedOS).
The London Underground Railways' Fund
The underground railways of the London area were not included in the 
reorganisation of the main-line railways, which took place under the 1921 
Railway Act, This may have been because many of London's buses, trams 
and underground were united under a common management before 1914 (110). 
The 1929 Labour Government decided to unify the whole of London's public 
transport system as a public corporation. The idea survived the fall of 
the Labour Government in 1931 and in 1933 the London Passenger Transport 
Board was set up to administer most of London's public transport (111).
The change in management of London's intra-urban transport would 
have been a highly satisfactory one for most of the Association's 
Executive; nationalisation of the railways was Labour Party policy during
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this period and A, G. Walkden, the Association's General Secretary, was a 
long-standing proponent of it. But the change would not necessarily have 
led them to expect any change in managerial attitudes towards the 
Association. The Chairman, Lord Ashfleld, and the Managing Director, 
Frank Pick, of the London Traffic Combine (or T. 0. T. ) had become Chairman 
and Vice-Chairman of the new London Passenger Transport Board(112). 
However, in January 1934 the Association was pleased to discover that the 
new Board was not insisting on the same severe restrictions on trade 
union membership that the T. 0. T. had imposed(113).
Despite this, there were still no proposals for a new pension fund, 
and in November 1934 new entrants were still being enrolled into the old 
T. 0. T. fund (114). The Executive had to wait until July 1935 before a 
new LPTB scheme was available for the Association's actuary's 
scrutiny(115). The proposed pension fund was not strictly new. It was a 
modified version of one that T.0.T. had set up for both its bus and 
railway clerks and was not established by statuted 16). A valuation of 
this fund had revealed a deficiency of £247,067 and the Association's 
actuaries considered that contributions should be increased from 3% per 
cent to 4% per cent(117).
The deficiency may have been caused because the pensions provided 
under this fund were calculated on a different basis from those of the 
other railway pension funds. This is how it was described: "the annual 
pension provided on retirement is 2 per cent of the aggregate amount upon 
which contributions have been made by the employee during the whole of 
his membership of the Fund. The minimum pension granted is £60 per annum" 
(118). A clerk who stayed in the lowest grade of clerk, Grade 5 all his 
working life from the age of eighteen to sixty-five - and many clerks did 
- would, on his retirement, receive a pension of £176.8.0. If he lived 
in retirement for six years, he would be paid more in pension than a
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similar clerk who was paid a pension and lump sum from the LMS pension 
fund. Even more surprising, the pension here exemplified was barely £10 
less than the average male pay in 1935/6(119). A conference of L. P. T. B. 
staff, held In May 1936, made four stipulations;
(a) No increase in the contributions of existing staff.
(b) The minimum pension was to be not less favourable
than those provided under the LMS scheme.
(c) Women, including women ticket clerks, should
be admitted on the same terms as men.
(d) The fund was to be guaranteed by the L,P. T. B. (120),
Because the fund was not established by statute, and so did not need 
an Act of Parliament to change it, the Association's negotiators could 
make use of Parliamentary procedures. They were unable to satisfy all 
the requirements that the staff specified, conceding increased 
contributions and ending up with a fund that was a modified version of 
that adopted for the Southern Railway. The Board said that they would 
not compulsorily retire male staff before the age of 65. There was some 
fear that this might happen because the LNER had been forcing employees 
to retire early, because of the depressed state of both the national 
economy and, in particular, of the railway industry(121).
Nothing was said about the L. P. T. B. guaranteeing the fund, because 
it was thought that the fund would be viable as long as earlier 
retirements were not introduced. The L. P. T. B. 's actuary estimated that 
the deficit would be reduced by £140,000. At this stage, in December 
1936, the Board would only accept in principle the inclusion of women 
administrative staff, but would not actually admit them until economic 
conditions improved. Women ticket clerks were not even considered, 
because they were regarded as 'wages staff ^  i. e.^  not salaried(122). By 
April 1937 both these points had been resolved. None of the employees
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represented by the Association were to be excluded from the fund and 
women were to be included in the fund on the same terms as men (123).
The Association's own Pension Fund
So a reasonably satisfactory pension fund had been pieced together for 
the LPTB, despite the absence of the most potent weapon in the armoury of 
the Association's negotiators; the use of parliamentary procedures to 
curb an employer. Of course, awareness that this weapon could be 
deployed against any future legislation promoted by the L. P. T. B. might 
have inhibited it from insisting on conditions which the Association 
would have judged as too restrictive or harsh. Throughout the period 
during which the Association was constantly engaged in negotiations about 
one or another of the railway pension funds, the state of one particular 
pension fund - so far not mentioned - could not have been far from the 
negotiators' thoughts. This was the Association's staff's own pension 
fund, which was long overdue for réorganisât ion(124).
It had originally been established in July 1912. This was 
shortly after the Association had tried to persuade the Departmental 
Committee, appointed by the Board of Trade to examine railway 
superannuation funds, that the most appropriate method of assessing 
benefits was the 'money value' basis. The Departmental Committee was not 
persuaded nor were any managers of any railway pension fund, but the 
Association used the basis for its own fund(125).
The 'money value' system suffers from a number of disadvantages 
and these became more apparent over the years. In May 1922 the staff 
approached the Executive and asked for the fund to be improved because, 
unlike other systems, when an employee left the Association he left no
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money in the fund, so the fund did not build up enough resources to deal 
with emergencies, such as breakdowns in health. The shortfall was 
cleared by adding an extra one per cent to the employee's contribution 
and the same amount to the Association's contribution. Another 
disadvantage arose because so many of the Association's staff had worked 
elsewhere - usually for a railway company - and so their membership of 
the pension fund was too short for them to amass a reasonable annuity.
So, at the same time as the contributions were increased, an Auxiliary 
Fund was set up. Employees could increase their pension by paying into 
the Auxiliary Fund a contribution which, again, would be matched by the 
Association (126).
These arrangements lasted until 1933. By then the Association 
had negotiated with the railway companies so that their members could 
enjoy improved pension benefits. The Association's staff might well have 
reflected that they were negotiating better benefits than their own, but 
they were not the only people able to draw attention to the differences. 
The Association could have been seen as observing double standards, 
although they had introduced their own fund in the genuine belief that it 
was a model. The disadvantages that emerged over time meant that the 
scheme was a potential embarrassment v^en the Association was urging 
improved pension schemes on other employers; campaigns to improve the 
GWR and LNER pension funds were carried on intermittently throughout most 
of the period between the two World Wars, In July 1933 the Association's 
staff once more asked for change in their pension arrangements; they now 
sought a reorganisation on the lines of the LMS or the Southern pension 
funds. By this time, more disadvantages of their fund had appeared. It 
may seem strange that they took so long to be identified, but the fund 
covered a very small number of people and in these circumstances it may 
well take more time for anomalies to become evident than with a larger
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fund(127).
Two major disadvantages were that a member of the fund was 
severely handicapped if he needed to retire through ill-health; and 
that, because there was no definite scale of pensions, the members could 
not obtain relief from income tax in respect of their contributions to 
the fund (128).
The Association asked their actuary to prepare a report on the 
feasibility of reorganisation based on the LMS scheme and a proposal for 
such a fund was drawn up. One element in it was that membership of the 
fund was to date from the beginning of a member's railway service.
The improvements were introduced but were expensive; an initial liability 
of £22,717 was involved but the reorganisation allowed for increases in 
contributions. These varied from 2 per cent to IH per cent and it was 
estimated that the liability would be liquidated in thirty years (129).
The disadvantages of the pension fund, surfacing over the years, 
were not the only reason that the Executive were agreeable to reforming 
it at this juncture. The Association was approaching a crisis in its 
history which, although not to be overcome by a revision of staff 
pensions, had a direct bearing on superannuation arrangements.
The crisis had arisen because some of the formative figures of 
the Association were due to retire. One of the features of the new fund 
was to be retirement of the permanent staff at sixty. A. G. Walkden, who 
had been General Secretary of the Association since 1906, G. Lathan, the 
Chief Assistant Secretary and another member of the secretarial staff, a 
Mr Brindley, all retired within a year or so of the establishment of the 
new fund. The Association's solicitor, who had held that position for 
many years, also retired about this time, in February 1937 (130). He was 
W. R. Southeard, who had been employed as the Association's full-time 
legal representative since 1918(131) . He had started out as a railway
- 172 -
clerk, but later took legal qualifications and worked for a firm that the 
Association retained before 1918. Southeard's employer then gave up his 
business, and the Association created a full-time post for him. Over 
the years, the work had become more complicated and when he retired the 
services of four solicitors were retained; one in London at £300; one in 
Leeds at £75; one in Birmingham at £25; and one in Glasgow at £25(132).
The senior secretary who replaced Walkden as General Secretary in 
July 1936, Mr William Stott, himself retired in September, 1940. This 
illustrates the extent and nature of the Association's staffing crisis 
(133) at a time when major pension issues remained unsettled.
Throughout the whole period between the Wars, the Association 
negotiated with the remaining two large railway companies; the GWR and 
the LNER, in an attempt to obtain improved pension arrangements for their 
employees. In one case, the LNER, a satisfactory fund was arranged on 
the eve of the Second World War, but the GWR could not be persuaded to 
modify their pension arrangements until the war had actually started.
The Great Western Railway* s Pension Fund
There were technical reasons why the GWR was able to maintain its 
attitude; these have been recounted already(134), but they need to be 
examined here also. Unlike the other three large companies created under 
the 1921 Railway Act, the GWR - a railway company that had been in 
existence before the Act - remained in being and subsidiary companies 
were amalgamated in it. The GWR had a pension fund before 1921, called 
the 'Great Western Railway Superannuation Scheme'. Because there had 
been no change in the company's name on amalgamation, entrants who joined 
it after the 1921 Act could be recruited into the existing pension fund. 
The Association, no doubt spurred on by its GWR members, attempted to
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persuade the company to revise their pension fund.
Because the GWR's position was so strong it was some time before 
the Association had an opportunity to exert pressure on the company. In 
August, 1927, the GWR pension fund was found to have a deficiency of £2% 
million. This may appear a surprisingly large amount, but this was a 
pre-1914 scheme and it has been explained above that these older schemes 
were sometimes based on defective actuarial calculations.
The Association's members were advised to resist an increase in 
their contributions to the fund(135). Their refusal to pay an extra one 
per cent on their pension fund contributions irritated the GWR 
management, who told Association representatives that they would defer 
the retirement of senior clerks, so that there would be a slowing down of 
promot ion(136). The unpleasant tone of this encounter may appear 
unreasonable, but it was quite soon after the General Strike and the 
relationship between the railway companies and railway trade unions was 
still strained.
The incident led to statements by the staff members on the 
pension fund committee that a reconstruction was under consideration, but 
the GWR directors denied this, although the staff committee-men stood by 
their story(137). The following year(1928) a GWR line conference was 
called to try to put some pressure on the GWR management(138). But the 
GWR management remained firm, and in August 193(^ they formally informed 
the Association that they had no intention of revising their pension fund 
(139).
No pressure was put on the GWR directors in the early 1930 S, 
presumably because the general economic situation was so dire, but by 
April 1935 economic conditions had improved and a quinquennial 
examination of the pension fund was due, eo the Executive decided to try 
again(140). A series of special meetings was arranged to press for a new
- 174 -
scheme. In October it was reported that a memorial was being prepared 
which would be sent to the GWR management(141). This was lodged with the 
General Manager in December 1935. It contained 9,000 signatures out of a 
possible 15,000(142).
A reply was received in February 1936 pointing out that the 
Railway Act of 1921 did not oblige the Company to establish a new 
consolidated pension fund. It admitted that the GWR clerical staff did 
not have as good a pension fund as did clerks on either the LMS or the 
Southern Railway, but said that non-clerical staff enjoyed better 
pensions and gratuities than on any other main-line railway company. It 
would be extremely expensive to make the changes that the Association 
suggested, so no useful purpose would be served by receiving a 
deputation. Although this response offered no clear opening for further 
negotiation it was decided that the General Secretary of the Association 
should have a meeting with the GWR pension fund committeemen to determine 
how they should next communicate with their General Manager(143).
Since April 1935, when this most recent attempt to improve the 
GWR pension fund had begun, there had been an important improvement in 
the Association's ability to help its members, In 1931, all the M. P. s 
sponsored by the Association had lost their seats(144). It then became 
difficult for the Association to organise Parliamentary pressure, but the 
General Election of November 1935 changed things: six members of the
Association were elected to Parliament. This meant that after having no 
response to requests for an interview with the GWR General Manager, the 
Association could say in June 1936 that unless they were given one, they 
would have to take Parliamentary act ion(145).
Eventually, this proved effective; the Chairman of the GWR agreed 
to see the new General Secretary of the Association, William Stott, early 
in 1937(146), At the interview in February 1937, the managers insisted
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that the company was not economically strong enough to construct a new 
consolidated fund. It was pointed out to them that they were in a 
stronger financial position than the other main-line railway companies; 
Stott also said that a higher rate of contributions would be considered. 
The General Manager of the GWR said that he would give the matter more 
thought. Meanwhile, he set up an actuarial investigation of the pension 
fund(147).
By now the Association had been pressing the GWR management to
produce a revised consolidated fund for nearly twenty years, on and off;
a dispiriting exercise. But, early in 1938, the GWR management offered 
an improvement to their pension fund arrangements.
To put this in context, some background information needs to be 
recapitulated. Between 1935 and 1939, the Association was vainly trying 
to persuade the Clearing House pension fund to include women clerks; also 
between December 1936, and April 1937, it persuaded the L, P, T. B. to 
include women in its new fund. Women's pensions must have been
recognised as high in the Association's order of priorities in the late
1930's; the GWR management appear to have thought that the most effective 
way of relieving the pressure for a new pension fund would be to provide 
pension arrangements for women clerks without even being asked. In 
February 1938 they published details of a pension fund they were going to 
provide for their women clerks(148).
The Association's Executive found out what the company 
contemplated a week before a Special Conference which had been called to 
consider a new programme of salaries and conditions, so the Executive 
asked this conference for its views on the GWR's pension proposal. The 
conference 'deplored' it(149). This reaction was not surprising, for 
what the Association wanted was a revised, consolidated fund; vdiat the 
women were offered was a fund with the benefits as offered by the 'C
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section of the GWR's men's pension fund - older employees of the company 
enjoyed better benefits than those provided by the ' C  section - but the 
contributions were to be higher than those demanded from men. 
Contributions for women who were 23 or older, on joining the fund, were 
higher than called for in the LMS pension fund and the benefits were much 
worse(150). (It is likely that the GWR management could have argued that 
the contributions were actuarially sound, as at 1938). Whether or not the 
GWR management were surprised by the reaction to their scheme, they told 
the Association the following month - March 1938 - that they were not 
prepared to do anything more(151).
The Association's Executive waited about seven weeks before 
deciding that a defective scheme was better than no improvement at all. 
They met the Staff Assistant to the General Manager of the GWR; a 
provisional committee for the new women's pension fund was appointed, 
pending an elected committee(152).
More than two years after the Association's General Secretary's 
meeting with the General Manager of the GWR, the actuary's report on the 
pension fund of the GWR was still not completed. This was in July 1939 
(153). Two months later it was reported that the GWR was still being 
pressed to reorganise its pension fund but it had not been possible to 
make proper contact with the Company's headquarters. A quotation from 
Bell's 'History of the British Railways during the 1939 to 1945 War' will 
explain the extent of the problem:
"The Great Western Railway decided to establish its emergency 
headquarters in the vicinity of Aldermaston Station(154), midway between 
Reading and Newbury. Beenham Grange, a short distance from the station, 
was purchased and occupied by the staff of the General Manager, Secretary 
and Solicitor on the outbreak of War. The Chief Accountant's staff was 
located first at Hyde End House, Brimstone and later at Wading Place, 
Aldermaston. The Chief Goods Manager took over Crookham House near 
Thatcham; the Chief Cashier was transferred to the GWR Staff Association 
institution at Reading; the Registration Office was moved to a house at 
Cholsey; and the staffs of the Chief Engineer and London Divisional
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Engineer were accommodated in waiting rooms, offices and restaurant cars 
at Reading." (155).
The GWR's fund was reorganised early in the Second World War, at 
the same time as the Railway Clearing System's fund, in July, 1941. The 
new scheme incorporated the separate women's fund and the company's other 
smaller funds. It was not as satisfactory a fund as the LMS's but the 
Association could at last be satisfied that the two funds that had 
resisted reorganisation throughout the 1930's were now reconstructed 
(156).
The London and North Eastern Railway Pension Fund
The reorganisation of the LNER's fund had been completed on the
eve of the Second World War, having been an issue ever since the
Company's need to float a new fund had become apparent.
As has been related, it was one of the three companies which
attempted, in December 1922, to obtain the right to enrol new entrants in
their constituent companies' pension funds. The other two companies, the
Southern and the LMS, had produced new pension funds by 1927; but the
*
LNER had not established a new fund even though in May 1923 it had been 
considering closing the old funds and establishing a new consolidated 
fund(157).
The LNER's problem was that, like the other three conglomerate 
companies, it was designed to be economically viable, but as the years 
passed, it was revealed not to be so. It had been anticipated that part 
of the area of the North Eastern Railway company - Northumberland and
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Durham - would be profitable and be able to support East Anglia - the 
other large segment included in the Company's area. In the event, the 
North-East's main industries, ship building and coal exports, were among 
the most depressed in the inter-war period, Some industry did move into 
Essex, but the effect of this was not enough to offset the reduction in 
railway traffic caused by the severe economic depression in North-East 
England <158).
An illustration of the company's straitened circumstances can be 
discerned from a comparison of dividends paid on ordinary stocks between 
1923 and 1938.
TABLE 6 - PERCENTAGE DIVIDEND PAID IN EACH YEAR
1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
LMSord. 7 7 6 3 4% 3% 4% 2
LNERpref5 5 5 % % % 3 -
LNERdef 2% 2% 1 - - - -
GWRord 8 7% 7 3 7 5 7% 5%
SRpref 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
SRdef 3% 3% 3% IM 2 2 2% 1*
Table 6(cont) Percentage Dividend 
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
LMSord M - - - - IM 1% -
LNERpref — - - — - - .- -
LNERdef — — — — — — — —
GWRord 3 3 3 3  3 3 4 %
SRpref 4 1 3 4 5 5 5 5
SRdef - - - - - % 1% -
(Based on the Railway Returns, 1923 - 1938 BL.Ref.421/21
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Comparison of dividends declared on ordinary stocks would not be 
a valid method of assessing the economic viability of inter-war railway 
companies for any single year, but comparison of the records over a 
period of years Is  a reasonable indicator, A company may pay low 
dividends for various reasons, but artificially lowering them for a 
number of years would be ill-advised, because the supply of fresh capital 
would almost certainly dry up. Cutting the interest on deferred stock by 
more than half in 1925, subsequently ceasing to pay any interest at all, 
and at the same time reducing the interest and ceasing to pay anything on 
it after 1929 were almost certainly actions forced by economic 
circumstances. Another method of assessing the relative abilities to 
generate revenue is used in the table below. Unlike the comparison of 
interest rates, it has the merit of being a direct rather than indirect 
compari son(159).
TABLE 7 NET REVENUE DIVIDED BY GROSS REVENUE
1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
LMS .226 .215 .235 .129 .201 .198 .210 .176
LNER .210 .180 .231 .087 .175 .184 .206 .187
GWR ,224 .205 .240 .149 .211 .199 .227 .203
SR . 236 .237 .253 .205 .230 .241 .247 .237
TABLE 7(cont. ) NET REVENUE DIVIDED BY GROSS REVENUE
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
LMS . 179 . 151 . 164 . 175 . 188 . 193 . 189 . 157
LNER .175 .147 .158 .162 .162 .169 .179 .124
GWR .182 .157 .170 .185 .183 .205 .211 .162
SR .230 .219 .251 .251 .258 .257 .256 .162
Based on the Railway Returns, 1923-1938 
(B.L, Ref. 431/21)).
This table not only illustrates that the LNER's performance was 
worse than any other company's in every year except one - in 1930, it 
performed better than the LMS - but it also displays the effects of the
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General Strike in 1926, the long mining lock-out which followed it, and 
the comparative economic strength of the Southern Railway, even in 1926. 
(There is evidence that the Southern Railway was much less affected by 
the General Strike and the mining lock-out than any other railway 
company)(160). The sharp drop in revenue in 1938, when the railway 
companies increased their rates and charges,is also well illustrated.
It is against this economic background that the Association's struggles 
over the LNER's pension fund must be judged.
Like the other new amalgamated companies, the LNER had been 
reported in May 1923 to be considering closing the pension funds of its 
constituent companies and floating as new consolidated fund. The 
Association's manoeuvres had ensured that, from January 1^  1923, new 
entrants could not be enrolled into the pension funds of the constituted 
companies and the Association expected that the consequential need for 
some new arrangement would lead to a consolidated fund on the lines 
eventually worked out for the LMS and Southern railways. But, in October 
1923, the LNER floated a new fund for new entrants only; all employees 
who had entered the company's service prior to 1923 would have to remain 
in the funds of the constituent companies(161). The Association learned 
in November 1923 that the LNER was promoting a pension fund bill in the 
forthcoming session of Parliament(162).
In January 1924, the General Secretary of the Association had an 
interview with the General Manager of the LNER, R.L. Wedgwood, who said 
that the company was proposing a scheme on the lines of the GWR pension 
scheme. Walkden said that it was not likely to be acceptable to his 
members(163).
Subsequently, the Executive of the Association unanimously 
empowered Walkden to oppose the LNER pension fund bill and any other 
railway bills, to protect or further the interests of the members of the
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Association (164), By March 1924, the LNER's bill had been successfully 
blocked. The company said they could not afford a fund based on the LMS 
pension fund, but would meet the management committees of their 
constituent funds (165). The meeting was held on 30 April, but all that 
the LNER would offer was the scheme for new entrants, without provision 
for the transfer of members of the company's existing funds. Meanvdiile, 
new entrants were enrolled into a provisional scheme. There was a 
nominal 3 per cent deduction from each employee's salary. No details are 
given of benefits, but they would probably have been as offered in the 
scheme the LNER attempted to force through Parliament(166).
The Association spent the rest of 1924 pressing the LNER to 
produce a revised fund. In June, the company again said they were 
thinking of a scheme on the lines of the GWR's. The Association asked 
for details of the scheme in writing(167) and organised a committee of 
employee members of the company's constituent funds. This committee 
added to the pressure on the company; a meeting was arranged for it on 14 
November 1924 and Walkden arranged to meet the LNER management(168). At 
this meeting, Walkden said that when the 1921 Railway Act had been 
passing through Parliament, new pension funds were promised for all 
railway staff. He thought there should be a settlement by the end of the 
year (1924) and he arranged for the Association's actuary to discuss the 
LNER's latest scheme with officers of the Company(169).
Over the winter of 1924 - 1925, the LNER management flirted with 
the idea of an LMS-type fund. The initial appraisal made by the LNER 
staff was that it would cost £4,000,000 to change to a consolidated fund 
of that kind. The Association's actuary examined their figures. At his 
first attempt he managed to reduce this estimate to £3,500,000 but 
thought £3,000,000 was possible; he wanted to continue working on this 
problem(170).
- 182 -
In April 1925, the LNER management offered a compromise; a 
pension based on the LMS's fund's rate, lump sums on a graduated scale 
and contributions as those of the LNER fund ^(in 1912 these varied 
between 2%% to 5#% according to age(171)). The Association's Executive 
decided to call a line conference (172) to consider the proposals, but 
the issue became redundant. In May, the company informed the Association 
that as a consequence of the 'Churchill budget' and the Widows and 
Orphans and Old Age Contributory Pensions Bill, they had decided to defer 
a decision on their pension proposals (173).
Old age pensions were first introduced under an Act of 1908; at 
the age of 70 a citizen of the United Kingdom earning less than £21 .0.0 
a year was entitled to a weekly pension of 5s.Od. The pension was 
financed out of general taxation; it was non-contributory. The pensions 
proposed under the Bill of 1925 were to be contributory; the reason for 
the budgetary provision for them in 1925 was that they could not be self- 
financing from the outset(174). The idea of a new State pension based on 
compulsory contributions had implications that called for examination 
both by employed and employers in undertakings that already had their own 
schemes; using 'the good offices of our esteemedv friend Mr. G,J. Wardle 
MP' the Association had negotiated railway clerks' exemption from the 
provisions of the contributory provisions of the National Insurance Act 
of 1911, on the grounds that they enjoyed more favourable benefits(175).
The Association's Executive set up a sub-committee on theiJ^ 
Pensions Bill, to assess its effect on members(176). In May 1925,
Walkden led a deputation of the LNER's pension funds' committee-men in an 
interview with their management, who^ repeated that the proposed 
legislation made further progress on the proposed fund :|^>possible(177). 
This extreme view was debatable, but the Association hardly dispute that 
it was a bad time to negotiate an <<cci(pational pension scheme and that a
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temporary standstill was reasonable. In the event, the Association 
continued to negotiate, probably hoping for early clarification of the 
effect of the Government's scheme on the LNER management's thinking(178), 
The LNER management, however, had decided to revert to their 
original idea; it seems likely that the change of plan coincided with 
the new legislated proposals rather^was prompted by them. They now 
prepared a Bill for the next session of Parliament, which would establish 
a new pension scheme for new entrants only(179), This was in July 1925. 
The Executive of the Association learned of the company's intentions the 
following month. Not surprisingly, the Association's Executive were not 
pleased with the LNER management's behaviour and they began organising 
demonstrations in LNER centres. They also arranged a meeting of 
committee-men on the LNER pension fund committees for 13 September in 
order to organise a campaign against this Bill. The LNER management could 
not meet the Executive until November(180); their Bill was scheduled to 
be presented in Parliament in the autumn of 1925 and, despite the 
Association's summer initiatives, the LNER management seemed to believe, 
at least until September 1925, that the Association would support their 
Bill (181). The combined pension fund's committeemen met on 13 
September and prepared a plan of campaign to be initiated if the LNER 
management would not withdraw their Bill(182). Walkden met Sir A. K. 
Butterworth of the LNER on 28 October; on being told that none of the 
existing pension funds was to be changed, he said that the Association 
would fight the bill(183). The Association's Executive were told that 
the LNER management's response was unsatisfactory and the campaign was to 
go ahead(184).
In November 1925 the LNER management, perhaps in anticipation of 
Parliamentary discussion, considered the difference between their 
proposed benefits and those provided under the LMS pension fund(185). At
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the Executive meeting of 9 January 1926, the General Secretary was 
empowered to oppose various railway Bills, including the LNER pension 
fund Bill(186), In March, the LNER pension fund bill was defeated at its 
second reading(187), In June, the North British Agents Annual Meeting 
expressed pleasure that the LNER pension fund Bill had been rejected.
They wanted an LMS-type fund and thought even sterner action might be
necessary(188).
No action on reorganising the LNER pension funds is recorded for 
the next few months. The Association was very busy with the General 
Strike settlement and the passage of the Southern Railway pension fund 
Bill, which was passing through Parliament with the Association's 
assistance. It may also have been thought that the LNER management 
should have a respite after their rebuff. In April 1927, the company was 
reported to be Investigating the cost of operating a Southern Railway
type pension fund(189). The General Secretary met the Chief General
Manager of the LNER on 2 November 1927, and was told that there were no 
plans for a re-organised fund(190). The Association made a further 
attempt to persuade the LNER to reorganise their pension fund vdiën their 
annual accounts were published in February 1928(191). The company 
replied that their economic situation was worse and that they could not 
consider a new pension fund. The Association decided to continue to 
maintain their case with the company, but not to press it for the time 
being.
Some worrying confirmation that the LNER's economic position was 
deteriorating came to the Association's attention in November 1928. The 
LNER management were inducing older members of their staff to retire by 
offering them special lump sums. The Executive were worried that this 
would upset the stability of the company's pension funds, decided to 
press once more for new pension arrangements(192). Pressure was applied
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on the company over the next months both by the Association's Executive 
and by the LNER pension funds' committee-men, but to no effect<193).
The company further extended the policy which had so disturbed the 
Association in November^ 1928. In Sept ember ^1930,^ they began to dismiss 
63 year old employees, giving them pensions for which they would normally 
have had to wait until they were 65. Station masters were allowed to 
stay in their station houses until they could arrange other accommodation 
(194).
The LNER asked the Association to leave the reorganisation of 
their pension funds in abeyance, but did not need to press this point.
The Association's Executive had already decided that, although 
regrettable, the company's behaviour was understandable in view of the 
economic climate and that pressure should be withheld for the time' 
being(195).
The following month, the committee-men of the North British 
Superannuation fund had a meeting with the Association's General 
Secretary and its Scottish solicitor. The committeemen thought that, 
under the rules of their fund, a 63 year old could not be given the 
pension normally payable at the age of 65(196). An aspect of the fund 
that may not have been considered by the LNER directors in London^ was 
that, before 1921, it catered for employees of a railway company in 
Scotland. Scottish law differs considerably from that which governs 
affairs in England and it may have been this aspect which upset the 
LNER's arrangements. The Scottish solicitor declared that it was not 
possible, under the rules of the North British fund, to pay the pension 
two years early(197). The compromise which the company organised was to 
pay compulsorily retired 63 year olds a pound a week until they were 65 
and eligible for a normal pension. This arrangement entailed the 
company's maintaining contributions to the fund throughout the two-year
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'mark-time' period<198).
It may well be that the policy of early retirement turned out not 
to have been as economical as was intended. This is, however, unlikely; 
other companies introduced similar policies. The Cheshire Counties 
Committee, which was jointly administered by the LMS and the LNER, made a 
further economy; their policy was for retirement at 62 without any mark­
time payments. By 1932, reports of hardship caused by enforced 
retirements were reaching the Executive of the Association(199), but the 
companies did not desist. By 1933, most clerks working for the LNER were 
retiring at 60 and women clerks, vrtio were not in any of their pension 
funds, were being dismissed at 55(200).
During the early 1930^ the Association continued to press the 
company to reorganise its pension fund, especially when the annual 
accounts were published, but there could have been little real 
expectation of a concrete result (201).
In December 1934, the General Manager of the LNER told the 
Association that it might be now possible to reorganise their pension 
funds(202). Tables 6 & 7 above confirms that the company's finances did 
improve that year. The Association's actuary was asked to make a report 
on the LNER's proposals(203). In July 1935 the contributions to the LNER 
provisional pension fund were increased from three to four per cent 
(204), and this appeared to confirm that the LNER had decided to 
reorganise its pension funds.
The Association's hopes were dashed in December 1936, when it was 
discovered that the company intended only to modify the conditions for 
clerks in one section of the Great Northern fund. A line conference of 
LNER members was furious at this minimal outcome and wanted the next LNER 
Bill in Parliament to be blocked to call attention to its unsatisfactory 
pension funds. The Executive did not agree to do this, but decided to
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raise the matter in Parliament by other roeans(205). This was possible 
because in November 1935 six Association members, including A. G. Walkden 
and G. Lathan, had been elected to the House of Commons.
Walkden met the Chief General Manager of the LNER in February 
1936 and once again it seemed that the company were amenable to 
reorganising their pension funds although they were concerned about the 
expense. The Executive saw some satisfactory progress in this, but 
determined that unless there was further early development they would 
block the next LNER bill(206).
As it turned out, the company did not respond to further 
prodding, so the Executive placed a block on the LNER (Scottish 
Provisional Order) Bill(207). This elicited a response within a 
fortnight. It now seemed to be agreed that a consolidated fund based on 
the Southern Railway’s vras a likely outcome. The company still insisted 
that the fund had to be self-financing and they did not think that the 
Southern Railway's rates were enough to provide for benefits at the 
levels its fund offered. The Association’s actuary agreed with this 
analysis. The stability of pension funds was increasingly affected by 
greater longevity and earlier retirement ages. Furthermore, labour 
turnover was not as frequent as it had been in more prosperous times.
When workers left a job they left some money in the pension fund; if 
more people stayed in a job until retirement age then pension funds would 
have to pay out more in pensions but would have less money in the fund.
It was decided to present the case for higher contributions to the next 
Annual Conference to ensure support for the Association's negotiators in 
their continued attempts to formulate a pension fund acceptable as 
realistic by the LNER's management. Meanwhile, the block on the LNER's 
bill would be continued(208). The Annual Conference of 1936 accepted the 
case for higher contributions, so the Association's negotiators had the
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necessary backing for moving to the next stage of meetings(209).
0 The blocking of the LNER's Bill had been maintained because the
company had introduced another economy measure to which the Association 
objected; they had failed to pay the appropriate higher salary when 
members of their staff were promoted. The company agreed to stop this 
practice and it was agreed to lift the block on the company's Bill<210).
Although representatives of the Association as a whole had 
accepted a policy of higher pension fund contributions, it was the 
Association's members who worked for the LNER who would have to pay them. 
In August 1936, there was a meeting of representatives from practically 
all the LNER pension funds. It limited the Association's negotiators to 
discussing contribution rates no higher than four and a half per cent and 
said that the final decision to accept or reject a consolidated fund 
should be made by the employees who would be affected. The delegates 
from the Great Central Fund did not attend the meeting. It was 
diplomatically reported that they were unable to do so, but the reason 
was that a number of members of the Great Central Fund were beginning to 
think that their current fund was a better bargain than what the likely 
outcome of a new consolidated fund(211). Disaffection continued to 
rumble as a background to the negotiations of the next few years. It was 
described as being confined to 'some clerks at Gorton', but this was the 
Great Central's main depot and engine-building works and so was more 
significant than the description suggests. The recalcitrants were still 
threatening legal action in December 1937, but by then it was apparent 
that they were in a minority and their action would be opposed by other 
LNER clerks<212).
Investigations to determine the outline of the new pension fund 
began in December 1936(213). The following month, compulsory retirements 
at 60 were suspended. In October 1937 the Association's Executive
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expressed to the LNER's management their concern about the length of time 
being taken to organise a preliminary scheme(214). By January 1938 the 
Executive judged the delays to be unreasonable enough to justify blocking 
the LNER (General Powers) 8111(215). This blocking worked; the following 
month a meeting was arranged with the LNER directors and it was then 
revealed that the LNER pension funds had a combined deficiency of £14 
million. It was agreed that this should be the responsibility of the 
company(216). More meetings were held during the summer of 1938 and in 
July it was announced that a Bill was to be promoted to establish a 
consolidated pension fund based on the Southern Railway's(217). The Bill 
was enacted on 25 May 1939 and came into operation on 1 July(218).
Summary and Implications
In 1941, the end of the story told in this chapter. Association 
members and staff contributed to seven pension funds. At the beginning, 
in 1919, there had been seventeen. All but two were established by 
statute. The seven revised and - where necessary - consolidated funds 
were: the LMS's, the Southern's, the Association's own, the London
Transport Board’s fund, the LNER's, the Great Western's and the Railway 
Clearing System's. This chapter has explained how the transformation 
came about. Given that between 1921 and 1923 over one hundred railway 
companies were amalgamated into four large ones, it might reasonably have 
been supposed that pension schemes would be reorganised as part of the 
general reconstruction. It has been demonstrated that this was far from 
the case. The Association had to work hard to achieve a satisfactory 
result. They did so and, in so far as getting the best possible bargain 
for their members was concerned, their work was within the traditional 
sphere of trade union activity. However, the circumstances of the time
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meant that getting a good bargain entailed involving the union in 
managerial aspects of a major industrial reorganisation and, to this 
extent, working outside traditional expectations.
Despite this, the Association's work on pension funds was 
regarded favourably by the NUR - the railway union that was older, 
bigger, and the Association's rival in recruiting members. Although the 
Association recruited a majority of clerks and supervisory staff, a 
sizeable number joined the NUR; enough for the NUR to have a salaried 
grades committee. In September 1932, this committee had a policy on 
railway pension funds. Its policy was;
". .. bringing into operation a standardised scheme of superannuation on 
all lines on a par with the scheme now in operation on the LMS; steps 
also to be taken to secure the entry of Supervisory Grades into the 
Superannuation Scheme" (219).
On 21 September 1932, the Association's negotiating sub-committee 
met the NUR's salaried grades committee. At the end of their 
discussions, the NUR committee decided to leave pension matters in the 
hands of the Association's negotiators, but asked to be informed 
periodically how the negotiations were proceeding(220).
An important aspect of the pensions story, as told here, is that 
it emphasises the constant day-to-day dealings between the Association 
and their members' employers. It is likely that, in any trade union, 
these dealings are the roost Important part of the union's &%rk from the 
point of view of the ordinary member, but it is difficult to describe 
them in a manner that brings out their importance. Even when they are 
set in the context of the circumstances to which they relate and which 
set them in train^l^piT^ the description is always likely to be 
repetitious; humdrum persistence and attention to detail are central to 
the activity. The pensions story is one which could not be told without
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an account of various to-ings and fro-ings that surrounded formal 
negotiations over a long time, and so it provides a focus for an aspect 
of trade union life that has an interest beyond the specific issue under 
discussion (221).
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Chapter 5
The Association, the General Strike and its Aftermath
Introduction
The General Strike of 1926 was a severe blow to the integrity and 
strength of the Association. It spent 77 per cent of the total funds it
had acquired up to the end of 1926(1) and lost 16,000 members from the 
number it had built up by the end of 1925(2). Any union might incur 
losses through a strike, but what needs to be explained is how one which 
had so far been, essentially, a non-striking union expended its resources 
so freely during a sympathetic strikeO. )
Popular expectations of postwar reconstruction were generally high. 
This was almost certainly true of working men, one third of whom had 
served in the forces knowing the horror of war at first hand, often 
seeing friends killed or horribly maimed(4). One well-known general 
history of the inter-war period sought to explain how these expectations 
were not satisfied(5)J its writer observed:
'When the war ended in November 1918, there were few who did not hope 
that the losses and sufferings it had brought might be redeemed in a 
better world.... The history of the twenty years between the two World 
Wars is the history of the disappointment of these hopes. '(6)
Amongst the 'few* were those who decided policj^ certainly for the 
first ten years, and their collective aim was to return affairs generally 
to what had obtained before the war. The outstanding example of this is 
the return to the gold standard at its pre-war rate. This policy will 
be mentioned later because of its direct relevance to the General Strike;
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the point here is that it harked back to pre-war days when London was 
the centre of a strong financial system based on gold(7). Since then, 
many of Britain's overseas markets had been lost, and changes in its 
domestic economy meant that there was no longer the sound economic base 
without which the return to pre-war conditions was doomed<d). It was as 
if some of the economic apparatus of pre-war Britain was restored in the 
hope that the rest would follow, Conflict between popular aspirations 
and the outcome of political decisions is one strand in the history of 
the next few years, underpinning the industrial militancy which was 
strongest just after the war and declined after the General Strike. In 
its way, the Association reflected this aspect of popular feeling.
The peculiarity of the Association from the end of the war until 
after the General Strike was that its Executive and senior officers were 
more ready to strike than most of its general membership. This 
propensity is demonstrated later in this chapter; relevant instances 
include the Executive's taking the initiative in promoting of a strike 
fund in 1921, and its energetic attempts to get the membership to support 
a proposed 'Triple Alliance strike, just prior to 'Black Friday' <9). The
Executive's behaviour in this period may simply been due to their 
perception that postwar deflation, which began at the end of 1920, 
signalled a general attack on wages and the conditions for industrial 
action. The general membership became more militant from 1921 to 1926, 
although never as much as was the railways' manual workforce.
The near-strikes of 1919 were the first sign that the Association's 
previous non-strike policy was now compromised(10). A change would mean 
setting up a strike fund, and in March 1920^ the Association's President 
suggested this should be done(ll). So at a special conference held in 
Birmingham^ it was decided that the subscription should be doubled to one 
shilling per week(12). Since membership was then at the highest point it
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was to reach In the inter-war period, this would have been a factor in 
the Executive's attitude: there were 87,054 members at the end of 
1920(13). After the classification appeals were determined, there were 
105,154 white-collar workers from whom the Association recruited 
members, (14) so it had managed to enrol 82.78% of its constituency. This 
was a remarkable achievement, but the high level was not maintained and 
it would be 1943, in the middle of another war, before it was reached 
again(15).
Membership dropped dramatically after 1920. At the end of 1921, it 
was 60,264; by 1922 it was 51,137(16). It is difficult fully to 
explain the decline, although the increased subscription appears to have 
been partly responsible. At the time, it was thought that the drop was 
caused by a number of factors, including reaction to immediate events 
after 1920 and dissatisfaction over classification. Also, the NUR was 
recruiting competitively, offering membership for a subscription of 5d 
per week in some districts(17). Whatever the reason for the drop, 
membership began to rise after January, 1923, when three grades of 
membership were offered at different rates, namely: one shilling, 
ninepence or sixpence. There were 66, 130 members by the end of 1925. 
Membership had suffered a reverse, but as most members continued to pay 
the highest rate, subscription income was maintained(18). However, a 
significant proportion of the membership was not prepared to pay the 
higher subscription which was thought necessary to build up a fighting 
fund. Those who left the Association may not all have done so because of 
principled objections to its policy, but the possibility that many, 
perhaps most of them, did so simply because they were unwilling to spend 
more on their union does not conflict with the view that the membership 
loss was related to a lack of militancy.
The period from the end of the first World War to the General Strike
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was one of unusual industrial activity for the Association, This was 
also true of other trade unions, subject to the same influences. The 
most immediate was the downward pressure exerted on wage-rates after 1920 
which affected many industries to a greater or lesser extent. The other 
influences also arose from the war; its ending signalled the release of 
energy which had been partly kept in check by the industrial truce which 
had been agreed at the beginning of the war. Added to this was the 
heightened class-consciousness and near-revolutionary attitudes so 
evident in the early 1920's. Most general commentators discuss them at 
some length(19). The Association was affected by them, but hesitated at
piecemeal, provocative behaviour. It refused to commit its membership to
the 'Hands off Russia' two-day strike saying that, 'at present it was not
Labour Party policy so it was not RCA policy'(20). It should be noted
that the General Strike was TUG policy.
The General Strike was in principle sympathetic, in support of the 
coal-mlners' grievances. Their industry had a serious problem; there 
were more pits and miners than the postwar economy required. Before the 
first World War, according to at least one commentator(21), there had 
been a large increase in the export of coal because competition from 
other countries had led to a drop in the export of manufactured goods and 
other exports were needed to keep trade balanced. By the 1920^s other 
countries had discovered that they could successfully compete in the coal 
trade(22). Britain's prewar expansion of its coal industry had 
attracted labour to it, making it one of the largest employers. Wartime 
needs kept up the demands for coal and a large labour force. During the 
war, many of the easiest coal workings were exhausted, and the remainder 
included those that were more difficult and more expensive to mlne(23).
In 1920, during the immediate and short-lived post-war boom, 1,083,000 
men were employed in coal extract ion(24). ,
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The inter-war period became progressively more difficult for the 
British coal industry. There was a drastic drop in exports; home 
consumption neither declined nor increased(25). But this lack of 
movement in domestic demand concealed industrial changes. The 
electrical industry and the iron and steel industry adopted more fuel- 
efficient processes, but there was also extensive substitution of other 
fuels for coal. Oil was largely substituted for coal for the propulsion 
of ships. The competition from other countries in the inter-war period 
was mainly from the USA, Germany and Poland(26).
The coal-owners* simplistic reaction to declining demand was to 
balance their accounts by cutting wage rates and so lowering their labour 
costs. Because wartime and immediate post-war inflation had ended by 
1921, many workers were earning more - in real terms - than before the 
war. There was a general fear that improvements would not be sustained; 
the attempt to reduce miners' wages might well be the beginning of a 
general attack. For many workers, solidarity with the miners was not 
simply helping fellow-workers who were under threat; it was attempting to 
stop the employers' attack before it reached you.
The state of the economy and of industrial relations after 1920 
presented the conditions under which the Association might favour 
industrial action or, at least, be unable to resist it. The 
Association's involvement in the General Strike ensued; its particular 
kind of collective common sense could not save it from what was to be a 
very uncomfortable time for its office and members. Once the strike was 
over, the common sense came back into play. The Association got the 
best deal in work-sharing as quickly as it could for the majority of its 
members, and then concentrated on fair treatment for the few who had been 
singled out for special treatment. Even though this meant interfering
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with railway legislation and in some cases took years to accomplish, the 
Association got the best deal for the majority of them also.
Postwar difficulties
At the time of the first World War, coal was by far the major source 
of fuel and the railways were the major mode of long-distance transport. 
Not surprisingly it was found necessary to take both these industries 
into government control during the war(27). This did not amount to full 
nationalisation, but even so, some of the advantages of nationalisation 
were demonstrated(28).
The TUC had declared an industrial truce during the war, after which 
many groups of workers prepared to make peacetime bargains with their 
employers. For workers in industries which had been controlled by the 
government, one possible element in the bargaining was the likelihood of 
making government control permanent. Nationalisation was part of the 
miners' programme, formulated at a special conference in January 1919; 
they also wanted a six-hour day and a thirty per cent increase in total 
earnings<29), After an unsatisfactory response from the government, a
strike ballot resulted in a majority of practically six to one for a 
strike. If the miners struck, they were likely to call for support from 
the other members of their 'Triple Alliance': the NUR and the National
Transport Workers Federation<30). This would mean a virtual general 
strike, a very unpleasant prospect after only a few months of peace.
Lloyd George's response was to set up a Coal Industries Commission, 
usually referred to as the 'Coal Commission' or the ' Sankey Commission', 
after its chairman, a judge. It issued an interim report on hours and 
wages on 20 March 1919; a report on nationalisation was published later.
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In the event, it made three reports on wages and hours, reflecting the 
various interests represented on the commission. Six members wanted the 
miners' claims conceded in full; the chairman and three others (all 
businessmen) recommended an immediate seven-hour day, to be reduced to 
six hours in 1921 if the economic conditions of the industry justified 
it. There were recommendations of a wage increase of two shillings a day 
for adults, and a levy of one penny per ton of coal to Improve the 
housing and amenities of the mining districts. The mine-owner 
representatives had even less generous recommendations<31). The 
Government accepted the Chairman's report and so did the miners - in a 
national ballot - and they called off the strike.
The final report was issued on 20 June. This time, seven members 
recommended nationalisation and one other was in favour of 
réorganisâtionof the mines by district - something similar to tdiat 
happened to the railway industry. The three coal owners and two of the 
businessmen wanted the ownership of the mines to be left as it was,
Lloyd George offered the 'reorganisation by district' plan, but the 
miner's conference angrily rejected it - seven out of thirteen members of 
the commission had voted for nationalisation. The miners considered that 
if the opinion of a majority of the commission could not be accepted, 
then the commission had been a bluff.
The reorganisation that Lloyd George offered the miners was the 
most 'collectivist' that the House of Commons was likely to accept. A 
virtual general strike may have been prevented, but a strong feeling of 
frustration and bitterness had been established in the mining areas, 
which was to affect industrial relations there for many years to come.
Some minor recommendations of the Sankey Commission were enacted. 
Three separate Acts ensued, one of which limited the miners' working day
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to seven hours. The Mining Industry Act set up a Mines Department, which 
was not a very effective body. A machinery of negotiation was set up 
which was so limited as to be useless. The Mines Department did 
establish a penny per ton levy which was used to build pithead baths. 
Institutes, and provide scholarships. The third statute was an emergency 
act which temporarily limited profits and extended the period of 
governmental control.
The pay increases obtained as a result of the Sankey Commission 
also proved very temporary. By early 1920, inflation had eroded them. 
Further negotiations about pay broke down on a question of productivity, 
that is, how large an increase in coal production was needed to 
compensate for the wage increases. A strike was called for 25 September
1920, and the Triple Alliance's representatives met on 22 September.
Some NUR members were unwilling to strike, because they earned less than 
miners. J.H. Thomas, the NUR'S General Secretary, persuaded the miners 
that they would have to prolong the negotiations if they wanted NUR 
support in a strike, and it was deferred until 16 October 1920, the NUR 
agreeing to put in their support on 24 October 1920(32). The 
government's response was to rush through the Emergency Powers Act and to 
set up direct talks between Lloyd George and the miners(33). The strikes 
were called off pending their outcome. The talks were virtually complete 
by October 28. There was an immediate award to the miners of an increase 
of two shillings per shift, a settlement that was to last until March 31
1921.
Early in 1921, the miners and the coal-owners started negotiations 
to decide what was to follow this settlement. The miners' main concern 
was to have a national wage based on a national pool of coal revenues. 
Unfortunately it became evident during the negotiations that the terms of 
trade were becoming adverse. Competition from other countries had pushed
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down the export price of British coal, but there was worse, Under the 
Treaty of Versailles, Britain was entitled to reparations from Germany, 
and they began to be paid partly in coal. International competition was 
bad enough, but the miners now had to compete with what was, in effect, a 
free gift,
'Black Friday'
The government stopped financially supporting the national pool of 
coal as soon as it could - 31 March 1921. The negotiations between the 
miners and the mlne-owners were broken off when this was announced on 
February 22, and the owners began posting notices at pits saying that 
from 1 April, wages would be paid at district, not national, rates. For 
somewhere like South Wales, which depended upon exporting most of its 
coal, this meant that wages would be practically halved(34). Not 
surprisingly, the miners came out on strike as soon as the controls 
ended, in April 1921. This time, they had approached their other two 
partners in the Triple Alliance beforehand, and for the first time in its 
history asked for its help. The NUR decided that strike action would 
depend upon the other partner in the alliance - the Transport Workers - 
taking similar action(35).
The NUR arranged a joint meeting between their B.C. and that of the 
Transport Workers for the 8 July, and wrote to other relevant unions 
including the RCA. The Association's E.G. decided they needed a special 
general conference, which was held in the Buston Theatre on the 11 
April (36). The Triple Alliance strike had been fixed for the following 
day. The Government declared a 'State of Emergency', Issued a royal 
proclamation mobilising the armed forces, and made available a subsidy so 
that the miners' wage cuts could be applied more slowly. Negotiations
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between the coal-owners and the miners re-opened and the Triple Alliance 
strike was postponed to the 15 April, but the negotiations broke down 
almost immediately on the question of a national settlement(37).
The Triple Alliance had decided that supervisory, professional, and 
technical staff in collieries, in transport and on the railways should be 
asked to join them, and invited the RCA and A5LEF executives to meet the 
Triple Alliance Committee on 13 April, The RCA said they could not 
undertake to join in the strike planned for 15 April without consulting 
their members; the problem was that the special conference on the 11 
April had said the branches should be circularised to determine if there 
was support for a strike. The following telegram was sent to all the 
Association's branches;
'Triple Alliance asks us to join impending strike. Please get members 
to consider coal dispute facts given in special conference circular 
eleventh Instant at mass meetings tomorrow and wire me result 
immediately. No time for further conference but your executive strongly 
recommend participation believing vital interests of all organised 
workers involved. Locomotive society have decided to join strike, /
There was some discussion, but eventually the Executive decided by
fourteen to nine that the telegram should be sent as worded(38).
Later that day, at 9 p.m., the Executive met again. Walkden, the
general secretary, informed them that the Great Western Company was
pressing the other railway companies to cut salaries by 25 per cent. It
was decided to send further telegrams to all branches including this
information. Then as many as could went back to their areas to assess
the mood of the membership(39).
The Executive met again on Friday 15 April. The replies from
branches showed that only sixty-seven wanted to strike. (There were 478
branches in 1921.) It was reported that there had been considerable
dissension at the mass meetings held over the country. All the same,a
motion was tabled to the effect that the Executive should call the
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Association out on strike, but before it could be debated a deputation 
once more had to go to a meeting of the Triple Alliance(40).
They found the Triple Alliance Strike had been abandoned and, 
worse, the Alliance itself appeared to have broken up. In Labour 
Movement folklore that day, Friday 15 April 1921, became 'Black 
Friday'(41).
'Red' Frldav
Once the possibility of.a Triple Alliance strike had receded, the 
miners were in a hopeless position. They continued their resistance 
until the end of June, but by then they had to admit defeat. There was 
to be no national pool nor national wages system. A government subsidy 
was provided to slow down the drop^ in wages, but eventually this was 
phased out and the regional differences were much as expected. In the 
Midlands end South Yorkshire there was little decline, but wage rates 
dropped to about half their earlier level in places that depended on coal 
exports.
Other industries suffered cuts in their wages after strikes; 
engineering, building, ship-building, printing, and cotton were all 
affected(42). Some NUR members and most of ASLEF's had to accept wage 
cuts but the RCA managed to avoid them(43). This was more due to 
circumstances than design. ASLEF and the NUR had obtained cost-of- 
living increases in 1920 and these were eroded first in Scotland and then 
in England. The Association were still negotiating their cost-of-living 
allowance and also the working of their sliding scale system. [For 
further details,see Chapter 2,] As the cost of living declined sharply 
after 1922, all these wage-cuts did not have as severe an effect as might
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have been expected In early 1921,
The miners' fears about the aftermath of 'Black Friday' were only 
partly realised. In 1923, the French occupation of the Rhineland led to 
a policy of passive resistance on the part of the Germans, The resultant 
lack of competition from German coal exports brought back some prosperity 
to those British coal-fields which depended on exporting coal(44). This 
lasted until 1925, when there was a double blow to the coal industry: 
foreign competition was now back at its most fierce and the Bank of 
England had returned to the Gold Standard at the pre-war rate of exchange 
i.e. £1 = $4.86(45).
It had been possible to maintain this rate of exchange before the 
war, when Britain had a much stronger economy. By 1925, many of its 
far-flung markets had been lost to other countries and some products were 
in much less demand than before the war. Britain could only maintain the 
pre-war parity of the pound with great difficulty; the return to the Gold 
Standard meant that exports became more expensive. In the event, coal 
exports fell drastically(46), The economic policy may now seem wrong­
headed but it accorded with contemporary perceptions of the economy.
The economist J. M. Keynes diagnosed the policy's unsoundness and he 
campaigned against it without success. For most commentators of the 
day, a return to the gold standard at the pre-war parity was essential. 
One summed up his arguments under four heads:
1. That other nations were expecting 
England to return to gold and failure to 
do 80 would be a blow to English credit.
2, A return to gold would reveal the real 
balance of payments and would force public 
attention on the failure of British exports 
to compete.
3, It would facilitate foreign loans.
4, It would prevent future 'unsound' 
experiments by Socialist Governments which
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might divert English people from the only 
real solution of their problems - economy 
and hard work, (47)
These arguments are very revealing; they illustrate that the 
return to the gold standard had an emotional attraction likely to be 
proof against rationality. What was not said was that the policy would 
benefit bankers, but not workers. Workers, first those in export 
industries and then others, would have to become more productive, make 
economies, and yet might still lose their jobs(48).
Black Friday had seen the end of the Triple Alliance, but the 
negotiations preceding it had demonstrated that ASLEF and the RCA could 
add effectiveness to any Triple Alliance dispute. In June 1925, it was 
proposed that a new Industrial Alliance should be established and the RCA 
was asked to join it(49). A specific invitation was offered possibly 
because the Association's usefulness had been apparent in April 1921, but 
the conditions of membership were wide enough to have let in the 
Association in any case, The Association proposed to join the Alliance, 
because the railway companies were contemplating making wage 
reductions(50).
The railway companies' proposals for economies were presented to 
their trade unions on 25 June 1925. The companies said that they were 
in an unprecedented depression; labour costs were estimated at 155 per 
cent higher than in 1914, whilst railway rates and fares had only 
increased by 50 per cent. They proposed a voluntary reduction in wages - 
somewhere between 5 and 10 per cent. The unions' negotiators asked for 
the proposals in writing, agreeing not to publicise them for the time 
being. The unions needed to confer before their next joint meeting with 
the management, and the Association decided to meet ASLEF and the NUR 
separately if they could not have a joint meeting(51). But by 12
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July, ASLEF had withdrawn from the discussions, so the other two 
executives considered the railway companies' draft. It suggested a 5 per 
cent reduction on all wages, salaries and directors fees; the sliding- 
scale bonus would continue. The cuts would last for a minimum of a
year, after which either side could give three months notice that they 
intended to end the arrangements.
The Association did not agree with the proposals, but decided to 
continue negotiating<52). All the trade unions with members working for 
the railways met on 22 July. Only the Boilermakers had not yet reached a 
decision; all the rest were for rejection, The Unions formally rejected 
the proposals on 28 July. The companies said they would implement other 
proposals and attempt to reduce staff(53). In November 1925 the National 
Wages Board considered the wage cuts as originally proposed, rejecting 
them by a majority vote; a minority report from representatives of the 
LMS and LNER companies said there should be wage cuts(54). (The 
companies did not let the matter rest, and finally negotiated a 2% per 
cent cut in July 1928(55),)
Although the proposals of 1925 never took effect, they spurred the 
Association into joining the Industrial Alliance and taking another step 
towards militancy. The Industrial Alliance itself came to nothing; the 
NUR withdrew after failing with a proposal on trade-union 
amalgamations(56). The Association was also forced to drop out after a 
special conference on 10 and 11 January refused to endorse its 
membership. It was a close card vote (28,400 against, 23,400 for).
The Treasurer also made an appeal at this conference for cash to bolster 
the Association's strike fund(57).
The Transport Workers, who had proposed the Industrial Alliance, 
waited until October 1927 before they finally dropped the idea vdiich, in 
fact, probably had little chance of success because the criteria for
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membership were so wide that the Alliance might simply have become a 
duplicate of the TUC(58).
The Association's Treasurer's appeal for funds was made because the 
overture to the General Strike had begun, Some of the coal companies, 
especially those dependent on exports, were experiencing difficulties 
even before the return to the Gold Standard. This had the effect that 
Keynes predicted, in the industry that he had forecast to be the first to 
suffer(59). On 30 June 1925, the mlne-owners gave notice that, in a 
months time, wages would be reduced and some districts, such as in 
Northumberland, would suffer drastically. The mine-owners hinted that if 
the legislation that limited the miners to a seven-hour working day could 
be modified with the miners agreeing an eight-hour day, then the effect 
of the wage reductions would be less drastic. The miners would not 
accept this and, on 3 July, refused to meet the mine-owners again unless 
the proposed reductions were withdrawn(60), and approached the General 
Council of the TUC, which had recently been empowered to intervene in 
disputes If large numbers of workers were iDVolved(Gl), (A.G. Walkden 
was a member of the Council over this period and was to be personally 
involved in many of the TUC's decisions during the General Strike. )
When the miners met the General Council on 10 July, it endorsed 
their action and began to consider how they could be assisted. The 
General Council set up a nine-man Special Industrial Committee, of which 
Walkden was a member,to keep in touch with the miners and to recommend 
what action would be required(62), A meeting of the transport unions was 
also arranged to organise a coal embargo.
It took place at Caxton Hall, and included the Executives of the 
NUR, ASLEF and the Association. The Transport Workers Executive was at 
its own union's biennial conference but pledged its support. The NS & FU 
(the seamen's union) did not think it was involved(63). Its leadership
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had been thought to be hostile to a coal embargo some days earlier(64),
It was agreed to enforce the embargo; the Association decided to call a 
special delegate conference if necessary. At another meeting on 
July, it was decided to start the coal embargo at midnight on 31 July, 
when the coal-owners* notices ran out(65).
The coal embargo never happened; early on 31 July the 
Government announced a subsidy to maintain miners' wages at their current 
level for about nine months, during which time a Royal Commission would 
consider the state of the coal-mining industry and attempt to resolve the 
current crisis. Friday, 31 July 1925, became known as 'Red Friday', 
because the power of the trade unions had forced the Government to change 
its policy. It was, perhaps, also felt that the memory of 'Black Friday' 
had been erased.
The General Strike
The Government was not solely motivated by the threat of a coal
embargo. On July 11 it had set up an independent court of inquiry into
the dispute, chaired by H.P, Macmillan, a Scottish lawer who had held a 
non-political law appointment in the 1924 Labour government(66). The 
miners refused to have anything to do with it, but its report, published 
on July 28, was largely based on conjectures about their point of view.
Another reason for the Government's decision was that it was not
ready for a confrontation. Coal stocks needed to be built up. The
Supply and Transport Committee, the emergency organisation which dated 
from 1919, had to establish satellites all over the country. A non­
governmental body was now set up to recruit volunteers who would take the 
place of striking workers. This was known as the 0. M. S. - the
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Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies(67). Thus the Government 
and its supporters made good use of the nine months that were to elapse 
before the General Strike.
The TUC did not use the time anything like as well. This was 
partly because many union leaders did not want to be involved in a 
general dispute. Over the winter, what had started as a proposed coal 
embargo had turned into an incipient General Strike. A ‘general* or
'national* strike - and it is pertinent that the trade union leaders 
preferred the latter name - had a long history as a part of socialist 
theory. Left-wing activists from the Chartists to the Syndicalists had 
seen it as the decisive class-war weapon(6Ô). For this reason, the trade 
union leaders stressed that there was no constitutional point at issue; 
what was in prospect was simply a very large-scale strike to help the 
miners. A slight difference of attitude between two of the more 
important trade union leaders is illustrative. At the meeting at Central 
Hall, Westminster, on 30 July 1925, when the details of the coal embargo 
were determined, J.H. Thomas wanted the issue raised in the Commons in an 
adjournment debate. Ernest Bevin, the General Secretary of the 
Transport and General Workers union, disagreed. He wanted it to be left 
as an industrial issue, not to be associated with anything 
constitutional(69). Bevin's hope was bound to fail, since large-scale 
industrial action is bound to have constitutional implications. The 
Government found little difficulty in using this aspect of the strike in 
their criticism of the TUC(70).
The Commission began its work in September 1925, and published its 
report, the 'Samuel Report', in March 1926(71). As a means of settling a 
long-running dispute, the report must be considered a failure. Most of 
its recommendations were for the long-term restructuring of the coal 
industry. Wage-cuts were the only short-term expedient the Commissioners
- 209 -
could propose, but they said that wages should be determined by national 
agreements and that longer hours should not be imposed. It was also 
recommended that the wage subsidy be withdrawn, and not reinstated again. 
The long-term recommendations were drastic. Coal-royalties were to be 
nationalised but the reorganisation was to be carried out without any 
general measure of compulsion. The miners were offered a mixture of 
improved amenities: more pithead baths, better housing, and annual
holidays. As this was to be 'when prosperity returns' it was not simply 
a sop, but was sop in the sky(72),
The miners were prepared for a reorganisation that would make the 
industry more efficient and able to pay a reasonable wage to a smaller 
workforce(73). Many mine-owners, particularly the proprietors of small 
mines which were likely to disappear in any shake-up, were opposed to 
reorganisation and most of the Government's support was temperamentally 
opposed to the idea of any nationalisation.
Once the Samuel Report appeared, negotiations were resumed. For 
a time, the Report was used both by the miners and the mine-owners to 
demonstrate the justice of their case. The mine-owners invoked it in the 
cause of wage-cuts; the miners said it supported their insistence on 
national agreements. The Special Industrial Committee of the TUC 
persuaded the miners to maintain negotiations even though the mlne-owners 
were behaving as if nothing had happened. But the end of the subsidy 
that had been granted the previous summer was approaching; mine-owners 
were exhibiting notices at the pits showing that they proposed post- 
subsidy wage-rates even lower than the miners had expected.
Although the TUC was attempting to persuade the miners to negotiate 
reasonably, the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, and his Cabinet were 
reluctant to put any pressure on the mine-owners either to compromise or 
concede. The negotiations dragged on throughout April and neither side
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would move. The miners would not discuss wage-cuts; they suspected that 
nothing would be done to reorganise the industry and they were not 
prepared to make a considerable sacrifice for the sake of the industry's 
viability if the other side was not prepared to concede what, by 
comparison^would be a relatively modest loss.
The TUC realised that the impending withdrawal of the subsidy was
bringing the affair to a head, and other trade unions would not be able
to give the miners'some sympathetic help without a consensual decision on 
it, so a meeting for representatives of the trade unions affiliated to 
the TUC was held in the Memorial Hall, Farringdon Road, on 29 April 
1926(74). The Association began an ordinary Executive meeting on the 
same morning at their usual meeting place, the Bonnington Hotel, 
Southampton Row. Walkden, the General Secretary, was also a member of 
the Special Industrial Committee of the TUC, so he could only pay 
fleeting visits to the B.C. meeting(75). The TUC's meeting at the
Memorial Hall remained in session pending the outcome of the miners'
negotiations with their employers; they were still proceeding when the 
Association's Executive visited the Memorial Hall in the afternoon of 
April 29, so the Executive returned to its usual business meeting.
For some days the wage negotiations had been 
a foursome, with the Special Industrial Committee and the Mining 
Federation on one side and, on the other, the mine-owners and the 
Government. This narrowed down to the SIC and the Government when, on 
30 April, the miners rejected the mine-owners' offer. The negotiations 
finally broke down later on the same day(76). This was reported to the 
Memorial Hall meeting, still in session after an adjournment the previous 
day. The meeting decided to re-convene the following morning; the 
Association's Executive attended there and, after the decisive vote to 
strlke(77), placed itself in the hands of the TUC's General Council.
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Steps were taken to co-ordinate the actions of the three railway unions 
and strike pay was fixed at £1 per member plus 5/- for each child, up to 
a maximum of £2 per week(78). The Executive reconvened in the 
afternoon; the Assistant General Secretary, G. Lathan, had met with J. 
Marchbank of the NUR who, because the NUR and ASLEF were not on the best 
of terms, left it to the Association to organise a triple meeting<79). 
This took place and a complete stoppage on the railways was arranged<80),
It had been decided that the whole of the Association's money on 
deposit at Barclays Bank should be placed in a current account with the 
CWS Bank. Various other banking arrangements were made so that there 
would be £77,000 available to the Association on Monday, 3 May. Five 
members of the Executive were selected to stay in London. They did not 
include Walkden, who was still working with the Special Industrial 
Committee. The rest of the Executive dispersed to their districts to 
organise the strike(81).
It was due to begin at midnight on 3 May, but negotiations to 
prevent it continued over the weekend between representatives of the TUC 
(Pugh, Thomas and Citrine) and the Government (Baldwin, Birkenhead,
Steel-Maltland, and Wilson)(82). These negotiations were marked by a 
series of accidents which appeared to have frayed people's nerves and 
contributed to the final break-down of negotiations in the early hours of 
3 May(83).
It is not intended in here to discuss in detail what happened 
during the nine days of the strike, which is well documented and 
discussed in detail in numerous accounts(84). Its beginnings have been 
presented in enough detail to explain the Association's involvement, on 
which the ensuing further account concentrates. The main activity of 
clerks during the strike was to man its 'bureaucracy', or as one source 
put it:
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•These striking R,C,A. members proved to be invaluable to the 
strikers, serving on the various Joint committees, taking minutes of 
meetings, editing and mimeographing strike bulletins, ... ' (85).
This work was important, but unlikely to involve clerks in any 
spectacular incidents or attract to them any special managerial 
displeasure. But the Association also recruited station-masters, 
controllers and other grades on whom the running of the railway depended. 
The movement of trains was then controlled by moving them from one 
signal-box's area to the next one. The more signal-boxes there were in 
commission, the quicker a train could pass. If a box was not working, two 
areas would have to be controlled from one box, and traffic would pass 
through the area more slowly. This effect would be exacerbated according 
to the number of boxes out of action. When a signalman was on strike the 
station-master could probably man the box and work the trains, but in a 
number of areas station-masters came out on strike(86). The withdrawal 
of their labour, directly and immediately crucial to the the railways' 
working, meant that they were particularly likely to be identified as 
malcontents.
Another function which these highly experienced senior staff would 
have been expected to perform, should they not be on strike, was the 
superintendence of the 'volunteer' staff recruited during the strike.
Lack of resources for training and supervising them is probably one 
reason why, apparently, they were put to such little use. At 
Paddington, 6,000 were recruited but only 2,500 were actually used(87).
The Association's response to the strike is of particular interest 
because it was the only white-collar union to be officially called out on 
strike. White-collar unions were not considered to be industrially 
militant; clerks and officials were thought more likely to support their 
employers than than fellow manual workers. This chapter's evidence shows
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that some of the Association's membership presented characteristics that 
accorded with received opinions about clerical workers. There had been 
the low response to the appeal to the branches during the the 'Black 
Friday' crisis, the reluctance to pay the higher subscription widely 
stated to be for an industrial fund, and the rejection of the Special 
Delegate Conference's recommendation on membership of the Industrial 
Alliance. The voting in the latter case was closer than that at the 
'Black Friday* Special Delegate Conference, which may indicate that the 
membership at large were gradually accepting the idea of a shared 
problem, with the miners in the front line facing a more general attack 
on wage levels. The railway companies' proposals for wage cuts are 
likely to have been fairly well known amongst the Association's 
membership by the time the Industrial Alliance was at issue.
It is not easy to determine what was the response of the 
Association's membership to the strike call. The Association's officers 
appear to have believed that a large proportion of its membership had 
come out in the first few days, The issue of the Association's Railway 
Service Journal for Jumdt 1^26 presents a favourable picture of the 
members' response and it is supported by a member's recollections 
published in 1976(88). D. A. Wilson, of Bradford, reports that before the 
Strike, remarks were heard around the office such as, "What me? Strike 
for the miners? Not bloody likely! Why, we'll be striking next for 
bricklayers and dustmen and God knows who - we'll never be working!"
This attitude, which he says was not uncommon, led him to expect some 
opposition when the Strike was called. He was chairman of a meeting on 
the evening before the Strike and expected a hostile reception to the 
news of an official strike, but the opposition was feeble and soon 
crumbled away. He has claimed that out of four hundred railway clerks, 
three hundred and sixty went out on strike.
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Walkden said that fifty thousand of the sixty-seven thousand 
members were on strike on 4 May. G, A. Phillips, in his study of the 
General Strike(89), thinks this was almost certainly an exaggeration. It 
may well have been, but there are no official figures for all the four 
main-line railway companies until Friday 7th May. There are some 
official data for the London Underground railways, for the first few 
days, but they seem unreliable and unlikely to be useful. Such official 
figures as are available for each day of the Strike, but excluding the 
London Underground, are at Appendix VII. Figures are available for only 
two companies on 4 May, but they appear incomplete and unreliable. 
Inconsistencies as between the first and later days are such as to 
suggest that the companies had not devised ways of collecting data that 
were reliable from the first day, although they were likely to be more 
reliable thereafter. As the figures for the GWR and the LMS suggest 
that at least twenty-two thousand of their white-collar workers - likely 
to be mostly members of the Association - were out on the first day, the ^
Association was not unreasonable in its contemporary estimate of fifty 
thousand on 4 May, even though later analysis casts some doubt on it. The 
highest official figure for the members of staff an strike from the four 
companies is for Saturday 8 May, when forty thousand, three hundred and 
ninety were counted as striking. (Most clerks worked on Saturdays in 
1926). The probable percentage figures for staff on strike for each day 
are:
7 May 30%, 8 May 39.2%, 10 May 37.8%, 11 May 36.4%, 12 May 35.2%, 13 
May, 35. 2%.
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Post-Strike Difficulties
The General Council of the TUC ended the Strike on 12 May(90), but 
they made no arrangements for a general return to work, leaving these to 
individual unionsOl). The railway managements did not accept the 
settlement in a charitable manner(92). The miners did not accept it at 
all, and the Mining Lockout dragged on until November, when reduced pay, 
district agreements and an eight-hour-day were accepted. The shortage 
of coal led to lay-offs in many other industries and strengthened the 
power of the railway managements to discipline workers who had struck, 
especially those vrtio had 'positions of trust' and others who had been 
especially active during the Strike(93).
The management of the GWR were informed that the Strike had been 
called off on 12 May and the other companies were almost certainly 
similarly informed. The GWR then posted notices announcing re­
employment for only enough workers to run the restricted train service 
that was expected to be all that was immediately possible, Other workers 
would be informed when their services were required(94). This action 
seems not to have been taken for operational and economic reasons alone, 
although the management could no doubt have so justified it. There was 
some feeling, evidently shared by a number of railway managers, that the 
strikes of the previous few years had reduced the 'discipline' of railway 
staff, a feature held to be particularly important to the railway 
service. The General Strike seems to have provided an opportunity for 
the renewal of this 'discipline'. It was suggested that employees'
'breach of contract' should be invoked and it was also hoped that the 
membership of trade unions by supervisory staff would be reviewed(95). f 
1hls attitude was revealed in a discussion between the Minister of Labour 
and representatives of the railway managements on the day the strike
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ended. The Government naturally wanted as quick and orderly a return to 
work as possible; the railway managers were urged to act 'cannily' to 
avoid further upset, It was thought that they should 'meet' the trade 
unions, preferably by 'the various Trade Unions getting into Immediate 
touch with the Associations of Employers concerned in order that, if 
possible, a satisfactory agreement may be reached'(96), The assumptions 
that the initiatives to ensure a rapid return would come from the trade 
unions and that the workers would be ready for sacrifices were probably 
made because the strike had been called off by the unions quite 
unconditionally. 'The Government had made no bargain whatsoever, nor 
had they entered into any commitments, '
The railway managers discussed with the Minister the four points 
which embodied the policy upon which they hoped to settle the Strike. 
These covered: the railway companies' abrogation of an obligation to re­
employ any striker; the reservation of their legal rights to claim 
damages; their right to refuse to re-employ anyone guilty of violence, 
intimidation, or damaging railway property; and not to re-employ senior 
staff who had been strikers(97). This last point was included because 
some railway managers related the perceived loss of discipline to the 
industrial organisation of senior railway staff. This perception led to 
some persecution of these grades after the Strike. The railway 
managements could be confident of support from the Government because the 
Minister said, 'so far as the Government was concerned, full sympathy was 
expressed with these points, as also with the restoration of 
discipline'(98).
The hopes that the 'hard-line' settlement could be imposed upon the 
railway workers were dashed the following day, when most of them refused 
to return to work if all the striking railway workers were not re­
employed (99). This attitude on the part of the railway workforce made
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it difficult to implement the 'hard-line' policy; it also made any 
return to work difficult. The continuation of the coal lockout and the 
delay before the general level of trade could recover from the Strike 
meant that many of the pre-Strlke railway force would not be needed for 
the attenuated railway service immediately after the Strike. The 
'hard-line' policy could have worked if only a few strikers returned, but 
the strikers' solidarity meant that some sort of compromise had to be 
negotiated with the trade unions(lOO).
The GWR management initially tried to get their workers back by 
widely distributing a message which presented their 'hard-line' position, 
but said there would be no wage reductions. It did not say that 
management intended to retain a week's wages which the strikers had 
already earned. (This was possible because the custom was for wages to
be paid a week in arrear.) On the morning of 13 May, the RCA and the
NUR sent letters to the railway managements saying that they were urging 
their members to return to work, but that when they attempted to do so, 
difficulties were placed in their way. The unions asked that the return 
should be made in the spirit indicated by the Prime Minister. The reply
of the General Manager of the GWR was little more than the message which
already been broadcast and exhibited on a poster at all GWR 
stations(lOl). Later, but still during the morning of 13 May, the
three executives of the RCA, the NUR and ASLEF met at the ASLEF 
headquarters in Hampstead and considered the difficulties facing 
returning railway strikers. They decided to send a joint letter to the 
secretary of the General Managers Committee(102),
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The Post-Strlke Settlement Negotiations
An emergency meeting of the Railway Companies Association was held 
on the afternoon of 13 May. It received the joint letter from the three 
railway trade unions which said that they had called their members out on 
strike again, but would like to meet the railway managements so that a 
settlement could be arranged(103). The union executives were informed 
that they could meet the General Managers at once, and a meeting was 
arranged for 4.30 p.m. that afternoon(104).
Walkden described the railway managers as 'exceedingly hard and 
angry'(105). The managers said that the unions did not disguise the 
fact that they had blundered(106). The negotiations began with a 
discussion about the statements made by representatives of the railway 
companies and the notices that had been exhibited at stations.
Eventually, draft terms for a settlement were handed to the union 
representatives(107). They became the basis for the settlement under 
which the railway workers returned and which overshadowed the 
relationship between them and their employers for the next few years; 
here is the draft.
1. Those employees of the Railway Companies 
who have gone out on strike to be taken 
back to work as soon as traffic offers and 
(wrk can be found for them.
2. In order to facilitate the early return of 
all men possible:-
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(a) The Guaranteed Week for those classes 
of employees covered by the agreements 
with Railway Companies to which the 
National Union of Railwayman are 
parties, to be suspended forthwith, 
but to be restored as soon as traffic 
becomes normal.
(b) Work available to be distributed as 
far as reasonably possible so as to 
equalise the number of days work for 
each man.
3. Each person as taken back to be re-instated 
in the position he held prior to the 
strike,
4. Each weekly paid person who had gone on 
strike to forfeit a week's wages at normal 
rates. Each monthly paid person to 
forfeit one-fourth of a month's salary.
5. This arrangement is not to apply to:-
(a) Persons who have been guilty of 
violence or intimidation.
(b) Persons in supervisory grades, 
including Station Masters,
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Goods Agents, and Clerks in Special 
Class and Class 1; but each such case 
is to be separately considered and 
decided by the Companies.
The Trade Unions agree that each man who 
left his work without notice has broken his 
contract of service and that the Companies 
do not by reinstatement surrender any rights that 
they may possess.
The trade unions realised that the railway companies could not be 
expected to re-employ all their striking workers immediately, but they 
could not manage without some of them; railway operation involves 
specialized work, much of which has no equivalent outside the railway 
industry and has to be performed at all hours of the day and night. Even 
if the railway managers used some of the volunteers they had acquired 
during the strike, they needed some of the strikers, The unions accepted 
the first paragraph of the draft terms, but insisted that the words 'men 
should be reinstated at grade seniority at each station* should be 
included. This was conceded.
It was decided that discussions about the 'Guaranteed Week', should 
be held over until after the strike, but it appears to have been tacitly 
agreed that there would not be enough work for all the workers to be 
taken back forthwith. The fourth clause of the draft terms was, 
predictably, not acceptable to the unions, especially as the company 
representatives appeared minded to enforce it strongly(100), the 
companies were prepared to forgo this demand only if the notorious 
'clause two' was inserted, i,e.
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"The Trade Unions admit that in calling a strike they committed a 
wrongful act against the Companies and agree that the Companies do not by 
reinstatement surrender their legal rights to claim damages arising out 
of the strike from strikers and others responsible."
When Walkden explained the unions' acceptance of this clause to his 
Association's Executive, it was not in terms of a trade-off. He said 
that the union representatives had allowed the clause to stand after an 
assurance had been given that there would be no action taken in respect
of it. The companies insisted upon its inclusion, 'as it was the only
;
feature which left them with any shred of dignity'(109). It is not 
suggested that he deliberately misrepresented the negotiations, but it 
must have been very difficult for the trade union leaders to accept the 
clause and anodyne remarks consistent v^ ith Walkden's account may well 
have been made on the management side. The problem of the sequestration 
of a week's wages was not finally settled until the following afternoon; 
the rest of the evening was taken up with discussion of the exclusion of 
supervisory staff from the strike settlement. The negotiations on this 
point were adjourned at about 10 p.m., and resumed at 10. 30 a, m. the 
following morning.
After the trade union representatives had left. Lord Ashfield, the 
General Manager of London's underground railway told the other General 
Managers that he wanted a quick settlement for the 'tube railways' and 
was prepared to settle on the basis of what had already been agreed, that 
is, clauses 1,2 and 5 of the final settlement. He did not want to 
dismiss or remove any of his supervisors, so the further negotiations 
about supervisors would not concern him(llO),
Lord Ashfield was no stranger to the affairs of the Railway Clerks 
Association. From 1916 to 1919, as Sir Albert Stanley, he had been 
President of the Board of Trade in the Coalition Government headed by 
Lloyd George(111). The President of the Board of Trade, prior to the
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creation of the Ministry of Transport, was responsible for government 
policy concerning the railway industry, Lord Ashfield had presided over 
the recognition of the Association's right to represent both clerks and 
supervisors, and may have felt that some of the comments which 
apportioned part of the blame for the extent of the strike to the 
organisation of supervisors in unions were a personal reflection on 
himself(112). As the manager of an undertaking that was separate from 
the mainline railways as far as labour were concerned<113), he did not 
share the other managers' most intractable problems, and his attitude in 
the Strike was more balanced than that of some other employers and many 
newspapers. This is the opinion of the authors of the official history 
of London Transport; to illustrate their opinion they quote a notice he 
issued on 3 May 1926. Its reasonable tone is in marked contrast to that 
of a similar notice issued to GWR employees on 2 May 1926(114).
' NOTICE TO THE STAFF
The regrettable dispute which has arisen with regard to the terms 
and conditions of employment in coal mines cannot justify the stoppage of 
those services which are essential to the public welfare. While it is 
recognised that the loyalty which has been shown by all classes of 
workers to the miners is admirable, it should not be forgotten that there 
is a wider and greater loyalty which should be be shown to the nation at 
large.
In this crisis each man must decide for himself but we hope that we 
can rely upon the staff remaining at work. There is no difference 
between the Companies and the staff, but both have a duty to the public 
which they should discharge. The Companies are bound to discharge to the 
best of their ability and resources their duty in providing public 
passenger services. Those members of the staff who do likewise are 
assured of their positions.
This is a notice which the GWR sent to all their stations and also 
to some of their workers at their homes(115):
'The National Union of Railwayman have intimated that railwayman have 
been asked to strike without notice to-morrow night. Each Great Western 
man has to decide his course of action, but I appeal to all of you to 
hesitate before you break your contracts of service with the old Company, 
before you inflict grave injury upon the Railway Industry, and before you 
arouse ill feeling in the Railway service which will take years to 
remove. Railway Companies and Railwayman have demonstrated that they
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can settle their disputes by direct negotiations. The Mining Industry 
should be advised to do the same. Remember that your means of living and 
your personal interests are involved, and that Great Western men are 
trusted to be loyal to their conditions of service in the same manner as 
they expect the Company to carry out their obligations and agreements. '
PADDINGTON STATION FELIX J. C. POOLE
May 2nd, 1926 General Manager.
Lord Ashfield and the trade unions conducted their separate 
negotiations after 10 p.m. on 13 May. Walkden confirmed that he agreed 
to abandon entirely the Managers' proposals with regard to supervisory 
grades<116>. A settlement was reached in the early hours of Friday 
morning, 14 May(117). Station staff were to report for duty on Saturday 
15 May and Headquarters staff the following Monday. In connection with 
this settlement, it should be remembered that, normally, the underground 
railways of London only carry passengers and that their demand for intra­
urban carriage would not be affected by the coal lock-out as was the 
traffic carried by the main-line railway companies. Their motive power 
would also be less affected because imported coal could be brought up the 
Thames to the power stations which generated electricity to move the 
trains. Walkden thought that this settlement proved helpful when 
negotiation continued with the General Managers of the main-line 
companies on the morning of 14 May.
When the negotiations with the General Managers were resumed, a new 
formula was offered to the unions to explain how it was intended to deal 
with the supervisory staff who had been on strike. It was to replace 
paragraph 5(b) in the draft terms of settlement:
'The Companies intimated that arising out of the strike it would be 
necessary to remove certain persons to other positions but no man's 
salary or wages would be reduced.
The Unions undertake:-
(1) Not again to instruct men to strike without 
proper notice.
(2) That Station Masters, Goods Agents and others
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holding positions of special responsibility 
shall be excluded from any future strike.
The Unions to furnish security for observance of 
this clause in the sum of £100,000. '
After much discussion, the trade union representatives offered an 
alternative form of words : -
'Persons in Supervisory grades in the special class who have 
participated in the strike may be transferred to positions other than 
those they occupied prior to the strike, each such case to be separately 
considered and decided by the Companies.
The Companies will notify the Unions by Monday next the names of men 
whom they propose to transfer and will afford the men an opportunity of 
having an advocate to present their cases to the General Manager.
In no case shall any such employees have their salaries or wages 
reduced.
The Unions agree to give no support of any kind to their workers who 
take any unauthorised action.
The Unions recognise that supervisory employees in the special class 
should not be encouraged to take part in any strike,'
The managers objected to this modification because they did not intend 
to confine their policy of removal to other positions to persons in the 
special class and supervisory grades. This point was agreed by the trade 
unions.
Although it appeared that agreement had been reached not to withhold 
payment for work done prior to the strike if the trade unions allowed 
Clause 2 to stand in the final agreement<118), there was some doubt 
whether this had been completely settled. The chairmen of each of the 
four companies were consulted by telephone and the companies agreed to 
pay the money. This removed the final obstacle to the agreement and it 
was signed at 4.30 p.m. on Friday 14 May 1926, in the following terms:
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TERMS OF SETTLEMENT AS BETWEEN THE RAILWAY COMPANIES ON THE ONE HAND AND
THE NATIONAL UNION OF RAILWAYMEN, ASSOCIATED SOCIETY OF LOCOMOTIVE
ENGINEERS & FIREMEN, AND THE RAILWAY CLERKS' ASSOCIATION ON THE OTHER.
1. Those employees of the Railway Companies who 
have gone out on strike to be taken back to work 
as soon as traffic offers and work can be found 
found for thorn. The principle to be followed 
in reinstating to be seniority in each grade at 
each station, depot or office.
2. The Trade Unions admit that in calling a strike 
committed a wrongful act against the Companies 
and agree that the Companies do not by 
reinstatement surrender their legal rights to 
claim damages arising out of the strike from 
strikers and others responsible.
3. The Unions undertake:-
(a) not again to instruct their members to 
strike without previous negotiations with 
the Companies.
<b) to give no support of any kind to their 
members who take any unauthorised action.
<c) not to encourage Supervisory employees in 
the Special Class to take part in any 
strike,
4. The Companies intimated that arising out of the 
strike it may be necessary to remove certain 
persons to other positions, but no such person's 
salary or wages will be reduced. Each Company 
will notify the Unions within one week of the 
names of men whom they propose to transfer and 
will afford each man an opportunity of having an 
advocate to present his case to the General 
Manager.
5. The settlement shall not extend to persons who 
have been guilty of violence or intimidation.
On behalf of the General On behalf of the
Managers' Conference:- Railway Trade Unions;
FELIX J.C. POLE J. H. THOMAS)National
C. T. CRAMP }Union of
H. G. BURGESS )Railwayman
J, BROMLEY >Associated
H. A. WALKER )Society of
}Locomotive
R, L, WEDGWOOD >Engineers
}& Firemen
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R.H. SELBIE A. G, WALKDEN)Railway
)Clerks'
)Associât ion
Dated this fourteenth day of May, Nineteen Hundred and twenty-six. '
Difficulties with the Settlement
The unions and the railway managers both hoped that the agreement 
would ensure that the railways would get back to work. The union 
negotiators understood that the effects of the miners’ continued lock-out 
would mean that railway traffic would be reduced both because of 
generally reduced industrial activity and because the supply of coal for 
railway locomotives would be limited. What the union negotiators did 
not realise was how the railway managers were going to implement the 
settlement and how many supervisors were to be disciplined for striking 
- by demotion, by removal to Jobs in different localities, by both 
strategies dr by simply withholding reinstatement. The first signs came 
when Association members reported back to work. They were asked to hand 
in their season tickets and were then told that they would be sent for 
when there was work for them. Applications for privilege tickets, 
meaning for travel at reduced rates, were also being refused<119).
Railway w>rkers' cheap travel is more than a fringe benefit; it 
has been argued that railways have been able to pay lower wages than 
other employers because of the value of cheap and free travel. It is a 
very easy way of augmenting wages; cheap or free seats on time-tabled 
passenger trains cost the railway management very little. For the 
railway employee, on the other hand, concessionary fares often enable him 
to live where where housing is cheap, but distant from his workplace.
When the agreement of 14 May was under discussion, a suggestion from the 
management had been that holidays should be arranged during the period of 
short-time working. Any railway worker would have reckoned on his cheap
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travel In planning his holiday; railway workers’ lives are built around 
their cheap fares in a number of ways and their sudden loss was a real 
hardship. It was an immediate example of the post-strike problems that 
dominated the Executive meeting of 16 May, which considered those that 
arisen so far.
An important concern was the amount which had been expended on the 
strike. Strike pay had been paid up to May 14, and it transpired that 
£120,000 had been issued in strike cheques for the two weeks(120). Over 
the strike period normal methods of communication were disrupted, and 
disbursing strike pay to members scattered all over the country must have 
been extremely difficult. The Association recorded that the payments 
were made with the minimum of delay using the facilities of the CWS 
Banking Department(121), Branches were asked to send in all relevant 
information, including the number of members who had not been reinstated.
Two Branches - Sunderland and Barnsley - reported that the National 
Association of Stationmasters, Agents and Yardmasters (NASAY) had made a 
re-appearance and copies of its literature were enclosed, It had grown 
out of an organisation called the North-Eastern Stationmasters 
Association and is referred to in the Chapter 2. Its last phase of 
aggression had been in the ’recognition crisis’ of 1919; its new attempt 
at expansion took place on the border of its original area(122).
The organisation may not have been a genuine ’company union’; but 
that is how the Executive of the RCA perceived it, and it certainly 
behaved like one. Its rates of subscription and benefit were similar to 
those of the Association but, to quote its literature, it was 'clearly 
understood that the business of this Association shall be conducted on 
constitutional lines'. This is a clear reference to the Government’s 
criticism of the TUG for calling the General Strike(123), and the NASAY’s
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renewed activity appears to have been directly related to the 
Association's participation. The coincidence of attempted encroachments 
by NASAY, or its predecessor, with the Association's threatened or actual 
industrial action may have been no more than opportunism at times when 
non-militant members of the Association would have been open to 
persuasion. Whether NASAY was ever managerially encouraged, supported 
or promoted is an open question, but there are grounds for suspicion.
The RCA acted fairly quickly to frustrate the NASAY, sending a circular 
to all station-master members and planning a station-masters' 
conference<124).
For two days, the Executive met and considered the fragmentary 
reports which it was receiving from its branches, often without its 
General Secretary, who was preoccupied with TÜC meetings. On 18 May the 
Executive joined the Executives of the other two railway trade unions for 
joint discussions, which took place daily until 22 May. Various post- 
strlke issues were discussed, such as work-sharing^ (the LMS was only 
operating on a fifty per cent basis(125)). Eventually it was decided to 
seek a further meeting with the railway managements. The issues the 
unions wanted to discuss can be summarised under five headings:
1. Reinstatement of supervisors and clerical 
employees.
2. Cases of intimidation.
3. Continued employment of volunteers.
4. Reinstatement of junior men in preference
to seniors.
5. Men working overtime whilst others are not
reinstated. (126)
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The first meeting on the morning of 20 May was 
unproductive because no General Managers were present and no firm 
decisions could be made. In the afternoon, two General Managers were 
still absent but the unions discovered why work-sharing was opposed by 
management - it would penalise the workers who remained 'loyal' during 
the strike(127).
The following day, the General Managers submitted a draft work­
sharing agreement for the bulk of the railway workforce. It gave them 
three days work a week, and did not apply to non-strikers, who still 
enjoyed a guaranteed week's work. It also did not apply to workers 
suspended under clauses 4 & 5 of the May 14 Agreement, It made no 
provision for clerical and supervisory staff, because their work 
presented special difficulties(128). The Association members had to wait 
until 2 June for a work-sharing agreement.
Also on the 21 May, the joint trade union meeting considered an 
appeal from the Miners' Federation to organise a coal embargo. The 
railway unions asked the TUC's National Strike Committee for advice, 
after which they rejected the appeal. It is convenient here to sketch in 
the further progress of the miners' lockout(129).
The railway unions could not help the miners with further industrial 
action, but they could send money. Up to 25 June, the RCA had already 
contributed £1,000 to the Miners' Federation Appeal(130). This 
represented nearly one per cent of the Association's total funds at the 
end of 1926(131). In August, a request from the TUC for further 
donations had to be declined because the Association's central funds were 
so low(132). On 8 November, branches were circularised with the 
suggestion that they could help the miners by raising at least a penny a 
week from each member. This was an outcome of a Special TUC Conference 
on 3 November 1926, which had been convened about a coal embargo still
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sought in support of the miners. Both ASLEF and the NUR said they could 
not join in a coal embargo, although the NUR attended the conference out 
of respect for the TUC.
All three railway unions were in a poor financial position as a 
result of the strike; ASLEF's was the worst(133). Industrial action is 
difficult for a union when funds are low, so a coal embargo would have
been problematical in any case. But it is likely that the membership of
the three railway trade unions were still so shaken by their experience 
that an enthusiastic response from them would have been doubtful even had 
funds been healthier. This must have been the miners' last hope, because
by the end of November the lock-out was over. There is no exact date
for its end, because the Miners' Federation agreed to negotiations on a 
district basis and districts returned to work on different days.
The terms which were obtained were, almost everywhere, heavily 
weighted in the mine-owners' favour. In most districts the eight-hour 
day was restored; the government had introduced an Eight-Hour Day Act in 
July 1926. Immediate wage reductions were introduced in South Wales, 
Scotland and the coal-fields in the North-East of England. In 1927, 
wages went down all over the country, and continued to drop further in 
1928. The average earnings per man-shift stood at 10s 5d in the first 
quarter of 1926; in 1927 the comparable figure was IDs 0#d and in 1928, 
9s 3%d; this was despite the longer hours being worked(134).
We will return now to the affairs of the Association. On 21 May 
the Executive decided that members who had been on strike and were not 
yet re-employed should not pay their Association's subscription vrfiilst 
they were continuing to receive benefit from the Associât ion(135). By 26 
May, it was reported that 5,573 members of the Association had not been 
taken back, and there were 118 suspensions under clauses 4 and 5 of the 
May 14 Agreement. Those suspended under clause 4 were to be
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transferred, but this was not to apply to anyone suspended under clause 
5. (Only one RCA member can be identified as suspended under clause 
5)(136), The benefits paid by the Association to those not yet 
reinstated was as follows: Section A members, £2 .0 .0 per week;
Section B members £1 .10 .0 per week; Section C members, £1 .0 .0 per 
week. There was also an allowance of 5/- for each dependant child to a 
maximum of four children.
The Association was pessimistic about the chances of early 
reinstatements. Because of the shortage of coal the Ministry of 
Transport had already ordered the railway companies to reduce their 
services by ten per cent, and it was reported on 26 May that there was to 
be a further reduction of another twenty per cent(137). On 2 June a 
short-time working agreement for clerks and supervisors was obtained, 
which also provided for attempts to find three days' work a week for ex­
strikers v^o were not suspended. 'Loyal' staff worked full time, ex­
strikers vrfio were due for holidays took them, and privilege ticket 
facilities were restored(136),
This agreement marks the end of the strike as far as the majority of 
RCA members were concerned. There remained those who were subject to 
clauses 4 & 5 of the original strike settlement; most were still 
unemployed and did not know where they would be permanently assigned.
Many of them were senior employees with long service and positions of 
authority. They had established households and had often served on 
local councils or other representative bodies. Now they were to be 
moved to a station or office that might be a long way from home and would 
certainly be at some distance. Demoted, they could expect slights and 
humiliations from people they had once supervised: loss of esteem
appears often to have been more disturbing than loss of income. Their 
punishment for striking for less than two weeks after years of valuable
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service recognised through promotion was disproportions!ly harsh, but the 
railway companies had been shocked by the strike. They genuinely felt 
that running the trains on time needed unrelenting discipline and these 
employees were the ones who had been Supposed to maintain it. It is not 
surprising that the railway managers over-reacted.
The 'Marathon' Negotiations begin
The problems of those members who were under suspension were not 
cleared up overnight. Their changing relationships with the railway 
companies turned into a marathon negotiating exercise for the permanent 
staff of the Association; it was still in progress in 1933.
The Association sent out £120,000 in strike cheques<139>. After 
the strike, more was expended in unemployment pay to members v^o were not 
taken back by the railway companies. Special grants were also paid to 
members who were unemployed for an unusually long time or who had been 
compulsorily transferred away from their home territory and so incurred 
abnormal expenses. The Association's total expenditure on the strike in 
1926 was £238,922, with a further £13,841 in 1927 (equal to at least 
£3 million at the present time). At the beginning of 1926, the 
Association's total funds stood at £310,129, which represented £4 13s.
9d. per member. At the end of 1926, the total funds were £119,833, or 
£2 3s. 9d. per member(140).
At the 1926 Annual Conference an appeal was made to all members 
except those not yet reinstated, to make a voluntary contribution of at 
least £1, spread over twenty weeks. These contributions must have 
helped the Association to recover from its financial difficulties(141). 
Walkden told the press that the Association had not needed to sell 
investments to pay for its involvement in the strike(142). This may
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well have been true, but £40,000 was borrowed from the CWS bank, and 
securities would have to be deposited as collateral(143).
Once the railways' work-sharing agreement had been signed, 
unemployment amongst ordinary Association members - as distinct from 
members who had been especially active during the strike or who were 
supervisors - dropped significantly. On 22 May 5,838 members were 
reported as not yet reinstated. Four days later - on May 26 - another 
483 were also reported, but another 748 reinstatements left a net figure 
of 5,573(144). A month later - on 25th June, after work-sharing had been 
agreed - this had been further reduced to approximately two thousand. 
There were grumbles about the administration of work-sharing and the 
Association's payment of unemployment pay(145), but it was tacitly 
recognised that Association had achieved all that could be done for the 
bulk of the membership for the present. The Association's efforts were 
now concentrated of the smaller groups who were under particular 
pressures.
The member© with the most urgent needs were those being prosecuted 
or sued in the courts for their activities during the strike. The 
prosecutions reported here were not brought by the police, but were 
initiated by two railway companies: the GWR and the LMS. The GWR 
charged the local secretaries of the three railway unions (NUR, ASLEF and 
RCA) with intimidation. The case was heard at Taunton on June 2; the 
magistrates decided that there was not enough evidence to send the case 
for trial. At Swindon, a member of the Association's Executive was also 
prosecuted for intimidation, but the evidence was unconvincing and the 
character of the defendant made it appear even weaker: he had twenty-
three years' railway service, was a Primitive Methodist local preacher 
and a borough councillor, and had been thanked by the police for helping 
to maintain order during the strike. His trial was farcical: one witness
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who was supposed to have been Intimidated was described as twice the 
defendant's size. At Towcester, two NUR members and a RCA branch 
collector were prosecuted for intimidation and, again, the evidence was 
insufficient. A similar outcome ensued at Clitheroe, where a RCA member 
and four other railway trade unionists faced a charge of intimidation.
At Manchester, the chairman of Manchester No.6 branch was awarded forty 
guineas costs against the LMS, after facing a similar charge<146). No 
successful prosecutions have been traced.
A civil action was brought against the secretary of the Chesterfield 
branch by the Derbyshire Times, a local newspaper claiming to have been 
damaged by the branch's activities during the strike. This was a more 
serious threat to the Association than were the intimidation cases, for 
an award of damages could have been costly and might have encouraged 
further claims. In the event, the case dragged on until 1928, when the 
plaintiffs stopped the case and paid £72 . 3s, 6d to the defendant for his 
costs and disbursements(147).
Many of the obvious and immediate problems had been resolved by the 
end of 1926, although full-time working was not restored until 1927.
The reinstatement of most of the ordinary members appears to have been 
achieved by October 1927(148), but a few members appear never to have 
been reinstated at all. These were mainly temporary and 'unappointed* 
clerks(149). In June 1927, there were said to be only a few such members 
left(150), and at the end of August 1927 it was decided to review the 
remaining casesdSl). Presumably they were advised that, after so long a 
time, there was little hope of reinstatement. The Association had been 
paying them unemployment pay for over a year and had also given grants to 
unemployed members whose circumstances were especially difficult. Up to 
November 1926, grants totalled nearly £240(152).
The negotiations which eventually led to the end of short-time
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working began with a joint meeting of the three railway trade unions held 
on 19th August 1926. It was called to discuss the way the strike 
agreements were working and to organise the arguments to be presented to 
a meeting of the railway general managers. It was hoped that the agenda 
would include the companies' way of dealing with clause 4 cases, 
especially the LNER and LMS who were insisting on demoting these workers 
as well as moving them to different parts of the country(153), Other 
matters were the retention of volunteers and the way the salaried staff 
had been organised since the strike. On this last point, the three 
ëx^cutives made a declaration that there should be no interference with 
salaried grades. They also requested the TUC to ask all other trade 
unions to make similar declarations. An attempt was made to have a 
joint meeting with the General Managers, but the reply was they saw no 
point; each company could settle its own problems separately. Pressure 
for a joint meeting continued throughout the autumn; by early November, 
the unions were also pressing for short-time working to be extended from 
three days a week to four(154), This was despite the fact that the coal 
lock-out was still in progress. A joint meeting was eventually fixed 
for 21 December and the general managers were then to be pressed to 
end short-time working completely<155).
At the joint meeting, the general managers suggested that everybody 
should work long enough to earn a standard week's wages. This was not 
satisfactory to the unions, but the.general managers were insistent(156). 
Despite more pressure the next development was the extension of the 
working week from three to four days on 21 February 1927, and from 1 
March it was further extended to five days, including Sundays. It was 
not until 11 April that the full guaranteed week was restored for 
'conciliation' staff and a full working week for clerical staff (157).
The restoration of normal working for those disciplined under
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clauses 4 and 5 of the original strike settlement remained to be settled. 
Negotiations about it had been in train since disciplinary action began; 
the pressure was now increased to restore the subjects of it to their 
former status.
On the first day of the General Strike, a director of the Great 
Western Railway Company called at Kingham, a GWR station in Oxfordshire. 
His first, and predictable, question was to ask for the station-master^
On learning that hé vras on strike, the director declared that the 
station-master would not be re-employed by the GWR. The station- "
master's daughter, in anonymous reminiscences(158),
says the discomforts her father suffered immediately after the strike 
were due to this visit. It may have contributed to them, but he would 
almost certainly have appeared on the clause 4 list^ even had the 
director not gone to Kingham on the crucial day, but the length and 
idiosyncracy of the GWR's clause 4 list may owe something to the 
peregrinations of this company director(159). The daughter reports that 
the Association fought her father's case and that at one point he was 
interviewed by his General Manager. It was decided that he should not 
go back to Kingham, but would be appointed to the next station in his 
grade to fall vacant. Until then, he would be found work somewhere in 
his Division (the Worcester Division). In August he was sent to 
Pershore to help with the plum traffic, working as a fifth-grade clerk 
(this is the lowest grade of clerk). In late autumn, he was appointed 
as station-master at Droitwich. Up to 8 November, he was rated as 
having lost approximately £45 as a consequence of his suspension and the 
Association gave him a grant of £35 to help compensate him(160). He 
received no further promotion but remained in the same grade until 
retiring twelve years later. He had been secretary of his Association 
branch, but after the strike he no longer took an active part in trade
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union affairs. He became a Droitwich councillor and later a J. P., 
eventually being elected Chairman of the Bench.
This case has been described at some length, because although it may 
not be typical it shows some features which appear in other clause 4 
cases. The Kingham station-master appears to have been fairly lucky, as 
there were still a number of clause 4 cases unresolved in January 1928. 
Three were GWR employees(161), but the Association considered that the 
LMS was the worst company for not re-instating clause 4 cases, followed 
by the LNER(162).
The statement that pressure to restore the clause 4 and 5 workers to 
their former status increased once the guaranteed week was restored 
should perhaps be qualified. It accords with the Association's records, 
but the impression that they give may be to some extent be distorted 
because of the concentration of attention on those workers in the 
Association's proceedings, after earlier post-strike problems were 
settled. As far as the majority of them are concerned, either they or 
the Association had decided by the beginning of November 1926 that what 
could be done for them had been done.
On 8 November and 15 December 1926, lists of grants made to 
members whose cases were not yet settled were published in the Executive 
Minutes(163), There were 27 names out of 118 which had been on the 
original lists (117 clause 4 and one clause 5) (164). The twenty-seven 
names may not have included all the unsettled cases, but must have 
covered most of them. Most who suffered suspension would have needed 
financial help, even though the original agreement specified no loss of 
earnings, because of their removal from one part of the country to 
another. Up to the 8th November, £460 . 11s. 6d. was paid to them in 
special grants. A further £92 . 15s. Od. was paid before the end of 1926. 
This was some compensation for losses totalling £917.0, Od. that they
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were estimated to have incurred(165).
There were differences in the companies' ways of handling clause 4 
and 5 cases. When the post-strike period began, the GWR looked like 
presenting the Association with most difficulty. Their 'clause 4* list 
was the longest and it included grades which no other company 
listed(166). In July 1926, they were withholding normal scale increases 
for workers who had been out on strike. The Association referred this 
action to the Central Wages Board(167). In April 1927 it was discovered 
that the company was discriminating another way. Women clerks on the 
GWR customarily received a company 'dowry' on marriage (when, 
compulsorily, their employment ceased), and it was discovered that they 
were not being given to women vrtio had been on strike(168). But in 
February 1927 it emerged that the GWR had begun to pay the scale increase 
to strikers. This appeared to be a direct result of the Association's 
complaint to the Central Wages Board; it had now reached the National 
Wages Board, but was withdrawn as a result of the company's action(169). 
In October 1927, it was reported that the company had stopped with­
holding dowries, apparently because of negotiating pressure(170). The 
pressure also appears to have modified the company's attitude on 'clause 
4', because most of its list was cleared by the end of 1926; the 
Kingham station-master was re-instated at Droitwich in the late autumn of 
that year. The Southern Railway disciplined only three workers, but it 
strongly resisted efforts to modify its attitude to them. The LNER also 
provided stern resistance, but the most stubborn company of all was the 
LMS, although their list of thirty-two was comparatively short. Its 
distinguishing feature was the only 'clause 5' case: an inspector at 
Dalston Junction in North London(171).
Disciplined members were mostly employed on the four main-line 
railways but two employees of two other companies were also involved in
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the 'negotiating marathon*. One was a clerk who worked for the 
Metropolitan Railway Company, which refused to take him back after the 
strike(172). The other member worked for the London General Omnibus 
Company. This was part of T. 0. T. (Trams, Omnibuses and Tubes) combine 
and Lord Ashfield, its managing director, did not discipline any of his 
railway employees(173), but this clerk was employed by a bus company and 
was demoted from class III to class IV. He was given a special grant 
and the Association negotiated his restoration to his former rank; he was 
said to have been selected as an example(174). It took about fifteen 
months to achieve the re-instatement in August 1927, and the pressure 
involved blocking a parliamentary Bill (175). The clerk was paid a final, 
special grant of £5(176).
This case gives some idea of the dimensions of the task of 
negotiating solutions to the problems created by the 'clause 4 and 5* 
lists. By June 1927 there were few cases left, but these were very 
intractable(177). When the LGOC clerk was restored to his old rank, 
eight other members were paid special grants (totalling £136) and there 
were at least three others for whom the Association was still 
negotiating(178).
As already explained, the LMS company was the most intractable.
Early in 1927, in connection with its normal business, the company 
promoted a Bill in Parliament: the 'LMS General Powers Bill', This was
blocked by the Association's M.P. s(179). Their action had a remedial 
effect; by the middle of February the LMS management had discussed all 
their 'clause 4 and 5' cases and some improvements had already been 
effected(180).
In November 1927, the railway companies approached the Association 
for help in promoting a Railways and Road Traffic Bill. This would 
allow the railways to engage in road transport operations and was an
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attempt to ensure that the loss of traffic caused by road competition 
would not mean too large a loss of revenue for the railway companies.
The Association's first response was to secure a promise that any 
operations made possible, if the Bill became law, would not lead to a 
loss of Jobs. They then said that co-operation could not be guaranteed 
unless all the outstanding 'clause 4 and 5' cases were cleared by the end 
of the year; they also hoped that the other two railway trade unions 
would co-operate in ensuring the resolution of these cases<161). In 
December 1927 the other two unions added their pressure to the efforts to 
have the remaining cases resolved(182).
Soon after this, one of the more notable of the outstanding cases 
was cleared up. A. W. Longbottom had been removed from his job as a 
canvasser and collector in Halifax to another job in Huddersfield, under 
clause 4. On 1 January 1928 he regained his former job. A Labour 
Party activist of long standing in Halifax, he had been on the borough 
council since 1912 and was its ü v - (Mayor in 1923. In July 1928 he was 
elected at a by-election as the M. P, for Halifax<l83).
By November 1928, very little movement was reported on the cases 
still outstanding(184). One of the three members disciplined by the 
Southern had retired; the other two cases remained unresolved(185). The 
three railway unions were pressing the railway companies for a joint 
meeting to attempt to settle them, but the companies were reluctant.
All the railway companies were promoting Bills in Parliament in 1928, and 
in January 1929 the two Association M. P. s were asked to put down blocking 
motions against all but the Metropolitan Railway Bill(186). This was 
despite the opposition of J.H. Thomas of the NUR, who did not consider 
blocking Bills to be a reasonable way of dealing with the cases at issue; 
he thought they should be dealt with by arbitration on the lines 
recommended in the victimisation section of the Mond-Turner Industrial .
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Conference report (187), By March, the effects of the blocking were 
evident; the railway companies were prepared for a joint meeting(188),
None transpired, but the pace of re-instatement quickened. By 
April 1929, the single 'clause 5' case had been settled, but the subject 
of it had to move from Dalston to Stoke-on-Trent. Jobs were being 
offered to others; some were being accepted and some members 
bargained(189). At the end of April, the Southern Railway was declared 
clear(190). There was a trickle of re-instatement all through 1929 and 
most of 1930. The penultimate case left was that of a member of the 
Executive who accepted a job similar to the one he had lost. He took it 
up on 1 January 1931, at Bolton, having formerly worked at 
Warrington(191).
The replacing of their own colleague back in a job comparable to his 
old one and not too far distant from it was the virtual end of the 
Executive's long and gruelling feat of negotiation. Most of the 
displaced members were reinstated, but it is not possible to determine 
how many were not, Only one member is mentioned in the E.G. minutes as 
not having been reinstated, but he seems to have been at some danger of 
dismissal before the strike(192). Even with this difficult case the 
Association demonstrated considerable patience, keeping up negotiations 
over a period of years.
Dealing with other Post-Strike difficulties
Other successful achievements of the post-strike period included the 
way the Association held in check its post-strike membership decline and 
its success, when the Trades Disputes Act became law, in persuading a 
large majority of the membership to 'contract-in'.
The decline in trade union membership after 1926 is a well
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documented(193), and a number of reasons have been offered in 
explanation. The main one is the manner in which the strike was called: 
in effect, the General Council of the TUC told the trade unions to, 'sink 
the differences you have amongst yourselves and leave the direction of 
the fight to us'. When it was called off, without proper safeguards 
having been made for the return to work, there must have been a sense of 
betrayal amongst trade unionists, and a strong feeling that they had been 
used and thrown aside. This feeling was probably less current amongst 
railway trade unionists, although it did exist(194). The unions had 
held out for a more reasonable strike settlement and the Association 
added to this a fierce fight to re-instate the comparative few whom the 
trade unions could not immediately protect when the strike ended.
Sensible management of industrial relations was not all that kept 
the drop in membership in check. A special Organisation and Propaganda 
Campaign was started in July 1927, when it was apparent that there was a 
real problem of falling membership. Short-time working had finished 
three months earlier, so It was reasonable to expect members to clear 
their arrears and for recruitment of new and lapsed members to start 
getting easier. When the campaign was launched there were said to be 
15,131 members with arrears amounting to £6,849; and 3,326 members were 
said to have been lost since the strike(195). After its peak of 87,054 
in 1920, the Association's membership had fallen to 51,137 in 1922, but 
rose thereafter to 66,130 in 1925. The strike brought it down through 
54,795 in 1926 to 50,208 in 1927. Increases to 52,227 in 1928, 54,347 
in 1929, and 59,473 in 1930, may not be solely attributed to the 
campaign, but it seems likely to have been largely responsible(196).
Originally, the campaign was meant to last for six months, and it 
was not meant to be national. However, experience demonstrated that more 
was needed, and it was decided that activity would be concentrated on one
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rregion at a time. A propaganda booklet was published: The RCA and its
Path of Progress<197), The campaign had hardly begun when a new factor 
appeared: the Trades Disputes Act, 1927. This was the Government's 
legislative response to the General Strike. Its provisions fell under 
four headings: three of them deal with sympathetic strikes, intimidation, 
and membership of trade unions by civil servants, but the provision which 
affected the Association's recruiting campaign was that union members now 
had to provide written agreement that they wanted to pay a political 
levy. In other words, they now needed to 'contract-in', whereas formerly 
they had to ' contract-out, ' by signing a declaration if they did not want 
to pay a political levy(198). The Executive’s response was to 
incorporate a contracting-in aspect to the recruiting campaign(199). As 
has been shown, the decline in membership was reversed; and the 
contracting-in can^aign also succeeded. In May 1928 the Association's 
national average for contracting-in was 80.9 per cent(200).
Conclusions
The General Strike was a shattering experience for the trade union 
movement. The probable intention had been to provide such a convincing 
demonstration of industrial power that the Government would force the 
coal-owners to reorganise the industry in a rational manner and to 
negotiate a satisfactory national agreement on miners' pay and 
conditions. If this was the intention - it appears to be the only 
rational one - then the General Strike was a failure. The success of 
Red Friday may have misled the trade union leaders as to the Government's 
view of them* and to over-estimate their own potency. The TUG made no 
formal, practical preparations for the strike,and independent 
organisation was very patchy(201). In the event, improvisation and local
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organisation were impressive. All the same, and despite the demonstration 
of remarkable solidarity, the Government had not quickly succumbed and 
the strike was turning into a conflict of attrition by the time it was 
called off. When it entered such a phase, the TUC leaders seem to have
become alarmed that they might have provoked a political adventure that
6
they did not intend and could not control.
A coal embargo enforced by the railway and transport unions would 
have been much more feasible. It was what was originally proposed 
before Red Friday, and it was the fear of this that led the Government to 
climb down<202). It was what the miners asked for again, soon after the 
strike on 21 May 1926, repeating their request through a special TUC six 
months later(203). But the railway unions were in disarray after the 
strike; prominent members were either suspended or had been sent to 
areas where they were not known and and had established no influence.
More limited than a general strike, a coal embargo could have been 
applied as a fairly long-term weapon of attrition; there is support for 
this interpretation from at least one authority(204).
The General Strike had a profound influence on the Association. 
Although it had sought and received a strike mandate in 1919, May 1926 
was the first occasion on which it attempted to bring out its whole 
membership. The experience must have been very disturbing for the 
Executive, especially as some of them were disciplined under clause four 
and at least one was arraigned in court.
The strike had at least two positive effects on the Association, 
although the cost was high. The first was in the experience of 
industrial organisation at a time of dispute and of negotiation 
afterwards - valuable for the negotiations on pay that continued through 
the 1930s, and for the aftermath of^a railway strike in Northern Ireland 
soon after the General Strike. The second, and perhaps the more
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significant, was the development of a cooperative relationship with the 
other railway unions; this was part of the post-strike negotiating 
experience referred to above. The two 'conciliation staff unions 
temporarily forgot their differences, and they could now regard the 
Association in genuine comradeship with them.
Both benefits were part of the greater maturity which the strike 
forced on the Association, and affected the union as a whole; the 
Strike's immediately disadvantageous effects fell largely on individual 
members, although its drain on resources laid general constraints on the 
Association. It was 1932 before its funds reached their pre-strike 
level(205), and the Association had to wait till 1940 for its membership 
to pass the 1925 figure(206).
It has already been suggested that the workers who were disciplined 
were probably the more active and influential members of the Association. 
The evidence for this is not extensive, because little is known about 
them as individuals, but what there is suggests that they were prominent 
members, some of whose trade union activity subsided after the Strike.
The station-master from Kingham, "... took no more active part in union 
affairs, but he continued to work in the public affairs of the 
town"(207). The career aspirations of ambitious members of the 
Association who had been strikers stood to be hindered if not completely 
blocked; even v^en there was no discrimination, suspicions of it could 
lead to long-standing grievances. Private information suggests that they 
were manifest amongst railway white-collar workers in the 1950s and 
1960s(208); a twenty-year-old striker in 1926 would still be at work 
until 1971. In July 1927 the Executive decided to investigate a case of 
a non-striker's allegedly unfair promotion to a position of station- 
master; he was employed by the LMS.(209) In August 1927 it was 
reported that the T. 0. T. (Trams, Omnibuses and Tubes) Consortium had
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declared an embargo on promotion for 1926 strikers<210); and the 
following year, the LMS was reportedly discriminating against Association 
members who wanted promotion. There were similar accounts from 
Manchester and South Wales<211), and the companies' records show that 
discrimination was possible, A file of reports and letters originally 
held in an office in Darlington, on the LNER, and now in the Public 
Record Office, has a letter detailing how workers' activities during the 
strike were to be entered on their staff records(212). Records for the 
GWR note that 'loyal' staffs' histories were to be suitably 
annotated(213).
It should be acknowledged that the majority of Association members 
would never have been promoted; there were not enough senior jobs. But 
those who were singled out to be disciplined precisely because of their 
senior grades had already achieved some recognition of merit, indicating 
that they might have expected further promotion; some frustrated hopes 
could have been realistic. For the rest, although the chances of 
promotion were unlikely, there would be a more generalised 
disappointment. Anyone who had been on strike and did not achieve 
advancement might attribute his failure, at least in part, to his share 
in the strike; there was no way of knowing whether it had any effect or 
not.
It has been suggested earlier in this chapter that there is an 
especial value in an account of a white-collar union's experience of the 
General Strike. The Association's members' beliefs about discriminatory 
treatment, real or imaginary, indicate something of the justification for 
the claim. Until after the first World War, the Association's policy had 
been against striking; a predictable stance for office workers with 
occupational reasons for identifying some of their interests as in common 
with those of their managements. At first sight, the change of policy
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and the Association's participation in the General Strike may be seen as 
a remarkable change of attitude. They certainly invite analysis, but are 
less dramatic than they seem, and can be presented as entirely in keeping 
with the attitudes that are here suggested as likely to be typical of 
white-collar workers.
There is no mystery about the Association's early participation in 
the General Strike; as a transport union it was in the first wave of the 
TUC's strike plan(214>. The Association's leaders' early perception of 
conditions likely to precipitate industrial action, their promotion of a 
strike fund in advance of the conj^ensus of the need for one, and the 
extent of members' support when the call eventually came, can all be 
explained in terms of stereotypically petit-bourgeois tenets of prudence 
and moderation applied in the circumstances of the time. They were no 
aberrations, but were part of a consistent industrial strategy.
The special interest of the episode is in what the Association 
learnt from it, and what lessons it had for white-collar unions in 
general. Reference has been made to the relationship between non­
militancy and white-collar workers' presumed alignment with employers 
rather than with manual workers. Non-militancy might be ascribed to 
loyalty to employers, middle-class morality, or false consciousness; but 
it can also be seen as the the rational consequence of working in 
organisations offering career structures. It was in direct conflict with 
the industrial strategy that was an equally rational response to the 
circumstances in which railway clerks found themselves after 1918, and 
the aftermath of the General Strike was a starkly salutary demonstration 
af the special problems that industrial action present for white-collar 
workers.
Railway clerks' hopes and expectations of advancement lay in 
expertise that singled them out not only as candidates for promotion but
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as vulnerable to victimization; reluctance to take industrial action was 
related to the sense of what members stood to lose, including career 
prospects. It is immaterial that the chances of any particular person's 
promotion may have been slight. Manual work was not without its 
parallels but, in general, the balance of factors in the calculus of 
militancy was likely to be significantly different, and the competitive 
aspects of career development placed the ambitious aspirant for 
supervisory or managerial status at especial risk of paying a high 
individual price for Identifying with the collective, On the other 
hand, the specialized expertise that made some of the Association's 
members particularly vulnerable to discriminatory practices was a 
bargaining counter tAen the return to work was negotiated; fair dealing 
was at the forefront of the Association's concern at that stage and its 
expenditure of time and money in the interests of those who remained 
unprotected was ungrudging. But this does not mean that members' 
interests were safeguarded to the full satisfaction of all, and those who 
continued to discern the strike's damaging effects three decades after it 
happened may well have thought them to be beyond the control of their or 
any union.
The General Strike presented the Association with nothing that was 
not theoretically accepted in its ordinary pursuit of industrial 
relations. Its members' propensity to strike, or not, was related to 
their assessment of vrtiat was to be gained or lost; negotiating strengths 
rested on the extent of organisation within particular monopolies of 
skills. But, in 1926, theory was put to practical test, not only with a 
white-collar union but one which was well-established, recognized, and 
relatively well-placed to support its members through the action and its 
consequences.
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Chapter 6
How The Association Dealt with Dissension
Introduction
TUX-.,'
It may seem strange to consider dissension as something contributing to 
the Association’s success. Strange, because dissidents were not allowed 
to flourish ‘like a hundred flowers' to enliven the stolid whole, but 
were cut back as soon as the Executive could think of a way of doing it. 
So this discussion might be expected explain how the union's solidarity 
was diminished by the Executive's attitude rather than the opposite. But 
it is.here argued that solidarity was manifest in the application of 
discipline, admittedly not at the instigation of the membership at large 
but with full support from representatives at delegate conferences who 
invariably confirmed their Executive's actions.
'Discipline' should be seen in its context, Although the 
Association took part in the General Strike, was affiliated to the T. U. C. 
and took a Aill part in Labour Party affairs, its representation of 
white-collar interests meant that it was not always at one with other 
trade unions(l). It had a long history of hostility to left-wing 
activity beyond official Labour Party policy. This principle was once 
specifically stated, not surprisingly during 1919 when industrial 
militancy was at its most intense(2). The Executive's reply to a 
branch's request for strike action was that it was not Labour Party 
policy, then neither was it RCA policyO).
The first instance of dissidence to be described here was perceived 
by the Executive as one where some members breached an important 
principle out of frustration. Because they were seen as isolated, their
“  160 —
behaviour was not regarded as part of organised left-wing dissent and 
there was an amicable settlement, even though the Association's permanent 
officials were severely provoked. The other two instances were 
identified as part of organized left-wing policy and dealt with more 
harshly.
One aspect of the Association's treatment of left-wing dissidents is 
that the 'bell, book and candle' episodes - or so they appear, as 
discussed in a Communist workplace journal, of which more later - were 
associated with A. G. Walkden's term as General Secretary(4). This does 
not mean that he decided the policy, but he certainly orchestrated it.
The first case, although the episode was trivial and was treated as 
such by the officials, did involve an important aspect of political 
practice and was therefore considered at some length by the Executive 
Committee. The point of principle was the doctrine that the Association 
should always present a united front in pursuing its relationships with 
other bodies. The other two cases, to do with workers' education and 
with the Communist element in the Association, had national and even 
international dimensions. According to G. D, H. Cole, there was conflict , 
between the Labour College movement and the Workers Education Association 
in every large town and union in the country (5), so the tale of the 
Association's part in this battle should be told. One factor was that 
the Labour College Movement had no funds other than those the Labour 
Movement could provide, but the WEA was allowed come public money (6), so 
the Labour College Movement may have seemed more pugnacious, because its 
need was greater. The Minority Movement was the name under which the 
Communist Party of Great Britain attempted to influence the trade union 
movement in the 19200b and early 1930Cs, and the Association's engagement 
with it provides another episode worth analysing. The three instances.
- 251 -
taken together, illustrate certain characteristics that typify the 
Association as it matured and consolidated its position between the wars.
Sectional Councillor; A 1ob for life?
I
Eastleigh No. 1 was the largest RCA branch in one sectional council's 
electoral area. The area can be described as the railway stations and 
depots in the rough triangle between Basingstoke, Salisbury and 
Southampton (7). A sectional council consists of representatives elected 
by the staff and members nominated by the employers. Candidates for the 
important positions of staff representatives were selected by a committee 
drawn from all the RCA branches in the area. Eastleigh No. 1 was the 
largest branch, because the main South Western Railway's works had been 
built there in 1909 (8). The RCA-supported candidate, chosen by the area 
committee, was a member of Eastleigh No. 1 branch, but over the years he 
had lost the confidence of its membership and a rival candidate was 
selected by the branch in January 1929. In the election the rebel 
Eastleigh No, 1 candidate was defeated, getting 403 votes against the 
'official' Association candidate's 586 (9).
The success of the 'official' Association candidate did not pacify 
the Executive Committee. From the beginning, they had acted to try to 
ensure that there would only be one candidate sponsored by the 
Association and that he should be the one to whom Eastleigh No. 1 
objected, but who had been approved by a majority at a selection 
conference. There was, however, no constitutional reason why other 
candidates should not stand with branch support, and Eastleigh No. I's
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feelings were strong enough for them to go against the Executive's 
expectations of solidarity and put up their preferred candidate.
Eastleigh No. 1 was a large and important branch and it actions had thrown 
into disorder the pre-election arrangements and inter-branch 
relationships in an area that should have been 'safe' as a sectional 
council seat for the Association. When the branch's disaffection was 
first manifest, the Divisional Secretary for the area had been sent to 
address a branch meeting in an attempt to persuade branch members that 
what they wanted to achieve by way of changes of representation was 
neither sensible nor possible. The branch saw the sectional councillor 
as weak and vacillating; the Divisional Secretary said that he was as 
effective as could be expected(10). On this perception, the rebels seem 
to have thought that recognition placed the union in a much stronger 
position vis-a-vis the railway companies than was the case - rather as if 
a modern Daily Mail reader were to take his newspaper's anti-union 
propaganda at face value and not understand why his own union failed to 
impose its will on his employer.
However, the Divisional Secretary's intervention provoked a 
complaint to the Executive Committee that he was hostile to the branch.
His counter-claim was that he had been received rudely, and the breakdown
of relations became a matter for the Executive Committee's sub-committee
>
on staff to consider, as the Divisional Secretary was a paid official,
The complaint had been preceded by a formal branch resolution censuring 
the Divisional Secretary; in the circumstances the Executive had to 
initiate formal procedures to assess the validity of thé resolution with 
a view to expunging it should it be judged unfair; consequently the 
branch's affairs were scrutinised by an Assistant Secretary. At this 
point, by which time the election was over, the branch officers were 
invited to meet members of the Executive Committee in London; the meeting
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was successfully conciliatory. Subsequently, the Executive Committee 
circulated all branches in an attempt to ensure that, in future 
elections, no more than one Association candidate would stand and that 
there vrould be no repetition of disturbances like the one they had just 
experienced <11).
This incident has been detailed at some length because it shows how 
the Executive Committee responded when left-wing politics were not 
involved in a dispute with a branch. The Association (and this does not 
simply mean the Executive Committee) were generally hostile to left-wing 
ideas, as was demonstrated by the large majorities by which left-wing 
proposals were usually rejected at annual conferences.
NCLC V. WEA: Conflict over workers' education
An example of the hostility to left-wing ideas is the manner in 
which the Association dealt with its relationships with the Central 
Labour College and the larger body into which it became absorbed; the 
National Council of Labour Colleges. Like the Workers' Educational 
Association, it offered educational facilities to trade unions, but it 
was the more left-wing of the two. Its curriculum was based on Qarxism, 
but it was not a Communist organisation. From time to time, attempts 
were made by Communists to infiltrate it, but usually they were 
rebuffed(12); its form of Iferxism predated the foundation of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). It was supported by the South 
Wales Miners' Federation and by the NUR(13). In the surge of left-wing 
feeling characteristic of the years following each of the large-scale 
wars of this century(14), the Association's annual conference in 1920 
resolved that a scholarship should be offered by the RCA for a member to 
attend the Central Labour College. The resolution had originated in the
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Richmond Branch's motion that the Association should take up a 
scholarship at Ruskln College. Newport Branch succeeding in amending it 
to substitute 'Central Labour' for ' Ruskin', thus altering the motion 
from an appeal for support for WEA type of education to the more left- 
wing type. The Executive's subsequent memorandum on the feasibility of 
such a scholarship implies that members were misled into voting for the 
proposal(15), in that they were not fully aware of its ideological 
connotations. The Executive may have suspected a South Welsh conspiracy 
because a sponsor of the Central Labour College was, as has already been 
noted, the South Wales Miners Federation. Ideas about a conspiracy would 
be reinforced when, after the new year had come and gone and the 
Executive had not only failed to implement the resolution, but had 
reappointed a representative to the Workers' Educational Association 
(WEA), Pontypridd Branch wrote asking vrtiy nothing had been done about the 
resolution, and was not satisfied with the response. After more 
correspondence, all the branch officers resigned and the branch ceased to 
function. Pressure was put on the branch officers to reactivate the 
branch, but it was only after a special meeting of the South Wales 
Council voted almost unanimously in protest against the Executive's 
failure to organise the provision of a scholarship at the Central Labour 
College that the branch resumed its normal activity (16).
In March 1921, the Executive learned that a Trade Union Enquiry 
Committee was looking into the various forms of working-claGc adult 
education such as Ruskin College, the Labour Colleges and the Workers 
Educational Association. A main consideration would be how the trade 
unions could best use their meagre educational resources. The existence 
of this committee, together with an estimate that support for a 
scholarship at the Central Labour College would mean a committment of 
£500 per annum, led to the withdrawal of a motion critical of the
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Executive's educational policy,even though its sponsors were Newport 
No. 1, Pontypridd, and Derby No. 1 (17). This action becomes more
understandable in the context of the financial information. The
Association never recovered from the costs incurred at the end of the
war; the subscription had been doubled at the beginning of 1921 and the 
increase was already leading to a loss of members (18), A resolution 
entailing heavy expenses could not expect much support from any but its 
most ardent proponents at the 1921 Annual Conference.
As might be expected, the Committee of Enquiry recommended that all 
the various educational bodies should be utilised. This gave no help to 
either side in the dispute. Those in authority in the RCA would probably
have denied that there was a two-sided dispute, but quite soon they
showed that they did not think the demands of the more left-wing members 
were sensible for the Association as a whole, and were determined that 
vp^ at they thought sensible would be what the Association would get (19), 
This was to be education after the fashion of the Workers' Educational 
Association (WEA) rather than that of the Labour College, The difference
between the two types is that the WEA style was in accord with
established cultural values, whereas Labour College education attempted 
to turn out class warriors equipped to change society through their 
understanding of its socio-economic dynamics(20).
At a time of high unemployment and ineffective government the Labour 
College movement had spread and, in October 1921, the various separate 
bodies - the Central Labour College in London, the Scottish Labour 
College and the mainly part-time local colleges scattered over the 
country - set up a central body to co-ordinate their efforts. This was 
known as the National Council of Labour Colleges(21).
Despite the setting-up of this body and the enthusiasm for the 
Labour College's type of education displayed by many members, especially
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those from the more economically depressed areas, the Executive decided 
to press the 1922 Annual Conference to decide that the Association should 
join the Workers' Educational Trade Union Committee (WETUC), This was 
not, as its name might suggest, a sub-committee of the TUC. It was an 
educational body originally sponsored by the Iron and Steel 
Confederation. Later, it also attracted the support of the Post Office 
Workers and the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen. 
The AESD appears to have had close links with the Association; later in 
the 1920s they concluded a joint membership agreement under which 
draughtsmen who transferred to railway drawing offices could 
automatically take up membership of the Association. The two unions were 
also involved in the establishment of the National Federation of 
Professional Workers. This helps to explain why the RCA, although a 
railway trade union, preferred to make use of the WETUC even though the 
Central Labour College was supported by the NUR, the largest railway 
union. But the underlying reason is likely to be that unions for 
draughtsmen, clerks and supervisors, reflecting the general attitudes of 
their members, were likely to be hostile to the Üarxist ideas that 
informed the Labour Colleges' concept of social
science, whilst industrially organised unions catering for manual workers 
seem to have been much less hostile. This contrast in attitudes meant 
that the split amongst Association members on the issue of fusion with 
the NUR was partly along ideological lines. (There were, of course, other 
influences affecting this issue),
At the 1922 conference, the Executive Committee had its way and the 
RCA joined the WETUC scheme. The changeover from the Labour College 
scheme was not achieved without opposition and the General Secretary, as 
part of the process of stifling it, reiterated a pledge which had been 
made at the 1921 Annual Conference, i.e. "that the E,C, would take
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further action after the question of the Ruskin and Labour Colleges had 
been decided at the forthcoming Trades Union Congress"(22), This pledge 
appears to have been enough to have persuaded the proposer of the main 
opposing amendment to withdraw it. The amendment had been forwarded by 
Bradford No. 1 branch, from which, as will be seen later, there emerged a 
leading member of the Association's Communist 'Minority Movement'.
The impression that appears to have been left with many of the 
proponents of the NCLC scheme was that the WETUC would act as an umbrella 
organisation such that Association members would be able to take any 
available form of workers' education under its auspices. The more 
perceptive of the left-wing members realised that this was not likely and 
pressed the Executive Committee and the officers on any flank where they 
seemed weak. The General Secretary had recently failed to capture the 
Woverhampton West Parliamentary seat at a by-election. Walkden had 
nursed this seat since 1913, and had visibly spent RCA money on his 
campaigns; he had fought a number of elections there and had always been 
unsuccessful (23). On this issue the Executive were weak, and were 
enthusiastically attacked.
At the 1923 Conference there was not time to discuss a resolution 
saying that a scholarship should be provided at the Central Labour 
College (24), so it was amongst those left over to be dealt with by the 
Executive, who presented a report to the 1924 Annual Conference, and once 
more stressed the cost of £500 per student per annum. The report also 
said that, having finished a Central Labour College course, a student 
would be unemployable. These arguments were enough to persuade the 1924 
Annual Conference to rescind the conference decision on the provision of 
scholarships at the Central Labour College,
But the issue did not die. Even before the annual conference that 
year, there was some correspondence between the secretary of the NCLC and
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the General Secretary of the Association, making it clear that the NCLC 
would only accept students direct from a union and not through the WETUC. 
The WETUC was charged with being the WEA under another name; the WETUC 
denied this, although admitting that their secretariat were also WEA 
officials(25). There were at least four resolutions calling for inclusion 
in the NCLC scheme at the 1925 Annual Conference, but all failed (26).
Matters stayed like this for a number of years; pro-NCLC resolutions 
would appear on the Annual Conference Agenda, but would be defeated. By 
1929, the two unions which supported the Central Labour College were 
finding the task very onerous. They tried to persuade the TUC to support 
the college, but this could not be agreed so, in 1929, the Central Labour 
College was forced to close down, The NCLC continued to provide 
correspondence courses, day and weekend schools, part-time classes and 
summer schools, but there was no longer a residential college (27), This 
removed the basis of the Executive Committee and Officers' objections to 
the NCLC. It was also, according to one commentator, less Aarxist- 
orientated by this time (28), but it was not until the Annual Conference 
of 1935 that a motion was passed saying that the Association should make 
use of the NCLC educational facilities (29).
This time there was much less difficulty in its implementation. A 
number of factors may have been responsible for this; most generally, 
there was a groundswell of sympathy for left-wing ideals in the Labour 
Movement during the 1930'e which affected the Association's rank and 
file. Also, Walkden, the politically moderate General Secretary, who 
had been in office since 1906, was soon to retire and he may have not 
opposed affiliation to the NCLC as strongly as he did formerly. The 
Association eventually came to an agreement with the NCLC and began 
sending students to their classes on the 1st January 1936 (30).
- 259 -
The Association and Its Minority Movement
Marxist ideas or any others that fundamentally questioned society's 
economic basis appear not to have appealed to the general membership of 
the Association. In the early 1920s, they might have voted for 
scholarships at the Central Labour College without realising that the 
basis of its teaching was Aarxist. Also, the very early 1920's were 
comparatively optimistic years; in 1920 many of the delegates at the 
Annual Conference had not long returned to civilian life and were likely 
to be open to new ideas. The late 1920^6 were a very different matter. 
The big divide was the General Strike of 1926 and, especially, its 
aftermath. The railway companies dealt very harshly with RCA members who 
had been on strike. Delegates at annual conferences now would be licking 
their wounds and keeping their heads down. There would be little 
sympathy for the few who urged the Association to adopt a more militant 
posture. In 1930, it was still paying money to members who were either 
still laid off work after the strike or who were in work which paid less 
than the positions they had occupied prior to the strike(31>. As 
explained in Chapter 5, strikers who were especially hounded by the 
railway companies tended toi^  be men in the more responsible jobs.
Prominent individual members suffered especial attention, but the 
bulk of members had their own worries. The way the strike was ended must 
have left a nasty taste in their mouths; they had to endure a period of 
short time working, and strikers were worried that their careers had 
suffered by their action<32). The word 'career' encapsulates one aspect 
of white collar union membership which is not usually a factor for the 
members of blue collar unions. It is likely that clerical workers have 
open to them a promotion hierarchy or 'career structure' leading to 
management grading and, if they aspire to rise by way of promotion, they
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may identify with management<33). Railway clerks in the 1920s probably 
did not welcome being told that their ambitious behaviour was an 
expression of false consciousness. Marxist theory the
existence of two classes, which are in a state of constant hostility; 
the bourgeois or ruling class, and the workers. On this theory, any 
attempt by a worker to identify with the ruling class is an example of 
false consciousness, that is, a failure to recognise and act in 
accordance with workers' t%ue class interests. A white-collar worker who 
understands the theory might well contrast it unfavourably with the 
liberal or pluralist ethic likely to have informed his upbringing. 
According to this, ambitious behaviour would be approbated as a 
praiseworthy effort to improve one's lot through one's own hard work. It 
is understandable that most railway clerks were likely to embrace the 
liberal ideology and that only a minority would turn to Marxism. This 
was even true over the period of the 1920s and 1930s because, although 
many people were unemployed, few were railway clerks, for whom there were 
some prospects of promot ion(34).
Over this period, railway clerks' favourable status was officially 
acknowledged. Their exemption from the contributory health insurance 
scheme introduced by the National Insurance Act of 1911 has been 
explained in Chapter 4, and they were excluded from its provision for 
unemployment. They continued to be covered by the arrangements made in 
subsequent legislation for for employers to obtain exclusion certificates 
exemp^hgl' their workers from requirements to pay unemployment insurance; 
it was the Association's policy to press the railway companies always to 
seek exclusion as they foresaw no contingencies againgst which their 
members needed insurance(35). All the same, there were some railway 
clerks who did not appear to have much hope of promotion and some who 
feared unemployment. In London, the most obvious group in this category
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were the clerks employed by the Railway Clearing House (36). Before the 
first World War, when there were over one hundred railway companies, the 
Clearing House's work was exacting^and without widespread use of 
calculating machines^finvolved a large number of clerks. From the first 
World War onwards the volume of their work declined. The wartime 
establishment of the common wagon pool reduced the complexity of their 
work. Also, at the end of the war, most of the railway companies merged 
into four large main-line companies. This, together with the increased 
usQ of office machinery, further decreased the workload(37), As the work
declined and became more simplified, promotion dried up and there was 
stagnation and even some fear of redundancy, These circumstances are 
likely to have promoted attitudes in Clearing House clerks that were not 
typical of the generality of RCA members.
In January, 1924, it was learned that a Post Office employee had 
obtained a successful judgement in the House of Lords regarding the 
payment of war allowances whilst he was in the armed forces, A Clearing 
House committee/ ' Druce and others'^ was formed to support one of their 
number vrtio thought he had a similar claim; there might have been others, 
The Executive Committee of the Association decided to help the committee, 
even though the Association's solicitor - W. R. Southeard - was doubtful of 
the claim's chances of success. The Executive gave £400 to help with the 
tost of the action, estimated to cost between £750 and £1,000 in total 
(38). This VÆ8 soon found to be inadequate. At the first hearing, early 
in 1925, judgement was given against the Clearing House committee and 
costs estimated at £2,500 were awarded against it; the committee 
appealed (39). In May 1925, it was reported that the Appeal Court had 
reversed the previous judgement against Druce and others. The railway 
companies (the Clearing House was governed by a committee of railway 
company managers) were likely to take the case to the House of Lords.
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The Association'6 Executive decided to support Druce and others, and 
to examine the position of other members of the Association in the light 
of the Appeal Court's decision (40). On 25 June 1926 it was reported 
that the House of Lords had decided against the Clearing House clerk's 
claim. This must have been a heavy blow to many railway clerks,but 
especially to those working at the Clearing House. Had the Appeal 
Court's decision been upheld, the railway managers would have had to pay 
out a large amount of money to ex-service clerks, and the matter was 
important enough to the managers to be one of the few actions of the 
Association which was mentioned in minutes of the major committees of the 
railway companies(41). The severity of the blow must have been 
exacerbated because the final judgement came just when it was becoming 
apparent how harsh was the settlement that the railway companies were 
hoping to impose on their workers after the General Strike.
Given this background, it is not surprising that, in September 1928, 
the Clearing House was one location about which the Association's 
Executive became concerned on the grounds of Communist activity. An 
explanation of the Association's dealings with its members who were 
active, proselytising Communists needs to be preceded by an outline of 
the Communist Party's industrial policy.
The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) was founded in 1920-21 
(42). Unlike other political parties it set out from its beginnings to 
have a tight, disciplined membership. Almost inevitably this meant a 
small one, which never rose above 10,000 until 1936. For most of the 
1920s it was between 2000 and 4000 (43). The tactics dictated for such a 
small membership were the permeation of existing political bodies. For 
the purposes of this account, the important aspect of this policy is the 
permeation of trade unions, but one other aspect is also relevant and 
needs to be mentioned. From 1925, a body called the National Left Wing
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had as one of its objects the re-entry of members of the CPGB as members 
of the Labour Party(44). A/weekly newspaper was set up in connection 
with this campaign: this was the Sunday Wbrker(45).
These two entities, along with the National Minority Movement, which 
co-ordinated permeation of the trade unions, were all under Communist 
control although ostensibly independent(46), Throughout its history, the 
British trade union movement has been subject to all manner of attempts 
by employers and other opponents to infiltrate, divide and subvert it.
The movement's reaction has been to place a high premium on solidarity.
In other countries such as France it has been possible for a separate 
Communist trade union movement to be established. This was not overtly 
attempted in Britain; instead, the group of Communist Party members in 
each trade union formed itself into a separate minority fraction, The 
National Minority Movement was established to co-ordinate their 
activities (47).
Up to late in 1928, the CPGB modified its revolutionary attitude 
when dealing with other bodies representative of workers' interests so 
that it could support them even whilst making it plain that ameliorative 
action was a waste of time, and that only a workers' revolution would put 
all matters right. In practice, this meant that Communist activists had 
to hold to two separate sets of principles as they attempted to 
politicise the working class (48).
In 1928, this was changed. Stalin had gained sufficient control 
over the Soviet Union to enforce his 'new line' on the Communist 
International, The 'new line' was described as 'class against class'
i.e., the Labour Party had cast its lot with the capitalist class, but the 
Communist Party stood for the working class. Parties of the capitalist 
class were to be stigmatised and opposed, and this included trade unions 
which were affiliated to them (49). This policy can be regarded as a
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return to pure revolutionary principles, but it isolated the Communist
party from other working-class institutions. This was contrary to the
A  ' ' '
CPGB's previous practice of accommodating to ' Labog^sm'. Prior to the 
•new line', Communist activists were valued by other trade unionists, 
because despite their other preoccupations their allegiance to working 
class ideals could not be faulted. The 'new line' changed everything; 
it led to new trade unions (50), and eventually to the break-up of the 
Minority Movement, It cut off the CPGB from the main stream of the 
labour movement for three years. Trade union leaders talked of breakaway 
unions and of the divisive influence of the CPGB; the Association found 
allies to back it in the harrying of its Communist members.
The Minority fraction in the Association can have had no illusion 
about the Association's official attitude to their activities. In August 
1926, Just before the General Strike, the Executive Committee issued a 
circular to branches saying that if trade councils to which they belonged 
had become affiliated to the National Minority Movement, the branches 
should not secede but should attempt to reverse the decision (51).
This must have been a warning for the Association's Communist 
members, but no action appears to have been taken against them until 
1928. In May of that year, the Communist members of the Railway Clearing 
House No. 1 branch were told to stop publishing a magazine called The 
Joggen Its first issue appeared in November 1927, so the attempt to 
suppress it was fairly prompt (52). There was a long-standing staff 
magazine for RCH clerks called The Jigger - a reference to an implement 
they used for drilling holes in large stacks of paper - and The Jogger 
appears to have changed a vowel to obtain its name, in riposte.
The magazine consisted of a single sheet folded to make four pages 
of reading matter, approximately foolscap size. It was reproduced from 
typing and sold for a penny. The masthead was its name in large letters
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and a stylised representation of the view looking north up Seymour 
Street, now Eversholt Street - the Railway Clearing House used to be 
situated on the left-hand side. There was also a five-pointed star 
containing a hammer and sickle and a short rubric; "The Communist Party 
paper for Clearing House Clerks". It carried some comment on wider 
issues; for example, the founding of the Daily Worker^ the Meerut 
Conspiracy Trial in India; but its main content was Marxist critique of 
local Clearing House issues and the Association's national policy insofar 
as it affected the Clearing House (53).
At first, the E. C.'s prohibition appears to have been observed 
because there was no issue in June nor July, but one appeared in August 
(54). This may have been a consequence of the acceptance of a 2% per 
cent reduction in pay, endorsed by a special delegate conference on 12 
August 1928 (55). Stewart Purkis, of the Railway Clearing House No, 1 
Branch, was told that he should cease publication and that he should 
appear before the Executive Commit tee(56), He did not comply, but the 
next meeting of the Executive Committee received a letter complaining 
about the publication of the Jogger This was signed by eighty members 
of the RCH No. 1 branch (57). Purkis was summoned to meet the Executive 
Committee at noon on Monday, 22 October 1928. He replied that he would 
be there at 5,15p.m. together with a Mr,G.Druce, a long-standing RCA 
member - probably the Druce of 'Druce and others', although this is not 
established. He would also be accompanied by a shorthand reporter. The 
Committee replied that they would see him at 12 noon - without a 
shorthand reporter, but he could bring Druce; and they were also 
prepared to pay him loss of earnings and other expenses. He further 
replied that if he could not appear with a shorthand reporter he would 
not meet them, and was told that if he would not attend a meeting of the 
Executive they would deal with him under the rules, that is, expel him
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out of hand. The Executive Committee decided in November to tell him 
that if there was no reasonable response from him before their December 
meeting he would be expelled from the Association under the rules in 
regard to members responsible for actions which are detrimental to the 
Association (58).
At the Executive's December meeting, a letter from Purkis, 
explaining that he was in Moscow, was read out (59). There was a move to 
expel him summarily, but instead it was decided that he and another 
Communist member of Bradford No. 1 branch, Rowland Hill, should be told 
that they were not allowed to spend Association money on a meeting of an 
organisation to which the Association was not affiliated. The two were 
mentioned on the programme of a National Minority Movement Railway 
Conference to be held on January 5; and at the January meeting it was 
decided to tell Messrs. Purkis and Hill not to use 'RCA' after their names 
when they were on Minority Movement business (60). At the March 1929 
meeting, Purkis and the Executive Committee at last met. Purkis would 
not agree to stop supporting The Jogger^ so he was expelled under rule 
16(a) (61).
The President and General Secretary went to a special meeting of the 
RCH No, 1 Branch held on 12 March 1929. A motion endorsing the Executive 
Committee's action in expelling Purkis was defeated by 92 votes to 78. 
Purkis said he was going to appeal to the Annual Conference to reverse 
his expulsion. (62). The Executive decided to compile a portfolio of 
letters and documents to support their case at the Annual Conference. 
Purkis was invited to send a statement of his case to the General 
Secretary, to be circulated to all the branches of the Association, and 
was also told he would be allowed reasonable expenses to cover his appeal 
to Annual Conference (63). He lost his appeal on a card vote; 39,275 
against, 3,750 for (64). He was allowed £19 to cover his expenses and
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the Union's retirement benefit which he had lost through his expulsion. 
RCH No.1 Branch voted 28 - 18 regretting his expulsion (65).
The 1929 Annual Conference was held between 6th and 9th May 1929.
At the general election held on 30th May, seven Association-sponsored 
M.P'^s were elected; another, also elected, was one of a pair of 
Association members who had been M. Ps before the election and was helped 
in his campaign by the Associâtion(66). This was a real achievement for 
the Association, but amongst those elected were the President, the 
previous President, and the Treasurer. These were honorary appointments, 
but the General Secretary and the Chief Assistant Secretary, the two most 
important paid officials of the Association, were also elected, and 
expensive arrangements had to be made to cover their responsibilities 
(67). Dissidents soon appreciated that there was scope for criticising 
those in authority in the Association.
The Secretariat and the Executive may have been elated by the 
General Election results, but their Minority Movement members soon 
brought them down to earth. The Sunday Worker of July 14th reported 
that Purkis had sent his £19 to the Meerut defence fund and his action 
had been approved by RCH No. 1 branch. Its Chairman said that the 
resolution approving Purkis's action had been passed at a small meeting 
of the branch with only 24 members present, about half voting for the 
resolution and the rest abstaining(68). On August 23, the secretary of 
the RCH No. 1 branch forwarded an application from Purkis for his 
expulsion to be revoked; "I am willing - as I state on the application 
form - to comply with the rules of the RCA. I say this after studying 
the rules and reaching the conclusion that there is no rule in the RCA 
rule book which prohibits members from publishing or supporting the 
publication of such loyal working-class criticism and propaganda as that 
which appears in The Jogger.*^  Purkis was told he would have to stop
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associating with the publication of The Jogger and the disruptionist 
policy it advocated before he would be considered for reinstatement (69),
In August 1929, a mimeographed letter headed the 'Railway Clerks' 
Minority Movement' was forwarded by its recipient to the General 
Secretary. It was signed by D. A. Wilson as Hon. Sec. of this group; he 
was also the organising secretary of the Bradford No. 1 RCA branch.
Wilson was not expelled from the Association, but he was relieved of his 
office when he refused to stop his Minority Movement activities (70). 
Branches were also circulated and told that known Minority Movement 
members should not be nominated as branch officers (71),
On September 15th there was an attack on Walkden in the Sunday 
Worker, an article by G. W. Chandler of Manchester No. 6 branch, an 
interesting branch that must have had some fascinating meetings. Another 
member was the Treasurer of the Association, A. E, Townend, who had also 
been M. P for Stockport since 1925. In 1923, the branch had attempted to 
persuade the Association to join the National Guilds Council which, 
amongst other policies, advocated workers' control of industry(72).
Chandler refused to comply with a request from the Executive 
Committee that he withdraw his personal attack on the General Secretary 
in the Sunday Worker (73), and was told that unless he gave an assurance 
that there would be no repetition he would be expelled from the 
Association. He wrote that he was considering a reply to the Executive's 
letter (74), and its meeting of December 1929 received à petition from 
160 members belonging to nine different branches. The petition protested 
about the efforts made to stifle Chandler and said that his criticisms 
were of policies, not personalities (75).
The Executive wrote to Chandler, saying that if he would not give 
the assurances they wanted by 11 January 1930 he would be expelled from 
the Association (76). After his expulsion was confirmed, in February
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1930, he said he wanted to appeal to the Annual Conference and asked for 
facilities to circulate a statement around all the branches (77), His 
statement was a reprint of his Sunday Worker article; his appeal failed,
(78).
In June 1932, both Chandler and Purkis applied to be re-admitted
(79), Purkis had now left the CPGB, having joined it soon after the 
General Strike(80) and been expelled in the summer of 1932, He had 
joined forces with the 'Balham Group', a very early Trotskyist 
organisation. It was the only group inside the CPGB which left as a 
result of the 'New Line' and the fall of Trotsky (81). They were asked 
for the undertakings they had earlier refused. In August 1932, Chandler 
gave a full enough retraction and was re-admitted to Marylebone No. 2 
branch (82). Purkis did not comply quite so quickly and was not re­
admitted to the Association until October 1932 (83). Later in the 1930s 
both men were further* rehabilitated by being elected to the Executive 
Committee; Purkis in 1936 and Chandler in 1939 (84), Prior to this, in 
1938, Chandler had been awarded the Association's gold medal because of 
his organising w>rk (85). Purkis was a member of a small sub-committee 
set up by the Executive Committee in 1937, in a response to a motion 
expressing dissatisfaction with the Association's journal at that year's 
Annual Conference (86).
This chapter may not present the Executive Committee and the 
officers in a very sympathetic light. People in authority are often not 
at their most endearing when coping with their critics. They may well be 
at their sharpest and least relenting when they perceive a major threat. 
This does not appear to be the way the Eastleigh incident was regarded.
It seems to have been attributed to muddled, uninformed thinking and a 
conflict of personalities, important because an important principle of 
union practice happened to be involved. The case of workers' education
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is.in a different order of dissent, G, D. H, Cole's account, referred to 
at the beginning of this chapter, says
"...the organisation of classes up and down the country (soon united in 
the National Council of Labour Colleges) brought about a fight with the 
WEA in every large-sized town or union. Many sleepy trades councils and 
Labour parties were astonished by a violent conflict between rival WEA 
and 'Plebs' propagandists,..." (87).
If his story is to be trusted, the officers of the Association must 
have had some idea what sort of fight they might have on their hands. It 
was the most determined and persistent onslaught from the ranks they had 
faced so far. As has been shown, it began with a resolution passed at 
the Annual Conference of 1920 in favour of an Association scholarship at 
the Central Labour College. The rules of the union, like most other 
union rule-books, confirm the annual conference as the supreme authority 
of the union (88). But there is normally only one delegate conference a 
year and the officials and Executive Committee make all the major 
decisions between delegate conferences. This means that, in practice, if 
the conference passes a resolution against the wishes of the officers and 
the Executive Committee, then they may simply frustrate the wishes of the 
conference by inaction or delays in implementing the resolutions. In the 
case of the scholarship at the Central Labour College they went even 
further. To sum up the narrative; in 1920, Conference resolved that at 
least one scholarship should be taken up at the Central Labour College.
In 1921 the Executive Committee persuaded Conference that a motion urging 
the implementation of the scholarship resolution be not put and that, 
instead, the matter be left in their hands. In 1922, a pro-WETUC 
resolution was passed by the Annual Conference. At this stage, the 
membership appears to have thought that this left open the option of 
either kind of facility, whether on WEA or NCLC lines. In 1923, a motion 
to implement the 1920 resolution was not debated, and, in 1924, a
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resolution was passed rescinding it. The Executive Committee's arguments 
from superior knowledge had won the day, and they had avoided 
implementing the will of the annual conference for four years.
This summary is not compiled to criticise the Executive Committee 
and the officers for abuse of their power. It seems that the Executive 
got its way through the advantage of administrative continuity and the 
skilful use of information. An attempt is made in the rule book to 
distribute administrative power in the union. In theory it is balanced, 
but union activists at any level understand its effective distribution. 
The officers and the Executive Committee concerned themselves with the 
affairs debated at delegate conferences, but they always appear to have 
coped with the outcomes of conferences by assessing some as legitimation 
of decisions they had already made and others as insights into worries 
and feelings of the general membership, which could not come to them in 
any other way. They perceived their role in terms of creative 
administration, including policy formulation, rather than of passive 
subservience to Conference.
The final example of dissident pressure inside the Association is in 
one way the most serious, because the members concerned were also members 
of an international revolutionary movement. The Executive Committee was 
able to deal with the threat with comparative ease. Supporters of the 
Minority Movement would have argued that the officers and Executive 
Committee were not sincere when they called themselves socialists; that 
they were not interested in the success of the working-class movement.
On the other hand, the logic of the Minority's position was that the 
Association should risk everything, that everything they had built up 
over the years on vrtiat to many members and certainly its officers and 
Executive, would appear to be the improbable premise that a workers'
State could be set up in Britain. The point of view of the
- 272 -
Association's establishment is clear from a Railway Service Journal's 
editorial of May, 1922:
Many of the present members ... know ... of the unsatisfactoriness of 
the conditions In railway offices twenty five years ago
We do not regard the present conditions as satisfactory, but twenty- 
five years ago they would have seemed unattainable<09).
Only the most dogmatic ideologue could dissent from the view that 
the workers represented by the union should do other than consolidate 
their achievements. It was unthinkable that these could be otherwise 
perceived as, for instance, concessions by a dominant class. When 
Walkden became General Secretary in 1906, the membership stood at 6,277 
and the total funds were £588 (90). Using the Executive's own estimate 
of potential membership as 100,000 (91), this meant that the Association 
had recruited 6 per cent of its possible membership. The ways whereby 
the Association could attempt to influence the railway companies were 
very limited; they could do no more than persuade some of the members to 
approach the management as a delegation. For railway clerks interested 
in promotion and, from all that has been written, with good reason to 
fear the railway management, this must have been an unnerving experience 
and only moderately useful. Practically the only industrial 
representative bodies through which the Association members could 
influence the railway companies were superannuation committees and the 
influence which could be brought to bear through them was limited to 
little more than their nominal field of operation.
By 1930, there were countless ways whereby the Association could 
influence the employers. Recognition meant that, together with the other 
two railway trade unions, it faced these employers at various levels: 
National Wages Board, Central Wages Board, Railway Councils, Sectional 
Railway Councils and Local Departmental Committees (92). The
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Association's negotiators also met the employers at other times, both on 
formal and Informal occasions. All these contacts meant that on one 
level or another, negotiation was practically continuous. All in all, 
recognition and its aftermath gave the union's Executive ample grounds 
for confidence that the distribution of power between management and 
workers had materially changed. Moreover, they could point tp changes 
not only in the arena of industrial relations but in that of 
Parliamentary politics as well. Parliamentary activities are dealt with 
at length in chapter 4, but, briefly, they derived from the union's 
perception of the value of direct Parliamentary representation of railway 
workers' interests. The railway companies needed to approach Parliament 
at intervals so that they could initiate and develop their projects; they 
needed private legislation in order to function. Private legislation 
needs to be uncontentious; if it is opposed its further progress through 
Parliament becomes extremely hazardous. The opportunity to voice 
interests at Parliamentary level, possibly by dissent, could be a potent 
weapon. This is one of the reasons for the RCA's support of a NUR- 
sponsored M. P. from about 1906, and for their attempts to sponsor M. Ps 
since 1910. In 1930, there were eight RCA-sponsored M.Ps who could block 
private legislation by making it contentious.
However, the limited fields of action open to the Association before 
1919 had certain advantages over the institutionalised arrangements 
established by 1930. In earlier days, members could coo how influence 
was brought to bear, or at least hear from other ordinary members what 
was being done. In 1930, the pressures whereby the union sought to 
affect decision-making mostly had to be mobilised in private; for much of 
the time negotiations had to be confidential. In short, the union's 
officials were becoming detached from the ordinary membership. The 
Eastleigh case exemplifies this and the attention the E.G. paid to it
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suggests that they understood its implications well enough to go to some 
lengths to re-establish an identity of interest, but did not fully 
appreciate that it might signify a more general development. The affair 
of The Jogger, ideologies apart* is a further example. The Jogger 
criticised the Association's negotiators for accepting a 2% per cent cut 
in salaries, unaware that the railway companies had sought much larger 
cuts and that the final figure was the result of hard bargaining.
Another aspect of The Jogger's criticisms may be Judged unfair: this
was that Walkden was drawing a salary of £1,000 from the Association.
But vdien he became General Secretary in 1906 he was already a goods 
agent, at the age of 33. If he had stayed with his railway company and 
could have brought to bear the energy and administrative ability he 
displayed in the service of the Association, he could certainly have 
expected to be earning more than £1,000.
But, unfair or not, the criticism shows that some members, at least, 
saw their General Secretary's life chances as very different from their 
own and, consequently, as likely to inhibit his perception of their 
interests - a classic anxiety of unions whose officers have life-time 
t enure.
The separation of the secretariat from the members is one of the 
characteristics said to be typical of developed organisations; tendencies 
to rigidity, oligarchy, and, in general, a trend for the organisation's 
executive hierarchy to set a high priority of maintaining itc own 
security and perpetuation, possibly at the expense of pursuing the aims 
that justify its existence (93). This may well mean over-riding members' 
express wishes on occasion, and circumventing democratic procedures. The 
conflict about workers' education may be seen in this light, and the 
executive's strong reaction to The Jogger may be seen as the union's 
establishment stamping on a grass-roots growth as early as it could
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because of its potential threat to their own position. Of course, there 
are arguments on the other side; that the establishment's secure position 
coincides with that of the union; that the Executive Council had to pay 
regard to its special knowledge and better information as well as to the 
members' wishes; that simplistic versions of democratic management can be 
impracticable, possibly dangerous, in large and complex organisations; 
and that, in the end, the test of a good union is its ability to hold its 
members. The debate on this is never closed; what is interesting about 
the conflicts within the Association in the 1920's and 1930's is that 
they show the union to be a maturing organisation, displaying the 
disadvantages as well as the advantages of maturation (94).
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CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has been offered as a study of a particular type of trade union - 
‘white-collar' - over a particular period of its history, The review of 
theoretical perceptions likely to be relevant to such a study, presented in 
the Introduction, concluded that there was little to be gained from models 
centred on the 'white-collar' character of the Association, but that Robert 
Michels' theory of creeping oligarchy in the bureaucracy of democratically- 
based organisations has much to offer.
The Association's inter-war history presents at least three illustrations 
of Michels' theory; its Executive's decision to support the strike that was 
proposed in 1921, despite manifest evidence of lack of members' support; the 
effort and investment that went into trying to get the General Secretary 
elected to the House of Commons; and the Executive's treatment of dissension. 
In all these instances, which represent quite different aspects of the 
Association's activities, the Executive's authority was threatened, or was at 
least in some sense on the line. It is in such circumstances that 
organisational realities are revealed.
In the first illustration, the 'Black Friday' episode of Chapter 5, the 
Executive's not finally questioned because the proposed strike did not
eventuate. The second, an aspect of the 'Parliamentary Affairs' discussed in 
Chapter 3, was not a single incident but a sustained exercise that extended 
beyond the central issue of the General Secretary's seat. Its implications 
are complicated because although control of Parliamentary seats was functional 
for the Association's industrial ends, it also represented social and economic 
advantages for individuals. The power to allocate candidatures for safe 
seats could be used to reward, to punish, and to further self-interest. The
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Association was stimulated into instituting safeguards a little late in the 
day, not particularly to curb the self-serving tendencies of ambitious 
officers but to avoid having to withstand any more crises like the loss of 
personnel to Parliament in 1929. The rules It then Instituted may be held as 
evidence against Michels’ theory, in that they represent a democratic check.
It should be noted, however, that other unions recognised this danger and 
introduced safeguards before the Association's, but they were not necessarily 
proof against office-holders' strong personalities. In 1891 the ASRS (the 
main precursor of the NÜR) decided that its full-time officials were not 
eligible as parliamentary candidates(1), but even so the rule was over-ridden 
in the case of J.H. Thomas, the NUR's General Secretary from 1916 to 1931(2), 
The third illustration^ might almost stand as a case-study of Michels' theory 
in action, although its discussion in Chapter 6 did not so present it. The
Executive's different methods of dealing with dissent, from 'talk over tea. 
cakes' with the Eastleigh rebels to 'bell, book and candle' for avowed 
communists, show its capacity for control. Its treatment of the Labour 
College question shows the extent to which a confident Executive could 
moderate and even subvert the will of the membership as expressed through the 
Annual Conference, theoretically the ultimate source of democratic control.
In practice, the ultimate check on the Executive's oligarchic power, 
given the level of organisation achieved by 1918 and sustained thereafter, was 
the Association's ability to maintain its membership. This raises a number 
of questions not directly relevant to the organisational theory that helps 
explain some aspects of the Association's inter-war history; nor are other 
theoretical perspectives on white-collar unionism helpful, except insofar as 
in directing attention to members' characteristics and behaviour they may 
suggest propositions about one central problem. This is the conundrum that 
underlies any assessment of trade unions' behaviour; the extent to which a
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silent majority betokens satisfaction or apathy. The validity of 
organisational theory that helps to explain successful oligarchic behaviour in 
a trade union's Executive does not mean that such an Executive's power is 
unlimited or exercised always, usually or even ever against the Interests of 
most of its union's members. The questions raised in the Association's case, 
between the wars, are to do with its political character, its behaviour during 
a period that was not favourable to industrial organisation, and the socio­
economic characteristics of the members.
One notable aspect of the Association is its adherence to the TUG and the 
Labour Party. This began before the first World War and the Association was 
well integrated into the Labour Movement thereafter. This was unusual for a 
white-collar union, and may be explained at least in part by the limits of the 
Labour Party's scope for pursuing extreme policies. The Association's 
political moderation could be reconciled with the main stream of Labour's 
activities and it could spurn some industrial adventures that beckoned, but 
its political affiliations led it into the biggest one of the period: the 
General Strike.
During the years leading up to the strike, and particularly in the three
years immediately after the end of the first World War, the Association's
Executive was more disposed to industrial militancy than were its members.
The Black Friday episode, already cited in this chapter, is an illustration of
this phenomenon, mentioned in the Introduction as a notable feature of the
v ' w  © I -
Association's inter war history, and especially so in^the Association's 
earlier policy of non-striking. In discussion surrounding the General Strike, 
2 Chapter 5 suggests that the phenomenon was more understandable than at first 
sight might appear: that is, whilst moderation and prudence were consistent 
with the attitudes consistent with white-collar work, railway clerks of the 
1920s found themselves in circumstances in which(^degree of industrial
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militancy was a response. On this analysis, the Executive’s
perceptions may have been ahead of of those of the membership at large, but
were not especially divergent; but clearly a balance had to be achieved
between the general rationale of moderation and the particular and temporal
case for militancy. More detailed accounts of the institutional behaviour of
other white-collar unions, which from time to time must also have been faced
»w«.y
with similar needs to balance conflicts of rationale,^ throw up similar 
instances of leaderships that were, on occasion, more militant than their 
members. More knowledge of the institutional deliberations and behaviour of 
white-collar leaders on occasions when, like the Association's Executive in the 
early 1920s, they had to provide leadership that reconciled strategies of 
pursuing members' immediately perceivable economic interests with the conditions 
of their lives and work in a stratified industrial society would make for a 
better-informed interpretation of the Executive's attitudes and contribute to 
theories of white-collar unionism.
It was the aftermath of the Strike that best illustrates the 
Association's character. It worked long and hard to recover, negotiating 
persistently for the available work to be shared out fairly and for its 
members to be reinstated. Other unions did the same, but the Association was 
notable in refusing to accept its share of the general decline in membership 
with philosophic resignation. It mounted a special campaign to bring back its 
lost members and to persuade them to pay the political levy. On the other 
hand, the general mood of the Association was against its more left-wing 
members who, dismayed at the quietism that they perceived to be overtaking 
their trade union, attempted to revive its pre-Strike activity. The 
Executive was certainly able to rely on its oligarchic security in exerting 
discipline, but the general membership was not disposed to resist.
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The Parliamentary activity that has already been referred to as evidence 
of the Association's Executive's oligarchic tendencies was nevertheless an 
aspect of its industrial policy, dating back to before the first World War. 
That is, the Executive's pursuit of Parliamentary representation was in 
principle unexceptionable; what was questionable were aspects of the way the . 
policy was pursued.
Parliamentary activity began purely as part of the Association's 
industrial policy but later it became an important element in the Labour 
Party's attempt to widen its electoral base. Ross McKibbin has explained how 
the Labour Party's M. P. s were originally elected by urban, industrialised 
constitutenciesO). The Party's realisation that it could not become 
ar^lternative government as long as it was confined to such constituencies was 
one reason for widening out, but there was another that applied even at the 
cost of unsuccessful candidatures. If a constituency is uncontested, 
electoral forces are released to help the governing party's candidates in 
vulnerable constituencies. From the 1922 election onwards, members of the 
Association were helped to fight hopeless campaigns in 'rural 
constituencies'; two in 1922; three in 1923, 1924 and 1929; thirteen in 1935. 
This increasing effort must have gladdened the hearts of the Labour Party's 
campaign managers.
The Association's role in national politics clearly has implications for 
an assessment of the characteristics of its members. Theoretical models of 
white-collar trade unionism are insufficiently analytic and there Is an 
acknowledged absence of information about individual members of the 
Association in this account, and of their lives and work. The main reason is 
the same as that which makes Michels' perspective more illuminating than 
others; it is the extent of institutional organisation that the Association 
had achieved by 1919. This study is presented from the point of view of the
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Association as an entity pursuing the industrial objectives that are a trade 
union's raison d'etre; an institutional account and none the worse for that.
By 1918 the Association's organisational structure was well established, and 
ordinary members were unlikely to distinguish themselves in union affairs 
otherwise than through its formal offices and procedures. As has been shown, 
the few who tried to influence affairs in other ways needed to be strongly 
motivated. This is not to say that there was no potential for change by way 
of grass-roots activism, either in the Association or in other trade unions 
with the degree of organisation that it manifested in the 1920s and 1930s; but 
the general conditions of the times were not propitious. Members may have 
seen the Association as a bureaucratic monster - if they conceptualised it at 
all - but it was their own monster and they needed one to face up to the 
railway companies. A minority immersed themselves in lay administration and 
possibly worked their way on to the Executive, but the limitations of 
inclinations and opportunities meant that the majority could only accept the 
Association as a helpful force, perhaps grumble about it sometimes, and get on 
with their lives.
What sort of lives these were is, nevertheless, a justifiable concern of 
anyone seeking to understand their trade unionism. The Association's members 
were part of the large army of clerks who did the railway companies' routine 
work, made necessary by the simple office technology of the times. They were 
not clerical workers, but their jobs were
secure. Their reasonable aspirations were confined to what might be 
described, with all the reservations that must surround so broad a 
categorisation, as a lower middle-class life-style.
There has been little scope in this account for attention to the day-to- 
day realities of the Association's members' working lives. Some sidelights 
are cast by its references to working conditions, pay and pensions; others
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come from its use of the Association's publications. Other publications, not 
drawn on at all, are those produced by the railway companies for their 
employees, but the most fugitive and potentially the most useful are those put 
out by the clerks themselves. One such source that is available comes from 
the Railway Clearing House. Before the first World War it had the largest 
concentration of railway clerks, and was possibly also London's largest 
concentration of clerks of any kind. It had a literary society from 1849, 
financially helped by the employer but run by a committee of clerks(4). The 
communist magazine The Jogger^ drawn on for Chapter 6's discussion of 
dissension,was by way of a riposte to The Jigger^ Railway Clearing House 
clerks' more orthodox publication that ran from 1921 to 1932; copies of all 
its issues have been preserved(5). They detail the urban and rural 
activities of various interest groups that the clerks organised in their spare 
time. But it is not to be expected that such publications would contain much 
direct information about working life, although they yield some.
For the most part, the Association's ordinary members remain 'hidden from 
history', to borrow the feminist coinage that has been used in connection with 
historians' neglect of women's history(6). Women are a group within the 
larger category of railway clerks whose history is hidden along with the rest, 
not only because of the absence of day-to-day information but because their 
small part in the Association's institutional history has regrettably been 
outside the scope of this presentation of it. Despite the general growth of 
clerical work as an occupation for women, on the railways it was largely men's 
work, as is demonstrated in the analysis of the workforce at Appendix I. 
However, the Association's treatment of its women members who had to leave the 
employment they took up in the first World War, and its intimations of a 
further influx with the onset of the second, are minor concerns of women's, 
trade unions' and occupational histories that deserve attention. But by and
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large, ordinary members' day-to-day lives cannot be covered in a chronicle 
that gives centrality to a trade union's pursuit of its industrial objectives 
through negotiations with employers. The voices from below are more likely to 
be heard through the work of other historians than those who are primarily 
concerned with trade union history as conventionally defined. The developing 
specialism of oral history promises to be a productive source, as is work of 
the kind pioneered by John Burnett's search for hitherto neglected documentary 
accounts of ordinary lives(7).
For reasons of space and scope, this account has not covered the 
Association's relations with other unions, except insofar as they were 
entailed in specific negotiations. This is an aspect of trade union history 
that tends generally to be neglected in institutional accounts, no doubt for 
the same reasons that have dictated its exclusion from this one. It should be 
noted as a topic deserving of further research, likely to offer something of a 
corrective to the narrowness to i^ich institutional accounts are unavoidably 
prone, and possibly fruitful for the development of more satisfactory 
theoretical approaches to trade union history.
In practical terms, how can the two inter-war decades be assessed? The 
Association weathered its way through them, and 'weathering' is an apt term, 
as the main theme that runs through the story is the Association's persistence 
in relatively adverse circumstances.
It started off well, with recognition after twenty two years' striving, 
its membership only twenty per cent short of the maximum, and around £50,000 
in its funds. An early strain on its resources came with the dismissal of 
the temporary clerks, many of them women, who had been recruited to replace 
men vdio had joined the armed forces during the first World War. The 
Association offered them full membership, vdiich included an unemployment 
allowance; the ex-servicemens' speedy return led to wholesale dismissals that
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drained the Associations' funds by about half in 1919. The settlement of 
the General Strike involved the Association in the activity that was its main 
function, negotiation with employers. This experience, stressful and 
relatively early in the Association's history as a trade union with employers' 
recognition, was unorthodox in many respects but not least in entailing the 
cooperation with other railway unions that was to be a feature of its wage 
negotiations for some time. The conditions that favoured combined 
negotiations also favoured quiescence in the membership. It was an era of 
deflation, vdien wage bargaining was a matter of resisting wage-cuts and 
speeding their restoration, of protecting members' position rather than 
advancing it. The whole railway work-force was similarly affected; it made 
sense for the unions to combine as long as their problems were seen as common. 
Later, vdien improvements seemed possible, each union saw its best way forward 
as through independent negotiations once more, and promoted its members' 
separate, specific interests.
Pensions were traditionally a perquisite of the white-collar segment of
the work-force, so it was the Association alone that took on the complex
problem of sorting out the tangled affairs of the railway companies' pension
funds. The result was one decent fund, one half-decent one, and five that 
were no more than moderate: perhaps not much of an achievement by some 
standards, but worth at least two cheers in a period when money was short and 
especially so for the railway companies.
An obvious question to be asked of Industrial relations is: do trade 
unions make any difference? It is certainly difficult to isolate the effects 
of workers' organisations from other factors that bear on their industrial 
fortunes, but the Association may Justifiably claim that, apart from any other 
benefits, its Industrial strategies were crucial in securing and improving 
railway clerks' socio-economic status between the wars in two particular ways.
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The wage settlement of 1919-20 brought railway clerks into the category of 
better-paid clerical workers, with pay approaching that of bank clerks, and 
the Association's subsequent alliance with other unions helped it to deal with 
wage cuts better than other groups of clerical workers<8). The outcome of the 
negotiations on pension funds were the other aspect of the Association's 
success: perhaps not ideal, but markedly better than might have been hoped
for without the Association's mixture of Parliamentary tactics and negotiating 
skill.
But throughout the period, the Association's strategies were necessarily 
defensive rather than aggressive. Even though it started out so well, the 
Association had to use all its talents to get from the end of the first World 
War to the beginning of the second as successfully as it did. It had fewer 
members and branches than it started with, but enough to sustain its 
established infrastructure and to face the problems of another war, with the 
experience of the first to look back on. Both World Wars presented trade 
unions with opportunities as well as problems, and have in general been . 
beneficial for unions and their associated political party. Peacetime has 
been less favourable. What is debatable, and to be taken up by the 
Association's next chronicler, are the Association's wartime prospects, what 
it made of the challenges and opportunities that came between 1939 and 1945, 
and its fortunes in the ensuing peace.
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Railways Act, 1921, London, January 1922, pp. 55 - 56,
192. MSS.55B/1/EC/16/5900,
193. MSS. 55B/I/EC/16/5900.
194. MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/5937.
195. MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/5965.
196. MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/5996.
197. MSS, 55B/1/EC/17/6000,
198 MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6022,
199. MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6046; the members of the Railway Staff National 
Tribunal were described as "one member to be selected from time 
to time by the Railway Companies from a panel previously 
nominated by them and to serve until the particular issues have 
been decided; one member to be selected from time to time by the 
Railway Trade Unions from a panel previously nominated by
them, and to serve until the particular issues referred have been 
decided; a Chairman to be appointed by agreement between the 
Railway Companies and the Railway Trade Unions, or, 
failing agreement, to be appointed by the Minister of Labour 
after consultation with the parties. The appointment may be for 
a specified period or for the hearing of particular issues/
There was a further clause in the Machinery of Negotiation 
concerning the membership of the Railway Staff National Tribunal; 
this read; "No Director or official of any of the Railway 
Companies, of the said Joint Lines or of the Railway Clearing 
House, and no official or member of any of the Railway Trade 
Unions shall be eligible for appointment as a member of the 
Railway Staff National Tribunal','
(See the texts of both the revised Machinery of Negotiation 
(following MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6125) and the original draft 
(MSS. 55B. /1/EC/16/5937,
200. Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op. cit. p, 543.
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201, See copy of amended Machinery of Negotiation following 
MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6125,
202, MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6144,
203, MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6144, A strong expression of the management's 
approval of the change can be found in PRO/RAIL/424/11 (Part 1>,
a paper entitled 'Comparison between the New and Old Machinery of 
Negotiation'.
204, Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op, cit. pp. 543-544.
205, MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/5927, 5928,
208, MSS, 55B/1/EC/17/5959; PRO/RAIL/424/11 (Part 1).
207. MSS, 55B/1/EC/17/5997,
208. MSS, 55B/1/EC/17/6021,
209. MSS, 55B/1/EC/17/6023.
210. MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6024; PRO/RAIL/424/11 (Part 1),
211. MSS, 55B/1/EC/17/6023,
212. The railway managers estimated that the abolition of the first 
2%% would cost £2,300,000 compared to £1,100,000 for the 
abolition of the second 2%%(See MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6026).
213. MSS, 55B/1/EC/17/6021, 6023, 6024, 6025, 6026, 6027. The text of 
the agreement can be found following MSS/55B/1/EC/17/6027; 
PRO/RAIL/424/11 (Part 1),
214. MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6037, 6048,
215. MSS, 55B/1/EC/17/6126 (b).
216. MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6126 (a).
217. Bagwell (The Railwaymen) pp, 548 - 549.
218. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6229,
219. Net Railway revenue for the three years wac; 1930; £37,716,114; 
1934; £31,480,717; 1935; £32,921,754,
220. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6352.
221. MSS,55B/1/EC/18/6366, MSS, 55B/1/18/6372 (3),
222. The two suggestions are designated (a) and <b> in the Executive 
minutes.
i
(a)That the 2%% deduction should cease to apply to anyone earning 
less than 55/- per week, with a "scaling-off of the percentage 
deduction in respect of earnings from 55/- to 60/- and the full 
2%% to apply to earnings amounting to more than 60/- per week.
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222<cont. )(b) That the present 2%% deduction should be reduced to
in res'pect of the first 40/- of weekly earnings, the full 2%% to 
apply in respect of any earnings in excess of 40/- per week, with 
a continuance of the present proviso that no adult's earnings 
should be reduced below 41/6d per week.
The Companies stated that the cost in the case of either of theee 
propositions would be approximately £600,000 per annum. (See 
MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6409).^
223. Bagwell(The Transport Revolution) op. cit. pp. 255 - 258.
224. See earlier in this chapter èCàri references to pooling agreements 
and the search for saf^jguards for staff.
225. C, L, Mowat, BrJtain Between the Wars, Î91Ô - 1940, London, 1966, 
p, 341, PRO/RAIL/421/44, p, 27,
226. P. S, Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op. cit. p 549.
227. MSS. 55B/1/EC/1^ /6435. The companies' offer was; "That as from the 
first full payJ^Tollowing July 1st 1936, the deduction of 2%% from 
all earnings at present operating under the Agreement of
10th August 1934, shall be replaced by a deduction of 1W% from 
all earnings. Conditions of service as determined by National 
Wages Board Decision No. 119 to continue in force. These 
arrangements to operate for a period of twelve months and 
thereafter until varied by agreement or by decision of the 
Railway Staff National Tribunal". The main difference between 
this offer and the union's suggestion was that it would take 
effect from the beginning of July instead of the beginning of 
June, and there was a stipulation that it should last for not 
less than twelve months, although it was understood that 
the unions would be free to approach the companies when the 1936 
railway returns were available.
228. MSS, 55B/1/EC/18/6454, 6478, 6514,
229. MSS.55B/1/EC/18/6454, 6478, 6492, 6493,
230. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6514,
231. Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op, cit, p.548.
232. MSS, 55B/1/EC/18/6514,
233 MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6524,
234, P,S, Bagwell (The Rallwaymen) op.cit. p.549,
235, The terms of the Railway Staff National Tribunal decision No. 1 
were;
(a) Conciliation Grades
A deduction of 1%% instead of the present 2%% shall be made from 
all earnings, subject to the following adjustments:-
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235(cont,) Earnings under 40/6d in a full week - No deduction
Earnings of 43/lid up to 44/6d in a full week - 6d deduction
In no case shall any deduction exceed the sum
of 3/- in respect of a week.
Overt ime
The standard rate of time-and-a-quarter for overtime shall be 
restored in place of the present rate of time-and-an-eighth. 
Overtime worked between 10 p, m. and 4 a, m, will thus be 
paid at the rate of quarter time extra in addition to the present 
night rate of time-and-an-eighth, making time^and-three-eighths 
in all. (This meant that the pre-1931 rate for night overtime of 
time-and-a-half was not restored, neither were the enhanced rates 
for night and Sunday duty restored).
Cb) CJorrfeaij Supervisât^ oA er on A
A deduction of 114% instead of the present 216% shall be made on 
all earnings, provided that in no case shall any deduction exceed 
the sum of £7. 10. 0 in respect of a year. (See 
MSS, 55B/1/EC/18/654Ô),
236, PRO/RAIL/42/46 p,17; P.S, Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op, cit. 
p. 551,
237, Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op. cit p.551.
238. 1935 Net Revenue £32,921,754, 1936 Net Revenue £35,730,560.
But this was still far short of Standard Revenue. The railway 
companies never achieved this Standard Revenue between 1923 and 
1938. From 1st September 1939, wartime financial arrangements 
took over (Railway Returns).
239, The NUR put forward three claims. ASLEF presented a short 
programme consisting of five items, (MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6665).
240. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6665.
241, See Chapter 6^  'How the Association dealt with Dissension ',
242. For further details of this. establishment see P. 5*-
The Railway Clearing House in the British Economy 1842 - 1929, ,
London, 1968.
243. The details of this scheme which was suggested to the railway 
companies during these negotiations were;
"Any employee who has been standing on the maximum of his or her 
class for three years, and for whom no promotion to a higher 
class is available shall receive an advance of £10 per annum, and 
after a further period of three years another advance of £10 per 
annum. When the employee is promoted to a higher class the total 
salary, Including the stagnation advance or advances, shall not 
be reduced. For example; when a Class 5 clerk in receipt of the
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243(cont.)first stagnation advance is promoted to Class 4, he shall 
remain on the minimum of that Class (£210) for two years after 
the date of promotion, and then go to the intermediate of Class 4 
(£220), and after a further two years he shall go to the maximum 
of Class 4 (£230); but if he is promoted to Class 4 while he has 
the second stagnation increase he shall remain four years on the 
intermediate of Class 4 (£220) before going to the maximum",
(See MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6665).
244. Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op. cit. p. 252, Barker and Savage op. cit. 
p. 155.
245. Railway Returns.
246. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6787.
247. The rates which were restored were the enhancements for night 
duty and Sunday duty and also the overtime rates for night duty.
At negotiations since March 1931, some of these rates had been 
partially restored and, at negotiations the previous August, the 
daytime overtime rate had been restored, but now they
were all restored.
National Wages Board National Agreement 
(119) rate rate restored by Decision No. 3 of RSNT
Night Duty Time & l/8th Time ft 1/4
Sunday Duty Time ft l/3rd Time ft 1/2
Night Overtime Time ft 1/4 Time ft 1/2
The NUR were not awarded their minimum wage of 50/- per week, but
their more poorly paid members were given some help. Adults 
whose base rate was less than 45/- were to have a 1/- a week 
rise, those on a base rate of 45/- were to have a 6d per week 
rise. There were a few staff with base rates less than 40/-, 
their rates were raised to 41/- (see P. S. Bagwell (The 
Railwaymen) op. cit, p,552),
248. The first period of wage cuts was from 13th August, 1928 - 13th
May, 1930, a period of nine months and one day; the second period
was from 28th March, 1931 to 16th August, 1937, a period of six 
years four months and nineteen days; seven years, one month and 
twenty days in all.
249. MGS. 55B/1/EC/19/6831, 8858 (277), From April 1931, to November, 
1936, the cost of living index never rose into the 50^8 and for a 
large part of this time it was in the 30’’s; between October 1936 
and October 1937, the rise was steeper than at any time since the 
early 1920 s, it rose 10 points from 48 to 58, (These figures are 
taken from the Cost of Living index published in the Ministry of
' Labour Gazette - it was based on 1914 = Zero),
250. See MSS, 55/1/CON/32 for 1930 programme.
251. See booklet entitled Rates of Pay and Conditions of Service of 
Men and Women Clerks employed by the Railway Executive^published 
by the Railway Clerks' Association in October 1948, (The writer 
of this thesis has a copy of this booklet).
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252. Since 1801, census data for the City of London and the London 
Boroughs confirms this tendency,
253. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6764. Bagwell (The Railwayman) op, cit. p.563,
254. MSS. 558/1/EC/19/6845, 6858.
255. MSS, 553/1/EC/19/6858,
256. MSS, 558/1/EC/19/6764.
257. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6825, 6846.
258. MSS, 558/1/EC/19/6858, It will be apparent from Chapter 4 of this
thesis; 'Pension Funds' that the LPTB were reluctant to include 
these ticket clerks into their pension fund and considered
them to be ' wages staff,
259. Their proposals were; time off in lieu of work on Bank Holidays;
that information should be provided respecting the rates of pay
of Professional and Technical Staff; payment of the women clerks' 
scales to women employed at Chiswick, Earls Court and Effra Road 
and their inclusion in the Administrative Staff; transfer to the 
Administrative Staff of the Depot Clerks in the Railvmy Operating 
and Engineering Departments; a flat rate increase of £20 for
all on and above the maximum of Class 5, including Station-
masters, Supervisors and P ft T Staff; that instead of going from
£140 to £150 at age 25, Class 5 Clerks should go to £160 and then 
proceed by increases of £10 per annum to £220 at the age of 31; 
that instead of an increase of 2/6d women clerks should have 5/- 
more at age 30 and a further 5/- at age 31, and that the existing 
Class 1 rates for women should be increased by 7/6d per week; and 
that the present scale by which Class 5 Station-masters and 
Supervisors go from £170 to £200 by annual increments of £10 
should start at £180 and go to £190, £200 and £220, All these 
rates to be increased by £10 for those working in the London 
area (which was not defined), (See MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6883).
260. MSS, 55B/1/EC/19/6897.
261. "In signing this Agreement the representatives of the Associated 
Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen wished to place on 
record their view that the decisions reached, in their considered 
opinion, do not adequately meet the claims submitted by their 
Union," (See MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6938).
262. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6915,
263. This is discussed later in this chapter; it came as a result of 
Railway Staff National Tribunal Decision No.6, 18th October 1939.
264. The full text of this Memorandum of Agreement can be found 
following Executive minute MSS. 558/1/EC/19/6838.
265. MSS. 558/1/EC/20/7060.
266. MSS. 55B/1/EC/20/7163.
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267. ms. 55B/1 /EC/21/7306.
268. MSS. 55B/1/EC/21/7332.
269. MSS. 55B/1/EC/21/7347.
270. R. Bell, History of the British Railways during the Wan 1939 - 
1945, London, 1946, pp. 232-233.
271. The railway managers said that there were 77.persons between the 
ages of 57 and 59 and eighty between 57 and 60, and the Companies 
would definitely fill the vacancies of those 77 or 80 persons.
The 80 persons were classified thus; 13 Special, 53 First, 8 
Second and 6 Third. If all the 80 accepted the offer there would 
be the following promotions; 13 First to Special, 66 Second to 
First, 74 Third to Second, 80 Fourth to Third, and 50 Fifth to 
Fourth <30 Fourths were in Class 5 posts) making a total of 283
promotions. There were 300 men in Class 4, most of them over 45
years of age, but less than half of them had been in Class 4 for 
10 years - there was one man of 51 and 30 men of 50 years of
age. If only half of the 80 accepted the offer, the Companies
might look at another batch. See MSS, 55B/1/EC/20/7084.
272. MSS. 55/1/CON/42; See MSS. 55B/EC/19/6845 for the draft version of 
the 1938 programme and MSS, 55/1/CON/43 for the approved short 
programme with the three added items. At MSS, 55G/5/PCS/2
is the Ntemorandum of Agreement, which gives the basic pay and 
conditions of salaried staff between the two World Wars, It can 
be used to demonstrate the expectations of the Association's 
Executive and members.
273. MSS. 55B/1/EC/20/6710,
274. MSS. 55/1/CON/14.
275. The NUR had six proposals;
1. A minimum weekly wage of 50/- for wages grades
2. Spreadover turns.
3. Twelve days annual holiday.
4. Abolition of extended rosters.
5. Minimum of four hours pay for Sunday duty for
all grades.
6. Weekly half-holiday (always to be on a
Saturday).
Item 1 was to apply to wage grades only. Spread-over turns, also 
called split turns, are turns consisting of two periods of work 
with a fairly long gap of rest time between. Railway 
workers are often called on to work them when they work trains 
catering for rush hour workers. An example would be to work 0730 
hours to 1100 hours and then 1500 hours to 1900 hours. They 
are not as unpopular now as they appear to have been in the 
1930's, because railway workers are now paid much better for 
working them. Item 5 was meant to apply to all grades.
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275(cont, )ASLEF had five proposals;
1. Improved rates of pay.
2. Twelve days annual holiday,
3. A minimum of 8 hours pay at time-and-a-half
for every signing-on on a Sunday,
4. Abolition of extended rosters,
5. Extension of the London Area. (See 
MSS. 55B/1/EC/20/6982)
276. MSS, 55B/1/EC/20/6982.
277. MSS, 55B/1/EC/20/7001,
278. This was broken down as; Improvement in Salaries, £1,318,000; 
Extension of London Area, £6,000; Extra Payment for Duty Between 
10 pm and 4 am, £72,000; Forty-hour Week, £1,699,000; Annual 
Holidays, £167,000; An estimate of the appointment of unappointed 
staff was not obtainable, (See MSS. 553/1/EC/20/7107),
279. MSS. 55B/1/EC/20/6982,
280. MSS, 55B/1/EC/20/7107.
281. The actual figure is £28,984,344.
282. MSS, 55B/1/EC/20/7128.
283. MSS, 55B/1/EC/20/7128,
284. Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op.cit. p, 560. MSS. 55B/1/EC/20/7211;
MSS, 55B/1/EC/20/7232, The Railway management's case for resisting 
the union's proposals can be found in RAIL/424/11 (Part 1), 
'Memorandum of Special Meeting of General Managers' 12th January 
1939,
285. Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op. cit. pp.560-561,
286. MSS. 55B/1/EC/20/6838,
287. Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op.cit, pp. 560-561;
MSS. 55B/1/EC/21/7323, 7346.
288. Mowat op, cit, p.625.
289. Mowat op. cit. p. 631,
290. C, L. Mowat op. cit. p. 640.
291. Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op. cit. p. 561.
292. Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op. cit. p. 552.
293. MSS. 55/1/CON/45.
294. MSS. 55B/1/EC/21/7323, 7346.
295. These minutes can be found following MSS.55B/1/EC/21/7307, the
meeting took place on 3rd May 1939.
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296. MSS. 55B/1/BC/21/7369; PRO/RAIL/424/11 (Part 1) correspondence 
between A3.EF and the Railway Companies between 1st - 3rd August 
1939, also PRO/RAIL/424/11, (Part 2).
297. MSS. 55B/1/EC/21/7639.
298. Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op. cit. p 562.
299. The Railway Clearing House number taking staff were located at 
junctions all around Britain. They monitored the movements of 
wagons, carriages and tarpaulins throughout the railway network. 
The Association worked hard to have them included in the salaried 
grades (See Bagwell (The Railway Clearing House) op, cit, pp,174 -
187.
300. MSS, 55B/1/EC/21/7369, PRO/RAIL/424/11 (Part 1) memorandum dated 
17th August 1939.
301. Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op.cit. p,562; MSS. 55B/1/EC/21/7384; 
PRO/RAIL/424/11 (Part 2) (Part 2 of this file is devoted to the 
threatened AS^EF strike),
302. MSS, 55B/1/EC/21/7384; PRO/RAIL/424/11 (Part 2).
303. Bell op. cit. p.71; PRO/RAIL/424/11 (Part 2), Page 3 of a
memorandum on*Labour Matters' dated 28th August 1939.
304. MSS. 55B/1/EC/21/7384.
305. Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op. cit. p.587; Bell op. cit. P.222;
PRO/RAIL/424/11 (Part 4).
306. Bagwell (The Railwaymen) op. cit. pp.573-597, R. Bell op. cit.
pp. 10 - 13, and pp. 19- 22.
307. Routh op. cit. table p. 90.
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Chapter 3 Parliamentary and Electoral Activities:Notes
1. Ross McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party, 1910-1924 
Oxford, 1974 (Paperback 1986), pp. 91-106.
2. David E. Martin, Unpublished monograph on George Lathan to be 
published in Dictionary of Labour Biography, 1985, p.3, ^
3. MSS.55B/1/EC/16/5863
4. MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/5375
5. MSS. 55B/1/EC/2/1042
6. MSS. 55B/1/EC/2/1151
7. H. A. Clegg, Alan Fox, and A. F, Thompson, A History of British
Trade Unions since 1639, Volume It 1389 - 1910, Oxford,
1964(1977) pp. 413-418.
8. Clegg, Fox and Thompson op. cit. pp. 418-420; Hugh Armstrong 
Clegg, A History of British Trade unions since 1339, Volume 
IJ: 1911-1933, Oxford, 1985 (Paperback 1987) pp. 211-218.
9. Clegg op. cit. p. 223.
10 Railway Clerk, October 1913; Adrian Tranter, The Railway Clerks'
Association; its origins and history to 1921, Unpublished Ph.D, , 
Cambridge, 1979, p. 190.
11. TSSA Annual Report 1976 p. 150, MSS.55B/1/EC/2/1035.
12. Tranter op. cit. p. 191.
13. I have used Sir Thomas Erskine May's Treatise on the Privileges 
and Usages of Parliament as a general reference on parliamentary 
procedures. ' Erskine May' is periodically re-edited and brought 
up to date. The most recent is the 21st edition, published in 
1989 and edited by C. J. Boulton, Two other relevant editions 
are the 12th, 1917 and the 13th, 1924, they were both edited by 
T, Lonsdale Webster. All editions were published in London.
14. Railway Clerk, July & August 1909; Following MSS. 55B/EC/4/1950
Memorandum marked 'Confidential' p. 5,
15. MSS. 55B/1/EC/2/979, 1079
16. Following MSS.55B/EC/471950 Memorandum marked 'Confidential' 
pp. 4 & 5; Adrian Tranter op. cit, pp, 129 & 134,
17. Railway Service Journal,, March, 1929, p. 94.
18. MSS. 55B/1/EC/2/1031(j); Adrian Tranter op, cit. pp. 162 & 163.
19. There is a thorough discussion of the problems of land 
acquisition for railway construction in Railways and Victorian 
Cities, John R Kellet. Rout ledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
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19(cont.>(Paperback, 1979). This work discusses land acquisition at 
the point vAîere problems were most acute.
20, The railway companies' pension funds are discussed in chapter 4 
of this thesis,
21, 0. R. McGregor, Divorce in England: A Centenary Study, Heinemann, 
London, 1957,
22, These examples are taken from one of a series of booklets issued 
by the London Midland and Scottish Railway Company (LMS) between 
1923 and 1939. They had a limited circulation and gave brief 
details of proposed private legislation which would have affected 
the LMS, They cover most of the sessions between these years, 
and include, as well as railway bills, details of such local 
authorities' bills as were considered of interest to railway 
managers. Local authorities are the other large source of private 
legislation. These booklets can be found under the following 
references:
PRO/RAIL/423/1 covers the 1923 session
PRO/RAIL/423/2 covers the 1924 session
PRO/RAIL/423/3 covers the 1925 session
PRO/RAIL/423/4 covers the 1926 session
PRO/RAIL/423/5 covers the 1927 session
PRO/RAIL/423/6 covers the 1930 session
PRO/RAIL/423/7 covers the 1931- 1932
sessions
PRO/RAIL/423/8 covers the 1937-■1938
sessions
23. Erskine May (21st Edition) op. cit, pp. 929 and 930,
24. Lord Campion, Introduction to the Procedures of the House of 
Commons, London, 1956, p. 296.
25. Private Bill Ledgers in the House of Lords Record Office. .
26. Information supplied orally from the Private Bills Office of 
the House of Commons, June 1991.
27, F.WB. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1916 - 1949, 
London, 1969 p, 45,
28. P.S. Bagwell, The Railwaymen, London, 1963;
MSS.55B/1/EC/4/1942
29. MSS. 55B/1/EC/4/1942, 1981
30, MSS. 55B/1/EC/4/1994
31, Craig op. cit, pp. 248 & 249. After the first World War, the 
wartime coalition government decided to continue in existence and 
devised a signal to demonstrate to the electorate particular 
candidates in the postwar election who supported the coalition. 
This was necessary as such candidates stood for different
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31(cont. )political parties, and was referred to derisively as the 
'coupon',
32. D. Butler and A. Sloman, British Political Facts 1900-1979, 
London 1980; J. M. Bellamy and J Seville eds., Dictionary of 
Labour Biography Volume 2, London, 1974, article on G, J. Wardle 
by P. S. Bagwell.
33. See Chapter 2, section on recognition negotiations and 
PRO/CAB/21/169.
34. MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5375, para. 28
35. Craig, op, cit, p, 45.
36. M. Stent on and S. Lees eds, Mie of J^ritisk éo/f
Volume III <1919 - 1945) Volume III, Brighton, 1979.
37. Craig, op. cit. p. 248.
38. MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5325 page 4, para 17
39. Paul Addison, The Road to 1945, London, 1975 (Paperback 1977)
pp.46-47; Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, 
London, 1963, pp. 196-199; James Hinton, Labour and Socialism: A 
History of the British Labour Movement 1Ô67 -1974, Brighton,
1983, pp. 148 - 149
40. MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5375 ,
41. The duration of a Parliament had been reduced from seven to five 
years by the Parliament Act of 19ll, so an election would
normally have been expected in or about 1915.
42. MSS, 55B/1/EC/3/1707
43. MSS, 55B/1/EC/3/1663 (c)
44. MSS. 55B/1/EC/3/1500
45. MSS, 55B/1/EC/3/1664
46. Many writers discuss this change in public attitudes; there is a
good summary of it iitj Keith MiddlemasC) Politics in
British Society, The Experience of the British System since 1911, 
London, 1980, pp. 94 - 119
47. MSS. 55B/1/EC/3/1707
48. MSS. 55B/1/EC/3/1729 (d), 1764 (b), 1838, 1855, 1858 (e)
49. MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/3015
50. It was unfortunate that this resolution had such a memorable
number because the incident was getting on some of the
Executive's nerves and the resolution's number helped to fix
it in their minds. The debate at the annual conference can
- 316 -
50<cont)be found at MSS. 55B/1/CON/19, This conference also 
resolved that any member of the permanent staff could be 
sponsored but while the Annual Conference proposed, the 
Executive Committee disposed.
51. The reasons for this ruling are detailed in a lengthy Political
' Sub-Committee report presented to the Executive Committee on 22nd 
February, 1932, see MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5375, Briefly^ the General 
Secretary's and the Chief Assistant Secretary's work was mainly 
with railway managers and government departments, and it was held 
to be an advantage in it for both to be Members of Parliament.
The argument did not apply to other head office staff, and was 
not accepted by the whole of the Executive,as the debate on the 
report demonstrates.
52. MSS. 55B/l/EC/7/3103. W. Stott was third in line in the 
Association's hierarchy. It ran: A. G. Walkden, G. Lathan, then 
W. Stott. G. Ridley came rather lower down in pecking order,
53. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3162 (f)
54. MSS. 55B/Î/EC/16/5687
55. Craig, op. cit. p, 321.
56. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6595 (a)
57. See the note prior to MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6521. This was at the 
Executive Committee held on Sunday 19th July, 1936.
58. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3319
59. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3168
60. MSS. 55B/l/EC/7/3103
61. MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/3015, 3057, 3103, MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5375
62. Paragraph 10 of MSS. 55B/l/EC/7/3103, paragraph 9 of
MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/3105. The comments made at these meetings 
demonstrate not only an awareness amongst the members of the 
Political Fund Sub-Committee, but also how tactful they thought 
they needed to be.
63. MSS. 55B/1/EC/16/5863
64. H. Pelling Social Geography of British Elections 1665-1910,
65. The Times House of Commons 1935, London, 1935, p. 84
66. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3319
67. Times House of Commons, 1929, London, 1929, p. 88.
68. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3248, 3249; MSS. 55B/1/EC/16/5649 <c)
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69. Craig, op. cit. p. 140 ; Stenton and S. Lees eds. Who's Who of 
British Members of Parliament Volume III (1919-1945) Brighton, 
1979.
70. Craig, op. cit. p. 248 & 140; A. J.P. Taylor English History: 1914 - 
1945, Oxford, 1965 (Paperback 1976) p. 341 n. 3.
71. MSS. 55B/1/EC/13/4746
72. MSS. 55B/l/EC/7/3103
73. Times House of Commons 1935 op. cit. p. 84,
74. MSS. 55B/1/EC/13/4760 (8)
75. MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5325
76. MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5584 for A. G. Walkden;
MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5311 for G. Lathan
77. MSS.55B/1/EC/15/5375. The reservation to be entered against this
document as a guide to the apportionment of tasks at the
Association's Head Office in 1930 is to do with its polemical 
aspect, that is, its presentation of job descriptions to support 
the argument that both the General Secretary and the Chief
Assistant Secretary should ideally be Members of parliament, but
that no other official should be. However, the account would 
have to be acceptable to the permanent staff in general, and as 
the Executive Committee decided to have the report printed and 
circulated to the branches it is to be assumed that the account 
was substantially unexceptionable.
78. MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5375
79. MSS. 55B/1/C0N/39-40; MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6489
80. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6330
81. MSS. 55B/1/EC/16/5649 para 6.
82. Formerly known as the Political Fund Sub-Committee,
83. MSS. 55B/1/EC/16/5649
84. (See Hansard Volume 174 column 832, 1924; also Chapter 4;'Pension 
Funds*for an explanation of why this action would count as 
'Association Duties’)
85. MSS. 55B/1/EC/16/5649; MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5375
86. MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/3102. The Dali legislated for a country with
a population of less than 3,000,000 in 1930, whilst the British
Parliament performed the same service for a population of 
46,052,000 and the sun had not yet set on the British Empire.
87. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6595
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88. Ji099 étouse o f 1935 op. cit. pp. 48, 87, & 125.
89. Times House of Commons 1935 op. cit, pp. 141, 132, 133, 100, 101,
48, & 66
90. 7iM93 of C@aMB m yl935 op. cit. pp. 123, 87, 92, ft 109.
91. MSS. 55B/1/EC/16/5649, paragraph 6.
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Chapter 4 The RCA and the Railway Pension Funds; Notes
1. Employees were normally paid back only their own contributions if 
they left for a respectable reason. This meant that payments made 
to the fund on their behalf helped to guarantee the payments for 
other beneficiaries. Employees dismissed for misconduct were 
usually paid back their own contributions but the North British 
and Glasgow and South Western companies returned half the 
contributions only,at the discretion of the fund's committee. An 
employee dismissed for fraud usually lost his contributions. 
Sometimes a part or even the whole of his contributions were paid 
to a dependent. If the employee had been a member of their fund 
for more than ten years, the Great Western returned the whole of 
the member's contributions.
2. The words 'pension' and 'superannuation' do not mean the same 
thing. A pension is a payment, not necessarily to an old person, 
after his retirement. To superannuate means to declare unfit for 
further use; an early variant of the word meant having survived a 
year. Despite their different origins, modern usage makes little 
distinction between the two words. In this chapter, the term 
'pension funds' is used for the funds established by railway 
companies for their clerical staff.
3. Cd. 5349, Report of the Departmental Committee on Superannuation 
and similar funds of the Railway Companies (1910). pp. 39 - 43.
4. Ibid; pp. 39 - 43.
5. Ibid; pp. 39 - 43. , PS. Bagwell, The Railway Clearing House 
in the British Economy 1Ô42 - 1922, London, 1968. pp.
162-169.
6. Cd. 5349 pp. 39 - 43.
7. The London Traffic Combine's pension fund was not established by 
statute, but some of its staff were in the Railway Clearing 
System's fund. (See ILO Studies & Reports Series A, No. 33 
(1930)).
8. A. G. Walkden, the Association's General Secretary, in his 
evidence to the Departmental Committee of Enquiry into Railway 
Superannuation Schemes (see Cd. 5484 p. 12) said that his 
membership was compelled to belong to one of sixteen 
superannuation funds. Fourteen main-line railway companies had 
their own funds. The other main-line companies used the Railway 
Clearing System's fund. Most of the Association's members 
working for the London Traffic Combine (T. 0. T. ) were recruited in 
their own fund, the Omnibus, Railway and Equipment Companies 
Staff Superannuation Fund, referred to by the Association as the
0. R. T. & E. Fund.
9. Railway Clerk, December, 1910. For National Insurance exemption 
see The Railway Clerk, November 1911, p. 231.
10. After MSS. 55B/1/EC/4/1950 on page 26 of the E. C. minute book.
11. Cd. 5349 p. 36
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12. Cd, 5349 pp. 1 - 20 and Cd. 5484, Evidence submitted to the 
Departmental Committee on Superannuation and similar funds of the 
Railway Companies (1911).
13. Cd. 5484 pp. 48 - 49.
14. Cd. 5464 p. 49.
15. Cd. 5349 pp. 35 - 36.
16. MSS. 55B/1/EC/2/1018.
17. See Chapter 2, ‘Improved Salaries in 1919'.
18. MSS. 55B. l/EC/5/2380, MSS. 55B/1/EC/6/2626
19. P.S. Bagwell, i(ev6iuttovr fi'mm Ï770, London 1974, 
p. 240.
20. Ministry of Transport Act (1919). T. C. Barker and C. I. Savage,
An Economic History of British Transport, Barker and Cl Savage, 
London 1974 p. 147
21. Cd. 5349 pp. 39 - 43.
22. Cd. 5349 p, 41.
23. Following MSS. 55B/1/EC/6/2626, MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/2871(a) and 
MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/2959
24. MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/3007
25. MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/3035 and MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/3078.
26. MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/3078. for the text of the paragraph which was 
inserted into the Bill.
27. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3153. for the text of the paragraph vdiich was 
inserted into this Bill.
28. MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/3115.
29. MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/3115 and MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3153.
30. B. B. Gilbert, MjrÀAisà SoGiAl London 1970,
pp. 235 - 254.
31. MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/2959
32. Cd. 5349 p. 26.
33. MSS. 55/I/CON/24,
34. MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/2937 (b).
35. Railway Act (1921) (11 & 12 Geo. Vc. 55) Part I Section 3 - (2).
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36. The Great Western was not only the largest company In its group, 
it was the only one with an independent pension fund. Of the 
thirteen others, the LMS group had the London and North Western, 
the Midland, the Lancashire and Yorkshire, the Glasgow and South- 
Western, and the Caledonian; it also had some employees in the 
Railway Clearing System Fund; the LNER had the Great Central and 
the North British; and the Southern had the South-Eastern and 
Chatham, the London Brighton and South Coast, and the London
and South-Western. See also MSS. 55B/1/EC/6394(a)
37. MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/3115
38. PRO/RAI^/101. This is the minute-book of several sub-committees 
of the LMS Board. It includes the minutes of the meetings of this 
sub-committee, PRO/RAIL/424/7 also contains accounts of son» of 
the meetings of this sub-committee, the funds were:
The London and North Western,
The Lancashire and Yorkshire,
The Midland,
The Railway Clearing House,
The Caledonian, The Glasgow and South-Western.
39. PRO/RAIL/424/7. Report of the Sub-committee dated 17 December 
1923,
40. PRO/RAIL/424/7 .
41. PRO/RAIL/424/7. (The question of supplements to
pensions funds to help annuitants cope with wartime and immediate 
post-war inflation is considered later in this chapter).
42. See MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3153 for details of Supplementary funds.
43. PRO/RAIL/424/7.
44. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3291.
45. PRO/RAIL/418/202. 20th July, 1923 pp. 5 - 8 .  This figure of 7,426 
was further broken down - 5,679 of them were men and 1,747 were 
women; 4,397 were members of a wages pension fund,
3,029 had no pension provision and 2,730 were over 50 years old. 
The Association's figures may be for those of the above who were 
members of the Association.
46. This'Ex Gratia' pension was based on the grade of the clerk 
concerned. The column on the right shows the percentage of clerks 
in each of these grades, when a general re-classification was 
underel'^taken in 1919-1920. It would be expected that most of 
this group of clerks would be in the lower grades. ?
- 322 -
Table 8.
Class 5 10/- per week 57. 2%
Class 4 12/6 per week 20. 0%
Class 3 15/- per week 11. 1%
Class 2 17/6 per week 5. 4%
Class 1 20/- per week 2. 9%
Special Class 22/6 per week 2.6%
(See PRO/RAIL/418/202 20 July, 1923 pp. 5-8)
(See following MSS. 55B/1/EC/5/2378),
47. PRO/RAIL/418/202 December, 1923 p. 34
48. PRO/RAIL/418/202 14th May, 1924 p. 52
49. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3472.
50. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3315, 3357, 3423 and 3443 (c).
51. MSS.55B/1/EC/8/3368, 3406 (c), and 3423. Mr Romerll, the 
Association's first M. P. devoted his maiden speech In the House 
of Commons to defending the Bill. (See Chapter 3^  Parliamentary 
Activities, 'The Association's campaign to provide parliamentary 
seats for Its members'.
52. PRO/RAIL/1007/630
53. PRO/RAIL/1007/630
54. British Labour Statistics Historical Abstract 1886 - 1968,
London, 1971p for the actual rate of Inflation during this 
period. There are also some figures at Appendix II.
55. MSS. 55B/1/EC/4/2Ô15.
56. The LNWR grants were based on the following formula: one sixtieth 
of retiring salary for each year of membership of the fund. If 
this was based on the salary scales which were current in the 
early part of 1919 - before salary negotiations - then the 
maximum grant would have been two thirds of the retiring salary; 
If the salary scale used was that In force In the latter half of 
1919, then the maximum grant was three fifths of the retiring 
salary. (MSS. 55B/1/EC/5/2380).
57. PRO/RAIL/630.
58. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3153.
59. There Is a report on these supplementary funds following 
MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3153. It Is dated 21 June 1923.
60. PRO/RAIL/1007/630. See a report of a sub-committee dated 26th 
June, 1924.
61. PRO/RAIL/1007/630, MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3297, 3315, 3357, 3368.
62. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3368, MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3406.
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63. MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3423.
64. MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3443 <c).
65. MSS. 55B/1/EC/10/3602, 3810.
66. MSS. 55B/1/EC/10/3854.
67. MSS. 55B/1/EC/11/3947.
68. MSS. 55B/1/EC/11/3968 (a).
69. MSS. 55B/1/EC/11/4019.
70. MSS. 55B/1/EC/11/4034.
71. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4235.
72. MSS. 55B/1/EC/11/3947.
73. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6280 (c).
74. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6316 <e).
75. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6354 (c).
76. MGS.55B/1/EC/21/7344.
77. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6621.
78. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6809.
79 MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6544.
80. P. S. Bagwell, The Railway Clearing House in the British Economy 
ÎÔ42-1922, London, 1968, pp. 282 - 283.
81. MSS. 55B/1/EC/11/4020.
82. MSS. 55B/1/EC/11/4206 <c).
83. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4235 (b).
84. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4235 <b).
85. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4291.
86. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4305 (a).
87. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4382 (a).
88. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4402 (a)
89. MSS. 55B/1/EC/13/4785.
90. MSS. 55B/1/EC/13/4839.
91. MSS. 55B/1/EC/14/5041,
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92. MSS. 55B/1/EC/14/5106 (a).
93. MSS. 55B/1/EC/14/5128 <b).
94. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6393 (e).
95. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6469.
96. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6544.
97. MSS. 55B/1/CON/41.
98. MSS.55B/1/EC/18/6487.
99. PRO/RAIL/424/7. See especially the memorandum to the President 
of LMS, dated 20 October 1930; and the letter to Sir Herbert 
Walker, the General Manager of the Southern Railway, dated 3 July 
1934.
100. MBS. 55B/1/EC/19/6607.
101. PRO/RAIL/390/351.
102. Bagwell (The Railway Clearing House) op. cit. pp. 270 - 273 and 
pp. 282 - 283.
103. Following MSS. 55B/1/EC/5/2378.
104. Bagwell (The Railway Clearing House) op. clt. pp. 270 - 273 and 
pp. 282 - 283.
105. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6354(g), MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6621(d).
106. MSS. 55B/1/EC/21/7344.
107. PRO/RAIL/390/351.
108. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6809.
109. Railway Clearing System Act (1940-1941) (4 & 5 Geo. VI) See also 
Note 162, below.
110. T.C. Barker and Michael Robbins, A History of London Transport, 
Vol. 2 pp. 137 - 191.
111. Barker and Robbins op. clt. pp. 270-311.
112. Barker and Robbins op. clt. pp. 504-517.
113. MSS. 55B/1/EC/16/5866.
114. MSS.55B/1/EC/17/6106 (f).
115. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6263 (a).
116. ILÛ Studies and Reports, Series A No. 33, The London Traffic 
Combine pp. 142 and 152. The funds which catered for most railway 
clerks were established by statute In the nineteenth century,
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116(cont. )when this was the only way to establish such an enterprise. 
The earliest railway pension fund was set up In 1854. As late as 
1909, the alternative to private legislation was to register a 
pension fund under the Friendly Societies Act (1890), but the 
maximum annuity allowed was £52, which made this method 
impractical for railway pension funds which catered for white- 
collar staff. (Cd. 5349 p. 27).
117. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6607.
118. (ILO Report, op. clt. p. 143.
119. Under the LMS pension fund,on his final salary of £200 he would 
be paid a pension of £120 and a lump sum of £300. For the male 
average pay(£186/£185) see Guy Routh, Occupation and Pay in Great 
Britain 1906-79, London 1965, 1980, pp. 120 & 121 table 2.27.
120. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6607.
121. MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5330, 5355.
122. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6669.
I,
123. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6684.
124. MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/5942 (4), following MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6004,
MSS. 55b/l/EC/17/6107 (b).
125. Following MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6004. See earlier In this chapter for 
an explanation of the 'money value' system.
126. Following MSS.55B/1/EC/17/6004, MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6107 (b).
127. In 1912, vdien the fund was established, the Association employed 
only thirteen people. By 1933 there had been a considerable 
Increase, but there were never more than 100 employees In the 
period between the two World Wars. In pension terms this would be 
a very small fund. It would be difficult for an actuary to 
estimate the pattern of claims for such a fund.
128. M5S.55B/1/EC/17/6107 (b).
129. MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/5942 (4).
130. MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6033, 6107 (b).
131. MSS. 55B/1/EC/4/1965.
132 MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6655, 6586 (4), 6872.
133. MSS. 55B/1/EC/20/7111 (4(b)), 7141 (8).
134. See earlier In this chapter and MSS, 55B/1/EC/18/6394.
135. MSS. 55B/1/EC/11/4206 (a).
136. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4235.
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137. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4275 (a), 4291.
138. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4335.
139. MSS. 55B/1/EC/14/5041 (c).
140. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6201 (h), 6280 (b).
141. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6316 (b)
142. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6293, 6354.
143. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6394.
144. See Appendix VI,
145. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6495.
146. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6607.
147. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6640, 6669. See later In this chapter, where the
change in policy by the Association on higher pension funds Is 
discussed. The change In policy was confirmed at the 1936 Annual 
Conf erence.
148. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6909.
149. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6929. MS. 55/I/CON/43.
150. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6909.
151. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6934.
152. MSS. 55B/1/EC/20/6981.
153. MSS. 55B/1/EC/21/7344, 7389.
154. At the time of Bell's publication (see note 1 5 ^ below) this
location had an obscurity It has since lost.
155. R. Bell, History of the British Railways during the war 1939 - 45, 
London, 1946.
156. For details of the benefits and contributions of this fund see 
Great Western Railway Superannuation Fund Act, 1941. As 
explained In the text, the new GWR fund and the new Railway 
Clearing System Fund were very similar and were established 
within a few days of each other. The benefits offered were 
exactly similar. The retiring age for men was 60, for women 55.
157. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3115.
158. For a discussion of this see P. S. Bagwell, The Transport
Revolution from 1770. London 1974 pp. 247 - 249.
159. Net revenue Is obtained by subtracting expenditure from gross 
revenue. Railway companies In the 1920^s and 1930 s considered 
expenditure to be a fixed amount and to vary directly with the
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159(cont,)8lze of the network. So the amount of surplus compared to 
the total amount of revenue will show how economically efficient 
a company was.
160. See Chapter 5; The General Strike.
161. PRO/RAIL/390/351.
162. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3267.
163. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3297.
164. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3298.
165. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3333.
166. PRO/RAIL/390/351.
167. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3368, MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3423, 3443(e)
168. MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3472 (b), PRO/RAIL/390/351.
169. PRO/RAIL/390/351.
170. MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3516.
171. Cd. 5349 pp. 51 and 52.
172. A line conference Is one confined to delegates
from a single railway line or company.
173. MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3616.
174. Bentley B. Gilbert, The Evolution of National Insurance in 
Britain, London, 1966 pp. 159 - 232; British Social Policy Î914- 
1939, London, 1970(1973) pp. 235 - 254.
175. The Railway Clerk, 15 September 1911, 15 November 1911. There
are numerous references to this attitude of the Association
throughout this period. See: MSS. 55B/1/EC/6/2600, 2657,
MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3351, MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4460, MSS. 55B/1/EC/16/5823, 
MSS.55B/1/EC/19/6748. Up to 1924, If not later, this attitude
was shared by the NUR and ASLEF, see MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3351.
176. MSS. 558/1/EC/9/3613; MSS. 558/1/EC/9/3647; MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3647.
177. PRO/RAIL/390/351.
178. MSS. 558/1/EC/10/3692.
179. PRO/RAIL/390/351.
180. MSS. 55B/1/EC/10/3722.
181. PRO/RAIL/390/351.
182. MSS. 55B/1/EC/10/3766.
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183. PRO/RAIL/390/351.
184. MSS. 55B/1/EC/10/3787.
185. PRO/RAIL/390/351,
Comparison of Benefits
LNER PROPOSALS
Pension based One third of average 
on salary plus a third of
last seven year average 
salary
LMS BENEFITS
Half of final 
salary
Plus a lump One year's final salary One and a
sum based on
If the member Not less than three 
died before months' current salary
pensionable and not more than one
age one year's current
salary.
half year's 
final salary
Not less than 
one year's 
current 
salary and 
not more than 
1% year's 
current 
salary.
186. MSS. 55B/1/EC/10/3810. .
187. MSS. 55B/1/EC/10/3854.
188. MBS.55B/1/EC/11/3934.
189. MBS.55B/1/EC/11/4100.
190. MBS. 55B/1/EC/12/4275.
191. MBS.55B/1/EC/12/4335.
192. MBS.55B/1/EC/13/4595.
193. MSS. 55B/1/EC/13/4682, MSS.55B/l/EC/14/4914(b), 4965, 5022.
194. MSS. 55B/1/EC/14/5056.
195. MSS. 55B/1/EC/14/5106 (b), 5128 (a).
196. MBS.55B/1/EC/14/5130.
197. MSS. 55B/1/EC/14/5169.
198. MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5355.
199. MBS.55B/1/EC/15/5355.
200. MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5284, MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5744<a), 5678.
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201. PRO/RAIL/390/351, MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5274, 5434(a).
202. MSS. 55B/1/EC/17/6106 (c).
203. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6201.
204. MSS,55B/1/EC/18/6263 (a),
205. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6354 (f).
206. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6394.
207. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18 6469.
208. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6487.
209. MSS. 55/1/CON/41.
210. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6495.
211. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6544
212. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6607, 6669, 6863.
213. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6607, 6822.
214. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6880.
215. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6929.
216. MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6934.
217. MSS. 55B/1/EC/20/7064, PRO/RAIL/390/351.
218. MSS. 55B/1/EC/20/7210, MSS. 55B/1/EC/21/7267, 7304, 7344 (a),
PRO/RAIL/390/351.
219. Following KBS. 558/1/EC/15/5528 on p. 239 of the E. C. minute book.
220. Following MSS. 558/1/EC/15/5528 on p.239 of E. C. minute book.
221. Here is a short list of some of the other issues which were the
subject of negotiation from time to time. The agreements which
were reached form the basis of the conditions of work of the 
railways' white-collar staff at the present time.
Conditions of service for night workers,
MSS. 558/1/EC/6/2712, 2719, MSS. 558/l/EC/8/3386(c), 3443 (b),
MSS. 558/1/EC/9/3500.
Definition of 'Home Station' for relief clerks' expenses.
MSS. 558/1/EC/6/2822, MSS. 558/1/EC/8/3438, MSS. 558/l/EC/9/3676, 
MSS. 558/1/EC/9/3713, MSS. 558/1/EC/10/3876.
Special overtime for station-masters.
MSS. 55B/l/EC/10/3874<g>, MSS. 558/1/EC/11/4073, 4177.
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221(cont. )Booking-on for more than one turn of duty in a day,
MSS. 55B/1/EC/6/2822, MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3718.
Travelling time. KBS. 55B/1/EC/6/2822.
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212. PRO/RAIL/397/4. The letter is dated 6th July, 1926.
213. PRO/RAIL/253/451.
214. Morris op. cit. p, 22.
-343-
Chapter 6 How the Association Dealt with Dissension: Notes
1. Many accounts of the General Strike mention the Association.
There is a passing allusion in Dora Russell, The Tamarisk Tree, 
London 1975(paperback 1977) p. 166...'It was said at the time 
that Walkden, the leader of the railway clerks, was so delighted
at his men's solidarity, that he would march up and down his
office singing, "The Railway Clerks are out on Strike", to the 
tune of the Red Flag.' In the Association's own records see 
especially: MSS. 55B/1/EC/10/3888 and 3889. At the 1903 
conference the Association voted 25 - 9 to become affiliated to 
the TUC (MSS. 55B/1/CON/1 - 4) A. G. Walkden^ was on the General 
Council of the TUC continuously from 1921 to 1936 (Who's Who, 
London, 1936) and Chairman in 1933 (MSS. 55B/1/EC/15/5548). See 
chapter ^ Wiich details the course of the Association's effort to 
make its members Members of Parliament.
2. Many commentators accept this. For exanmple C. L. Mowat, Britain 
between the Wars 1914 - 1940, London, 1955, 1956, (1966)
pp. 30-43; S. Glynn and J. Oxbarrow, Interwar Britain: a Social 
and Economic History, London 1976 pp. 163-168. For a
contemporary 'bosses' view see PRO/MT/49/19: letter from Lord
Ashfield to Sir E.Geddes dated 17 May, 1920.
3. MSS. 55B/1/EC/4/2148,
4. See The Jogger No. 13 March, 1929. Other instances are the Annual 
Conference of 1929 (MSS. 55B/1/CON/22) and the closing of the 
Sheffield Branch in 1913 ( MSS. 55/1/CON/7. )
5. G. D. H. Cole and Raymond Postgate, The Common People, LmAon,
VÊ199 p ^ 6, MmWoemafc Ihe.
CdAtroi LaJbour Q o lle g e  OQ09 ^  O S fii -
ï<3i00i>i^  It& N A ir io W  CoüAciX o i  0 9 2 :
6. J". R  in The Labour College Movement, London, 1979 p. 57.
7. MSS. 55B/1/EC/4631, 4669, 4695 (2).
8. H.P. White, Regional History of Railways in Great Britain
Vol. II Southern England, London 1961
p. 140.
9. MSS. 55B/1/EC/4695 (2).
10. MSS. 553/1/EC/4610 (3), 4621, 4637.
11. MSS. 55B/1/EC/4669, 4695. See 55B/3/WEH/1-52 for the circular.
12. Millar op. cit. pp. 80 - 82.
13. There are several accounts of the history of the Labour Colleges.
One is Appendix A in P. S. Bagwell The Railwaymen London, 1963,
written from the point of view of one of the two trade unions
which originally sponsored the Central Labour* College - the ASRS, 
later the NUR. Another account, by Oraik* Central Labour 
College London, 1964,Craik was a principal of^the College.
Another source is J.F. Horrabin and Winifred Horrabin^ Working 
Class Education, London, 1924. Winifred Horrabin was secretary
13(cont. )of the Plebs League, which was affiliated to The Labour 
College Movement in 1924. Perhaps the most authoritative is 
J, P. M. Millar The Labour College Movement, London, 1979.
14. Several explanations have been offered to explain this phenomenon 
- a sure sign that it remains an open question. There is a good 
discussion In by Dr. B. A. Waites 'The Effects of the First World 
War on Class and Status in England 1910 - 1920' Journal of 
Contemporary History 11,34 (1976),
15. MSS. 55B/1/EC/5/2563.
16. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3189 (a),
17. MSS. 55/I/CON/23. The cost of a scholarship at the the CLC was 
only £125 p.a. ; but students' further maintenance expenses and 
the College's expectation of general financial assistance beyond 
the educational fees produced the estimate of £500,
(MSS. 55B/l/EC/8/3189(b).
18. MSS. 55B/1/EC/16/5864, MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/2977.
19. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3189
20. Bagwell op. cit., Craik op. cit., J.F. & W. Horrabin op. cit.,
J. P. M. Millar op. cit.
21. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3189 (a), MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3628,
22. MSS. 55/1/C0N/24.
23. MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/3121. See Chapter 3/Parliamentary Activities?
24. MSS. 55B/1/CON/19.
25. MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3628.
26. MSS. 55/1/C0N/27.
27. Bagwell op. cit., Craik op. cit., J.F. & W. Horrabin op. cit.
28. Craik op. cit. pp. 154 - 157.
29. MSS. 55/I/CON/39 - 40. JPM Millar op. cit. p.121 The Co-operative
Union had affiliated to the NCLG In 1933 (JPM Millar op. clt pp.
116-117),
30. MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6358, 6450, 6261, 6380 (d).
31. This is discussed at greater length in Chapter 5; 'The 
Association and the General Strike'; detailed justification is 
there provided in Substantiation of this short summary.
32. There were still veteran strikers employed by British Rail in the 
1950's and also in the early 1960's; this was a constant 
complaint amongst them. (Private information from Mr. R. Linsley, 
a British Railways employee of long standing and until recently
BR's Record Officer).
33. Most commentators on white collar workers discuss this point.
See, for example, G. S. Bain, The Growth of White Collar Unionism, 
Oxford, 1970. D. Lockwood, The Blackcoated Worker London, 1958.
F. Parkin Class, Inequality and Political Order, London, 1971.
34. The contrast between western capitalist ideology and other 
ideologies, particularly socialist Ideology, is discussed by 
various commentators. See Parkin op.cit., R. Miliband
The State in Capitalist Society, London, 1973, W. B. Gallie, 
'Liberal Morality and Socialist Morality' (1956), reprinted in 
Philosophy, Politics, and Sociology Oxford, 1970 edited by 
P. Laslett.
35. There are periodical references to exempî/tion from paying 
unemployment insurance in the E.C. minutes. The most recent 
series of minutes start in November 1933, v^en a new Unemployment 
Insurance Bill was proposed (KBS. 55B/1/EC/16/5823). They were 
still exempted under this Bill when it became an Act until June 
1937, when it was agreed by the Railway Companies and the 
Association that 15% of railway staffs should be insured.
(MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6748). That is, 15% of the staff from each of 
the four main-line companies. (MSS. 55B/1/EC/19/6762).
36. MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3614.
37. For a full account of the work of the Railway Clearing House see 
P. S. Bagwell, The Railway Clearing House in the British Economy 
ÎÔ42 - Î922 London, 1968. Despite the title, the account 
continues to 1963, when the Clearing House was finally disbanded.
38. MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3314.
39. KBS. 55B/1/EC/9/3567.
40. MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3612,
41. For example see the LNER minutes for 25th June 1926. 
PRO/RAIL/390/7, KBS. 55B/1/EC/11/3919.
42..There detailed descript ions of the complicated negotiations
and manoeuvres which led to the foundation of the CPGB in L. J. 
MacFarlane, The British Communist Party: Its Origin and 
Development until 1929, London, 1966J Henry Pel ling. The 
British Communist Party, A Historical Profile, London, 1958 
(1975); Roderick Martin, Communism and British Trade Unions 
1924-1933: A ^tudy of the National Minority Movement, Oxford,
1969} and Tom Bell, The British Communist Party: A Short History, 
London, 1937.
43.. There is a list of membership figures down to 1929 at the end of 
MacFarlane op. cit. For its period it agrees with the longer 
list given in Felling, op.clt.
44. Felling op. cit. p. 40.
45. McFarlane op. cit. p. 143.
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46. For example, on Its establishment the Sunday Worker numbered 
amongst its shareholders; 35 miners' lodges, 24 I.L,P. branches, 
54 Labour Party branches, 24 trade councils, 72 trade union 
branches and 12 co-op guilds. However, the editor was always a 
member of the CPGB and for its launch a quarter of that year's 
subsidy from the Soviet Union was needed i.e. £4,000. In
1926 when it had a stable circulation of 85,000, , CPGB 
membership varied between 6,000 and 46(cont. )10, 730. (Cmd. 2682 
p. 666, MacFarlane op. cit p.143.) In 1929, when the Communist 
party line changed, it closed down.
47. Felling op. clt. pp. 26 and 27.
48. Most historians who examine the CPGB in the 1920s and 1930s 
discuss this point. See Martin op. cit. pp. 11 & 12 and 
MacFarlane pp. 102 - 104.
49. MacFarlane op. cit p. 229.
50. Two were set up in 1929; the United Mineworkers of Scotland and 
The United Clothing Workers' Trade Union in London. (MacFarlane 
op. clt, p. 247)
51. MSS. 55B/1/EC/10/3733.
52. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4447, 4466.
53. There is a file of Joggers held at the Modern Record Centre of 
the University of Warwick under the reference MSS. 172A. Under 
this reference there are the following copies of this magazine;
No. 1 November 1927 to No. 14 May 1929, and No. 16 August 1929 to 
No. 19 January 1930. At the John Johnson Collection in the 
Bodleian Library Oxford, there are issues No. 6 May 1928 to No. 20 
March 1930. Here the Jogger is described as "A Communist Paper 
for Clearing House Clerks published from 1927 until an unknown 
date, irregularly (usually monthly)" - (as has been seen from the 
text, the E.C. of the Association had an influence on this 
irregularity) - "one penny an issue, published by the Euston Rail 
Group of the Communist Party, reproduced from typing".
54. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4466, 4495.
55. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4498.
56. MSS. 558/1/EC/12/4495,
57. KBS. 55B/1/EC/12/4532, Jogger No. 10 December 1928,
58. MSS. 55B/1/EC/12/4547(2), . 4559. , KBS. 55B/1/EC/13/4573 (a)
59. KBS. 55B/1/EC/13/4615, 4616. There is a copy of Purkis's letter 
to the General Secretary with this minute.
60. MSS. 55B/1/EC/13/4631, 4636.
61. MSS. 55B/1/EC/13/4657; this rule concerns members who are 
responsible for actions detrimental to the Association.
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62. MSS. 558/1/EC/13/4692, also Jogger Uo. 13 13th March 1929.
63. MSS. 558/1/EC/13/4692.
64. MSS. 558/1/CON/22.
65. MSS.558/1/EC/13/4692, 4763. For the Meerut trial see Felling 
op.cit. pp. 42 and 43.
66. MSS. 558/1/EC/13/4746.
67. MSS. 558/1/EC/13/4760 (a).
68. MSS. 558/1/EC/13/4778 (a).
69. MSS. 558/1/EC/13/4807 <d).
70. MSS. 558/1/EC713/4778 (b), 4807, 4820, 4837, (at this point in the 
E. C. minutes there are two minutes with the same number; this 
refers to the second one). This is the Wilson %Ao wrote an 
account of the activities of the 8radford RCA branch during the 
1926 General Strike. (See Chapter 5, "The Association and the 
General Strike" and Jeffrey Skelley ed. The General Strike 1926 
Lawrence and Wishart, London 1976).
71. MSS. 558/1/EC/13/4837.
72. MSS.558/1/EC/8/3236. The National Guilds Council was a socialist
organisation which was active in the years immediately after the 
1914 - 1918 war. It is associated with the economist and 
historian G. D. H. Cole, who was involved with the Labour Research 
Depart ment.
73. This periodical was published between 1924 and 1929. It was not
an open Communist newspaper, but it closed down in 1929, when a
different Communist policy took effect. See Felling op. cit. pp.
40 & 41, and note 46 above.
74. MSS. 558/1/EC/13/4807 (b).
75. MSS. 558/1/EC/14/4881.
76. MSS. 558/1/EC/13/4841.
77. MSS. 558/1/EC/14/4910,
78. MSS. 55/1/CON/31.
79. MSS. 558/1/EC/15/5474, 5504.
80 The Balham Group; How British Trotskyism began,
London, 1974, p. 15.
81. Groves op. cit. gives the full text of the letter from Stewart
Furkis to Harry FolliWlwhich led to his expulsion. See also
Essays in Labour History 1916 ~ 1939 Edited by Asa Briggs and 
John Saville: an article by John Seville 'May Day 1937' p. 270
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81<cont.)note 106, records that Stewart Purkis and Rowland Hill 
(another RCA ex-communist) were both now Trotskyists,
82. MSS. 558/1/EC/15/5517.
83. MSS. 558/1/EC/15/5563.
84. MSS. 55/I/CON/41, MSS. 55/I/CON/44.
85. The Railway Service Journal June 1939.
86. The Association's Journal has been published monthly from 15th
June 1904. From 1904 to 1919 it was known as the Railway Clerk
and from February 1919 to 1951 as The Railway Service Journal.; 
MSS.558/1/EC/20/6987.
87. Cole and Postgate op. cit. p. 56.
88. Rule 39a in 1929, currently Rule 38a.
89. The official view of the Association was rarely set out, this 
editorial celebrates the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
Association and nostalgia was in fashion. A commemorative 
booklet was also published at this time; Twenty-five Years of 
Work and Progress through the R, C. A., London, 1922.
90. MSS. 558/1/EC/16/5863.
91. MSS. 558/1/EC/8/3438.
92. Railway Council, Sectional Railway Councils, and Local 
Departmental Committees London and South Western Railway, London, 
February 1922. Schemes for the Establishment of Local 
Departmental Committees, Sectional Councils, Railway Councils 
Central and National Vages Boards, Railway Clerks Association, 
London, 1922. (Also see Chapter 1)
93. There is a short discussion of the various characteristics of 
organisations in Chapter One of The Theory of Organisations, 
London, 1970, ed. D. Silverman, which comments on the 
'displacement of goals through time', a concept which is also 
discussed in R. Michels, Political Parties, London, 1915;
R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structures, Illinois, 1949; 
and R. K. Merton The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, Chicago, 1955.
94. Commentators on the participation by members of trade unions in 
the affairs of their unions, but who take different viewpoints on 
the matter are; V. L. Allen, Power in Trade Unions, London, 1954.
S. Lipset, M. A, Trow, J. S. Coleman Union Democracy, Glencoe 
Illinois, 1956.
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Notes on Sources
The main sources for the history of the Railway Clerks' Association are 
the Association's archives. The bulk of them is deposited at the Modern 
Records Centre at Warwick University, classified under ' >GS.55' or 
' MSS. 55B'. Some of the archives are retained at Walkden House in 
Central London, the headquarters of the Transport Salaried Staffs' 
Association. The major items still held at Walkden House are a near- 
complete run of annual reports, a set of rule- books and a run
of the Association's journal. From June 1904 (when the first issue 
appeared) until January 1919, it was called the Railway Clerk; from 
February 1919 to April 1951 it was the Railway Service Journal and 
subsequently has been the Transport Salaried Staff Journal*
The run of rule-books at Walkden House starts at 1909 and continues 
to date. The Modern Records Centre at Warwick University has some of the 
earlier rule books. There have been 19 editions between 1909 and 1983 
but new rule books are not issued after every rule change; Walkden House 
has several copies of some editions, with relevant amendments.
The main sources used for this thesis are the reports of the Annual 
Conferences and the minutes of the Executive Committee of the 
Association.
The full records of the proceedings of Delegate Conferences from 
July 1920 until May 1932 - most of the period covered by the thesis - are 
in untranscribed Pitman's shorthand, having been so retained because of a 
decision of the Association's Executive Committee in May 1922, to the 
effect that the full records should be left untranscribed. (At this 
date, the records of conferences from 1920 onwards had not been
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transcribed and a decision was needed on them and on practice for the 
future, see MSS. 55B/1/EC/7/2929). There are printed 'conference 
proceedings' for all years, but these lack the detail of the shorthand 
records.
There is a complete run of the Executive Committee minutes for the 
whole of the period covered by this thesis; it is numbered from 972, the 
first minute of the meeting of 25th and 26th January 1913, to 7395, the 
last minute of the meeting held on the 17th September 1939. There are 
two series of E. C. minutes: an early one from Feb. 1900 to Mar, 1906;
and a later one from Jan. 1913 to the present day.
These minutes are the only records of executive decisions that the 
Association retained. There is no evidence that any more restricted 
records ever existed, and there is material in the minutes which the 
executive was unlikely to want to be published widely. Some of it has 
been used in this thesis, but other data includes details about the pay 
and conditions of individual staff, their mortgage arrangements and such 
matters which the Executive would want to keep confidential. The nature 
of the records was underlined when an Executive Committee member wanted 
copies bf" the minutes to be circulated to all members after committee 
meetings, and the suggestion was defeated. (MSS. 55B/1/EC/Ô/3145)
The Executive Committee minutes are in typescript; the copies 
pasted in minute books held at Warwick are original and are the only 
record. This was brought home vividly to me whilst working in the 
Modern Records Centre, some years ago, v^en an official of the Transport 
Salaried Staffs' Association came in to consult an old Executive 
Committee minute. It recorded a decision that was relevant to a current 
problem about the application of appeals procedures for a particular case 
in which disciplinary sanctions were being invoked by the union; I
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helped him find his information. The minutes are still working papers 
but extra copies are not kept at Walkden House.
The use of the minutes supports the view that they are a valuable 
record of the work of the union, but they have limitations. They record 
only (diat the Executive judged to be relevant; and there was a body of 
shared knowledge amongst the members of the Executive, often unspoken or 
alluded to in ways that would be clear then, but need to be elucidated 
now. But the over-riding consideration is that institutional minutes, 
such as the EC's, could never be a complete and sufficient source of 
knowledge of the matters that were institutionally addressed.
Principal other sources are unpublished papers held at the Public 
Record Office, and published State Papers. Of these, the main classes 
consulted at the Public Record Office have been the railway companies' 
records held under the references RAIL 1-780, and other records formerly 
held by the Railway Record Office, which are also filed under tbe'Raif 
class, i.e. RAIL 1000- 1165. Other records consulted at the Public 
Record Office are the Ministry of Transport records filed under the MT 
reference. They include papers dealing with railway affairs prior to 
1919, when the Board of Trade dealt with them. Cabinet minutes and 
Cabinet papers filed under the CAB reference have also been consulted.
Published State primary sources, mainly Parliamentary Papers and 
reports of parliamentary proceedings^ have also been used. For example: 
in 1908, a Departmental Committee enquired into railway superannuation 
funds.
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APPENDIX I
Numbers of Clerical and Administrative Staff broken down by 
Grade and Pay; also Total Railway Employment and Cost of 
Living Index 192Ô - 1938.
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APPENDIX II
Wage Rate and Cost of Living Indexes 1918 -*1940.
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Weekly Wage Rate Indices
1900 = 100 1956 = 100 1956 = 100
191Ô 207, 6 1923 3b. 9 1933 34. 4
1919 227. 8 1924 37 1934 34. 5
1920 287.8 1925 37. 3 1935 35. 1
1926 37. 1 1936 35. 8
1956 = 100 1927 36. 8 1937 37
1918 38. 7 1928 36. 3 1938 38. 1
1919 42. 4 1929 36. 2 1939 38. 3
1920 53. 6 1930 36 1940 43. 5
1921 53. 0 1931 35,5
1922 38. 8 1932 34. 8
V
Cost of Living Index
July 1914 =: 0
1918 - 1919 1920 1921
J anuary 85-90 120 125 165
February 90 120 130 151
March 90 115 130 141
April 90-95 110 132 133
May 95-100 105 141 128
June 100 105 150 119
July 100-105 105-110 152 119
August 110 115 155 122
September 110 115 161 120
October 115-120 120 164 110
November 120-125 125 176 103
December 120 125 169 99
Cost of Living Index (continued)
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1922 July 84 1923 July 69 1924 July 70
December 80 December 77 December 81
1925 July 73 1926 July 70 1927 July 66
December 77 December 79 December 69
1928 July 65 1929 July
December 68
61
December 67
1930 July 55 
December 55
1931 July 47 1932 July 43
December 48 December 43
1933 July 38 
December 43
1934 July 41 1935 July 43 1936 July 46
December 44 December 47 December 51
1937 July 55 1938 July 59 1939 July 56
December 60 December 56 December 73
1940 July 87
December 95
Sources; Rates of Pay of Railway Staffi Railways Staff 
. Conference, July 1938; PRO/RAIL/421/42-46; 
British Labour Stati^ si^ s Historical Abstract, 
1896-1968, Department of Employment and 
Productivity, 1971.
This was the cost of living Index devised during the first 
World War and continued In use from 1914 until 1947. For 
most of this time It was published by the Ministry of 
Labour. It was used to calculate changes In railway 
workers' wages made vAien the various slldlng-scales were 
used.
- 373 -
APPENDIX III
Numbers of Members, Branches, amount of funds and average 
amount per member: 1918 - 1939.
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Numbers of Members. Branches, Amount of Funds and average 
amount per Member; 1918 - 1939
Rate of Total
Year Members Branches Subscription Funds
Average amount 
of Funds per
Member
1918 71,481 355 6d. per week £ 50,330 £ 14. Id.
1919 84. 337 427 6d. per week £ 45,061* .£ 10. 8d.
1920 87,054 478 6d. per week £ 63,719 £ 14. 8d.
1921 60,264 478 1/- per week £108,031 £ 1. 15. lOd.
1922 51, 137 464 1/- per week £153,143 £ 2. 19. 8d.
1923 57,482 464 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per week
£206,607 £ 3. 11. lOWd.
1924 62,526 467 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per week
£259,106 £ 4. 2. 10%d.
1925 66,130 469 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per week
£310, 129 £ 4, 13. 9d.
1926 54,795 455 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per week
£119,833** £ 2. 3. 9d.
1927 50,208 447 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per week
£139, 049 £ 2. 15. 4%d.
1928 52,227 448 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per week
£172,531 £ 3. 6. Id.
1929 54,347 444 1/-
6d*
9d. & 
per week
£194,326 £ 3. 11. - 6d.
1930 59,473 444 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per week
£231, 358 £ 3. 17. lOd.
1931 59,158 443 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per week
£260,985 £ 4, 8. 3d.
1932 58,964 442 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per' week
£303,145 £ 5. 2. lOd.
1933 57,968 444 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per week
£329, 243 £ 5. 13. 7d.
1934 58,677 435 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per week
£363, 749 £ 6. 4, Od.
1935 60,059 430 1/-
6d,
9d. & 
per week
£388, 382 £ 6. 9. 4d.
1936 60,931 432 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per week
£426, 231 £ 6. 19. lid.
1937 62,365 433 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per, week
£458, 959 £ 7. 7. 2d.
1938 64,106 435 1/-
6d.
9d. & 
per week
£490,814 £ 7. 13. 2d.
1939 64,369 436 1/-
6d.
9d, » 
per week
£534,462 £ 8. 6. Od.
*Heavy cost of Unemployment Pay (See Chapter X> C23,790 in 1919
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**Heavy cost of General Strike (See Chapter X) £236,922 In 1926
13.641 In 1927 
Total 252.763
Sources: MSS. 56B/1/ÊC/16/5Ô63; PR0/F5/12/142.
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APPENDIX IV
Comparative Data on Clerical Workers' Pay in 1910.
377 -
46, 15% of Insurance Clerks
44. 18% of Bank Clerks
43, 18% of Commercial Travellers
and Salesmen
36.84% of Civil Service Clerks
34.78% of Law Clerks
27.77% of Local Government Clerks
23. 19% of Mercantile and General
Clerks
22.22% of Telephone Clerks(other
than Post Office clerks)
10.34% of Railway Clerks and
Of f icers
(All these figures refer to male employees)
In 1910 the British Association were presented with 
these percentages at their annual meeting. They give the 
proportions of non-manual workers in various industries 
whose annual pay exceeded £160.
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APPENDIX V
The Negotiating Machinery Imposed by the 1921 Railway Act
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APPENDIX VI
Elections at which Association Members stood: 1918. - 1936.
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ELECTIONS at which ASSOCIATION MEMBERS STOOD
1918. Voting 14th December 1918. Result declared 
28th December 1918. The 'Coupon Election',
Lloyd George and his wartime cabinet decided to 
prolong the wartime coalition of Conservatives, 
Coalition Liberals, and Coalition Labour in 
power, an election was long overdue, so a general 
election was called as soon as possible after the 
war. Because the supporters of the Government 
belonged to different parties each candidate, tdio 
supported the Government, could have a letter 
confirming this; it became pejoratively known as 
'the coupon', which gave its name to the 
election. The result was: Coalition Unionist
335, Coalition Liberal 133, Coalition 10, (Total 
Coalition 478); Conservative 23, Irish Unionist 
25, Liberal 28, Labour 63, Irish Nationalist 7, 
Sinn Fein 73, Others 10 (Total 707).
Six RCA members stoodj three head office 
employees*
A. G. Walkden Wolverhampton, West
G. Lathan Watford
W. E. Hill Enfield
Three members of the Executive Committee:
A. E. Townend Blackley (Manchester)
H. G. Romeril St. Paneras, South-East
T. H. Gill York
1922, 7th March, by-election at Wolverhampton, West, 
A. G. Walkden failed to be elected.
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1922. 15th November, called by Bonar Law to confirm his 
recently constituted government. This 
Conservative government was formed, when the 
Conservative ' back-benchers' rebelled and decided 
to no longer support Lloyd George's coalition.
The result was: Conservative 345, National
Liberal 62, Liberal 54, Labour 142, Others 12, 
(Total 615), Eight RCA members stood:
A. G. Walkden Wolverhampton, West
G. Lathan Enf ield
H. G. Romeril St. Paneras, South-East
T. H. Gill York
A. E. Townend Blackley (Manchester)
S. Lomax Bolton
W. R. Robins Gloucestershire
(Cirencester and
Anderson
Tewkesbury)
F. Derbyshire (High Peak)
1923. 6th December, called by Baldwin, Bonar Law had 
said he would not decide on a policy of 
protectionism without putting the decision to the 
test of an election; Baldwin wanted to have a 
protectionist policy, he felt bound by Law's 
promise. The result was: Conservative 258,
Liberal 159, Labour 191, Others 7. (Total 615).
It resulted in the formation of the first 
minority Labour government. Eight RCA members 
stood, one was elected:
H. G. Romeril
A. G. Walkden 
G. Lathan 
A. E. Townend 
W. R. Robins
F. Anderson
G. Mathers
F. C. Watkins
St. Paneras, South-East 
(The RCA's first M, P. ) 
Wolverhampton, West 
Sheffield (Park) 
Stockport 
Gloucestershire
(Cirencester and 
Tewkesbury) 
Derbyshire (High Peak) 
Edinburgh, West 
Buckinghamshire 
(Aylesbury)
- 383 -
1923(cont.)The Association also helped to elect a non­
member, W, W. Henderson at Enfield.
1924. 29th October^ this election was forced on Ramsay 
MacDonald, when the Liberals withdrew their 
support and voted with the Conservatives to bring 
down the Government. the result was: 
Conservative 419, Liberal 40, Labour 151, 
Communist 1, Others 4, (Total 615). Seven RCÀ- 
-supported and three 'helped' candidates stood, 
none were elected:
'Supported Candidates'
A. G. Walkden Heywood and Radcliffe
G. Lathan Sheffield (Park)
H. G. Romeril St. Paneras, South-East.
T. H. Gill Blackburn
A. E, Townend Stockport
G. Mathers Edinburgh, West
G. N. Gallie Forfar
'Helped' Candidates
F. C. Watkins Buckinghamshire
(Aylesbury)
F. M. Jacques Berkshire (Newbury)
H. Maw Newcastle, North
1925. On the 17th September, there was a
by-election at Stockport, A. E. Townend was 
elected as the RCA's second M. P.
1928. On the 13th July, there was a by-election at 
Halifax; A. W. Ldngbottom, the RCA's third M. P.
1929. 30th May^ this was the first inter-war election
called for the 'normal' reason: after four years
in office, a prime Ainister^ attempts to choose
a favourable moment for an election, before the 
allotted time runs out. The election resulted 
in the second minority Labour government. The 
result was: Conservative 260, Liberal 59, Labour
288, Others 8, (Total 615). Eight RCA-supported 
and nine 'helped' candidates stood. Seven 
supported and one helped candidates were 
elected.
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«Supported* Candidates
A. G. Walkden Bristol, South Elected
G, Lathan Sheffield(Park)Elected
H, G, Romeril St. Paneras,
(South-East) Elected 
A. E. Townend Stockport Elected
T, H. Gill Blackburn Elected
G, Mathers Edinburgh,West Elected
F, C. Watkins Hackney, Central Elected
G, N. Gallie Forfar
'Helped* Candidates
A, W, Longbottom Halifax Elected
F. M. Jacques Berkshire (Newbury)
J. Adshead Manchester (Rusholme)
A. Moss Manchester (Exchange)
W. Muter Glasgow (Pollock)
W, R. Robins Wiltshire (Chippenham)
J, A. Sparks Somerset (Taunton)
H. H. Vickers Yorkshire (Buckrpse)
Frank Anderson Lancashire (Stretford)
1931, 27th October^ called by the recently formed
'National' government to confirm its authority. 
The government had been formed with the support 
of the Conservatives, most of the Liberals and 
was headed by the p~ime Minister of the previous 
Labour government, it also included a few of his 
Labour colleagues. Not surprisingly, the Labour 
party in parliament was routed. The result was: 
Conservative .473, Liberal National 35, Liberal 
33, National Labour 4, (total government support 
554); Labour 52, Independent Liberal 4,
Others 5, (total 615). Eight RCA-supported and 
seven 'helped' candidates stood, none were 
elected.
'Supported Candidates'
A. G. Walkden Bristol, South
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G. Lathan
H. G, Romeril 
T. H, Gill
A. E, Townend 
G, Mathers 
F. C. Watkins 
A. W. Longbottom
Sheffield (Park)
St. Paneras, South-East
Blackburn
Stockport
Edinburgh, West
Hackney, Central
Halifax
'Helped Candidates'
J. A. Sparks 
W. R. Robins 
J. Adshead 
F. Anderson 
P. F. Pollard
J. Willerby 
F, M, Jacques
Chelmsford
Chippenham
Manchester (Rusholme) 
Lancashire (Stretford) 
Wandsworth (Balham & 
Tooting)
Tamworth 
Wat f ord
1935. 14th November; this can be considered to have
been called for 'normal' reasons, but there had 
also been a change of ^rime Minister. The 
parliament had lasted nearly four years, which 
was nearly 'normal', the change of ^rime (Minister 
was from 'National' to Conservative; Q the 
government was appearing less and less 'National' 
and more and more Conservative, so an election, 
as soon as possible after the change was 
sensible. Result: Conservatives 432, Liberals
20, Labour 154, ILP 4, Communist 1, Others 4, 
(Total 615). Ten RCA-supported and eighteen 
'helped' candidates stood. Six supported 
candidates were elected:
'Supported Candidates'
A, G. Walkden 
G, Lathan
G. Mathers
F, C. Watkins 
3F. Anderson 
F. B. Simpson 
A. E. Townend
H. G. Romeril
Bristol, South Elected
Sheffield (Park) Elected
Linlithgow Elected
Hackney, Central Elected
Whitehaven Elected
Ashton Elected
Carlisle 
Battersea, South
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T. W. Burden East Ham, North
A. W. Longbottom Halifax
•Helped Candidates'
J. Adshead Birmingham (Edgbaston)
R. S. Armst rong Lancashire (Lonsdale)
A. J. Best Yorkshire (Richmond)
H. P. Chilcott Devon (South Molton)
J. Franklin Lincolnshire (Louth)
J. Haworth Liverpool (West Derby)
J. R. Hughes Denbigh
C. W. J ames Hemel Hempstead
H. Jones Anglesey
G. S. Lindgren Hitchen
J, Mclnnes Pollock
S. W. Morgan Wat f ord
P. Morris Swansea, West
A. Moss Altrincham
W. R. Robins Chippenham
F. Smithson Yorkshire W. R. (Barkston
Ash)
J. A. Sparks Buckingham
R. W. Wright Derbyshire (High Peak)
1936, November; at a by-election at Clay Cross 
(Derbyshire), G. Ridley, a RCA-supported 
candidate was elected.
Sources: F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Results 1913-
1949, London, 1969; MSS. 55B/1/EC/3/1729(d), 
1764(b), 1838, 1855, 1858(e), MSS. 55B/l/EC/7/3015, 
MSS. 55B/1/EC/8/3253, MSS. 55B/1/EC/9/3465, 3474, 
MSS.55B/1/EC/13/4746, MSS. 558/1/EC/15/5375;
MSS. 55B/1/EC/18/6330, MSS. 558/1/EC/19/6595(a), 
Railway Service Journal, December, 1931,
C. L. Mowat, Britain between the Wars,
1916-1940, London, 1955, pp. 2-8, 165-168,
187-194, 346-352.
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APPENDIX VII
Discussion of Railwayman on Strike in May 1926.
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Discussion of Data on railway workers on strike in May 1926
The figures presented below were obtained from two volumes 
called: 'Supply and Transport Committee Daily Bulletins'.
These bulletins would have had a very limited circulation, 
because they are marked 'Secret'; they were only released to 
researchers on 1st January 1968. The reference for the 
first volume is PRO/CAB/27/331, this contains the figures for 
the 4th, 5th and 6th May; the reference for the second 
volume is PRO/CAB/27/332, this contains the figures for the 
rest of the Strike. On the first day of the Strike, the 
columns of figures are described as 'staff on strike' and 
' normal staff, On all other days, the two columns are 
described as 'staff available for duty' and ' normal staff. 
There are two possible explanations for this change: the
Supply and Transport Committee wanted to know what staff"were 
available to work, so that they could estimate v^at intensity 
of railway service they could expect and asked for the data 
to be presented in that form, the other explanation is that 
the data came labelled 'staff available for duty' and 'normal 
staff and on the first day the former was subtracted from 
the latter to obtain the data labelled 'staff on strike'.
The bulk of this data needs to manipulated in this manner, if 
a figure for strikers is wanted. The trouble with this is 
that it makes no allowance for people with genuine excuses 
for being absent from work such as holiday or sickness.
Because I have some personal knowledge, which is 
relevant to this problem, I have attempted to allow for 
employer-condoned absence in the data from Wednesday, 5th May 
1926, when the formulation 'available for duty' was first 
used.
When I originally wrote this, part of my job was to 
monitor the absences from vmrk of 100-120 London Transport 
railway workers. During 1982, there was a considerable 
amount of industrial activity on Britain's railways, 
including London Transport's. On London Transport's 
railways there had been very few strikes over the previous 
few years and clerical staff who had to handle this increase
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In activity administratively were issued with instructions on 
how to submit the various periodical returns. I think it 
most likely that these instructions were more liberal than 
those issued to clerks doing a similar job in 1926. In 
1902, the instruction was that only staff who booked on for 
duty, if necessary by telephone, and carried out the 
instructions they were given, would be regarded as 'on duty' 
and be paid for it. Only those whose absence was covered by 
a valid sick certificate were counted as sick, all others 
were considered to be on strike. At any one time, the 
average number of those one hundred and twenty railway 
workers with absences covered by a sick certificate was six.
I consider that the figure would have been lower in May 1926 
- obtaining a doctor's certificate is likely to have been 
more difficult. I have, therefore, used a fraction slightly
less than for 1962 - i.e. 4% to represent the element of sick
absence in the 1926 figures, it would probably also account 
for any holiday absence. Using this percentage a simple 
formula to obtain the probable number of strikers can be 
obtained:
Normal Staff - Staff Available for Work -4 (Normal Staff) =
100
= Probable Number of Staff on Strike
(It is acknowledged, of course, that this formula is
arbitrary and crude).
There are other peculiarities of these figures, which 
should be noted. The machinery for collecting and collating 
them was apparently not perfected until the 7th May, so that, 
prior to that date, the figures for some companies are 
incomplete.
The figure for normal staff for the London and North- 
-Eastern company appears to be rounded to the nearest one 
hundred, but for some days, it is broken down into into 
'England' and 'Scotland' sub-totals not rounded, which 
nevertheless add up to 33,000, the full company total, which
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looks'like a rounded one. There is some doubt, therefore, 
whether the grand total is accurate and fortuitously a 
rounded figure, or whether the sub-totals have been adjusted 
to correspond to a rounded total, although discrepancies are 
unlikely to be material ones. : The 'Normal Staff figure for 
the GWR for the 4th May does not correspond with the same 
figure for that company for any other day.
Response of the Railway Clerical and Supervisory 
during the General Strike
Tuesday 4th May 1926
Probable number of 
Railway company Staff on strike Normal Staff
Great Western 3,434 (22%) 15,288
London and North-Eastern Not yet available
London Midland and Scottish 18,633 (43%) 43,181
Southern Not yet available
Wednesday 5th May 1926
Probable number of 
Railway company Staff on strike Normal Staff
Great Western 3,579 (23.3%) 16,126
London and North-Eastern Not yet available
London Midland and Scottish 17,888 (41.1%) 43,535
Southern 3,397 (32.6%) 10,410
Thursday 6th May 1926
Probable number of 
Railway company Staff on strike Normal Staff
Great Western 3,455 (21.4%) 16,126
London and North-Eastern Incomplete
London Midland and Scottish 18,038 (41.4%) 43,535
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Southern 4,547 (43. 7%) 1,0410
Friday 7th May 1926
Probable number of
Railway company Staff on strike Normal Staff
Great Western 3, 445 (21. 4%) 16,126
London and North-Eastern 14, 731 (44, 6%) 33,000
London Midland and Scottish 17,860 (41. 0%) 43, 535
Sout hern 4, 171 (40. 1%) 10,410
Saturday 8th May 1926
Probable number of
RotlwoY PoiPRmY. Staff on strike Normal Staff
Great Western 3, 442 (21. 3%) 16,126
London and North-Eastern 15,097 (45. 7%) 33,000
London Midland and Scottish 17,700 (40. 7%) 43, 535
Southern 4, 155 (39. 9%) 10,410
There are no figures for Sunday 9th May 1926.
Monday 10th May 1926
Railway company
Probable 
Staff on
number of 
strike Normal Staff
Great Western 3, 504 (21. 7%) 16,126
London and North-Eastern 14,409 (43. 6) 33,000
London Midland and Scottish 17,044 (39. 2%) 43, 535
Southern 4, 006 (38.5) 10,410
Tuesday 11th May 
Railway company
1926
Probable 
Staff on
number of 
strike Normal Staff
Great Western 3, 466 (21.5%) 16,126
London and North-Eastern 13,997 (42.4%)
London Midland and Scottish 16,074 (36.9%)
Southern 3,942 (37. 9%)
33,000 
43,535 
10, 410
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Wednesday 12th May 1926
Railway companv
Probable number of 
Staff on strike Normal Staff
Great Western 3, 423 <21. 2%) 16,126
London and North-Eastern 13, 405 <40. 6%) 33, 000
London Midland and Scottish 15,475 (35. 5%) 43, 535
Southern 3940 (37. 8%) 10,410
Thursday 13th May 1926
Probable number
Railway company of staff on strike Normal staff
Great Western 3, 306 (20. 5%) 16126
London and North-eastern 13, 071 (39. 6%) 33,000
London Midland and Scottish 15,023 (34. 5%) 43, 535
Southern 3, 850 (36. 9%) 10,410
There are no detailed staff statistics in the Supply and 
Transport Bulletins for the 14th May 1926. This was because 
many workers were back at work, the TUC having declared that 
the strike had ended. However, because the railway 
companies had insisted on such stringent conditions before 
they would allow any of their strikers to return, many 
railway workers were still out. In fact, there may even 
have been more clerks and supervisors on strike on that day 
than any other day of the strike. There are strike figures 
available for one railway company - the Great Western* -
* see PRO/RAIL/253/451. There were 3,113 clerks and 1,062 
supervisors absent on the 14th May; this is uncorrected. 
Corrected for sickness etc., there were 3,530 clerical staff 
probably on strike out of a normal staff of 16,126, i.e.
21.9% '
- and according to these there were 173 more clerks and 51
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more supervisors on strike on the 14th May than there were on 
the 13th May. There is no similar increase in the number of 
conciliation (non-white-collar) staff on strike, but most of 
these staff had been on strike, so there was not the same 
scope for an increase.
Comments in the Supply and Transport Bulletins on the Strike 
situation on the railways on the 14th Mav 1926
Great Western
London and North Eastern
London Midland & Scottish
Southern
No large resumption of work.
Not signing on in large numbers
General disinclination to 
resume until all men were 
reinstated.
More men offered themselves 
than the company could find 
work for and a good many were 
told to stand by till work was 
available.
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